Economic Growth
There will be no U.S. Bond Strategy report next week. Our regular publication schedule will resume on September 10th, with our Portfolio Allocation Summary for September. Highlights Fed: Absent inflationary pressures or excessive financial asset valuations, the Fed must maintain an accommodative policy stance. This means cutting rates if the market demands it. Expect another 25 basis point rate cut in September. Duration: Stronger economic data will eventually lead long-dated bond yields higher, un-inverting the yield curve and allowing the Fed to stop its mini easing cycle. Investors should keep portfolio duration close to benchmark, but stand ready to reduce duration at the first signs of stronger global economic data. Yield Curve & Recessions: An inverted yield curve signals that the market views monetary policy as restrictive. Restrictive policy should be viewed as a necessary pre-condition for recession, but not one that helps much with timing the next downturn. Feature Chart 1Markets Want More Easing And The Fed Should Accommodate Bond investors had their hands full last week, as comments from Fed officials produced an unusually wide range of views. The hawks were most vocal early in the week as Boston Fed President Eric Rosengren, Kansas City Fed President Esther George and Philadelphia Fed President Patrick Harker all made the case for leaving rates at current levels, even as the market continues to price-in another 25 basis point rate cut in September, followed by an additional 50 basis points of cuts between October and February (Chart 1). Fed Chairman Jerome Powell, however, did not try to shift market expectations one way or the other during his Jackson Hole speech on Friday. This suggests that he is probably comfortable with current bond market pricing. In our opinion, we will see another 25 basis point rate cut in September and the Fed is justified in doing so. The Fed Can’t Fight The Markets, And It Shouldn’t Chart 2Keep Financial Conditions Supportive In the current environment, monetary policy exerts its greatest influence on the economy via its impact on broad financial conditions. Easier financial conditions lead to stronger growth and higher inflation in the future (Chart 2), and the Fed must ensure that financial conditions remain accommodative during the current global slowdown. This means that the Fed’s most important job is to ensure that investors perceive Fed policy as supportive for equities and corporate credit. In other words, unless Chairman Powell wants to slow the economy, he must bow down to the markets and deliver enough monetary easing to keep broad financial conditions accommodative. The minutes from the July FOMC meeting, released last week, suggest that the Fed understands this dynamic and will act as appropriate. In their discussion of financial market developments, participants observed that financial conditions remained supportive of economic growth, with borrowing rates low and stock prices near all-time highs. Participants observed that current financial conditions appeared to be premised importantly on expectations that the Federal Reserve would ease policy to help offset the drag on economic growth stemming from the weaker global outlook and uncertainties associated with international trade as well as to provide some insurance to address various downside risks. Chart 3No Sign Of Rising Inflation Expectations... Simply, if the market expects another rate cut in September, the Fed would be wise to deliver. Otherwise, broad financial conditions could tighten sharply, making it more difficult for economic growth to recover. It is not always the case that the Fed should act to ensure that financial conditions remain accommodative. If inflation expectations were breaking out to the upside, or financial asset valuations were stretched, then the case could be made for the Fed to fight back against the market’s easing expectations.1 However, neither of those conditions are in place today. The cost of inflation compensation priced into long-maturity TIPS has collapsed, and it is well below the 2.3% - 2.5% range that would be consistent with well-anchored inflation expectations near the Fed’s target (Chart 3). Survey measures of long-dated inflation expectations have been more stable, but are not threatening to move significantly higher (Chart 3, bottom panel). Equally, financial asset valuations are nowhere near “bubbly” (Chart 4). The risk premium priced into corporate bonds after accounting for expected default losses is above levels seen early last year, while the S&P 500’s 12-month forward Price/Earnings ratio is below its early-2018 peak. If inflation expectations were breaking out to the upside, or financial asset valuations were stretched, then the case could be made for the Fed to fight back against the market’s easing expectations. Further, the 2-year/10-year Treasury slope recently inverted and the broad trade-weighted dollar continues to appreciate (Chart 5). Both of these factors suggest that the market views Fed policy as insufficiently accommodative. St. Louis Fed President James Bullard bluntly summed up the situation in an interview last week, saying that it is “our job to get the yield curve to be un-inverted”. Chart 4...Or Excessive Financial ##br##Asset Valuation Chart 5The Case For More Accommodative Monetary Policy We agree with this sentiment. Absent inflationary pressures or excessive financial asset valuations, the Fed must maintain an accommodative policy stance. This means cutting rates if the market demands it, in an effort to un-invert the yield curve. The Economy Must Lead Chart 6Still Waiting For A Rebound In Global Growth But the Fed can’t un-invert the yield curve all on its own. The Fed can pull down the short-end of the curve, but it needs to economy to cooperate if it wants to boost long-end yields. In fact, if the global economic data improve, then the market will no longer require Fed rate cuts to keep financial conditions accommodative. If the economic data improve a lot, then the market might even be able to live with rate hikes and still maintain supportive broad financial conditions. We haven’t yet seen much evidence of improvement in the global economic data, but we remain confident that a rebound will take hold before the end of the year.2 Flash PMI data for August were released last week and showed a drop in the U.S. figure to below the 50 boom/bust line (Chart 6). The Flash data showed small gains in the Eurozone and Japan, though both of those PMIs also remain below 50. In contrast with the weaker PMI data, Leading Economic Indicators (LEI) are showing some signs of strength. Although both the U.S. and Global (excluding U.S.) LEIs remain at below-average levels relative to their trailing 12-month trends (Chart 7), the Global (ex. U.S.) index bottomed several months ago and the U.S. index ticked higher last month. Troughs in the LEIs tend to precede troughs in both the Global PMIs and bond yields. Chart 7Leading Economic Indicators Suggest The Rebound Might Be Soon Bottom Line: The Fed must keep financial conditions accommodative, and this means satisfying the bond market’s expectations for further rate cuts. Eventually, stronger economic data will lead long-dated bond yields higher, un-inverting the yield curve and allowing the Fed to stop its mini easing cycle. Investors should keep portfolio duration close to benchmark, but stand ready to reduce duration at the first signs of stronger global economic data. The Inverted Yield Curve And Recession Risk We have received a lot of client questions on the topic of using the yield curve to forecast recessions. In this week’s report we explain our views about how the inverted yield curve should be interpreted. In short, we think an inverted yield curve should be viewed as a necessary pre-condition for recession, but not one that helps much with timing the next downturn. The Flash PMI data showed small gains in the Eurozone and Japan, though both of those PMIs also remain below 50. We start by recognizing that many variables have strong track records at forecasting recession, and those variables can be grouped into two broad categories: Financial market indicators (including the yield curve, stock market, oil price, etc…) Economic indicators (including initial jobless claims, unemployment rate, housing starts, etc…) In general, financial market indicators give more advance warning of recession but they are also prone to sending false signals. Economic indicators, on the other hand, are less prone to false signals, but often provide little (if any) advance notice. With this in mind, we turn to Chart 8. The top panel of which shows the New York Fed’s popular Recession Probability Indicator, an indicator derived purely from the 3-month/10-year Treasury slope. We also calculate the same model using the 2-year/10-year slope, but the results are not materially different. Chart 8Recession Probability Indicators The top panel of Chart 8 shows the strengths and weaknesses of using financial market data to forecast a recession. The New York Fed’s model started to rise about 3 years prior to the last recession and 5 years prior to the 2001 recession. The model also fluctuated up and down several times in the late 1990s, suggesting that recession risk was lower in 1998 than in 1996 even though the recession was actually 2 years closer. In general, the model clearly illustrates that the yield curve flattens as the economic recovery ages, but also that the yield curve can provide a recession signal far in advance of the actual recession. The model’s signal can also reverse if the yield curve re-steepens. The bottom panel of Chart 8 shows the New York Fed’s yield curve-based Recession Probability Indicator alongside our own recession indicator, one that is based on several different variables (including the yield curve). Our model is designed to give less lead time than a pure yield curve model, but also fewer false signals. Once again, the late-1990s are instructive. The yield curve-only model was sending a recession signal of varying magnitudes for 5 years before our multi-factor model shot higher in 2001. What can we conclude from looking at these different recession models? Essentially, we should view an inverted yield curve as a signal that the market views monetary policy as restrictive. Restrictive monetary policy is a necessary pre-condition for recession, but it does not help us much with timing. Policy could remain restrictive for several years before the recession takes hold, or policy could move from restrictive to accommodative and the yield curve’s recession signal could vanish. Incorporating The Term Premium, Is This Time Different? Some publications at BCA have made the case that the yield curve’s recession signal is distorted in this cycle because of the deeply negative term premium. While this could be true in theory, in practice, we think it would be unwise to dismiss what the yield curve is telling us about the current stance of monetary policy. Chart 9Uncertainty Around The Term Premium Bond yields consist of two components, short rate expectations and a term premium. The yield curve’s power as a recession indicator comes from the rate expectations component. Assuming a constant term premium, an inverted yield curve means that the bond market expects the overnight rate to fall in the future. This is more likely to happen in a recession. However, if the term premium were deeply negative at the long-end of the yield curve, then an inverted yield curve might simply reflect the negative term premium and not an expectation that the fed funds rate will decline. In theory, this could be the case if, for example, the equity hedging value of Treasury bonds is perceived to be much higher now than in the past. In that case, investors might be willing to pay to take duration risk in order to gain the perceived diversification benefits. That is a plausible story. The problem is that we cannot verify it in the data because bond term premia cannot be accurately estimated. For example, one popular term premium estimate, the New York Fed’s Adrian, Crump and Moench (ACM) estimate, placed the 10-year zero coupon term premium at -84 bps on July 22. On that same date, the spot 10-year Treasury yield was 2.06%. This implies that the market’s 10-year average fed funds rate expectation was (206 bps – (-84 bps)) = 2.9%. In other words, the ACM estimate tells us that on July 22 the market expected the fed funds rate to average 2.9% over the next 10 years. This seems highly implausible, given that the New York Fed’s Survey of Market Participants, taken that same day, shows that the median market participant expected the fed funds rate to average 2% over the next 10 years (Chart 9). According to that median survey response, the 10-year term premium was +6 bps on July 22, not -84 bps! The point is not that survey measures of term premia are preferable to more sophisticated models of the ACM variety. We simply wish to point out that term premia estimates are highly uncertain, and the actual term premium on any given day is impossible to pin down. Once we recognize this fact, then we should at least be skeptical of claims that a negative term premium is distorting the recession signal from the yield curve. Given the uncertainty surrounding term premium estimates, we are inclined to simply take the yield curve’s signal at face value. Bottom Line: The proper interpretation of an inverted yield curve is that it is a signal that the market views monetary policy as restrictive. Restrictive monetary policy is a necessary pre-condition for recession, but it does not help us much with timing. It is conceivable that a deeply negative term premium is currently distorting the yield curve’s signal about the stance of monetary policy. But given the uncertainty surrounding term premium estimates, we are inclined to simply take the yield curve’s signal at face value. Ryan Swift, U.S. Bond Strategist rswift@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 We have made the case that inflation expectations and financial conditions are the two most important factors to monitor when tracking Fed policy. For further details please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “The New Battleground For Monetary Policy”, dated March 26, 2019, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 2 We elaborated on the reasons to expect a rebound in global growth in the U.S. Bond Strategy / Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, “Where’s The Positive Carry In Bond Markets?” dated August 20, 2019, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification
