Executive Summary Caught In Risk-Off Selling Weak Chinese and European economies are suppressing copper demand and helping to temper prices in a market that remains fundamentally tight. Weaker US GDP growth could put the three largest economies in the world in or close to recession in 2H22/1H23, which would contribute to demand-side weakness in copper markets. The odds manufacturing and base-metals refining will be curtailed in Europe are rising. Although a strike in Norway has been averted by government intervention, maintenance on Russia’s Nord Stream 1 pipeline scheduled to begin next week likely will serve as a pretext for longer and deeper natgas supply cuts to the EU. Bottom Line: Despite fundamental tightness in global copper markets, prices are being restrained by fears weaker Chinese and European economic performance will lead to a global recession. Early reads of US GDP pointing to negative growth in 2Q22 stoke these fears. Heightened economic policy uncertainty globally exacerbates them. We remain fundamentally bullish copper and will re-establish our long SPDR S&P Metals & Mining ETF (XME) – down ~ 40% from its highs in April – at tonight’s close. In addition, we went long the XOP oil and gas ETF at Tuesday’s close, after prompt Brent breached the buy-trigger we set last week of $105/bbl during this week’s crude-oil sell-off. Feature Lower GDP growth expectations in China and the EU – along with a wobbly US economy being flagged by an Atlanta Fed GDPNow forecast pointing to negative growth in 2Q22 – are stoking fears of a global manufacturing and industrial recession. This prompted a rout in industrial commodities – base metals and oil – this week, which still has markets on edge. This slow-down in the world’s three largest economies – accounting for almost 50% of global GDP expressed in purchasing-power terms – is the only thing keeping the level of global copper demand close to supply at present (Chart 1).1 At least for the time being, this is keeping the threat of sharply higher copper prices, which would be more in line with the low levels of supplies and inventories globally, at bay (Chart 2). As of the week ended May 27th, global copper stocks stood at just above 562k tons, which is ~ 31% lower y/y. Chart 1World’s Biggest Economies Slowing Chart 2Copper Prices Disconnect From Fundamentals Uncertainty Weakens Copper Prices Energy and metals markets remain extremely tight on a fundamental supply-demand basis.2 The sharp sell-off this week in oil and metals prices is, in our view, evidence industrial-commodity prices have decoupled from fundamentals. This makes traders – hedgers and speculators – extremely risk-averse, which reduces liquidity and increases volatility. On the back of these concerns, markets exhibit the sort of volatility associated with economic collapse, despite still-strong underlying fundamentals. Chart 3Rising Global Policy Uncertainty Volatility is on the rise due to increasing economic uncertainty in these markets. This makes it extremely difficult to assign probabilities to different price outcomes (i.e., true uncertainty). The BBD Global Economic Policy Uncertainty is approaching levels seen during the early pandemic (Chart 3). We put this rising uncertainty down to poor policy and communication from central banks and governments; a pig’s breakfast of energy policy globally that increasingly adds nothing but confusion to markets; and a muddled public-health policy in China, which produces random shut-downs in global supply chains as covid infections randomly crop up in important port cities. Lastly, the East and West are moving toward a new Cold War, which already is having profound effects on all markets, trade flows and capital availability in the short- and medium-term. This keeps markets on edge and forces them to parse every geopolitical development that hits the tape.3 Re-forging supply chains, re-building basic industrial infrastructure as the West moves away from outsourcing to China and other EM states will be costly and volatile, especially as embargoes and sanctions increase between these blocs. This political and economic evolution will require increased investment in base metals production and exploration, along with similar commitments to oil and gas. Low and volatile prices will not support this, as they disincentivize investment, and set markets up for continued shortage and scarcity going forward. In the metals markets, years of underinvestment by major mining companies will keep copper supplies and inventories tight going forward (Chart 4). This will hinder and delay the global renewable-energy transition, which cannot be realized without higher base-metals supplies. Chart 4Structural Underinvestment In Mining Fundamentally Bullish Copper Recession Fears Haunt Metals Globally … The proximate causes of the persistent weakening of copper prices is the demand destruction arising from the lockdown in China, and an increasing concern over the economic prospects of the EU as it prepares for a possible shut-off of Russian natgas exports. Should Russian supplies be cut off, the EU will be pushed into recession as natural-gas rationing – and the attendant prioritization