Government

Highlights When interest rates are ultra-low, central banks have no margin for policy error. A small loosening or tightening has the potential to produce either a stall or catastrophic turbulence. The analogy is flying a plane at high altitude. Bond investors should have a strong preference for U.S. T-bonds over German bunds (currency hedged). Currency investors should prefer the euro over the dollar. For equity investors, valuations do not appear structurally attractive anywhere, once a sufficient equity risk premium is factored in. But a setback in the region of 5-10% could create a tactical entry point. Feature As the ECB Governing Council convenes for its October monetary policy meeting, an experience familiar to pilots1 provides a perfect analogy for central banks' very limited margin for error. Pilots call the experience "flying in coffin corner." Chart of the WeekUnusually High Turbulence For The German 30-Year Bund Next time you're in a plane climbing to 35,000 feet, here's something to think about; or perhaps, not to think about. As the plane gains altitude, its stall speed increases while its upper speed limit simultaneously decreases. For the pilot, this means less and less margin for error (Figure I-1). The plane's stall speed is the minimum speed to generate sufficient lift. At higher altitude, as the air gets thinner, the stall speed increases. Meanwhile, the plane's upper speed limit is set by the speed of sound. Airliners cannot fly too close to the speed of sound because the sonic shockwave produces violent and catastrophic turbulence. At higher altitude, as the air temperature drops, so does the speed of sound. Which means the plane's upper speed limit decreases. By the time the plane has reached the rarefied atmosphere of 35,000 feet, these lower and upper speed limits are barely 25 knots (30mph) apart,2 leaving almost no room for flight data misinterpretation or pilot error.3 Hence, at high altitude pilots morbidly say they are "flying in coffin corner." Analogously, in the rarefied atmosphere of zero or near-zero interest rates, central bank policy is also in coffin corner. When short-term and long-term interest rates approach the zero bound, there is no room for economic data misinterpretation or policy error. A small loosening or tightening of monetary policy has the potential to produce either a stall or catastrophic turbulence (Figure I-2 and Chart of the Week). Figure I-1Flying At High Altitude ##br## Has No Margin For Error Figure I-2Monetary Policy At Ultra-Low Rates ##br##Has No Margin For Error Avoiding A Stall At today's zero or near-zero interest rates in the euro area, a small loosening of monetary policy risks stalling the banking system, and thereby stalling the economy. A bank's core business is simple. Take in deposits, and lend them out at a higher interest rate than the deposit-rate - with the difference in the two defining the bank's net interest margin. A part of the net interest margin is a compensation for the risk of non-performing loans. This should be profit-neutral if correctly priced. The other large part of the net interest margin comes from the interest rate term-structure, as loans tend to be long-term while deposits are short-term. Hence, all else being equal, the bank's profitability suffers as the term-structure flattens. For a while, the bank can protect its profitability by cutting the interest rate paid on short-term deposits to well below the policy rate. However, once the policy rate hits zero, this profit-protection strategy hits a wall - because a negative deposit rate would risk an exodus of deposits into cash or cash-substitutes. Alternatively, the bank could charge a higher rate to borrowers, but this would tighten credit conditions. The third possibility is for the bank to suffer a hit to its already-thin net lending margin, but this would also tighten credit conditions. The pressure on the bank's profitability and share price would increase the cost of equity, making it harder to raise capital (Chart I-2). Given that an insufficient capital buffer is a major constraint to euro area bank lending, this would be a de facto tightening of credit conditions. The paradox is that at the zero bound, the smallest additional monetary loosening - via interest rate cuts or QE - risks stalling euro area bank credit creation (Chart I-3). Thereby it risks stalling economic growth. Chart I-2The ECB's QE Has Hurt Bank Valuations Chart I-3The Interplay Between Bank Profits And Bank Credit Creation Avoiding Violent Turbulence An extended period of ultra-low interest rates, and a commitment to keep them structurally low, has compressed the yields on government bonds pushing up their prices. As competing asset classes, the prices of corporate bonds and equities have also increased. This phenomenon is called the Portfolio Balance Effect. The big problem is that the prices of riskier assets have increased by more than is justified by the portfolio balance effect alone. This distortion is the result of a behavioural finance phenomenon called Mental Accounting Bias. Mental Accounting Bias describes the irrational distinction between the return from an investment's yield and that from its capital growth. The distinction is irrational because the money that comes from yield and the money that comes from capital growth is perfectly fungible.4 Rationally, what should matter is an investment's total return. But psychologically, the distinction between yield and capital is very stark. Fears about self-control cause people to compartmentalise yield as spending money and capital as saving money. Hence, people who want their investments to generate spending money - say, retirees - have an irrational focus on yield. Traditionally, the safe income from cash and government bonds satiates the people who irrationally focus on yield. However, in recent years, central banks' extended experiments with ZIRP, NIRP and QE have forced these