Highlights Portfolio Strategy The sustained global growth slowdown, widening junk spreads, along with the risk of a U.S. recession becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy suggest that caution is still warranted in the broad equity market on a 3-12 month time horizon. Weakening consumer sentiment, softening hotel industry operating metrics that point to a margin squeeze, anemic relative outlays on lodging and a decelerating ISM non-manufacturing index, all signal that more pain lies ahead for the S&P hotels, resorts & cruise lines index. Waning industry operating metrics, a bearish signal from our EPS growth model along with the mighty U.S. dollar warns against bottom fishing in the S&P electrical components & equipment (EC&E) index. Recent Changes There are no changes to the portfolio this week. Table 1 Feature The S&P 500 traded in an uncharacteristically tight range last week before falling apart on Friday on the back of a re-escalation in the U.S./China trade war. Worries of recession also resurfaced. Not only did the MARKIT flash manufacturing PMI break below the 50 expansion/contraction line, but it also pulled down the MARKIT flash services PMI survey that barely held above the boom/bust line. Adding insult to injury, the 10/2 yield curve slope inverted anew last week further fanning these recession fears. Worrisomely, consumer sentiment took a hit recently according to the University of Michigan survey (top panel, Chart 1). Importantly, what caught our attention was the following commentary: “The main takeaway for consumers from the first cut in interest rates in a decade was to increase apprehensions about a possible recession. Consumers concluded, following the Fed’s lead, that they may need to reduce spending in anticipation of a potential recession.” While the consumer is the last and most significant pillar standing for the U.S. economy, reflexivity may spoil the party and a recession may become a self-fulfilling prophecy. This is the message the bond market is sending and it is warning that the path of least resistance is a lot lower for stocks (bottom panel, Chart 1). Chart 1“The First Cut Is The Deepest” Economists are also downgrading their U.S. real GDP growth estimates and that forecast now stands at 2.3% for the current year according to Bloomberg. While the recession alarm bells are not sounding off, these downward revisions bode ill for stocks (Chart 2) Chart 2Watch Out Down Below Moving to another part of the fixed income market, stress is slowly building in the high yield market especially given the recent tick up in bankruptcies and the blind sides that cove-lite loans now pose to bond investors. As a reminder, the U.S. high yield option adjusted spread (OAS) troughed last September and continues to emit a distress signal for the broad equity market (junk OAS shown inverted, top panel, Chart 3). Chart 3Mind The Gaps With regard to global growth, it is still missing in action, and given that Dr. Copper is on the verge of a breakdown, a global growth recovery is a Q1/2020 story at the earliest. This week we update a consumer discretionary subindex and also highlight an industrials sector subgroup. Chart 4SPX: The Next Shoe To Drop? Chart 5Risk To View Other financial market variables concur that global growth is elusive. J.P. Morgan’s EM FX index has broken down and EM equities are also hanging from a thread. The EM high yield OAS has broken out signaling that the risk off phase has yet to fully run its course (EM junk OAS shown inverted, bottom panel, Chart 4). Finally, there is a short-term risk to our cautious equity market view. Indiscriminate buying in U.S. Treasurys has now pushed the 10-year yield down almost 180bps from last November’s peak deeply in overvalued territory. While such a move is not unprecedented, buying may be exhausted and in need of at least a short-term breather (Chart 5). Netting it all out, the sustained global growth slowdown, widening junk spreads, along with the risk of a U.S. recession becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy suggest that caution is still warranted in the broad equity market on a 3-12 month time horizon. As a reminder, this is U.S. Equity Strategy’s view, which contrasts BCA’s sanguine equity market house view. This week we update a consumer discretionary subindex and also highlight an industrials sector subgroup. Empty Spaces When the consumer is worried about a possible recession as the latest survey revealed, the knee jerk reaction is to tighten the purse strings and marginally retrench. The latest University of Michigan consumer sentiment survey made for grim reading and such souring in confidence will continue to weigh on lodging equities (Chart 6). As a result, we remain underweight the niche S&P hotels, resorts & cruise lines consumer discretionary subgroup. When the consumer is worried about a possible recession as the latest survey revealed, the knee jerk reaction is to tighten the purse strings and marginally retrench. Chart 6Stay Checked Out Of Hotels Already discretionary retail sales have taken the back seat and non-discretionary retail sales are in the driver’s seat. In fact, the top panel of Chart 7 shows that the relative retail sales backdrop has plunged to levels last seen during the GFC, warning that relative share prices have ample room to fall. Drilling deeper in the consumption data is instructive. Lodging outlays are decelerating and are also trailing overall PCE. The implication is that relative profits will likely underwhelm sustaining the 18-month long de-rating phase (middle & bottom panels, Chart 7). On the operating front the news is equally dour. While selling prices are expanding, the relentless construction binge will lead to a mean reversion sooner rather than later (bottom panel, Chart 8). Chart 7De-rating Phase To Gain Steam Chart 8Margin Squeeze Looming Tack on the ongoing assault from the new sharing economy unicorns like Airbnb, and industry pricing power will remain in check in coming quarters. Similarly, the ISM non-manufacturing price subcomponent is warning that a deflation scare is looming in the lodging industry (second panel, Chart 8). Not only are selling prices under attack, but also labor-related input costs are on fire. The sector’s wage inflation is climbing at a 3.9%/annum pace or roughly 120bps higher that the overall employment cost index (third panel, Chart 8). Taken together, there are high odds that a profit margin squeeze will weigh on profits and on relative share prices (top panel, Chart 8). Importantly, the overall ISM services survey best encapsulates the bearish backdrop of the S&P hotels, resorts & cruise lines index. Historically, relative share prices have been moving in tandem with the ISM non-manufacturing survey and the current message is that selling pressures on relative share prices will persist in the coming months (Chart 9). Chart 9Heed The Message From The ISM Services Survey In sum, weakening consumer sentiment, softening hotel industry operating metrics that point to a margin squeeze, anemic relative outlays on lodging and a decelerating ISM non-manufacturing index signal that more pain lies ahead for the S&P hotels, resorts & cruise lines index. Bottom Line: Continue to avoid the S&P hotels, resorts & cruise lines index. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5HOTL – MAR, HLT, RCL, CCL, NCLH. Short Circuited The S&P EC&E index broke down recently (top panel, Chart 10) and we reiterate our underweight recommendation in this industrials sector subgroup. While it is tempting to bottom fish here especially given oversold technical and bombed out valuations (bottom panel, Chart 11), a number of the indicators we track suggest that more losses are around the corner. Chart 10Sell The Weakness Chart 11Good Reasons For Valuation Discount First the trade-weighted dollar has broken out to fresh cyclical highs despite the collapse in the 10-year yield. Historically, relative share prices and the greenback are tightly inversely correlated and the current weak global growth message the U.S. dollar is emitting is bearish for the S&P EC&E index (U.S. dollar shown inverted, middle panel, Chart 10). This global growth soft patch is not only negative for new orders owing to deficient foreign demand, but the appreciating currency also makes EC&E exports less competitive in the global market place (U.S. dollar shown inverted, bottom panel, Chart 10). Second, while industry new orders have been resilient, the massive inventory buildup dwarfs new order growth and warns that a deflationary liquidation phase is looming (middle panel, Chart 11). In fact, the recent drubbing in the ISM manufacturing prices paid subcomponent portends a deflationary industry phase (third panel, Chart 12). Adding it all up, waning industry operating metrics, a bearish signal from our EPS growth model along with the mighty U.S. dollar warns against bottom fishing in the S&P EC&E index. Other operating metrics are also warning that EC&E profits will underwhelm. Industry weekly hours worked have plunged and sell-side analysts have been aggressively cutting EPS estimates (bottom panel, Chart 13). On the productivity front, executives have not adjusted labor cost structures to lower running rates yet (second panel, Chart 13) and, thus, our EC&E productivity gauge (industrials production versus employment) is contracting which bodes ill for industry earnings (third panel, Chart 13). Chart 12Weak Profit Backdrop Chart 13Deteriorating Operating Metrics Finally, our S&P EC&E EPS growth model does an excellent job in encapsulating all these moving parts and is signaling that the path of least resistance is lower for EPS growth in the coming months (bottom panel, Chart 12). Adding it all up, waning industry operating metrics, a bearish signal from our EPS growth model along with the mighty U.S. dollar warns against bottom fishing in the S&P EC&E index. Bottom Line: Stay underweight the S&P EC&E index. BLBG: S5ELCO – AME, EMR, ETN, ROK. Anastasios Avgeriou, U.S. Equity Strategist anastasios@bcaresearch.com Current Recommendations Current Trades Size And Style Views Favor value over growth Favor large over small caps
Highlights Sovereign bond yields have cratered over the last few months, … : Over the last three months, 10-year yields in the U.S., France, Germany, Switzerland and Australia have fallen by 71, 64, 53, 54, and 67 basis points, respectively. … and the Treasury curve has experienced a significant bull flattening, … : Month-to-date total returns for the Barclays Bloomberg Long, Intermediate and 1-3-Year Treasury Indexes are 9.2%, 1.6% and 1.1%, respectively. … indicating that the bond market thinks more rate cuts are in store: The textbook interpretation of an inverted curve is that monetary policy is too tight and needs to be loosened, but technical factors have amplified the flattening pressure. Is the bond market reacting to weakening growth prospects, or uber-dovish central banks?: The answer has implications well beyond the fixed-income universe. It could mean the difference between an economic slowdown and a market melt-up. Feature BCA researchers convened last week for our monthly View Meeting, much of which was given over to the global decline in sovereign bond yields. Does their plunge owe more to weakening growth prospects or central banks’ synchronized dovish pivot? There have surely been elements of both; after all, central banks wouldn’t be so dovish if they weren’t concerned about the growth outlook. It is clear to our fixed-income strategists that the yield move has overshot the data, however, and they mainly attribute the overshoot to monetary policy. No central bank wants a stronger currency while confronting a demand deficiency aggravated by trade tensions and a global manufacturing slowdown. The New York Times Business section put the prevailing policy winds into living color in a nearly full-page, four-column graphic spotlighting the 32 central banks that have cut their policy rate so far this year.1 The pell-mell rush to cut rates is emblematic of a global scramble for competitiveness. No central bank wants its economy to be caught without a buffer while other economies are busily reinforcing theirs. The Message From The Bond Market Trade tensions are a legitimate threat to global economic growth already challenged by a downswing in the global manufacturing cycle. A recession is a possibility, but it is hardly a foregone conclusion. We agree with our fixed-income colleagues that the yield selloff has overrun the economic fundamentals. Last week’s preliminary European manufacturing PMIs suggested that manufacturing may finally be stabilizing, and there is still no evidence that the manufacturing downturn has infected the services sector (Chart 1). A recession is hardly a foregone conclusion. 