Europe

The Global Investment Strategy service tactically downgraded equities in February but then upgraded them in May. The decision to upgrade equities to overweight in May was clearly premature, as stocks fell significantly in June. However, the rally in July has brought stocks back above the level where we upgraded them. Hence, we are using this opportunity to shift our recommended equity allocation back to neutral. While our base case forecast still foresees no recession in the US over the next 12 months, the risks to this view have increased. In Europe, we see a recession as more likely than not. China’s economy will remain under pressure due to Covid lockdowns, a shift in global spending away from manufactured goods, and a weakening property market. Even if the US avoids a recession, this could prove to be a bittersweet outcome for stocks: While earnings will hold up, the Fed is unlikely to cut rates next year, as markets are currently discounting. Real bond yields, which have already risen steeply this year, will rise further, weighing on equity valuations.  Time to Take Some Chips Off the Table The consensus view among investors these days seems to be that the US is heading into a recession (or may already be in one), which will cause stocks to fall during the remainder of the year as earnings estimates are slashed. Looking out to 2023, most investors expect stocks to recover as the Fed begins to cut rates. I have the opposite view. While the risks to growth have increased, the US will probably avoid a recession over the next 12 months. This will allow stocks to rise modestly from current levels into year-end. However, as we enter 2023, it will become obvious that the Fed has no reason to cut rates. This could cause stocks to give up some of their gains, thus producing a fairly flat profile for equities over a 12-month horizon. In past reports, we have argued that the neutral rate of interest – the interest rate consistent with full employment and stable inflation – is higher than widely believed in the US. The nice thing about a high neutral rate is that it insulates the economy from tighter monetary policy: Even if the Fed raises rates to 3.8% next year, as the dots are currently forecasting, that will only put rates in the middle of our fair value range of 3.5%-to-4% for the US neutral rate. The downside of a high neutral rate is that eventually, investors will need to value stocks using a higher discount rate. The 10-year TIPS yield has already increased from -0.97% at the start of the year to +0.36% today. It will rise to 1%-to-1.5% by the middle of 2023. A higher-than-expected neutral rate also raises inflation risks because it could cause the Fed to inadvertently keep monetary policy too loose. Inflation is likely to fall significantly over the coming months as supply-chain bottlenecks ease. However, this decline in inflation could sow the seeds of its own demise: As inflation falls, real wage growth – which is now negative – will turn positive. Rising real wages will booster consumer confidence and spending. A reacceleration in inflation in the second half of next year could prompt the Fed to start hiking rates again in late 2023, thus producing a recession not in 2022 but in 2024. Outside the US, the outlook is more challenging. In Europe, a recession is more likely than not in the second half of the year. We expect the recession to be fairly short-lived, with European governments moving aggressively to mitigate the fallout from gas shortages through various income support schemes for the private sector. Chinese growth should rebound in the second half of the year. However, the specter of future lockdowns, the shift in global spending away from manufactured goods towards services, and the weakening property sector will continue to weigh on activity. We will have much more to say about this view change early next week. In the meantime, please review our report from last week entitled “The Downside Of A Soft Landing” for further color on some of the points made in this short bulletin. Tomorrow, my colleague Ritika Mankar will be sending you a Special Report making the case that the US economy’s ability to spawn mega-sized companies may become increasingly compromised over the next decade.   Peter Berezin Chief Global Strategist peterb@bcaresearch.com Follow me on LinkedIn & Twitter.

Special Report

Executive Summary The ECB finally exited negative interest rates last week. In exchange for higher rates, the doves received an ambitious anti-fragmentation tool, the TPI. The ECB deposit rate is likely to reach between 1% and 1.5% by the summer of 2023. The ECB’s number one problem remains the widely different neutral rates across the Eurozone’s largest economies. Our r-star estimates suggest that the German neutral rate is significantly above that of Spain, Italy, and even France. This divergence in r-star means that the TPI will be activated, but its presence alone is not enough to tame the peripheral bond markets when the ECB hikes rates. While the near-term remains fraught with risks, BTPs are increasingly attractive for long-term investors. The TPI also creates a bullish long-term backdrop for the euro. Many R-Star In The European Sky Bottom Line: Diverging neutral rates across the Eurozone’s main economies will impair the ECB’s ability to normalize interest rates over the next twelve months without also activating the new anti-fragmentation tool, the TPI. BTPs have become attractive for long-term rather than short-term investors.   Last week, the European Central Bank (ECB) increased interest rates by 50bps, the first hike in eleven years and the third time in its history that it has tightened policy by such a large increment. In exchange for this abrupt end to negative interest rates, the doves on the Governing Council (GC) extracted the creation of the Transmission Protection Instrument (TPI), a new facility designed to limit fragmentation risk on sovereign bond yields in the Eurozone. These two moves raise three key questions: Will the ECB continue to increase rates this aggressively in the coming months? Have peripheral spreads peaked? Will the threat of TPI buying be enough to put a ceiling on spreads, or will the ECB actually need to activate the program in the coming months? To answer these questions, we evaluate where r-star (the neutral real rate of interest) stands in the four largest Euro Area economies. While there is scope for the ECB to push policy rates higher, the wide differences in r-star across European nations indicate that the TPI will need to be activated to stabilize peripheral bond markets, most importantly, Italian government debt. This makes BTPs attractive for long-term investors, although near-term volatility will remain elevated as the markets test the ECB’s resolve. What Happened? Related Report  European Investment StrategyLooking Beyond Europe’s Inflation Peak In terms of interest rates, the most important conclusion from last’s week policy meeting was that forward guidance has been abandoned. The ECB is now fully data dependent, and each policy meeting will be a live one. Another rate hike is certain for the September meeting, ranging from 25bps to potentially 75bps if the ECB wishes to further “front-load” tightening. The single guiding principle will be the outlook for inflation.   ​​​​​​​ Chart 1Incoming Inflation Peak We do expect inflation to peak soon in the Eurozone, mostly because of the decline in the commodity impulse and slowing food inflation (Chart 1).  Additionally, the one-month impulse of our Trimmed-Mean CPI is weakening. However, as of June, headline and core inflation stand at 8.6% and 3.7%, respectively. Inflation is unlikely to slow enough by the September meeting to prompt the ECB to forecast inflation falling below its 2% target by 2024.  In this context, our base case remains that the GC will opt for a 50bps hike in September. Beyond September, we expect the ECB to revert to 25bps rate hikes and the policy rate to settle between 1% and 1.5% by the summer of 2023, which is broadly in line with the current pricing of the €STR curve (Chart 2). We are somewhat less hawkish than the market for the month of October, because we expect inflation to roll over this fall. Moreover, the European economy continues to decelerate, as highlighted by the declines in the ZEW growth expectations and the PMIs (Chart 3). This deceleration will allow the ECB to revise down its inflation outlook over time. Chart 2Appropriate Pricing Chart 3Growth Is Slowing The announcement of the TPI was the other crucial development from the last ECB meeting. The TPI was unanimously supported. In addition, its asset purchases will be unlimited, and the GC will have much discretion with respect to its implementation. These are three important features that give it ample credibility. However, the program has yet to be activated. Chart 4PEPP Reinvestment Doing Little We do not share the optimism of the GC members who believe that the TPI’s existence alone will narrow peripheral spreads without the ECB having to purchase a single bond. The market will have to figure out what the GC deems as “unwarranted” and “disorderly” moves, especially in a context in which the Draghi government has collapsed and Italy’s commitment to reform will be challenged exactly as interest rates begin to rise. Moreover, the flexible re-investment of PEPP redemptions has not prevented BTP/Bund spreads from widening (Chart 4). As a result, we expect the market to test the ECB’s resolve over the coming weeks, which is likely to result in volatility and wider spreads until the TPI is activated. Bottom Line: Last week’s ECB meeting was a seminal moment. The ECB not only abandoned eight years of negative rates in one go, but it also implemented an ambitious program that aims to restrict peripheral spreads, albeit with some near-term volatility. European policy rates are set to rise to between 1% and 1.5% by the summer of 2023. In Search Of A Neutral Rate During Thursday’s press conference, President Christine Lagarde refused to respond to a question about the neutral rate of interest in Europe. We have sympathy for her predicament. The ECB’s biggest problem is that there is not one neutral interest rate for the entire euro area, but nineteen individual neutral rates for each Eurozone country, with wild differences among them.1  The differences between the neutral rates across the Eurozone are the key factor limiting how far and how fast the ECB may increase rates. It is also the main reason why the ECB resorts to an alphabet soup of non-interest rate policy measures (APP, PEPP, LTRO and, now, TPI) to maintain appropriate monetary conditions across the bloc. But exactly how wide are the differences between the neutral rates? To answer this question, we expand on the methodology developed by Holston, Laubach and Williams (HLW) from the San Francisco Fed  to estimate the neutral real interest rate – or “r-star” - in Germany, France, Italy, and Spain. These are the four largest economies in the Euro Area, accounting for 70% of its GDP. Specifically, we run regressions between the real interest rates in those countries versus trend GDP growth and current account balances, which approximates the savings-investment balance. Mimicking the HLW methodology, the inflation expectations used to extract real interest rates from nominal short rates reflect an adaptative framework whereby inflation expectations are a function of the ten-year moving average core CPI. Our methodology produces estimates of r-star that range from 0% in Germany, to -0.8% in Italy, or a GDP-weighted average of -0.3% for the Eurozone (Table 1). When incorporating last week’s ECB rate hike, Europe’s real deposit rate falls to -1.2% if we use the smoothing procedure from HLW to compute inflation expectations, or -3.7% if we use current core CPI. In either case, policy remains accommodative for everyone. Table 1Many R-Star In The European Sky We also ran a second set of estimates for r-star, which includes total nonfinancial debt-to-GDP. The logic reflects the notion that adverse debt dynamics was a key force behind the 2011/12 European sovereign debt crisis, which obligated the ECB to reverse course after pushing up the repo rate twice in 2011. Moreover, heavy debt loads not only constrain the ability of various countries to withstand higher rates, but they are also linked to misallocated capital and are therefore likely to depress trend GDP growth over time compared to countries with lighter debt loads. This adjustment changes the picture considerably. While Germany’s real neutral rate of interest remains around 0%, those of Italy and Spain plunge to -1.8% and -2.4%, respectively. France has also experienced a large decline in its r-star to -2.1% in response to the heavy debt load carried by its private and public sectors. Using this method, the GDP-weighted Euro Area r-star falls to -1.4% (Table 1). So which version of the model is more accurate? We believe the most realistic estimate for r-star in each of the four countries is the simple average of both the unadjusted and the debt-adjusted r-star. This implies that the inflation-adjusted neutral rate is close 0% in Germany, -1.2% in France, -1.2% in Spain and -1.3% in Italy (Table 1). Are those results consistent with reality? A country-by-country