yield-focussed investors out of cash and government bonds into risky investments. And just like every distortion, this phenomenon has generated memes to justify the act: 'reach for yield', 'search for yield', and 'there is no alternative' (TINA). But the irrational focus on yield instead of total return has artificially bid up the prices of risky investments. To the point that they no longer offer a sufficient risk premium5 for the very real possibility of substantial losses over a 5-10 year horizon (Chart I-4 and Chart I-5). The unfortunate thing is that as central bankers have little expertise in psychology or behavioural finance, they have been blind to the very dangerous behavioural distortion that their monetary policy experiments have unwittingly unleashed. Chart I-4A Positive Yield On Equities##br## Can Produce A Negative 5-Year Return... Chart I-5...And Even A Negative ##br##10-Year Return The risk is that the smallest monetary tightening could trigger an aggressive unwinding of this behavioural distortion. Recall the violent turbulence in global financial markets at the start of the year after just one 25bps rate hike from the Federal Reserve. Now consider what might happen if the Fed hiked again and the ECB simultaneously announced a rapid tapering of its QE program. How Must The Pilots Fly? In a rarefied atmosphere, pilots have very little margin to alter speed without inducing a stall or violent turbulence. The same applies to central banks today. The ECB has the hardest piloting task. It is becoming difficult to justify the current aggressive pace of QE given the danger of stalling the euro area banking system; and given that the euro area's nominal GDP and nominal wage bill are both growing at a very respectable 3% (Chart I-6). But an abrupt end to the ECB's QE could create violent turbulence in QE-distorted financial markets. Chart I-6What Deflation Threat? Euro Area Nominal GDP And The Wage Bill Growing At 3% Hence, the ECB's best course of action is to hint at a very gradual deceleration of QE to start at some point in the second half of 2017. Turning to developed economy central banks in general, we remind readers of a very powerful observation. Since 2008, no major central bank has been able to hike interest rates by more than 1.75%. And every central bank that has hiked rates has had to start unwinding those hikes within a year, ultimately taking the policy rate to a new all-time low (Chart I-7 and Chart I-8). Chart I-7Since 2008, All Rate Hikes ##br##Have Been Quickly Reversed Chart I-8Will The U.S. Be ##br##Any Different? No Given the turbulence that rate hikes will generate in the financial markets and/or the economy, we fully expect the Federal Reserve to go through exactly the same experience. The important upshot is that global central bank policy through 2017-18 will be considerably less divergent than is discounted. Bond yields could creep higher in the short term. But on a 1-year horizon, bond investors should have a strong preference for U.S. T-bonds over euro area bonds, and especially over German bunds (currency hedged). Over the same horizon, currency investors should prefer the euro over the dollar. For equity investors, valuations do not appear structurally attractive anywhere once a sufficient equity risk premium is factored in. Moreover, the potential for ECB QE-tapering combined with expectations for a Fed rate hike could generate some near-term turbulence. That said, a setback in the region of 5-10% could create an excellent entry point for a 3-month trade. Dhaval Joshi, Senior Vice President European Investment Strategy dhaval@bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading Model* There are no new trades this week. Last week's long silver/short lead pair trade has bounced sharply. And the short U.K. A-rated corporate bonds trade has achieved its 4% profit target. For any investment, excessive trend following and groupthink can reach a natural point of instability, at which point the established trend is highly likely to break down with or without an external catalyst. An early warning sign is the investment's fractal dimension approaching its natural lower bound. Encouragingly, this trigger has consistently identified countertrend moves of various magnitudes across all asset classes. Chart I-9 * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report "Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model," dated December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com The post-June 9, 2016 fractal trading model rules are: When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. Use the position size multiple to control risk. The position size will be smaller for more risky positions. 1 Your author is a former pilot in the Royal Air Force reserve. 2 For an Airbus A330. 3 Tragically, a combination of flight data misinterpretation and pilot error at 35,000 feet was disastrous for Air France flight AF447 flying from Rio de Janeiro to Paris in June 2009. Going through a storm, the airspeed indicator started giving a false reading and the pilot took the wrong corrective action, resulting in a catastrophic stall. 4 Assuming no difference in tax treatment of income and capital gains. 5 Please see the European Investment Strategy Weekly Report "The Great Distortion... And How It will End" dated September 15, 2016 available at eis.bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading Model Recommendations Equities Bond & Interest Rates Currency & Other Positions Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch ##br##- Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch ##br##- Interest Rate Expectations

Special Report