10-year Treasury yields have been falling sharply since their 3.25% peak in early November, and the current leg down is the third in a series of sharp declines (Chart 2, top panel). Global sovereign yields have followed the same pattern (Chart 2, bottom panel), but the latest plunge is as much a reflection of ubiquitous easing biases as it is of new concerns about economic weakness. That may sound like a minor point, of interest only to macro specialists, but it has import for all investors. If the yield decline isn’t signaling new softness, then easier financial conditions will be free to act as a tailwind for risk assets. Chart 1Services Are Holding Up ... Chart 2A Brief Inversion ... But Yields Are Freefalling Neither investment-grade (Chart 3, top panel) nor high-yield corporate bond spreads evince any particular concern about the economy (Chart 3, bottom panel). Although they’ve ticked up, they remain near the bottom of their post-crisis range, and are nowhere near the levels they reached in 2011-12, during the federal budget showdown/U.S. downgrade and the flare-up of the Eurozone crisis, or in 2015-16, during the last manufacturing recession. With banks still easing lending standards for corporate and industrial borrowers (Chart 4), spreads won’t undergo a systematic widening. Borrowers do not default as long as there is a lender willing to roll over their maturing obligations, so tighter credit standards are a precondition for spread-widening cycles. Chart 3No Sign Of Stress Among Corporate Borrowers ... Chart 4... And Banks Aren't Applying Any Pressure The Message From The Housing Market Chart 5Lower Rates Have Yet To Impact Housing ... We have been disappointed by residential investment’s muted response to the significant year-to-date decline in mortgage rates (Chart 5, bottom panel). The trajectory of starts and permits (Chart 5, top panel) hasn’t changed, new and existing home sales haven’t perked up (Chart 5, second panel), and mortgage purchase applications (Chart 5, third panel) appear not to have heard the news that rates are much lower. We thought that the swift fall in mortgage rates would promote more residential investment than it has to date. There is a difference, however, between disappointing growth and a full-on contraction. With affordability remaining high relative to history (Chart 6), and apartment rents exceeding monthly mortgage payments in several locales (Chart 7), housing demand should remain well supported. There are no excesses in the housing market in terms of inventory or oncoming supply that would make housing a source of economic or financial instability. Inventory relative to the number of households is bumping around its all-time lows (Chart 8), and cumulative household formations have easily outstripped housing starts since the crisis broke (Chart 9). Structural factors like a lack of supply geared to first-time and first-move-up buyers, and the ravenous appetite of pools of capital purchasing single-family homes for rent, are squeezing out some would-be buyers, but housing is not about to induce a recession. There are plenty of things for investors to be concerned about, but the housing market isn’t one of them. Chart 6... Though They Have Placed Homeownership In Easier Reach Chart 8... Inventories Are At Record Lows, ... The View From Broad And Wall We concede that stocks are not behaving as if all is well. Big daily swings are not a feature of healthy markets, and eight of this month’s sixteen sessions have registered moves of at least 1%. The second quarter’s 3% year-over-year earnings growth is three percentage points better than the consensus expected when earnings season kicked off, however, and despite the single-day moves, the S&P 500 has spent all but the first day of the month in a well-defined range between 2,825 and 2,945 (Chart 10). The market may be jumpy from one day to the next, but investors have not been concerned enough to engage in sustained selling. The equity market’s verdict on housing is more optimistic than ours. Inspired by earnings reports, the S&P 1500 Homebuilders Index have broken out to a new 52-week high (Chart 11). Retailers were the stars of last week’s earnings releases, with Lowe’s, Nordstrom and Target posting double-digit percentage gains after reporting numbers that failed to live up to investors’ worst fears. Equities are validating the view that the U.S. consumer is alive and kicking. Chart 11Homebuilder Stocks Have Broken Out The GDP Outlook Chart 12Capex Intentions: Elevated But Slipping If consumers are well positioned, the U.S. economy should be, too. Consumption accounts for two-thirds of the U.S. economy, with investment and government spending equally dividing the other third. Federal expenditures amount to about 40% of government spending, and between this year’s fiscal thrust and next year’s hotly contested presidential election, D.C. can be counted upon to do its part for the economy. At the state and local level, healthy household income should support state sales and income tax receipts, while still-rising home prices will provide the property taxes to keep municipal coffers full. That leaves fixed asset investment as the economy’s Achilles heel. We are confident, as noted above, that residential investment will not decline enough to pose a problem for the economy, but corporate investment is in the crosshairs of the uncertainty surrounding the multiple trade squabbles. The NFIB survey and the regional Fed surveys indicate that capital expenditure plans are rolling over, even if they remain at a fairly high level (Chart 12). Our base case remains that investment will not fall enough to offset robust consumption and trend-level government spending, but a marked worsening in trade tensions could erode business confidence enough to drag the economy below stall speed. Busted Thesis In our mutual-fund days, we followed one rule without exception. If our thesis for owning a stock was disproved, we got rid of the stock without a backward glance. We no longer manage money, but our clients do, and we try to set a good example, especially in the inevitable instances when things go wrong. We are closing out our agency mREIT recommendation on the ground that we got the rates call underpinning it very wrong. Things went wrong with our agency mortgage REIT recommendation right from the get-go. In retrospect, we should have waited until the FOMC meeting dust settled before putting on a curve-dependent position. We are closing it out now, though, because we recommended the group in anticipation of a steeper yield curve. Given that we think it will take some time for investors to become convinced that a recession is not imminent, and given that mechanical factors may push yields even lower, we do not expect sustained curve steepening for several months. Although we only held it for four weeks, the recommendation left a mark. Through Thursday’s close, our defined subset of agency mREITs lost 11%, while the S&P 500 is down 3.1% and the Barclays High Yield Index is flat. We’re taking our medicine and moving on, but we will take another look at the group when the curve eventually does begin to steepen. Investment Implications Even if recession fears are overblown, as we and a majority of our colleagues believe, it will likely take some time for investors to overcome their concerns. That leads us to believe that equities may be unable to make new highs in the near term, and that Treasury yields have more downside risk than upside risk in the next few months, as rising convexity2 compels investors following asset-liability management strategies to seek out long-maturity bonds. The yield point may sound complex and esoteric, but our Global Fixed Income Strategy team increasingly believes it’s a key to understanding the negative-yield phenomenon and is researching the issue for an upcoming Special Report. Monetary accommodation is not a silver bullet. If the economy has already flipped from expansion to contraction, modest rate cuts parceled out at a deliberate pace will be insufficient to turn things around, and equities and spread product will suffer. If the expansion remains intact, however, rate cuts will help shore up the economy at the margin and quite possibly fuel a new phase of the bull markets in risk assets. Our money is on the latter, and we expect that this bull cycle has one more burst in it that will allow it to sprint to the finish line like the majority of its predecessors. Doug Peta, CFA Chief U.S. Investment Strategist dougp@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Smialek, Jeanna and Russell, Karl, “Rates Are Falling Again. That May Be Dangerous.” New York Times, August 17, 2019, p. B1. 2 Duration measures a bond’s sensitivity to changes in interest rates. Convexity measures duration’s sensitivity to changes in interest rates, which increases as rates fall. Investors like life insurers and pension funds, who match the duration of their investment portfolios with the duration of their liabilities, are forced to increase the duration of their bond holdings at an increasing rate as interest rates fall.
Highlights Economic data suggest the current business cycle in China has not yet reached a bottom. Stimulus measures have not been forceful enough to fully offset a slowing domestic economy and weakening global demand. With possibly more U.S. tariffs to come, intensifying political unrest in Hong Kong and a currency set to depreciate further, the potential downside risks outweigh any potential upside over the near term. Investors who are already positioned in favor of Chinese equities should stay long. We are still early in a credit expansionary cycle, and we expect further economic weakness to pave the way for more policy support in China. However, we recommend investors who are not yet invested in Chinese assets to remain on the sidelines until clearer signs of materially stronger stimulus emerge. Feature Chart 1A Breakdown In Chinese Stocks Financial market volatility surged in the first half of the month following U.S. President Donald Trump’s recent tweet, vowing to impose a 10% tariff on the remaining $300 billion of U.S. imports of Chinese goods by September 1st. By the end of last week, prices of China investable stocks relative to global equities had nearly wiped out all their 2019 year-to-date gains. (Chart 1) The extent of the decline has left some investors wondering whether the time has come to bottom-fish Chinese assets. In our view, the answer is no. In this week’s report we detail five reasons why the near-term outlook for China-related assets remains negative. We remain bullish on Chinese stocks over the cyclical (i.e. 6-12 month) horizon and recommend investors who are already positioned in favor of China-related assets stay long. However, we also recommend investors who are not yet invested to remain on the sidelines until surer signs of materially stronger stimulus emerge. As we go to press, the U.S. Trade Representative Office announced that the Trump administration would delay imposing the 10% tariff on a series of consumer goods imported from China — including laptops and cell phones — until December.1 Stocks in the U.S. surged on the news. Today’s rally in the equity market highlights our view, that short-term market performance can be dominated and distorted by news on the trade front. However, market rallies based on headline news will not sustain without the support of economic fundamentals. Reason #1: Chinese Economic Growth Has Not Yet Bottomed In a previous China Investment Strategy report,2 we presented some simple arithmetic to help investors formulate their outlook on the Chinese economy. We argued that in a full-tariff scenario, investors should focus on the likely outcome of one of the two following possibilities: Scenario 1 (Bullish): Effects of Stimulus – Impact of Tariff Shock > 0 Scenario 2 (Bearish): Effects of Stimulus – Impact of Tariff Shock ≤ 0 In scenario 1, the impact of China’s reflationary efforts more than offsets the negative shock to aggregate demand from the sharp decline in exports to the U.S. Scenario 2 denotes an outcome where China’s reflationary response is not larger than the magnitude of the shock. For now, we remain in scenario 2 due to Chinese policymakers’ continual reluctance to allow the economy to re-leverage. The magnitude of the credit impulse so far has been “half measured” relative to previous cycles.3 More than seven months into the current credit expansionary cycle, Chinese economic data have not yet exhibited a clear bottom. As a result, more than seven months into the current credit expansionary cycle, Chinese economic data have not yet exhibited a clear bottom, with the main pillars supporting China’s “old economy” still in the doldrums (Chart 2 and Chart 3). Chart 2No Clear Bottom, Yet Chart 3Key Economic Drivers Struggling To Trend Higher In addition to a weakening domestic economy, China’s external sector has been weighed down by U.S. import tariffs as well as slowing global demand. (Chart 4). The possibility of adding a 10% tariff by year end on the remaining $300 billion of Chinese goods exports to the U.S. may trigger another tariff “front-running” episode in the 3rd quarter. However, Chart 5 and Chart 6 highlight that any front-running would be against the backdrop of sluggish global demand. Therefore, not only the upside in Chinese export growth will be very limited in the subsequent months following the front-running, but export growth is also likely to fall deeper into contraction. Chart 4Domestic Demand More Concerning Than Exports Chart 5Pickup In Global Demand Not Yet Visible Chart 6Bottoming In Global Manufacturing Also Delayed Reason # 2: A-Shares Are Not Yet Signaling A Sizeable Policy Response In previous China Investment Strategy reports, we have written at length about how Chinese policymakers are reluctant to undo their financial deleveraging efforts and push for more stimulus. After incorporating July credit data, our credit impulse, at a very subdued 26% of nominal GDP, was in fact a pullback from June’s credit growth number (Chart 7). This confirms our view that the current stimulus is clearly falling short compared to the 2015-2016 credit expansionary cycle. It underscores Chinese policymakers’ commitment to keep their foot off the stimulus pedal. What’s more, the recent performance of China’s domestic financial markets has been consistent with a half-measured credit response, and is not yet signaling a meaningful change in China’s policy stance. The A-share market since last summer has been trading off of the likely policy response to the trade war. Chart 8Market Not Signaling Significant Policy Shift Chart 8 (top panel) shows that the A-share market has closely tracked China’s domestic credit growth over the past year. Given this, we believe that the A-share market is reacting more to the likely policy response to the trade war, in contrast to the investable market which rises and falls in near-lockstep with trade-related news (middle panel). The fact that A-share stocks have been trending sideways underscores that China’s domestic equity market continues to expect “half measured” stimulus. This week’s sharp decline in China’s 10-year government bond yield is in part related to escalating political unrest in Hong Kong (bottom panel), and in our view does not yet signal any major change in the PBOC’s stance. Finally, our corporate earnings recession probability model provides another perspective on the equity market