evaluation suggests that this ranking is correct. To arrive at this judgment, we evaluated each country based on the following four dimensions: Private sector debt accumulation since 2010. If policy is particularly easy for one country, the private sector will be incentivized to take on debt at a more rapid pace than if monetary conditions were tighter. House price appreciation since 2010. Housing is the part of the economy most sensitive to monetary conditions. Larger real estate price gains will materialize in economies where monetary policy is particularly loose. Profit growth since 2010. Easy monetary policy will subsidize corporate profitability, either through faster domestic activity or a cheaper exchange rate (or both). Unemployment rate. The unemployment rate is a crude measure of slack in the economy. An easier policy setting in one country will reduce the unemployment rate compared to a country where policy rates are high relative to r-star. Germany Chart 5Loosest Monetary Conditions In Germany Germany exhibits all the evidence of monetary policy being much more accommodative for that country than the other four countries, for the following reasons: Since 2010, German private debt has been expanding much faster than the average of the four countries (Chart 5, top panel). Germany is experiencing the fastest house price appreciation (Chart 5, second panel). Germany’s profits have grown much faster (Chart 5, third panel). Germany’s unemployment rate stands at only 3%, compared to an average rate of 8% for the four nations together (Chart 5, bottom panel). France Chart 6French Monetary Conditions Are Tighter France is a mixed bag. Monetary policy has been easy for France, but the French economy lags Germany on three of the four aforementioned dimensions: Since 2010, French private debt is growing at the fastest pace of the four economies studied, outpacing even that of Germany (Chart 6, top panel). While French house prices have grown slightly faster than the average of the four nations, they lagged German real estate prices (Chart 6, second panel). While French profits have also bested the average of the four nations, they nonetheless trail German profits (Chart 6, third panel). France’s unemployment rate is in line with the average of the four countries under observation (Chart 6, bottom panel). Spain For most of the period following 2010, Spain has suffered from the scars of the disastrous deleveraging that was required in the wake of the sovereign debt crisis. Its trend growth collapsed, and the ECB’s common policy was never as accommodative as it was for its northern neighbors. However, in recent years, the Spanish economy seems to be catching up, a result of the impact of previous structural reforms and the improved competitiveness brought about by collapsing real unit labor costs: Chart 7Spain Still Grapples With Problems Since 2010, Spanish private debt has contracted by 20% compared to a 33% expansion for the European average (Chart 7, top panel). Spanish real estate prices have also lagged far behind those of the other countries put together (Chart 7, second panel). However, since 2015, Spanish house prices have begun to recover, and they are now moving at the same pace as the Euro Area average. Spanish profit growth remains weak compared to the average of the four countries studied in this report (Chart 7, third panel). The Spanish unemployment continues to tower at 13%, well above the average of the four largest Euro Area economies (Chart 7, bottom panel). Italy Italy has a similar profile to that of Spain. While its worst performance is solidly in the rear-view mirror, the recent period of easy monetary policy has allowed for some recovery. Nonetheless, Italy still lags far behind other Eurozone countries, which suggests that policy in Italy is not nearly as accommodative as in the rest of the Eurozone. Chart 8Italy Shows Little Improvements Burdened by very large nonperforming loans, the Italian banking sector has been unable to provide adequate credit to the Italian private sector, which already had a limited appetite for debt. As a result, since 2010, Italian private credit has lagged far behind the European average (Chart 8, top panel). Italian real estate prices have not recovered meaningfully from their contraction between 2011 and 2019. Consequently, Italian housing prices lag substantially behind the average of the largest Euro Area countries (Chart 8, second panel). Italian profits remain weak (Chart 8, third panel). While not as elevated as the Spanish unemployment rate, at 8%, Italy’s rate is comparable to the four-country average (Chart 8, bottom panel). Generalizations These observations about individual countries confirm that Germany’s r-star is significantly higher than those of Spain and Italy. When compared to France, the German r-star is also higher, but the gap is much narrower than that between Germany and the two southern nations. The recent ECB Euro Area Bank Lending Survey confirms that France’s r-star is well below that of Germany. French lending standards are tightening as fast as those in Italy (Chart 9). In effect, France’s heavy private sector debt load is proving to be a burden as the ECB begins to tighten policy, which implies a lower French r-star. Chart 9Lending Standard Are Tightening Most In France And Italy​​​​​​​ Bottom Line: Among the four largest economies in the Eurozone, a modeling exercise based on the HWL approach reveals that there is a large gap in neutral real interest rates, with Germany on one side around 0%, and Italy, Spain, and even France on the other side with r-star estimates ranging between -1.2% and -1.3%. A survey of current economic activity in these four nations confirms the results from the modeling exercise. Investment Implications The main consequence of the differing r-star across the Eurozone is that the ECB will need to remain an active player in the sovereign bond market. The German, Dutch, and Baltic economies are overheating, and policy needs to be tightened. This means that the ECB will continue to hike rates over the coming months. However, it cannot raise rates much more before they become problematic in Italy, Spain, and even France. Thus, the ECB will activate the TPI in the coming months in order to ease monetary conditions in those economies relative to the stronger group by limiting policy-induced increases in bond yields. In fact, using the r-star estimates adjusted for the debt-to-GDP ratios, the ECB would need to absorb roughly 30% of the Italian total debt to bring Italy’s r-star closer to Germany’s levels. This will not happen, which means that in the foreseeable future, Italy