Highlights Muni Credit Cycle: The reading from our Municipal Health Monitor supports low Muni/Treasury yield ratios for now, but will become less supportive near the end of 2017. This is consistent with historical lags between the muni and corporate credit cycles. Issuance: State & local government investment spending will increase in 2017, as will muni issuance for new capital. Pensions: The pension funding problem will only get worse in the coming years. Credit ratings do not adequately reflect the risk from under-funded pensions. Election: Muni/Treasury yield ratios have not yet discounted Donald Trump's recent plunge in the polls. Maintain an overweight allocation to municipal bonds for the time being, but stand prepared to gradually reduce exposure as the muni credit cycle starts to turn in late 2017. Feature The financial crisis marked a major inflection point in the municipal bond market. Not only did the economic fall-out from the housing crash lead to historically large state & local government budget gaps, but the end of bond insurance and a growing realization that municipal default is possible have focused investor attention on credit quality more than ever before. In this Special Report we zero-in on the Municipal/Treasury (M/T) yield ratio.1 We identify its major short-run and long-run drivers, and assess where it is headed in the context of the municipal bond credit cycle. The Longer-Run Outlook For Yield Ratios An important input to our understanding of the municipal credit cycle is our Muni Health Monitor (MHM). The MHM is a composite of eight indicators of state & local government budget health. Full details of the indicator and its components can be found in the Appendix to this report. The MHM has an excellent track record of signaling the major inflection points in muni ratings migration (Chart 1). We observe that the MHM bottomed in 2006, one year before the previous trough in ratings migration. The MHM also crossed into "deteriorating health" territory six months before municipal downgrades started to outpace upgrades in 2008. More recently, the MHM crossed back into "improving health" territory in Q4 2012. Muni ratings migration also peaked in Q4 2012 and upgrades began outpacing downgrades in Q4 2014. Chart 1The Municipal Health Monitor Leads Ratings We pay attention to the trends in muni ratings because ratings and state & local government net borrowing explain more than 50% of the variation in the average M/T yield ratio since 1997 (Chart 2). Further, increased investor focus on the creditworthiness of municipal issues has made the yield ratio even more responsive to ratings and net borrowing since the Great Recession. So where are we currently situated in the muni credit cycle? The MHM remains in "improving health" territory, but appears to have entered an extended bottoming-out phase. Given the re-leveraging that has already occurred in the corporate sector, it would be extremely unusual for the MHM to improve further during this cycle. In fact, our Corporate Health Monitor tends to lead the MHM by about two years (Chart 3). This squares with what we know about the behavior of state & local governments throughout the economic cycle. Chart 2The Muni Credit Cycle Illustrated I Chart 3The Muni Credit Cycle Illustrated II Typically, the corporate sector will increase debt loads when times are good and will then be forced to de-lever when the economy enters recession, profits contract and those debt loads become unsustainable. State & local government budget gaps, on the other hand, will tend to narrow during an economic recovery as rapid income growth translates into increased tax revenue. It is only during a recession that state & local government budget gaps widen, since tax revenue plummets while expenditure growth - particularly for social benefits - remains firm. The end result is that the municipal credit cycle tends to lag the corporate credit cycle. This is also apparent in the ratings data (Chart 3, bottom panel), which suggest that we should expect to see muni downgrades (and hence yield ratios) head higher near the end of next year. The typical lag between the corporate credit cycle and the municipal credit cycle suggests that M/T yield ratios should remain well behaved until late-2017, and then begin to move higher. However, the extraordinary length of the current economic recovery gives us some cause to believe that the lags in this cycle may be somewhat longer. We turn to a macro analysis of net state & local government borrowing to shed some further light on this issue. Net borrowing is simply the difference between revenues and expenditures. On the revenue side of the ledger, state & local governments have already seen a significant deceleration in tax receipts during the past year (Chart 4). Every source of tax revenue - except for property taxes - has slowed alongside what has been disappointing overall economic growth so far in 2016. While a return to the 10% revenue growth that was seen in the mid-2000s is unlikely, we expect most of the recent deceleration will soon be reversed. Aggregate weekly hours bounced sharply in September (Chart 5), and federal income tax withholdings also continue to grow rapidly. Both indicators suggest that income growth will be stronger during the next few months, which will support state & local tax receipts. On the expenditures side, while spending on social benefit programs has increased, state & local governments have largely dealt with budget gaps by cutting back severely on discretionary spending (Chart 6). Investment spending has also collapsed and, as a result, gross municipal bond issuance has been dominated by refinancing (Chart 6, bottom two panels). Chart 4S&L Government Revenue Chart 5Income Growth Will Rebound Chart 6S&L Government Expenditures This could all be about to change. Both U.S. Presidential candidates have prioritized infrastructure spending as part of their platforms. Hillary Clinton plans to increase infrastructure spending by $500 billion. This consists of $250 billion of federal infrastructure spending over the next five years and $25 billion of seed money to create a national infrastructure bank. The bank would also accept an additional $225 