implications of the current path of stimulus. If the current size of stimulus holds through the end of 2019, our model suggests that the probability of an outright contraction in corporate earnings lasting through year end remains quite elevated, at close to 50% (first X in Chart 9). The July Politburo statement signaled a greater willingness to stimulate the economy; as a result, we are penciling in a slightly more optimistic scenario on forthcoming credit growth through the remainder of the year, by adding 300 billion yuan of debt-to-bond swaps4 and 800 billion yuan of extra infrastructure spending5 to our baseline estimate for the rest of 2019. However, this would only add a credit impulse equivalent of 1 percentage point of nominal GDP and would only marginally reduce the probability of an earnings recession to 40% (second X in Chart 9). A 40% chance of an earnings recession is well above “normal” levels that would be consistent with a durable uptrend in stock prices, and in previous cycles, Chinese stock prices picked up only after business cycles and corporate earnings had bottomed (Chart 10). In sum, the current pace of credit growth, signals from the domestic equity market, and our earnings recession model all suggest that it is too early to bottom fish Chinese stocks. Chart 9A "Measured" Pickup in Stimulus Will Not Be A Game Changer Chart 10Too Early To Bottom Fish Reason #3: The Trade War Is Far From Over Our Geopolitical Strategy team maintains that the U.S. and China have only a 40% chance of concluding a trade agreement by November 2020, and that any trade truce is likely to be shallow.6 We agree with this assessment, which has clear negative near-term implications for Chinese investable stocks, even if temporary rallies such as what took place yesterday periodically occur. Since the onset of the trade war, Chinese investable stocks appear to have traded nearly entirely in reaction to trade-related events. Hence, until global investors are given proof that much stronger stimulus can and will offset the impact of the trade war on corporate earnings, Chinese stocks are likely to continue to underperform their global peers. Reason #4: The Hong Kong Crisis Is A Near-Term Risk Another near-term catalyst for financial market turbulence in China is the worsening situation in Hong Kong. For now, we hold the view that a full-blown crisis (i.e. China intervening with military force) can be avoided, but we are not ruling out the possibility of a severe escalation or its potential impact on market sentiment towards Chinese assets. On the surface, China investable stocks (the MSCI China Index, the predominantly investable index that now includes some mainland A-shares) are not directly linked to businesses in Hong Kong: Out of the top 10 constituents of the MSCI China Index, which account for roughly 50% of the index’s market capitalization, seven are headquartered in mainland China and do not appear to have significant revenue exposure to Hong Kong. By contrast, at least 30% of Hang Seng Index-listed companies have business operations in Hong Kong. The remaining three companies in the top 10 MSCI China Index are Tencent (the largest component of the index, with a weight of approximately 15%), Ping An Insurance (4% weight), and China Mobile (3% weight) – all of which registered large losses in the past week. Both Tencent and Ping An Insurance are headquartered in Shenzhen, a southeastern China metropolis that links Hong Kong to mainland China. China Mobile appears to have the most revenue exposure to Hong Kong of any top constituent through its CMHK subsidiary, which is the largest telecommunications provider in Hong Kong. It is true that there has been little evidence so far that Chinese investable stocks have been more impacted by the escalation in political unrest in Hong Kong than by the escalation in the trade war. Indeed, the fact that the two escalations were overlapping this past week makes it difficult to isolate their effects. But if unrest in Hong Kong spirals out of control, it could result in mainland China intervening. According to an analysis done by BCA’s Geopolitical Strategy team,6 the deployment of mainland troops would likely lead to casualties and could trigger sanctions from western countries. The 1989 Tiananmen Square incident shows that such an event could lead to a non-negligible hit to domestic demand and foreign exports under sanctions. Should this to occur, the near-term idiosyncratic risk to Chinese stocks in both onshore and offshore markets will be significant. Reason #5: Further RMB Depreciation May Weigh On Stock Prices Whether due to manipulation or market forces, last week’s depreciation in the Chinese currency (RMB) was economically justified and long overdue. Chart 11RMB Depreciation Long Overdue Chart 11 shows the close relationship between the U.S.-China one-year swap rate differential and the USD/CNY exchange rate. The true source of the correlation shown in the chart remains somewhat of a mystery, given that Chinese capital controls, particularly following the 2015 devaluation episode, prevent the arbitrage activities that link rate differentials and exchange rates in economies with fully open capital accounts. However, Chart 11 clearly shows that China’s currency would have already weakened by now if it was fully market-driven, and we do not believe that the People’s Bank of China will be inclined to tighten monetary policy in order to reverse the recent devaluation. Hence, the path of least resistance for the CNY is further depreciation. If the threatened 10% tariff on all remaining U.S. imports from China is imposed this year, our back-of-the-envelope calculation based on Chart 12 suggests that a market-driven “equilibrium” USD/CNY exchange rate should be at around 7.6. We have high conviction, based on previous RMB devaluation episodes, that China’s central bank will not allow its currency to depreciate in a manner that invites speculation of meaningful further weakness – meaning we are not likely to see a straight-lined or rapid depreciation down to the 7.6 mark. Chart 12Market Driven 'Equilibrium' Provides Some Guidance On The Exchange Rate A “managed” currency depreciation is in and of itself stimulative for the Chinese economy. At the same time, aggressive market intervention via the PBoC burning through its foreign exchange reserves is also unlikely: A “managed” currency depreciation is in and of itself stimulative for the economy. It improves Chinese export goods’ price competitiveness and helps mitigate some of the pain caused by increased tariffs. Therefore it is in the PBoC’s every interest to allow such depreciation. However, no matter how “orderly” RMB depreciation may be, the fact that the PBoC has signaled it is no longer defending a “line in the sand” exchange-rate mark is likely to trigger another round of “race to the bottom” currency devaluation from other regional, export-dependent economies.7 A weaker RMB and emerging market currencies will also contribute to USD strength. A strong dollar has been negatively correlated with global risky assets, implying that for a time, a weaker RMB will be a risk-off event for risky assets and thus presumably for Chinese and EM equity relative performance. Investment Implications Our analysis above highlights that the near-term outlook for Chinese stocks is fraught with risk, and it is for this reason that we recommended an underweight tactical position in Chinese stocks for the remainder of the year in our July 24 Weekly Report.8 However, by next summer (the tail-end of our cyclical investment horizon), it is our judgement that one of two things will have likely occurred: The trade war with the U.S. will have abated or been called off, and investors will have determined that a “half-strength” credit cycle is likely enough to stabilize Chinese domestic demand and the earnings outlook. In this scenario, Chinese stocks are likely to rise US$ terms over the coming year, relative to global stocks. The trade war with the U.S. will have continued, and Chinese policymakers will have acted on the need to stimulate aggressively further in order to stabilize domestic demand. In combination with an ultimately stimulative (although near-term negative) decline in the RMB, the relative performance of Chinese stocks versus the global benchmark will likely be higher in hedged currency terms. Because of the near-term risks to the outlook, we agree that investors who are not yet invested should remain on the sidelines until surer signs of materially stronger stimulus emerge. But investors who are already positioned in favor of Chinese equities should stay long, and should bet on the latter scenario: rising relative Chinese equity performance in local currency terms, alongside a falling CNY-USD / appreciating USD-CNY exchange rate. Jing Sima China Strategist JingS@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 “US to delay some tariffs on Chinese goods”, Financial Times, August 13, 2019. 2 Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, “Simple Arithmetic”, dated May 15, 2019, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Reports, “Threading A Stimulus Needle (Part 1): A Reluctant PBoC”, dated July 10, 2019, and “Threading A Stimulus Needle (Part 2): Will Proactive Fiscal Policy Lose Steam?”, dated July 24, 2019, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 4 The remaining of 14 trillion debt-to-bond swap program rounds up to 315 billion yuan. 5 The relaxed financing requirement for infrastructure projects can add 800 billion yuan. 6 Please see Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, “The Rattling Of Sabers”, dated August 9, 2019, available at gps.bcaresearch. 7 Please see Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report, “The RMB: Depreciation Time?”, dated May 23, 2019, available at ems.bcaresearch.com. 8 Please see China Investment Strategy Weekly Report, Threading A Stimulus Needle (Part 2): Will Proactive Fiscal Policy Lose Steam?”, dated July 24, 2019, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations
Highlights Duration: Hawkish trade policy will continue to weigh on bond yields for at least the next few months, but a rebound in global economic growth should take hold before the end of the year. Ultimately, a growth rebound will lead to higher bond yields on a 12-month horizon, but the timing is difficult and investors should keep portfolio duration close to benchmark for the time being. High-Yield: The Fed’s accommodative policy stance and the likelihood of a global growth recovery argue for maintaining an overweight allocation to corporate credit. Within that allocation, junk bonds should outperform investment grade due to much more attractive valuations. 10-Year Treasury Yield: The current shock to global economic growth is of a similar magnitude to the one that occurred in 2015/16. However, wage and inflationary pressures are higher now than they were back then. This means that the 10-year Treasury yield will not re-visit the 2016 trough of 1.37%, and is probably already close to its floor. Feature Regular readers will be aware of our Fed Policy Loop framework for analyzing the wiggles in financial markets. The Loop works as follows: Step 1: A dovish shift in Fed policy leads to a favorable market reaction, easing financial conditions. Step 2: Easier financial conditions suggest to the Fed that economic growth will strengthen in the future. The Fed can therefore respond by adopting a more hawkish policy stance. Step 3: The Fed’s hawkish policy shift leads to a negative market reaction, tightening financial conditions. Step 4: Tighter financial conditions suggest to the Fed that economic growth will weaken in the future. The Fed is forced to ease monetary policy at the margin. Return to Step 1 But it appears that BCA readers aren’t the only ones aware of the Fed Policy Loop. President Trump has also been exploiting the two-way relationship between Fed policy and financial conditions as he escalates his trade war with China. Chart 1 illustrates how this has been working. Step 1 of the Fed policy loop continues to function exactly as described above. However, the last few times that financial conditions have eased, the President has seized the opportunity to ratchet up trade tensions. Much like the Fed, the President reasons that periods of easier financial conditions are when the economy and financial markets can best handle a negative shock. The fall-out is that financial conditions tighten in response to the hawkish trade announcement, and the Fed is forced to respond to tighter financial conditions by turning even more dovish. The end result is that the part of the Fed Policy Loop labeled “Hawkish Fed” is by-passed. Without that step it is impossible for bond yields to rise (Chart 2). Chart 2The Back-Drop Of The Interrupted Fed Policy Loop Our Geopolitical Strategy service provided a comprehensive breakdown of U.S./China trade negotiations in last week’s report.1 The overall message is that the 2020 election is the President’s main constraint. He views hawkish trade policy as a winning issue, but only insofar as it can be accomplished without a significant decline in the stock market or economic activity. Faced with that constraint, the President will continue to interrupt the Fed Policy Loop, and the Fed will continue to do its job by adopting a more dovish monetary policy to offset possible trade shocks. At present, this means that another rate cut is likely in September. Against the back-drop of the “interrupted” Fed Policy Loop, Treasury yields can only move higher if global economic growth strengthens. In that case, the policy loop will remain operative, but at an overall higher level of yields. With that in mind, while hawkish trade policy will continue to weigh on bond yields for at least the next few months, a rebound in global economic growth should take hold before the end of the year. This will lead to higher bond yields on a 12-month horizon. Still Tracking The 2015/16 Roadmap In our research, we have repeatedly pointed out the similarities between the 2015/16 episode of flagging global growth and the current period. Specifically, we continue to witness weak manufacturing data – both in the U.S. and abroad – but a resilient service sector and strong labor market. Much like in 