will not be able to withstand the levels of interest rate needed to cool down the German economy. Nonetheless, the TPI can help the ECB in fine-tuning monetary conditions across the Eurozone as it hikes policy rates. For now, Italian bonds are likely to remain volatile until the TPI is activated, especially considering the political situation in Italy, where the outlook for structural reform seems compromised by political uncertainty. This volatility will result in the activation of the TPI before year-end. Once the TPI is activated, BTP/Bund spreads are likely to move back toward 100bps, the level historically consistent with the ECB’s involvement in the sovereign debt market during the APP/PEPP era. The activation of the TPI will also be a positive development for the European corporate bond market, especially investment grade bonds. In last week’s post-conference press release, the ECB revealed that the TPI will also be able to buy private issuer securities. Thus, the ECB is likely to return as a potential buyer in this market. Moreover, investment grade bonds already price in a European recession and therefore offer a large value cushion with 12-month breakeven spreads trading in their 79th historical percentile (Chart 10). We especially like European investment grade corporate bonds relative to US ones on a USD-hedged basis. Relative valuations are in favor of Europe, and the ECB is not tightening policy as much as the Fed. Related Report  European Investment StrategyTo Parity And Beyond The euro will ultimately benefit from the activation of the TPI. The narrowing of both sovereign and corporate spreads resulting from the program represents a very bullish development for EUR/USD (Chart 11), especially because the ECB will likely sterilize the bonds purchased under the program (i.e. the ECB’s balance sheet will not expand because of the TPI). The TPI will also allow the ECB to deliver higher interest rates, which further supports the euro. Nonetheless, we continue to see substantial (roughly 20%) odds of a break below parity in the near-term, especially if wider BTP-Bund spreads in the coming three months are the key catalyst behind the TPI’s activation.  Chart 10Eurozone IG Debt Is Attractive Chart 11The TPI Will Help The Euro, Eventually Finally, last week’s policy development is unlikely to affect the absolute performance of European stocks. European equities remain mostly impacted by the fluctuations in global stock prices and the shifting probability of a recession in Europe this winter in response to the evolving energy crisis on the continent. European equities are inexpensive, and the probability of a recession is declining as a result of the resumption of natural gas flows from Russia. Crucially, the broadening trend toward coal utilization this winter and the growing list of deals that Europe is striking to secure non-Russian gas supplies suggest the impact of Russian cutoffs this winter could be more limited than once feared. Moreover, we expect European governments to hose their economies with stimulus if a crisis does emerge, which would both limit the depth of the crisis and prompt a rapid rebound in activity once winter ends. However, the inattention of the ECB to recession risks suggests that European equities could lag US equities in the near term. Bottom Line: The differences in r-star across Europe mean that the ECB will be forced to activate the TPI before year-end in order to hike interest rates further. Practically, this means that medium- to long-term investors should overweight Italian bonds at the current level of spreads. Short-term investors should remain on the sidelines; the political situation in Italy is still dangerous, and speculators are likely to test the ECB’s resolve. This also means that the euro is attractive as a long-term play, but it still carries large left-tail risk in the near term. While investors should favor European investment-grade bonds in USD-hedged terms relative to the US, European equities are likely to continue to suffer headwinds compared to US stocks.   Mathieu Savary, Chief European Strategist Mathieu@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes   1     In fact, it will soon be 20 r-star since Croatia will join the euro on January 1, 2023.

Listen to a short summary of this report.     Executive Summary The odds of a recession in the US are lower than widely perceived. The probability of a recession is higher in Europe, although this week’s partial resumption of gas flows through the Nord Stream 1 pipeline, along with increased use of coal-fired power plants, should soften the blow. Chinese growth should rebound in the second half of the year. However, the specter of future lockdowns, the shift in global spending away from manufactured goods towards services, and the weakening property sector will continue to weigh on activity. With the Twentieth Party Congress slated for later this year, it is increasingly likely that the authorities will open up a firehose of stimulus. Fading recession risks will buoy stocks in the near term. However, a brighter economic outlook also means that the Fed, and several other central banks, may see little need to cut policy rates in 2023, as the markets are currently discounting. The end result is that government bond yields will rise from current levels, implying that stock valuations will not return to last year’s levels even if a recession is averted. After Rapidly Raising Rates, Markets Expect Some DM Central Banks To Start Easing Next Year Bottom Line: We recommend a modest overweight on global equities for now but would turn neutral if the S&P 500 were to rise above 4,050.   Dear Client, I am delighted to announce that Ritika Mankar, CFA, has joined the Global Investment Strategy team. Ritika will be writing occasional special reports on a variety of topical issues. Next week, she will make the case that the US economy’s ability to spawn mega-sized companies may become increasingly compromised over the next decade. Best regards, Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist The Case for a Soft Landing in the US Chart 1Cyclicals Underperformed Defensives As Recession Risks Intensified Over the last few months, investors have become concerned that the Fed and many other central banks will need to engineer a recession in order to bring inflation down to more comfortable levels. While these fears have abated over the past trading week, they still continue to dominate market action (Chart 1). We place the odds of a US recession at about 40%. This is arguably more optimistic than the consensus view. According to Bank of America, the majority of fund managers saw recession