of human needs going into winter – will constrict economic activity, particularly in manufacturing. This leaves two of the three largest economies in the world either in recession or not growing at all. Added to this is the fear of a wobbly US economy, which has been slowed by higher energy prices and the Fed’s hawkish tightening of monetary policy. The Atlanta Fed’s GDPNow forecast for 2Q22 estimates a 2.1% contraction in US GDP. This would be the second consecutive quarter of negative growth and would meet a widely held rule-of-thumb indicator or recession.4 In our modelling, we estimate the income elasticity of copper demand in DM economies like the EU and US (1.39) and EM-ex-China (0.87) states is higher than that of China (0.37). This means that a 1% contraction in p.a. Chinese real GDP would translate to a 0.37% p.a. fall in copper demand, all else equal. A contraction of real incomes – i.e., real GDP – in the EU and EM-ex-China will cause a larger relative adjustment in copper demand than in China, even though the level of copper demand in China is far greater in absolute terms (Chart 5). A recession in the EU will reduce import demand for China’s manufactured output in these markets (Chart 6). As China’s trade volumes fall, Chinese manufacturing PMIs will contract. Similarly, exports to China from the EU will weaken as manufacturing weakens and real GDP moves lower. We believe this will put more pressure on the Chinese government to provide fiscal and monetary stimulus to counter such a downdraft. Chart 5Copper Demand Sensitive to Real GDP (Income) Chart 6Trade Channel Effects Follow GDP Weakness … But China Worries Dominate The Chinese economy is showing signs of further slowing.5 Weakness in credit levels, infrastructure investment, manufacturing, the property sector, and exports all indicate the covid-policy lockdowns, high commodity prices, and parsimonious credit and fiscal policies have produced a dramatic slowing in economic activity. In our modelling, we find evidence that each of these components exhibits a long-run inverse relationship with Chinese copper inventories, which in turn exhibits a long-run inverse relationship with COMEX copper prices. Roughly 10 days after the initial Shanghai lockdown, copper prices went into contango (Chart 7). This occurred despite continuous declines in Chinese copper inventories during the lockdown months (Chart 8). Such anomalous behavior – i.e., as inventories fall markets become more backwardated – makes it difficult to connect prices and supply-demand-inventory fundamentals. Chart 7Copper In Contango For Most Of China’s Lockdown Chart 8Chinese Copper Inventories Continue To Draw In Lockdown BCA’s China Investment Strategy expects a muted 2H22 recovery for the Chinese economy. Rolling lockdowns due to China’s COVID policy will reduce the potency of fiscal and monetary stimulus. The stop-start nature of economic activity will stymie growth in disposable income and job creation, which in turn will translate to weaker aggregate demand. The knock-on effect of weaker business activity due to the lockdown earlier this year has been a higher propensity to save by households (Chart 9). Household surveys conducted by the PBoC show that, since 2017, household savings have been increasing, suggesting a precautionary sentiment (Chart 10). Chart 9Chinese Economic Slowdown Reduced Credit Demand Chart 10Rising Precautionary Savings... Chart 11...Will Impact Domestic Property Market We do not expect the property market to recover in a manner similar to what occurred following China’s re-opening after the first wave of the COVID-19 pandemic. Depressed household purchasing power will keep housing demand subdued, while the “three red lines” policy, which limits the amount property developers can borrow, will keep supply low (Chart 11).6 Housing accounts for ~ 30% of copper consumption in China, which means weak property markets will remain a drag on copper demand. Investment Implications Continued weakness in China’s economy and a potentially deep recession in the EU will continue to restrain demand for copper globally. In addition, with the US economy looking wobbly, the third global pillar of economic strength also will be weakening going into 2H22. These fundamental demand-side effects will lower pressure on tight copper inventories and keep prices subdued, in our view. This does not, however, signal an all-clear for copper supply or inventory tightness. Weaker demand is the only thing keeping prices from rising sharply, given the tight supply and inventory position of global copper markets. On the supply side, governance issues in copper-rich Latin American states, which are in the process of revising their social contracts with copper producers and consumers, will increase mining costs for companies, disincentivizing long-term and large-scale investments in new mines.7 These costs ultimately will be borne by consumers as supply shortages mount and the need to increase capex grows. Ultimately, this will feed into longer-term inflation and inflation expectations. Chart 12Caught In Risk-Off Selling We remain long-term bullish copper, as fundamentals remain tight and will get