2015/16, we expect that the shifts toward easier monetary policy in the U.S. and more accommodative credit conditions in China will eventually put a floor under the global manufacturing cycle. The Fed will continue to do its job by adopting a more dovish monetary policy to offset possible trade shocks. At present, this means that another rate cut is likely in September. Case in point, even as President Trump has tightened global financial conditions at the margin through his hawkish trade policy, overall global financial conditions have eased since the beginning of the year (Chart 3). In 2016, easier financial conditions eventually led to upturns in crucial measures of global growth such as the Goldman Sachs Current Activity Indicator (Chart 3, top panel), the Global Manufacturing PMI (Chart 3, panel 2), and the CRB Raw Industrials index (Chart 3, bottom panel). The same dynamic should play out this time around. It’s likely that the main reason why global growth has not responded as quickly as it did in 2016 is that Chinese policy easing has not been as rapid (Chart 4). Our China Investment Strategy service’s Li Keqiang Leading Indicator – a composite measure of money and credit indicators designed to lead Chinese economic activity – has clearly bottomed, but has not yet surged as it did in 2015/16. However, Chinese policy easing continues to ramp up, a process that will continue in the months ahead. The most recent indication of this trend was China’s decision to de-value its currency versus the U.S. dollar, causing the exchange rate to jump above the important psychological threshold of 7 yuan per dollar (Chart 4, bottom panel). China took similar measures to de-value its currency in August 2015, a move that initially roiled markets but eventually helped usher in a rebound in global growth. Chart 3The 2015/2016 Scenario Has Yet To Play Out... Chart 4...As Long As China Does Not Stimulate More When it comes to strategy, we remain confident that global growth is close to a trough, but admit that timing the rebound is difficult. One indicator that should help with timing is the ratio between the CRB Raw Industrials index and Gold (Chart 5). This ratio is tightly correlated with the 10-year Treasury yield, and will only rise when the perceived improvement in global growth – proxied by the CRB index – starts to outpace the perceived dovish tilt to Fed policy – proxied by the rising gold price. Chart 5Keep Tracking The CRB / Gold Ratio In light of these difficulties with timing, we recommend that investors keep portfolio duration close to benchmark, but position for a rebound in global growth by maintaining an overweight allocation to credit risk and by running a heavily barbelled Treasury portfolio, overweighting the long and short ends of the curve while avoiding the 5-year and 7-year maturities. The barbell strategy increases average portfolio yield, and also avoids the part of the yield curve that will suffer the most when yields rise. Take Credit Risk In Junk As mentioned above, we recommend that investors maintain an overweight allocation to corporate credit versus Treasuries, despite our recent shift to benchmark duration.2 This is particularly true for high-yield bonds, where spreads are very attractive. Charts 6A and 6B show one of our favorite ways of looking at corporate bond spreads. The charts show the 12-month breakeven spread for each credit tier as a percentile rank relative to history.3 We show each credit tier individually to control for the time-varying average credit rating of the overall indexes. Similarly, we show breakeven spreads instead of the average option-adjusted spreads to control for the time-varying average duration of the bond indexes. Chart 6A shows the following valuation for investment grade credit tiers: Throughout history, Aaa credits have been more expensive than they are today only 13% of the time. Aa credits have been more expensive than they are today 19% of the time. A-rated credits have been more expensive 20% of the time. Baa credits have been more expensive 33% of the time. Chart 6B shows that the corresponding valuation for high-yield is much more compelling: Ba credits have been more expensive than today 55% of the time. B credits have been more expensive 81% of the time. Caa credits have been more expensive 84% of the time. Chart 6AInvestment Grade Breakeven Spreads Chart 6BHigh-Yield Breakeven Spreads In general, this way of looking at spreads shows that investment grade credits are quite expensive, while high-yield credits are either fairly valued or cheap. However, there is one more adjustment we can make to get an even better picture of corporate bond value. Adjusting For The Phase Of The Cycle A useful tool for cyclical portfolio allocation is to split the cycle into three phases based on the slope of the yield curve (Chart 7). We define the three phases as: Chart 7The Three Phases Of The Cycle Phase 1: From the end of the last recession until the 3/10 Treasury slope flattens to below 50 bps. Phase 2: When the 3/10 slope is between 0 bps and +50 bps. Phase 3: From when the 3/10 slope inverts until the start of the next recession. We have previously discussed the implications of the different phases for bond portfolio allocation in more depth.4 This week, we simply want to point out that credit spreads tend to be tighter during Phase 2 of the cycle, when monetary policy has tightened, but not by enough to cause a surge in corporate defaults. The recent surge in investment grade net debt-to-EBITDA likely reflects the shift toward a greater concentration of Baa-rated issuers. With this cyclical decomposition in mind, we can calculate the median breakeven spread for each credit tier in past Phase 2 periods and use that as a spread target for this cycle. We then convert our breakeven spread targets into average option-adjusted spread targets using current index duration. Charts 8A and 8B show how far each credit tier’s spreads are from target. The message is quite clear. Outside of Aaa, investment grade credits are more or less fairly valued, while high-yield credits appear very cheap. Chart 8AInvestment Grade Spread Targets Chart 8BHigh-Yield Spread Targets One might reasonably challenge this approach to corporate bond valuation by noting that, outside of looking at credit tiers individually, we have not taken fundamental credit quality trends into account. That is, we have made no adjustment for the fact that the credit quality of a Ba-rated issuer might be worse today than in prior cycles. We are skeptical that fundamental credit metrics matter more than the phase of the monetary policy cycle when it comes to corporate bond spread forecasting.5 However, this point of view is still worth exploring, especially considering that net debt-to-EBITDA for the median corporate bond issuer is quite elevated compared to history (Chart 9). Note that we have not attempted to maintain consistent weightings between the different credit tiers in the bottom-up samples shown in Chart 9. This means that the recent surge in investment grade net debt-to-EBITDA likely reflects the shift toward a greater concentration of Baa-rated issuers. Nonetheless, the net debt-to-EBITDA ratio of the median junk issuer is clearly worse than during the past two recoveries. But even if we take this into account by looking at the ratio between the junk index 12-month breakeven spread and the median net debt-to-EBITDA, we see that the ratio is still close to its historical median (Chart 10). In other words, at current spread levels junk investors appear reasonably compensated for the elevated median net debt-to-EBITDA ratio Chart 9Elevated Corporate Leverage Chart 10Favor Junk Bonds Bottom Line: The Fed’s accommodative policy stance and the likelihood of a global growth recovery argue for maintaining an overweight allocation to corporate credit. Within that allocation, junk bonds should outperform investment grade due to much more attractive valuations. Close To The Floor Chart 11Now Vs. Mid-2016 In a prior report we walked through the process of creating a macroeconomic fair value model for the 10-year Treasury yield, with a focus on describing the different independent variables that might be included in such a model, and the rationale for each one.6 This week, we focus on two vital macroeconomic variables and use them to demonstrate why the 10-year Treasury yield is unlikely to re-visit its mid-2016 trough of 1.37%. The two main variables we focus on are (i) the pace of economic growth, and (ii) the size of the output gap. All else equal, a stronger pace of economic growth leads to expectations for a higher policy rate in the future and a higher 10-year Treasury yield today. However, it is not just the pace of growth that matters. The same rate of economic growth generates more inflationary pressure when the output gap is small than when it is large. This means that bond yields should be higher when the output gap is smaller (or more specifically, less negative). We have found that the Global Manufacturing PMI is probably the indicator of economic growth that correlates best with the 10-year Treasury yield. Similarly, measures of wage growth – and to a lesser extent core inflation – tend to give the best read on the output gap. With that in mind, we can see how these factors look today relative to when the 10-year yield troughed at 1.37% in mid-2016 (Chart 11). Global economic growth looks slightly worse, but not dramatically so. The Global Manufacturing PMI is at 49.3 today. It troughed at 49.9 in 2016. If this were the only variable that mattered, we might reason that the 10-year yield should be below 1.37% already. But we also need to consider that wage growth and inflation are both much higher than in 2016. Average hourly earnings are growing at a year-over-year rate of 3.2%, compared to a rate of 2.8% when the 10-year troughed in 2016. Similarly, the Atlanta Fed’s measure of median wage growth is up to 3.7% for the un-weighted sample and 3.9% for the sample that is weighted to more closely match the demographic characteristics of the overall population (Chart 11, panel 3). It’s true that core PCE inflation is running below where it was in mid-2016, but the trimmed mean measure is much higher (Chart 11, bottom panel). The core PCE inflation measure also has a strong track record of converging toward the trimmed mean, a process we expect is playing out again. The core PCE inflation measure also has a strong track record of converging toward the trimmed mean, a process we expect is playing out again. Bottom Line: The current shock to global economic growth is of a similar magnitude to the one that occurred in 2015/16. However, wage and inflationary pressures are higher now than they were back then. This means that the 10-year Treasury yield will not re-visit the 2016 trough of 1.37%, and is probably already close to its floor. Ryan Swift, U.S. Bond Strategist rswift@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, “The Rattling Of Sabers”, dated August 9, 2019, available at gps.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Portfolio Allocation Summary, “Underinsured”, dated August 6, 2019, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 3 The 12-month breakeven spread is the basis point widening required on a 12-month horizon for each credit tier to break even with a duration-matched position in Treasuries. 4 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Special Report, “2019 Key Views: Implications For U.S. Fixed Income”, dated December 11, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 5 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy / Global Fixed Income Strategy Special Report, “The Risk From U.S. Corporate Debt: Theory And Evidence”, dated April 23, 2019, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 6 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “Bond Kitchen”, dated April 9, 2019, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification
Highlights Negative Interest Rates: Time will tell if negative bond yields are indeed the “new normal”. We need to see negative yields maintained outside of a growth slowdown to prove that thesis. USTs & Bunds: U.S. Treasuries and German Bunds both look overbought, amid extreme price/yield momentum and aggressively long duration positioning. Yet given the persistent headline risk from the U.S.-China trade dispute, and without signs of improving growth in China or Europe, it is too early to position for a reversal of the stretched yield moves. Maintain a neutral overall stance on global duration exposure.1 Feature Positive Headlines On Negative Yields? Investors should always be cautious of “new era” explanations to justify an elevated asset price after a massive rally. That is akin to internet stocks in the late 1990s that were valued on “clicks and eyeballs” in the absence of actual profits. Or the “peak oil” thesis, predicting an impending exhaustion of global petroleum supplies, that was trotted out during past periods when oil prices were already above $100/bbl. The latest such argument can be found in government bonds, where fundamental justifications for the growing inventory of negative yielding bonds being “the new normal” have started to proliferate. The arguments underlying the “Negative Normal Thesis” (which we will coin “NNT”, not to be confused with the MMT of Modern Monetary Theory!) are hardly new. Aging demographics, “savings gluts” and a dwindling supply of global safe assets have been widely cited as causes for low bond yields since early in the 21st century (remember former Fed Chair Alan Greenspan’s famous “bond conundrum”?). Proponents of NNT point to Japan as the textbook example of how rates can stay low forever when savings are high and demand for capital is low. They are now declaring the “Japanification” of Europe … with the U.S. next in line to eventually join the negative rate party. If the argument that negative interest rates are now normal were to hold, however, we would need to see bond yields continue to stay at negative (or at least extremely low) levels even after global economic growth has stabilized. Chart of the WeekIs This Really A “New Era” For Bond Yields? If the argument that negative interest rates are now normal were to hold, however, we would need to see bond yields continue to stay at negative (or at least extremely low) levels even after global economic growth has stabilized. For if negative yields are, in fact, structurally driven by excess savings and not just cyclically driven by weak nominal growth, then improving economic momentum should have little impact on the level of interest rates. That would be a true “Japanification” scenario. For now, as far as we can tell from the data, the big decline in bond yields over the past year can be fully explained by the classic drivers – slowing economic growth and soft inflation (Chart of the Week). Investors are keenly aware of the triggers for these moves by now: a) slowing global trade and capital spending, both victims of the ever-worsening U.S.