as likely in this month’s survey. Not surprisingly, investors consider recession to be a major risk for equities over the next 12 months (Chart 2). Chart 2Many Investors Now See Recession As Baked In The Cake Even if a recession does occur, we have contended that it will likely be a mild one, perhaps so mild that it will be difficult to distinguish it from a soft landing. A number of things make a soft landing in the US more probable than in the past: Labor supply has scope to increase. The labor participation rate is still 1.2 percentage points below its pre-pandemic level, two-thirds of which is due to decreased participation among workers under the age of 55 (Chart 3). The share of workers holding multiple jobs is also below its pre-pandemic level (Chart 4). The number of multiple job holders has been rising briskly lately. That is one reason why job growth in the payroll survey – which double counts workers if they hold more than one job – has been stronger than job growth in the household survey. Increased labor supply would obviate the need for the Fed to take drastic actions to curtail labor demand in its effort to restore balance to the labor market. Chart 3Labor Supply Has Scope To Rise Chart 4The Number Of Multiple Job Holders Is Still Below Pre-Pandemic Levels A high level of job openings creates a moat around the labor market. There are almost two times as many job openings as there are unemployed workers in the US (Chart 5). Many firms are likely to pull job openings before they cut jobs in response to a slowing economy. A high level of job openings will also allow workers who lose their jobs to find employment more quickly than usual, thus limiting the rise in so-called frictional unemployment. It is worth noting that the job openings rate has declined from a record 7.3% in March to a still-high 6.9% in May, with no change in the unemployment rate over this period. Chart 5A High Level Of Job Openings Creates A Moat Around The Labor Market A steep Phillips curve implies that only a modest increase in unemployment may be necessary to knock down inflation towards the Fed’s target. Just as was the case in the 1960s, the Phillips curve has proven to be kinked near full employment (Chart 6). Unlike in the late 1960s, however, when rising realized inflation caused long-term inflation expectations to reset higher, expectations have remained well anchored this time around (Chart 7). Chart 6The Phillips Curve Is Kinked At Very Low Levels Of Unemployment Chart 7Long-Term Inflation Expectations Are Well Anchored   The unwinding of pandemic and war-related dislocations should push down inflation. A recent study by the San Francisco Fed estimates that about half of May’s PCE inflation print was the result of supply-side disturbances (Chart 8). While the ongoing war in Ukraine and the threat of another Covid wave in China will continue to unsettle global supply chains, these problems should fade over time. Falling inflation would allow real wages to start rising again. This would bolster confidence, making a soft landing more likely (Chart 9). Chart 8Supply Factors Explain Half Of The Increase In Prices Over The Past Year Chart 9Positive Real Wage Growth Will Bolster Consumer Confidence A lack of major financial imbalances makes the US economy more resilient to economic shocks. As a share of disposable income, US household debt is 34 percentage points below its 2008 peak (Chart 10). Relative to net worth, household debt is at multi-decade lows. About two-thirds of mortgages carry a FICO score above 760 compared to only one-third during the housing bubble (Chart 11). Non-mortgage consumer credit also remains in good shape, as my colleague Doug Peta elaborated in this week’s US Investment Strategy report. While corporate debt has risen over the past decade, the ratio of corporate debt-to-assets today is still below where it was during the 1990s. Moreover, thanks to stronger corporate profitability, the interest coverage ratio is near an all-time high (Chart 12).   Chart 10AUS Household Debt Is Not Especially High Anymore (I) Chart 10BUS Household Debt Is Not Especially High Anymore (II) Chart 11FICO Scores For Residential Mortgages Have Improved Considerably Since The Pre-GFC Housing Bubble Chart 12Corporate Balance Sheets Are In Decent Shape Chart 13Tight Supply Limits The Downside Risks To Housing Just like the US does not suffer from major financial imbalances, it does not suffer from any major economic imbalances either. The homeowner vacancy rate is near a record low, which should put a floor under residential investment (Chart 13). Outside of investment in intellectual property, which is not especially sensitive to the business cycle, nonresidential investment is still below pre-pandemic levels and not much above where it was as a share of GDP during the Great Recession (Chart 14). Spending on consumer durable goods has retraced four-fifths of its pandemic surge, with little ill-effect on aggregate employment (Chart 15). Chart 14Outside Of IP, Nonresidential Investment Is Still Low Chart 15Spending On Durable Goods Has Been Normalizing Without Derailing The Economy Europe: A Deep Freeze Will Likely Be Avoided Chart 16Russia Can Potentially Cause Significant Economic Damage In The EU If It Closes The Taps The macroeconomic picture is less benign outside the US. Four years ago, German diplomats laughed off warnings that their country had become dangerously dependent on Russian energy. They are not laughing anymore. German industry, just like industry across much of Europe, is facing a major energy crunch. The IMF estimates that output losses associated with a full Russian gas shutoff over the next 12 months could amount to as much as 2.7% of GDP in the EU (Chart 16). In Central and Eastern Europe, output could shrink by 6%. Among the major economies, Germany and Italy are the most at risk. Fortunately, Europe is finally stepping up to the challenge. The highly ambitious REPowerEU plan seeks to displace two-thirds of Russian gas by the end of 2022. The plan does not include any additional energy that could be generated by increased usage of coal-fired power plants, a strategy that the European political establishment (including the German Green Party!) has only recently begun to champion. It is possible that EU leaders felt the need to generate a crisis mentality to justify the decision to burn more coal. Dire warnings about how Europe is prepared to ration gas also send a message to Russia that the EU is ready to suffer in order to thwart Putin’s despotic regime. Whether Europe actually follows through is a different story. It is worth noting that the Nord Stream 1 pipeline