tighter. That said, over the short term, aggregate-demand weakness in the three major economic pillars in the world makes us leery of getting long copper futures, particularly as prompt COMEX prices test support (Chart 12). Persistently weak copper prices will disincentivize the needed investment in new supply the world will need to effect a transition to renewable energy in coming decades. For this reason, we are comfortable re-establishing our long XME metals and mining ETF at tonight’s close, as copper prices are down 40% from their April highs. Robert P. Ryan Chief Commodity & Energy Strategist rryan@bcaresearch.com Ashwin Shyam Research Analyst Commodity & Energy Strategy ashwin.shyam@bcaresearch.com Paula Struk Research Associate Commodity & Energy Strategy paula.struk@bcaresearch.com Commodity Round-Up Energy: Bullish. A strike by Norwegian energy-sector workers that would have hit the natural gas market in Europe particularly hard was averted earlier this week.8 This still leaves the EU and UK (Europe) at risk of additional losses of Russian natgas exports beginning next week when Nord Stream 1 (NS1) maintenance is due to start. These threats have pushed Dutch Title Transfer Facility (TTF) natural gas prices up close to 93% since 1 June, and close to 400% y/y as of Tuesday. For the first five months of this year, Europe’s been importing just under 15 Bcf/d of LNG, with ~ 8.5 Bcf/d of those volumes coming from the US, based on EIA data. The EIA expects US LNG exports to average ~ 11.9 Bcf/d this year and 12 Bcf/d in 2023. Europe accounted for just under 75% of US exports in January – April of this year, and we expect that to continue going forward. The IEA expects Russia to supply 25% of EU demand this year, the lowest in 20 years. Last year, Russian imports covered ~ 40% (~ 7 TCF) of EU demand. Base Metals: Zinc stocks are depleted but prices are dropping on recession fears (Chart 13). Smelting operations were hit last year following the power-supply crunches in China and Europe. While China has recovered its energy security, Europe, which accounts for ~15% of global refined zinc supply, has not. Reduced natgas supply from Russia will make the smelting shortage in Europe even more acute, especially if power and fuel rationing occur. In April, China was a net exporter of zinc for the first time since 2014, as low demand in the state and low European zinc supply incentivized Chinese smelters to ship metal to the West despite high outbound tariffs. Precious Metals: Markets switched from inflation to growth fears, as central banks, notably the Fed began hiking interest rates aggressively to curb inflation. Investors have been flocking to the USD, which hit a 20-year high on recession fears this week (Chart 14). This has happened at the expense of the yellow metal, which, since breaking through the USD 1800/oz mark last week, has continued to drop, hitting an 8-month low as of yesterday's close. Chart 13Global Copper Inventories Remain Tight Chart 14 Footnotes 1 Please see China, US and EU are the largest economies in the world, which was published by Eurostat 19 May 2020. 2 For additional discussion of oil-market fundamentals, please see Recession Unlikely To Batter Oil Prices, which covers our expectation for global oil balances and prices. It was published 16 June 2022. 3 Please see Hypo-Globalization (A GeoRisk Update) published by BCA Research’s Geopolitical Strategy 30 July 2021. See also Commodities' Watershed Moment, which we published 22 March 2022. 4 Please see GDPNow, published by the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta 1 July 2022. 5 Please see Third Quarter Geopolitical Outlook: Thunder And Lightning, published by BCA’s Geopolitical Strategy 24 June 2022. This report notes, “China’s political crackdown, struggle with Covid-19, waning exports, and deflating property market have led to an abrupt slowdown this year. The government is responding by easing monetary, fiscal, and regulatory policy, though so far with limited effect … . Economic policy will not be decisive in the third quarter unless a crash forces the administration to stimulate aggressively.” 6 In August 2020, the Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development and the People’s Bank of China proposed to implement a policy which kept a ceiling on companies’ asset to liability ratio at 70%, net debt to equity ratio at 100%, and cash to short-term borrowings ratio at 1. Developers whose liabilities are within these requirements may increase their liabilities by less than 15%. These were known as the “three red lines.” Per that policy, if one or more of these ceilings are surpassed, maximum liabilities growth is capped at a lower percentage. 7 Please see Add Local Politics To Copper Supply Risks, which we published 25 November 2021. It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. See also Chile sticks to plan for new mining profit tax up to 32% linked to copper price, published by reuters.com via mining.com 1 July 2022. 8 Please see Norway’s government halts oil and gas strike published by ft.com 5 July 2022. Investment Views and Themes Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Trades Closed In 2022