-China trade dispute; b) the lagged impact of past monetary tightening (Fed rate hikes and, arguably, the end of ECB bond buying at the end of 2018); and c) the persistent strength of the U.S. dollar preventing global “reflation”. You do not have to be an aging saver to view those as good reasons to favor the near-term safety of government bonds. Right now, the steady drumbeat of weakening cyclical global growth indicators is fueling bullish bond sentiment, especially in the parts of the world most exposed to global trade like Europe. Looking ahead, however, we may get the first test of NNT much sooner than expected. The latest update of the OECD’s leading economic indicators (LEI) was released last week. The message is consistent with the modest improvement seen over the past several months (Chart 2), with meaningful gains seen in many economies sensitive to global growth like Mexico, Taiwan, Australia and, most importantly, China. Our “leading leading” indicator – the diffusion index of the global LEI, which includes many of the individual country OECD LEIs – continues to show that the majority of countries are seeing a rise in their LEI. We have shown that the LEI diffusion index has, in the past, been a fairly reliable leading indicator of the direction of not only the global LEI itself but of global bond yields as well. At present, the relatively optimistic reading from the global LEI diffusion index is at odds with the sharp downward momentum in bond yields (see the middle panel of the Chart of the Week). NNT at work, or a sign of a bubble forming in government bond markets? Time will tell. To be sure, the shaken confidence of investors thanks to the intensifying U.S.-China trade dispute has likely weakened the link between growth and yields – at least temporarily. Investors need to see hard evidence that global growth is bottoming out before seriously reevaluating the current level of bond yields. Signs of improvement in Chinese growth momentum would go a long way to turning around depressed investor confidence. It is still a bit too soon, however, to expect a rebound in Chinese domestic demand given the long lags between leading indicators like the OECD measure (or the China credit impulse) and hard Chinese economic data (Chart 3). More likely, a change in trend for these series would not be visible until well into the 4th quarter of 2019, at the earliest. Chart 2A Ray Of Hope For Global Growth? Chart 3Still A Bit Too Soon To Expect A China Turnaround Signs of better growth in Europe – where negative bond yields are most prevalent, including in corporate bonds – would also help to reverse excessive investor pessimism. A turnaround there, however, also needs better growth in China, given the heavy exposure of European exporters to Chinese demand. So until we see signs of a pickup in Chinese growth momentum, the economic gloomsters, “Ice Agers” and NNT crowd are in charge of the global government bond market. Until we see signs of a pickup in Chinese growth momentum, the economic gloomsters, “Ice Agers” and NNT crowd are in charge of the global government bond market. Bottom Line: Time will tell if negative bond yields are indeed the “new normal”. We need to see negative yields sustained outside of a growth slowdown to prove that thesis. Have The Rallies In U.S. Treasuries & German Bunds Now Gone Too Far? Last week, we upgraded our overall global duration call to neutral on a tactical (0-3 month) basis.2 This was driven by the growing risk that the global central banks – most notably, the Federal Reserve – could be forced to become even more dovish because of the escalation in the U.S.-China trade war. Furthermore, our Global Duration Indicator has pulled back after the steady rise since late 2018, and is now in line with the aggregate level of 10-year bond yields in the major developed markets (Chart 4). This is consistent with a neutral tactical duration view. Chart 4The Signal From Our Duration Indicator Is Consistent With A Neutral Stance There are signs, however, that Treasuries are overbought: Even as Treasury yields are heading closer to the 2016 lows, U.S. inflation expectations derived from the TIPS market are closer to 2% than the lows below 1.5% seen in 2016 (Chart 5). That market pricing seems reasonable, with realized inflation higher, and the labor market tighter, than was the case three years ago. The price momentum for the 10-year Treasury yield is approaching the extremes seen in the “post Fed QE” era (Chart 6), with the 6-month rate of change of the Bloomberg Barclays U.S. Treasury index approaching 10%. The deviation of the 10-year Treasury yield from its 200-day moving average, which is also at the post-QE extreme of -75bps, tells a similar story. Chart 5A Different U.S. Inflation Backdrop Vs. 2016 Chart 6The Fall In UST Yields Looks Stretched Investor positioning has become VERY long, with the J.P. Morgan duration survey of Active Clients surging to the highest level in the two-decade history of the series (Chart 6, third panel). A similar story applies to the German bond market, where the entire yield curve out to 30-years is trading below 0% (raising a cheer from the NNTers): Market-based inflation expectations have collapsed, with the 5-year CPI swap, 5-years forward reaching a low of 1.2% – lower than 2016, despite a tighter overall euro area labor market, accelerating wage growth and core inflation remaining sticky around 1% (Chart 7). The 6-month total return of the German government bond index is reaching a post-European Debt Crisis extreme near 10%, while the 10-year Bund yield is trading around a similar extreme of 50bps below its 200-day moving average (Chart 8). Chart 7European Inflation: Expectations Worse Than Reality Chart 8The Fall in Bund Yields Is Looking Stretched While the near-term backdrop does not justify a tactically bearish view on Treasuries or Bunds, the stretched technical backdrop suggests that yields could snap back quite sharply on any sign of better global growth or an easing of U.S.-China trade tensions. While the near-term backdrop does not justify a tactically bearish view on Treasuries or Bunds, the stretched technical backdrop suggests that yields could snap back quite sharply on any sign of better global growth or an easing of U.S.-China trade tensions. Bottom Line: U.S. Treasuries and German Bunds both look overbought, amid extreme price/yield momentum and aggressively long duration positioning. Yet given the persistent headline risk from the U.S.-China trade dispute, and without durable signs of improving growth in China or Europe, it is too early to position for a reversal of the stretched yield moves. Maintain a neutral overall stance on global duration exposure. Robert Robis, CFA, Chief Fixed Income Strategist rrobis@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, “Trade War Worries: Once More, With Feeling”, dated August 6, 2019, available at gfis.bcarsearch.com. 2 Please see BCA Global Fixed Income Strategy Weekly Report, “Trade War Worries: Once More, With Feeling”, dated August 6, 2019, available at gfis.bcarsearch.com. Recommendations The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns
Highlights A unified push among central banks to drop their currencies inevitably leads to lower interest rates, which eventually sows the seeds of a recovery. However, with prospects of a full-blown trade war in front view, fundamentals could be put to the wayside for longer, as markets keep the switch on risk aversion. The new round of tariffs could pin USD/CNY at about 7.3-7.4, given the impact from negative feedback loops. The breakdown in the AUD/JPY cross is precarious. Stay short USD/JPY, but focus on the crosses rather than on outright bets versus the dollar. The RBNZ’s dovish surprise was a positive catalyst for our AUD/NZD and SEK/NZD positions. Remain long. Feature Chart I-1Summer Blues Just as summer trading volumes are falling close to new lows, central banks appear to be weaponizing their exchange rates in a renewed currency war salvo. Both the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) and the Reserve Bank of New Zealand (RBNZ) surprised market participants this week by slashing rates by more than expected. In retrospect, the European Central Bank probably fired the first shot at its forum in Sintra, Portugal this June. ECB President Mario Draghi highlighted back then that if the inflation outlook failed to improve, the central bank had considerable headroom to launch a fresh expansion of its balance sheet. What has followed is a renewed wave of dovishness by global central banks, which should intensify, given the latest flare-up in the trade war. For currency strategy, this means fundamentals could be temporarily put to the wayside, as markets keep the switch on risk aversion (Chart I-1). This is because there is little visibility on either the political or the economic front. Our strategy remains three-fold: First, maintain tight stops on tactical positions. Second, we prefer trades at the crosses rather than versus the dollar, for now. Finally, maintain portfolio insurance by being short the USD/JPY. USD/CNY And The Economics Of Tariffs Chart I-2Sino-U.S. Trade Is Small Relative To Domestic Demand Standard theory suggests that exchange rates should move to equalize prices across any two countries. The question that naturally follows is by how much? The answer is that the exchange rate should move by exactly the same percentage point as the price change, everything else equal. If both countries produce homogeneous goods, then it is easy to see why, since there is perfect substitution. All demand will flow to one country, until its currency rises by enough to equalize prices across borders again. However, assume countries ‘A’ and ‘B’ produce heterogeneous goods (‘A’ being the U.S. in this case, and ‘B’ China). Then the loss of purchasing power in Country ‘A’ will lead to less demand for Country ‘B’’s goods. The former loses purchasing power because prices of imports have increased by the amount of the tariff. This means the latter’s currency will have to adjust downwards for the markets to clear. The decrease has to match the magnitude of the price increase, if there are no other outlets to liquidate Country ‘B’’s goods. This is obviously a very simplified version of the real world economy, but it highlights an important point that is central to the discussion: The currency move necessary to realign competitiveness will always be equal to, or less than, in percentage point terms, to the price increase. In the case where the entire production base is tradeable, it will be the former. But with a rise in the number of trading partners, a more complex export basket, import substitution, shipping costs, and many other factors that influence tradeable prices, the currency adjustment needed should be smaller. Since the onset of 2018, the U.S. has slapped various tariffs on China, the latest of which is 10% on $300 billion worth of Chinese goods. The U.S. currently imports $509 billion worth of goods from China, about 16% of its total imports. However, as a percentage of overall U.S. demand, this only represents 2.4% (Chart I-2). This suggests that at best, a 25% tariff on all Chinese imports will only lift import prices by 4% and consumer prices by much less. On the Chinese side of the equation, exports to the U.S. account for 18.4% of total exports, a ratio that has been falling since 2018. Therefore, a tariff of 25% should only lift export prices by 4.5%. The conclusion is that the yuan and the dollar only need to adjust by 4-5% to negate the impact of a 25% tariff. Part of the rise in the dollar and fall in the RMB has been due to tariffs, but it has mostly been due to the fact that global trade has been slowing. This brings us to an important point: Part of the rise in the dollar and fall in the RMB has been due to tariffs, but it has mostly been due to the fact that global trade has been slowing (Table I-1). The DXY index is up 10% since its 2018 trough, while the USD/CNY has risen by 12%. This is much more than economic theory would suggest. In quantity terms, the IMF estimated that a 20% import tariff from East Asia would lift the U.S. dollar’s REER by 5% over five years, while dropping output by 0.6% over the same timeframe.1 But if past is prologue, the new round of tariffs will pin USD/CNY at about 7.3-7.4, given the impact from negative feedback loops – mainly a slowing global economy and a slowing Chinese economy. With no corresponding export subsidy for U.S. goods, however, the rise in the dollar makes exporters worse off. And with over 40% of S&P 500 sales coming from outside the U.S., this will make a meaningful dent in corporate profits. This is an important political impediment. Historically, trade wars are usually synonymous with recessions. As such, there are acute political constraints inching both sides towards an agreement. A Disorderly Breakdown Or Steady Depreciation? The RMB has been trading like a pro-cyclical currency, meaning it is becoming an important signaling mechanism for the evolution of the cycle. The USD/CNY has been moving tick-for-tick with emerging market equities, Asian currencies, and even some commodity prices (Chart I-3). It has also closely mirrored the broad trade-weighted dollar (Chart I-4). This has implications for developed market currencies, especially those tied to Chinese demand. Therefore, it will be important to see if the RMB has a disorderly breakdown towards 7.4 or if it stabilizes at higher levels. A few barometers will be key to watch: Chart I-3The Yuan Is Pro-cyclical Chart I-4Is The Dollar Headed