resumed operations this week after Germany received, over Ukrainian objections, a repaired turbine from Canada. The resumption of partial flows through the pipeline, along with increased fiscal support for households and firms, reduces the risks of a “deep freeze” recession in Europe. The unveiling of the ECB’s new Transmission Protection Instrument (TPI) this week should also help anchor sovereign credit spreads across the euro area. While the exact conditions under which the TPI will be engaged have yet to be fleshed out, we expect the terms to be fairly liberal, reflecting not only the lessons learned from last decade’s euro debt crisis, but also to serve as a powerful bulwark against Putin’s efforts to destabilize the EU economy. China: Government’s Growth Target Looks Increasingly Unrealistic Stronger growth in China would help European exporters (Chart 17). Chinese real GDP grew by just 0.4% in the second quarter from a year earlier as the economy was battered by Covid lockdowns. Activity should pick up in the second half of the year, but at this point, the government’s 5.5% growth target looks completely unachievable. The specter of future lockdowns, the shift in global spending away from manufactured goods towards services, and the weakening Chinese property sector are all weighing on the economy (Chart 18). Chart 17European Exporters Would Welcome A Stronger Chinese Economy The authorities will likely seek to stimulate the economy by allowing local governments to bring forward $220 billion in bond issuance that had been originally slated for 2023. The problem is that land sales – the main source of local government revenue – have collapsed. Worried about the ability of local governments to service their obligations, both retail investors and banks have shied away from buying local government debt. Chart 18A Slowing Property Market And Covid Lockdowns Have Been Weighing On The Chinese Economy Meanwhile, the inability of property developers to secure adequate financing to complete construction projects has left a growing number of home buyers in the lurch. In most cases, these properties were purchased off-the-plan. Understandably, home buyers have balked at the prospect of having to make mortgage payments on properties that they do not possess.  With the Twentieth Party Congress slated for later this year, it is increasingly likely that the authorities will open up a firehose of stimulus, including increased assistance for property developers and banks, as well as income-support measures for households. While such measures will not address China’s myriad structural problems, they will help keep the economy afloat. Equity Valuations in a Soft-Landing Scenario A few weeks ago, the consensus view was that stocks would tumble in the second half of the year as the global economy fell into recession but would then rally in 2023 as central banks began lowering rates. We argued the opposite, namely that stocks would likely rebound in the second half of the year as the economy outperformed expectations but would then face renewed pressure in 2023 as it became clear that the Fed and several other central banks had no reason to cut rates (Chart 19). Chart 19After Rapidly Raising Rates, Markets Expect Some DM Central Banks To Start Easing Next Year Chart 20Real Rates Have Jumped This Year In a baseline scenario where a recession is averted, we argued that the S&P 500 could rise to 4,500 (60% odds). In contrast, we noted that the S&P 500 could fall to 3,500 in a mild recession scenario (30% odds) and to 2,900 in a deep recession scenario (10% odds). It is worth stressing that even at 4,500, the S&P 500 would still be 11% lower in real terms than it was on January 4th. At the stock market’s peak in January, the 10-year TIPS yield stood at -0.91%, while the 30-year TIPS yield stood at -0.27%. Today, they stand at 0.58% and 0.93%, respectively (Chart 20). If real rates do not return to their prior lows, it is unlikely that equity valuations will return to their prior highs. This limits the upside for stocks, even in a soft-landing scenario. The sharp rally in stocks over the past week has priced out some of this recession risk, moving equity valuations closer towards what we regard as fair value. As we noted last week, we will turn neutral on equities if the S&P 500 were to rise above 4,050. As we go to press, we are only 1.3% from that level.   Peter Berezin Chief Global Strategist peterb@bcaresearch.com Follow me on         LinkedIn & Twitter Global Investment Strategy View Matrix Special Trade Recommendations Current MacroQuant Model Scores    

Executive Summary Upside Oil Price Risk Dominates Despite global recession fears and uncertainty over Russia’s retaliation for the EU embargo against its exports, oil markets will continue to tighten. After breaching $15/bbl in June, the Dec22 vs Dec23 Brent backwardation – our preferred seasonal indicator for inventory tightness – is back above $10/bbl and rising.  There is an increasing risk Russia will cut crude output, if G7 states impose a price cap on its oil sales.  Our modeling indicates the loss of an additional 2mm b/d of Russian output vs our base case beginning in 4Q22 would lift prices above $220/bbl by 4Q23. On the downside, our modeling indicates the loss of 2mm b/d of demand vs our base case – i.e., essentially wiping out this year’s expected growth – would push average Brent prices toward $60/bbl next year. Our base case forecast for Brent crude oil is unchanged.  We expect 2022 Brent to average $110/bbl, and for 2023 prices to average $117/bbl.  WTI will trade $3-$4/bbl below Brent. Bottom Line: We expect markets to continue to tighten as the EU embargo of Russia oil progresses.  A price cap on Russian oil sales could lead to a production cut that takes prices above $220/bbl by 4Q23.  An economic collapse could push Brent toward $60/bbl.  Risks remain skewed to the upside.  