Higher? In a world of rapidly falling yields, Chinese rates remain attractive. Historically, USD/CNY has moved in line with interest rate differentials between the U.S. and China. The current divergence is unsustainable (Chart I-5). Typically, offshore markets have had a good track record of anticipating depreciation in the yuan. Back in 2014, offshore markets started pricing in a rising USD/CNY rate, and maintained that view all the way through to 2018, when the yuan eventually bottomed. Right now, not much depreciation is being priced in (Chart I-6). The reason offshore markets in Hong Kong and elsewhere can be prescient is because more often than not, they are the destination for illicit flows out of China. Chart I-5The Chinese Bond Market Is Attractive Chart I-6Forward Markets Not Concerned As In 2015 Chinese money and credit growth, especially forward-looking liquidity indicators such as M2 relative to GDP, have bottomed. Historically, this led the cycle by a few months. The drop in Chinese bond yields is also reflationary, and should soon stimulate imports, especially if the improvement in exports continues (Chart I-7). Chinese government expenditures are likely to inflect higher, especially given acute weakness in the July manufacturing data. Again, this suggests stimulus this time around may be more fiscal than monetary (Chart I-8). In addition, the recent VAT cuts for manufacturing firms, a cut to social security contributions, and a pickup in infrastructure spending are all net positives. Chart I-7Trade War Extends Traditional Lags Chart I-8Government Spending Set To Increase The housing market remains healthy. A revival in the property market will support construction activity and investment. House prices have been rising to the tune of 10% year-on-year, and real estate stocks in China remain firm relative to the overall index. If house prices roll over, this will be a negative development (Chart I-9). The housing market remains healthy. A revival in the property market will support construction activity and investment. If house prices roll over, this will be a negative development. In terms of market dynamics, the AUD/JPY cross breached the important technical level of 72 cents, but has since recovered. This is important, since the cross failed to break below this level both during the euro area debt crisis in 2011-2012 and the China slowdown of 2015-2016. It will be especially important to see a clear breach to signal we are entering a deflationary bust (Chart I-10). Chart I-9China Housing Is Fine Chart I-10AUD/JPY Breakdown Is Precarious Bottom Line: We are watching a few key reflationary indicators to gauge whether it pays to be contrarian. The message is that it is not time yet, given the ramp-up in the trade war rhetoric. Notes On The RBNZ Chart I-11AUD/NZD Is Cheap This week, the RBNZ surprised markets by cutting interest rates by 50 basis points to parity (expectations were for a 25-basis-point cut). From an external standpoint, this makes sense. Australia and China are New Zealand’s biggest trading partners, and have been easing policy much earlier. The RBNZ’s bet was that demand was probably going to recover by now. The latest salvo in the trade war probably dashed those hopes. Meanwhile, over the last 35 years, the AUD/NZD cross has spent more than 95% of the time over 1.06. With the AUD/NZD near record lows, the cross is cheap on a real effective exchange rate basis (meaning NZD is expensive) (Chart I-11). This suggests that even though interest rates are aligning in both Australia and New Zealand, the Aussie should be 11% higher relative to the Kiwi because of the valuation starting point (Chart I-12). The market remains more dovish on Australia relative to New Zealand, in part due to a more accelerated downturn in house prices and a significant slowdown in China. The reality is that the downturn in Australia has allowed some cleansing of sorts, and brought it far along the adjustment path relative to New Zealand. Economic data in New Zealand are now converging to the downside relative to Australia (Chart I-13). Chart I-12Interest Rates Could Move In Favor Of AUD Chart I-13New Zealand Has More Economic Downside The RBNZ began a new mandate on April 1st to include full employment in addition to inflation targeting. But given that the RBNZ has been unable to fulfill its price stability mandate over the last several years, it is hard to argue it will find a dual mandate any easier. Business confidence is rapidly falling, and employment will soon follow suit (Chart I-14). Meanwhile, for an economy driven by agricultural exports, productivity gains will be hard to come by. Economic data in New Zealand are now converging to the downside relative to Australia. The final catalyst for the AUD/NZD cross will be a terms-of-trade shock which, at the moment, is turning in favor of the Aussie (Chart I-15). Iron ore prices may face further downside, given that supply from Brazil is back online, but China’s clear environmental push has lifted the share of liquefied natural gas in Australia’s export mix. Since eliminating pollution is a strategic goal in China, this will be a multi-year tailwind. As the market becomes more liberalized and long-term contracts are revised to reflect higher spot prices, the Aussie will get a boost. Chart I-14Employment Growth Could Collapse In New Zealand Chart I-15Terms Of Trade Favors##br## Aussie Bottom Line: Remain long AUD/NZD as a strategic position and SEK/NZD as a tactical position. Housekeeping The stop on our short XAU/JPY position was triggered at 158,000 with a loss of -3.27%. This was a mean-reversion trade between two safe-havens, likely to work even if volatility remains elevated. Put it back on. Finally, lift the limit sell on EUR/GBP to 0.95. Chester Ntonifor, Foreign Exchange Strategist chestern@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Maurice Obstfeld, “Tariffs Do More Harm Than Good At Home,” IMFBlog, September 8, 2016. Currencies U.S. Dollar Chart II-1USD Technicals 1 Chart II-2USD Technicals 2 Recent data in the U.S. have been mostly positive: Labor market remains tight: Unemployment rate was steady at 3.7%; Participation rate increased to 63%; Average hourly earnings increased by 3.2% year-on-year; Nonfarm payrolls increased by 164 thousand. Initial jobless claims fell to 209 thousand last week. Trade balance narrowed slightly to $55.2 billion in June. Michigan sentiment index was unchanged at 98.4 in July. Markit composite and services PMI both increased to 52.6 and 53 respectively in July, while ISM non-manufacturing PMI fell to 53.7 in July. DXY index fell by 1% this week, erasing the gains following the Fed’s hawkish surprise last week. Weakness in the dollar given a ramp-up in trade war rhetoric suggest that dollar tailwinds are facing diminishing marginal returns. A few of our favorite dollar indicators, including the bond-to-gold ratio, are sending a warning signal. Report Links: Focusing On the Trees But Missing The Forest - August 2, 2019 Global Growth And The Dollar - July 19, 2019 On Gold, Oil And Cryptocurrencies - June 28, 2019 The Euro Chart II-3EUR Technicals 1 Chart II-4EUR Technicals 2 Recent data in the euro area have continued to deteriorate: Producer price inflation fell to 0.7% year-on-year in June. Retail sales increased by 2.6% year-on-year in June, surprising to the upside. Markit composite PMI was unchanged at 51.5 in July, while services PMI fell slightly to 53.2. Sentix investor confidence fell further to -13.7 in August, the lowest since 2014. EUR/USD increased by 1% this week. In the most recent Economic Bulletin, the ECB highlighted the risk of a weaker Q2 global services PMI which might lead to a more broad-based deterioration in global growth. With negative interest rates and diminishing marginal returns to monetary policy, the euro area will be ever dependent on fiscal stimulus. Report Links: Battle Of The Central Banks - June 21, 2019 EUR/USD And The Neutral Rate Of Interest - June 14, 2019 Take Out Some Insurance - May 3, 2019 Japanese Yen Chart II-5JPY Technicals 1 Chart II-6JPY Technicals 2 Recent data in Japan have been mixed: Composite PMI was unchanged at 51.2 in July, while services PMI fell to 51.8. Household spending yearly growth fell to 2.7% in June. That said, previous growth of 4% was too high relative to Japan’s potential. Wages increased by 0.4% year-on-year in June. Leading economic index and coincident index both fell to 93.3 and 100.4 respectively in June. The trade balance increased to ¥759.3 billion in June. Current account balance narrowed to ¥1,211 billion in June. USD/JPY fell by 0.9% this week. In the Summary of Opinions released this week, the BoJ concluded that the Japanese economy has been moderately expanding, a trend that is likely to continue in the second half. However, this may be too ambitious. As we go to press, Q2 GDP growth is still pending, and a marked slowdown could be a harbinger for a much softer second half, especially given renewed trade tensions. That said, the path to easier monetary policy will be lined by a stronger yen. Report Links: Portfolio Tweaks Into Thin Summer Trading - July 5, 2019 Battle Of The Central Banks - June 21, 2019 Short USD/JPY: Heads I Win, Tails I Don’t Lose Too Much - May 31, 2019 British Pound Chart II-7GBP Technicals 1 Chart II-8GBP Technicals 2 Recent data in the U.K. have been mostly positive: Markit composite PMI increased to 50.7 in July. Services and construction components also increased to 51.4 and 45.3 respectively. Retail sales increased by 0.1% year-on-year in July. Halifax house prices contracted by 0.2% month-on-month in July. GBP/USD has been very volatile but returned flat this week. All eyes are on the new PM Boris Johnson and new Brexit developments. Our Geopolitical strategist is assigning 21% risk of a no-deal Brexit, and the probability would rise to 30% if negotiations with the EU fail. We believe that the pound could easily drop to 1.10-1.15 if there is no deal. That being said, we are looking to sell EUR/GBP at 0.94, given Europe will also absorb some collateral damage from a hard Brexit. Report Links: Battle Of The Central Banks - June 21, 2019 A Contrarian View On The Australian Dollar - May 24, 2019 Take Out Some Insurance - May 3, 2019 Australian Dollar Chart II-9AUD Technicals 1 Chart II-10AUD Technicals 2 Recent data in Australia have been mostly positive: Producer price inflation increased to 2% year-on-year in Q2. Retail sales grew by 0.4% month-on-month in June. Both composite and services PMI increased to 52.1 and 52.3 respectively in July. Australian Industry Group (AiG) construction index fell to 39.1 in July. Exports grew by 1% month-on-month in June, while imports contracted by 4% month-on-month. This nudged the trade surplus to A$8 billion in June, a record. AUD/USD fell by 1.8% initially, then rebounded, returning flat this week. The RBA held interest rates unchanged at 1% on Tuesday, after cutting by 25 bps both in June and July. Long-term government bond yields declined to record-lows. Currency markets are currently focused on interest rate differentials. Once the focus shifts to other fundamentals as global interest rates converge, the Aussie dollar will get a boost. Report Links: A Contrarian View On The Australian Dollar - May 24, 2019 Beware Of Diminishing Marginal Returns- April 19, 2019 Not Out Of The Woods Yet - April 5, 2019 New Zealand Dollar Chart II-11NZD Technicals 1 Chart II-12NZD Technicals 2 Recent data in New Zealand have been positive: Consumer confidence decreased by 5.1% month-on-month in July. On the labor market front, the participation rate was steady at 70.4% in Q2; Unemployment rate fell to 3.9%; Wages increased by 2.2% year-on-year in Q2. NZD/USD fell by 0.8% this week. RBNZ shocked the market with the half-percentage point rate cut this Wednesday, stating that a larger initial move would be best to meet the inflation and employment objectives in New Zealand. The RBNZ also lowered 2-year inflation expectations from 2.01% to 1.86% in Q3. Relative terms-of-trade favors our long AUD/NZD position. Stay with it. Report Links: Where To Next For The U.S. Dollar? - June 7, 2019 Not Out Of The Woods Yet - April 5, 2019 Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - February 15, 2019 Canadian Dollar Chart II-13CAD Technicals 1 Chart II-14CAD Technicals 2 Recent data in Canada have been mostly positive: Imports and exports both fell to C$50.2 billion and C$50.3 billion in June. The trade balance thus narrowed to C$0.14 billion. Bloomberg Nanos confidence index increased to 58.6 last week. Ivey PMI increased to 54.2 in July. New housing price index contracted by 0.2% year-on-year in June. USD/CAD increased by 0.2% this week. The sudden oil prices drop has dragged down the Canadian dollar. WTI crude oil prices plunged by more than 10% during the past week, and Western Canadian Select crude oil spot prices fell by 14.5%. Report Links: Portfolio Tweaks Into Thin Summer Trading - July 5, 2019 On Gold, Oil And Cryptocurrencies - June 28, 2019 Currency Complacency Amid A Global Dovish Shift - April 26, 2019 Swiss Franc Chart II-15CHF Technicals 1 Chart II-16CHF Technicals 2 Recent data in Switzerland have been mostly negative: Headline and core consumer price inflation dropped to 0.3% and 0.4% year-on-year respectively in July. Manufacturing PMI fell to 44.7 in July. Consumer confidence fell to -8 in July. Real retail sales increased by 0.7% year-on-year in June. USD/CHF fell by 1.2% this week. The concerns over the global growth, an escalating trade war, a potential hard-Brexit, political tensions in the Middle East and East Asia continue to weigh on investors’ sentiment. VIX once again touched 24 following Trump’s tweet to threaten to impose 10% tariffs over $300 billion Chinese goods last Thursday. We continue to favor the safe-haven Swiss franc as a tactical portfolio hedge. Report Links: What To Do About The Swiss Franc? - May 17, 2019 Beware Of Diminishing Marginal Returns - April 19, 2019 Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - February 15, 2019 Norwegian Krone Chart II-17NOK Technicals 1 Chart II-18NOK Technicals 2 There is little data from Norway this week: Manufacturing production yearly growth fell from 5% in May to 3% in June. USD/NOK has been flat this week. Next week, the Norges Bank is likely to reverse its well-telegraphed forward guidance of rate hikes, following global developments. With oil prices down, and a new trade war, they will stand pat in line with market expectations, but an interest rate cut cannot be ruled out. Report Links: Portfolio Tweaks Into Thin Summer Trading - July 5, 2019 On Gold, Oil And Cryptocurrencies - June 28, 2019 Currency Complacency Amid A Global Dovish Shift - April 26, 2019 Swedish Krona Chart II-19SEK Technicals 1 Chart II-20SEK Technicals 2 Recent data in Sweden have been mixed: Industrial production contracted by 0.7% year-on-year in June. Services production yearly growth also fell to 1.3% in June. However, industrial orders increased by 7.5% year-on-year in June, the strongest since July 2018. Budget balance widened to SEK 28.2 billion in July. USD/SEK fell by 0.9% this week. The upside surprise in industrial orders is mainly led by transport equipment. Mining and quarrying also rebounded to 9.3% compared with -7.8% in May. Our SEK/NZD position is now 0.4% in the money. The negative carry has been narrowed following RBNZ’s 50 bps rate cut. Report Links: Where To Next For The U.S. Dollar? - June 7, 2019 Balance Of Payments Across The G10 - February 15, 2019 A Simple Attractiveness Ranking For Currencies - February 8, 2019 Trades & Forecasts Forecast Summary Core Portfolio Tactical Trades Limit Orders Closed Trades
Highlights U.S.-China: The escalation of the trade war has renewed investor fears that uncertainty could create an even deeper drag on global growth, requiring a more aggressive easing of global monetary policy. Fed: The Fed had an opportunity last week to regain control of monetary policy from the markets, but opted for only a cautious rate cut that came off as too hawkish. The FOMC will be forced to play defense in the next 3-6 months, likely by cutting rates more than originally envisioned given the market turbulence stemming from the trade war escalation. Fixed Income Asset Allocation: Raise overall global portfolio duration to neutral on a tactical (0-3 months) basis, at least until equity markets stabilize. Maintain strategic (6-12 months) overweights to global corporate bonds, however, as global leading economic indicators are bottoming. Feature A Painful Repricing Chart of the WeekNot A Pretty Picture A long-overdue correction in risk assets, or the start of something more sinister? That is the question investors must now consider. Another Twitter blast from @realDonaldTrump has triggered chaos in global financial markets, with the imposition of fresh U.S. tariffs on Chinese imports. This shattered the market calm since the June G20 meeting, when an announced truce on the U.S.-China trade dispute led to optimism that a real deal could be reached. China retaliated to the new tariffs by allowing the USD/CNY exchange rate to depreciate beyond the perceived line in the sand at 7.0. The trade news came at a bad time for financial markets, a few days after the release of soft global manufacturing PMI data for July that highlighted how global growth remains highly vulnerable to trade war developments (Chart of the Week). The Fed did not help matters by delivering an interest rate cut last week but somehow coming across as hawkish (or, at least, not dovish enough). The market response to the renewed trade tensions and yuan weakness has been classic “macro risk-off” – sharply lower government bond yields, alongside big declines in global equity markets and commodity prices (Chart 2) and increases in the value of typical safe-havens like gold and the Japanese yen (Chart 3). Chart 2Growth-Sensitive Assets Not Doing Well Chart 3Safe Havens In Demand The nature of the fall in global bond yields has been consistent with what has been seen so far in 2019 – fairly coordinated moves in terms of size, with much smaller changes seen in cross-country yield spreads. This suggests that the unobservable “global” bond yield is falling in response to deteriorating global growth expectations, rather than country-specific factors driving local bond yields. Global trade uncertainty – and what that implies for future weakness in corporate profits, investment and employment – is indeed an “external shock” for every nation. We admit that our current duration recommendations have not been aligned to benefit from these moves. Our forecasting philosophy for government bond yields is based on what our colleagues at our sister service, BCA U.S. Bond Strategy, have dubbed “The Golden Rule of Bond Investing”.1 In that framework, the primary driver of government bond market returns (excess returns over cash, to be precise) is the outcome of central bank policy moves versus what is discounted in interest rate markets. In the U.S., we have been steadfast in our expectation that the Fed would disappoint market pricing that was calling for as much as 90bps of rate cuts over the next 12 months. Global trade uncertainty – and what that implies for future weakness in corporate profits, investment and employment – is indeed an “external shock” for every nation. Chart 4Rate Cuts Required - And Discounted - Everywhere Now, with the President giving markets the unpleasant news that a trade deal with China is not imminent, and new tariffs about to be imposed, the pressure is on the Fed to provide an offset through easier monetary policy. Some are even interpreting the timing of Trump’s latest Tariff Tweet in a Machiavellian fashion, as if he wanted to create more uncertainty to get to Fed to cut rates (and, by association, help deliver Trump’s goal of weakening the U.S. dollar). On the surface, Trump ratcheting up the trade tensions sounds like a risky economic game to play leading up to the 2020 Presidential election. Our colleagues at BCA Geopolitical Strategy, however, note that many of the leading Democratic presidential nominee contenders have themselves been pushing for a more hawkish stance on China. Trump may now feel politically emboldened to become even harder on China himself, to avoid being outflanked by the Democrats – even if it means the U.S. stock market suffers a nasty selloff as a result. Although, again, if the Fed cuts rates as a result, Trump will likely view that as a victory given his constant haranguing of Fed Chair Jay Powell over the past year. With Powell tipping his hand last week that trade uncertainty was something that could trigger additional Fed interest rate cuts, and with Trump now highly incentivized to create that uncertainty, the case for betting against the rate cuts discounted in U.S. interest rate markets has weakened – even though it is still debatable whether the U.S. economy has softened enough to justify a full-blown easing cycle. With Powell tipping his hand last week that trade uncertainty was something that could trigger additional Fed interest rate cuts, and with Trump now highly incentivized to create that uncertainty, the case for betting against the rate cuts discounted in U.S. interest rate markets has weakened Our Central Bank Monitors are now signaling a need for some easing of monetary policy in all the major developed economies, including the U.S. (Chart 4). Even though our 12-month Discounters also show that a lot of easing is already priced into Overnight Index Swap (OIS) curves in those same countries, the amount of cuts discounted is consistent with the dovish message from our Central Bank Monitors. Given the renewed trade tensions, alongside no signs of much improvement in overall global growth momentum, we are less certain at the moment that the amount of cuts discounted by markets will not be delivered. Thus, under our Golden Rule framework, a below-benchmark overall global duration stance is not warranted at this time. Therefore, this week, we are increasing our overall duration stance to neutral from below-benchmark, on a tactical basis. In our model bond portfolio on Page 10, we are implementing this view by “neutralizing” the duration exposures within each country. This is done by keeping the same total country weightings versus the benchmark index, but allocating across all maturities in line with the index weightings within each country. This adds about one-half of year of duration to the model portfolio to bring it up the same level as the benchmark index, but without altering the overall allocations to countries or spread product sectors. What To Do Beyond The Short-Term? Chart 5A Lot Of Bad News Discounted In Bond Yields Despite the near-term concerns and volatility stemming from the increased trade tensions, we do not advocate moving to a more defensive portfolio allocation (above-benchmark duration, underweight corporate bonds) to position for a deeper global growth slowdown, for the following reasons: A lot of bad news is already discounted in global bond yields. The rally in government bond markets this year has pushed bond yields down to stretched levels using typical valuation metrics (Chart 5) like the 5-year OIS rate, 5-years forward; the term premium on 10-year yields, and market-implied inflation expectations from CPI swaps or inflation-linked bonds. Additional sustainable declines will be harder to achieve from current levels. The U.S. economy is still holding up relatively well, especially compared to other major economies. Although the U.S. manufacturing sector data has slowed, U.S. Treasury yields already are in line with the diminished readings of the ISM Manufacturing index, which is still above the 50 level signifying expanding activity (Chart 6). The non-manufacturing (services) side of the economy has not seen the same degree of slowing, while consumer confidence and retail sales have both picked up of late. Also, the mean-reverting U.S. data surprise index – which is correlated to the momentum of bond yields – is very stretched to the downside, suggesting less downside potential for Treasury yields from weak U.S. data (Chart 7). Chart 6UST Yields Consistent With Slower Manufacturing In addition, the easing of U.S. financial conditions from the 2019 rally in U.S. equity and credit markets before the past few days does suggest a rebound in U.S. growth is likely beyond the next few months. It will take much bigger market declines than seen so far, something beyond a mere “garden-variety” correction in U.S. equities, to tighten financial conditions enough to offset the prior loosening. Chart 7Treasuries Are Vulnerable To Better Data Early leading indicators are flashing a future bottoming of global growth. Several of the more reliable leading economic signals, like our global LEI diffusion index and the China credit impulse, are both flashing the potential for a rebound in global growth to begin around the end of the year (Chart 8). If Chinese policymakers choose to offset the negative domestic economic impact of the new Trump tariffs with even more stimulus measures, as seems likely, then the odds of an eventual growth rebound would improve – especially if there is also a healthy dose of monetary easing from the Fed, ECB (both rate cuts and renewed asset purchases) and other major central banks. Early leading indicators are flashing a future bottoming of global growth. Summing it all up, we see the best way to protect against the risks of an even deeper near-term selloff in risk assets is to increase duration by buying liquid government bonds, rather than reduce credit exposure by selling less liquid corporate bonds. It would take signs that the improvement in leading economic indicators is reversing to justify downgrading global corporate bond exposure. We think it more likely that we’ll be reducing our recommended duration exposure back to below-benchmark sometime in the next few months. We will be watching news on global trade, China stimulus and U.S. non-manufacturing growth before making the next change to our duration call. We see the best way to protect against the risks of an even deeper near-term selloff in risk assets is to increase duration by buying liquid government bonds, rather than reduce credit exposure by selling less liquid corporate bonds. With regards to country allocation within developed market government bonds, we are choosing to stick with our current recommendations: overweight core Europe, the U.K., Japan, Australia and Spain; underweight the U.S. and Italy; and neutral Canada (Chart 9). Those allocations have served us reasonably throughout 2019, with the bulk of the overweights outperforming the Bloomberg Barclays Global Treasury index in hedged USD terms, and the U.S. actually only just matching the global hedged benchmark (thanks to the yield pickup for non-U.S. debt from hedging currency exposure back to higher-yielding U.S. dollars). Chart 8A Light At The End Of The Tunnel? Chart 9We're Sticking With Our Country Allocations Only in the case of Italy, were we have maintained an underweight stance given our concerns about weak Italian growth and the implications for debt sustainability, have we seen a significant underperformance of our recommendation. At current yield/spread levels, however, we remain reluctant to simply chase higher-yielding Italian bond yields in the absence of any sign of improving Italian growth that would justify lower Italian risk premia. Bottom Line: The escalation of the trade war has renewed investor fears that trade could create an even deeper drag on global growth, requiring a more aggressive easing of global monetary policy. Raise overall global portfolio duration to neutral on a tactical (0-3 months) basis, at least until equity markets stabilize. Maintain strategic (6-12 months) overweights to global corporate bonds, however, as global leading economic indicators are bottoming. Robert Robis, CFA, Chief Fixed Income Strategist rrobis@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see BCA U.S. Bond Strategy Special Report, “The Golden Rule Of Bond Investing”, dated July 24, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com. Recommendations The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index Duration Regional Allocation Spread Product Tactical Trades Yields & Returns Global Bond Yields Historical Returns
In Q2, U.S. quarterly annualized growth slowed to 2.1% from 3.1%, but nonetheless beat expectations of 1.8%. Moreover, final sales to domestic purchasers, a good measure of final domestic demand, rebounded to 3.5% from 1.8%, suggesting that the domestic…