Our base case Brent price forecast remains unchanged: $110/bbl on average this year and $117/bbl in 2023. Feature The global oil market is tightening even with China demand restrained by its zero-Covid-19 tolerance policy, and parts of Europe almost surely facing recession if Russian pipeline gas supplies are cut off or tighten significantly between now and the approach of winter. Upside price risk dominates, in our view. Our Brent price forecast remains unchanged, averaging $110/bbl this year and $117/bbl in 2023. Markets remain tight: Oil supply will remain below demand, which will force inventories to draw (Chart 1). Related Report  Commodity & Energy StrategyRecession Unlikely To Batter Oil Prices This will push Brent into a steeper backwardation going into year-end, forcing the Dec22 v Dec23 Brent spread higher (Chart 2). High levels of backwardation – i.e., prompt-delivery futures trading above deferred-delivery futures – is how inventory tightness manifests itself: Refiners are willing to pay more for prompt delivery than deferred delivery, because they need oil now to meet demand. This is occurring despite weaker demand coming out of China and EU states, as the latter begins to ration energy supplies ahead of the coming winter. Chart 1Inventories Will Tighten Chart 2Markets Will Backwardate Further Russia Risk Is Increasing The supply-side risks that we outlined in last week's report — chiefly the risk Russia will unilaterally cut oil supply if a price cap is imposed by G7 states led by the US – remain in place. We expect the EU to follow through on its commitment to phase out all Russian oil and refined product imports in 2H22 and 1Q23. The EU formally agreed to cut 90% of its Russian oil imports by the end of this year. The EU’s goal is to be completely out of ~ 2.3mm b/d of seaborne crude oil imports and 800k b/d of pipeline imports this year. In 1Q23, the EU will be reducing its refined product imports (e.g., diesel fuel) from Russia as well. Russia will lose more than 4mm b/d of crude and product exports to the EU as a result of these embargoes. We continue to expect the cutoffs in EU exports will result in Russia being forced to shut in 1.6mm b/d of production this year and another 500k b/d next year. In our base case, we expect this to take Russian crude production down from more than 10.5mm b/d prior to its invasion of Ukraine to something close to 8.0mm b/d by the end of next year. Spare capacity remains tight. Almost all of OPEC 2.0’s spare capacity is in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). These are the only two OPEC 2.0 states that are able to increase production and maintain it at higher levels for an indefinite period of time. Despite repeated pleas from the US, these states continue to indicate they do not see the need to sharply increase oil production, even after US President Joe Biden made a trip to the region last week to ask them in person to do so. With ~ 2-3mm b/d of spare capacity available – the exact level is not public knowledge – digging into spare capacity now would leave nothing in the tank, so to speak, to meet another supply shock (e.g., a unilateral cut-off of Russian supplies in response to a G7 price cap on oil sales). KSA, as a matter of policy, maintains a minimal level of spare capacity (1.0 – 1.5mm b/d) to handle unforeseen supply shocks. In addition, the OPEC 2.0 agreement to return production removed from the market during the COVID-19 pandemic agreed last July, and the US release of 1mm b/d of inventories out of its Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) both expire in September.1 The US SPR has not indicated it will extend its release of inventory beyond September. Markets will tighten. The return of barrels from OPEC 2.0 is largely moot, since only KSA and the UAE – which we dub Core OPEC 2.0 – have been able to consistently raise output since the July 2021 agreement to return barrels to the market. The other OPEC 2.0 member states – the “Other Guys” – have consistently missed their production quotas this past year (Chart 3). Lastly, the odds of the US and Iran reaching a rapprochement continue to fade, almost to the point of vanishing. Iran reportedly will supply Russia with drones for its war in Ukraine. This indicates the Iranian government has all but capitulated on reviving its nuclear deal with the US, which would have brought an additional 1mm b/d back on the market.2 Outside of OPEC 2.0, we expect US production in the Lower 48 states ex-US Gulf will increase 0.8mm b/d this year, and 0.75mm b/d next year, given price levels and the shape of the WTI forward curve (Chart 4). This is mostly unchanged from previous production expectations. Chart 3Lower OPEC 2.0 Production ex-KSA, UAE Chart 4Capital Discipline Drives US Shale Production Growth We continue to expect US shale-oil producers will maintain capital discipline, and will continue to prioritize shareholder interests by returning capital to investors via share buybacks and strong dividend distributions. Besides, boosting output over the balance of this year is becoming increasingly difficult, given oil-services equipment shortages and lack of capital.3 In our base case, we continue to anticipate demand will rise by 2.0mm b/d this year and 1.8mm b/d next year. This is lower than our estimates at the start of the year by close to 3mm b/d. This is all down to the sharp GDP growth slowdown forecast by the World Bank last month, which pushed our oil-demand estimates lower.4 Oil demand continues to grow, albeit it slowly, which, against a backdrop of tightening supplies, means the risk to prices remains to the upside. In our base case, the supply-demand fundamentals are largely balanced (Chart 5). These fundamentals (Table 1) are driving our forecast for $110/bbl Brent this year and $117/bbl next year (Chart 6). Chart 5Markets Remain Finely Balanced Chart 6Brent Backwardation Will Steepen Table 1BCA Global Oil Supply - Demand Balances (MMb/d, Base Case Balances) To Dec23 Uncertain Evolutions: Between $60 And $220/bbl We have noted the heightened uncertainty surrounding our oil-price expectations, which makes forecasting more tentative than usual.5 This week, we consider larger supply and demand shocks via econometric simulations to at least define possible price paths consistent with our assumptions and modeling. To the upside, we estimate a 2mm b/d loss of output resulting from a cutoff of Russian crude oil production. Relative to the status quo ante – i.e., prior to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February – this would remove a total of ~ 4mm b/d of Russian production from the market (2mm in our base case plus an additional 2mm b/d). Our modeling indicates this could push prices above $220/bbl by 4Q23, depending on how the additional 2mm b/d production cut is implemented – i.e., suddenly or staged pro-rata (Chart 7).6 This high-price scenario would be difficult for markets to adjust to, given the short-term inelasticity of global oil demand. In its wake, we would expect demand destruction on a large scale. Chart 7Upside Oil Price Risk Dominates On the downside, we simulate a sharp contraction in oil consumption that removes an additional 2mm b/d of demand vs our base case – i.e., essentially wiping out this year’s expected growth. This would push average 2023 prices toward $60/bbl in our modeling. Losing this much demand would amount to a global economic collapse. A deep global recession cannot be ruled out, as markets have been reminding us over the past couple of weeks. However, the downside risks are not as pronounced as the upside risks in our estimation. There has not been an excessive accumulation of inventory in the OECD, as Chart 1 indicates. In the non-OECD economies, inventory accumulation in China appears to be intentional and policy driven. In addition, the supply response to sharply lower prices would be met by sharply lower production by KSA and the UAE, along with the US shale-oil producers over the course of a couple of months. This would arrest the down leg a demand shock produced in previous oil-price collapses when production was not as flexible, and inventories adjusted with longer lags. Economic growth in the EU could slow in some but not all of the member states, according to recent IMF estimates.7 The US may slow, and is at risk to a hard landing due to poorly calibrated Fed tightening. This could usher in a deep recession. However, the US also might even benefit from the EU going into recession, since it is not as resource constrained as the EU. Lastly, the EU’s been getting ready for this Russian energy cut-off and has lined up alternative energy sources (LNG and coal mostly). In addition, states already have begun asking their citizens to conserve energy, particularly natural gas. This forced conservation can achieve significant energy savings and is not new to the world: It was demonstrated by Japan after the Fukushima disaster in 2011 and the US in the late 1970s. Investment Implications Our base case oil-price forecast remains $110/bbl and $117/bbl on average for this year and next. Simulations of uncertain prices evolutions – i.e., evolutions we cannot attach a probability to at present – indicate upside price risk is dominant. This inclines us to remain long oil equities via the XOP ETF. We were tactically long 4Q22 and 1Q23 TTF futures until stop losses on both trades were elected on July 15th, generating returns of 89.6% and 83.1% respectively.   Robert P. Ryan Chief Commodity & Energy Strategist rryan@bcaresearch.com Ashwin Shyam Research Analyst Commodity & Energy Strategy ashwin.shyam@bcaresearch.com Paula Struk Research Associate Commodity & Energy Strategy paula.struk@bcaresearch.com     Commodities Round-Up Energy: Bullish Markets will await the conclusion of maintenance on the Nord Stream 1 (NS1) pipeline scheduled for this week. We continue to expect a cut-off of Russian natgas shipments to Europe, in addition to the 60% of volumes that already have been cut. In its latest GDP forecasts, the IMF expects EU GDP growth of 2.9% and 2.5% in 2022 and 2023, respectively. In and of itself, this would support our expectation for oil prices averaging $110/bbl and $117/bbl this year and next, as it is in line with the GDP forecast expected by the World Bank, which drives our forecasts. However, EU GDP still could contract in response to a complete shut-off of Russian gas imports in 2H22, particularly if it is sudden and prompts the EU to go to Phase 3 of its energy emergency plan and invoke gas rationing. EU gas inventories continue to build going into winter (Chart 8). Markets are critically dialed in to how the inventory builds ahead of winter proceed following NS1 maintenance: If it is delayed for technical reasons the storage fill rate will slow. Base Metals: Bullish China formally created a state-backed company to oversee all of its iron ore imports and overseas ore assets on Tuesday. The purpose of this company is to wrest pricing power away from iron ore suppliers – most of which are based in Australia – and reduce its reliance on Australian iron ore imports. A single buying entity will effectively create a monopsony, since China imports ~70% of global iron ore to supply its steel making industry, the largest in the world. Precious Metals: Bullish We have tactically downgraded our gold view on the back of continued USD strength. Reports of civil unrest in China – which was forecast by BCA’s Geopolitical Strategy - arising from the unfolding mortgage crisis likely will boost demand for gold, but it will boost demand for USD even more, in our view (Chart 9). We are closely monitoring this situation, along with possible increases in systemic financial risk in Chinese banks, which also would support USD demand. We remain strategically bullish gold. Chart 8 Chart 9       Footnotes 1     Please see OPEC+ agrees oil supply boost after UAE, Saudi reach compromise and U.S. to sell up to 45 mln bbls oil from reserve as part of historic release published by reuters.com on July 19, 2021 and June 14, 2022, respectively. OPEC 2.0 is our moniker for the producer coalition led by KSA and Russia; it also is referred to as OPEC+ in the media. 2     This could presage an unravelling of the status quo in the Middle East, as our colleagues at BCA Research’s Geopolitical Strategy highlight in their most recent report Questions From The Road published on July 15, 2022. 3    Please see Fracking Growth ‘Almost Impossible’ This Year, Halliburton Says, published by bloomberg.com on July 19, 2022. 4    Please see Recession Unlikely To Batter Oil Prices, which we published on June 16, 2022. It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 5    Running simulations is a good way to identify risks and at least have an intuition for where prices might go given difference evolutions of fundamentals. Please see Russia Pulls Oil, Gas Supply Strings for discussions and simulations of prices in response to different supply and shocks we ran last week. 6    The timing and depth of the shocks we simulate here are not assigned a probability to express our view of their likelihood. This reflects our belief that these are highly uncertain outcomes. That said, having an intuition for what to expect should the markets evolve in such a way as to create a probability one of these outcomes has become likely is useful. 7     The smaller EU economies are most at risk to sharp economic downturns from a cutoff in Russian gas exports, according to the IMF. The Fund estimates that in “Hungary, the Slovak Republic and the Czech Republic—there is a risk of shortages of as much as 40 percent of gas consumption and of gross domestic product shrinking by up to 6 percent.” Please see How a Russian Natural Gas Cutoff Could Weigh on Europe’s Economies published by the IMF on July 19, 2022. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations We were stopped out of our Long 4Q22 TTF Futures trade on July 15, with a return of 89.6%. We were stopped out of our Long 1Q23 TTF Futures trade on July 15, with a  return of 83.1%.  Strategic Recommendations Trades Closed in 2022