billion in direct loans. Clinton's plan would also bring back the Build America Bonds (BABs) program. Donald Trump has also expressed a desire to invest heavily in infrastructure, and has floated figures in the range of $1 trillion, although he has been less specific about the details. Historically, about 70% of public investment has occurred at the state & local government level (Chart 7). This suggests that if infrastructure spending became a priority it would lead to a large increase in state & local government investment and hence municipal bond issuance. However, with Clinton's plan it is still unclear whether the bulk of infrastructure spending would be financed through the Treasury market or the muni market. Certainly, to the extent that increased spending is financed through the BABs program, then tax-exempt muni issuance would not be impacted. In our view, state & local government investment spending will head higher in 2017 even without any support from the new President. The need for state & local governments to invest in infrastructure has been evident for some time, but only recently have budgets become healthy enough for governments to consider it. There is a strong correlation between state & local government investment spending and the net percentage of states with a total balance (general fund plus rainy day fund) that exceeds 5% of expenditures (Chart 8). This figure has just recently moved into positive territory and, not coincidentally, more than $200 billion worth of infrastructure spending will be on ballots requesting voter approval in November.2 Chart 7State & Local Government ##br##Drives Investment Chart 8Healthy Enough##br## To Invest The combination of resilient, but not surging, revenue growth and increased investment spending in 2017 is consistent with the idea that the muni credit cycle will follow the lead of the corporate cycle and start to turn near the end of next year. Bottom Line: The reading from our Municipal Health Monitor supports low Muni/Treasury yield ratios for now, but will become less supportive near the end of 2017. This is consistent with historical lags between the muni and corporate credit cycles. The Pension Problem Of course, the elephant in the room with regards to the long-run outlook for municipal credit quality is pensions. So far pensions have only entered our discussion of the muni credit cycle tangentially, since the pension funded ratio is a component of the MHM (see Appendix). However, large unfunded pension liabilities - should they persist - have the potential to be severely destabilizing for the muni market at some point in the future. According to the U.S. National Accounts, aggregate defined benefit pension entitlements at the state & local government level total $5.6 trillion, only 65% of which are currently funded by assets. However, this aggregate figure masks large divergences between a few municipalities with unsustainable pension liabilities and the majority of municipalities where pension liabilities are probably manageable. Chart 9Low Returns Put Pressure On Pensions In a recent report,3 the Center for Retirement Research at Boston College found that 36 states should be able to fund their existing liabilities by making annual payments that total less than 15% of revenue. However, five states - Illinois, New Jersey, Connecticut, Hawaii and Kentucky - require annual payments in excess of 25% of revenue. The breakdown is found to be similar at the city level, where pension costs were found to be manageable for the majority of cities, although Chicago, Detroit, San Jose, Miami, Houston, Baltimore, Wichita and Portland all face annual pension costs that exceed 40% of revenue. Unfortunately, while the pension situations of most municipalities are currently manageable, they are only likely to get worse. Changes in the aggregate pension funded ratio closely track returns from a portfolio that is 50% invested in the S&P 500 and 50% invested in the Barclays Treasury index (Chart 9). Based on current equity valuations, it is probably only reasonable to expect 6% annual nominal returns from the equity market during the next 10 years,4 and the 10-year Treasury yield suggests that 1.8% is a reasonable expectation for annual nominal Treasury returns. Taken together, annual nominal investment returns from a 50/50 portfolio during the next decade could be close to 4%, far below the historical average of 8.9% and also below the 7.6% average return assumed by state & local pension plans in 2014. The two main points are that: The pension problem is likely to get worse, not better Given that large under-funded pensions are concentrated in only a few states, inter-state muni allocations are very important On this second point, we observe that states with lower pension funded ratios have higher General Obligation (GO) bond yields (Chart 10), and also that not all of the difference is reflected in credit ratings. We ran a cross-sectional regression of GO bond yields against credit rating and found that a correlation remains between the residual from that regression and the pension funded ratio (Chart 11). In other words, credit rating does not adequately control for the risk presented by under-funded pensions. Chart 10Municipal Bond Yields Vs. Pension Funded Ratios Chart 11Municipal Bond Yields Vs. Pension Funded Ratios: Controlling For Credit Rating Bottom Line: The pension funding problem will only get worse in the coming years. Credit ratings do not adequately reflect the risk from under-funded pensions. The Short-Run Outlook For Yield Ratios So far we have discussed the muni credit cycle and noted that M/T yield ratios should begin to move higher on a sustained basis at some point near the end of 2017. However, the near-term drivers of M/T yield ratios suggest that an overweight allocation to municipal bonds remains appropriate for the time being. We have found that the bulk of near-term volatility in M/T ratios can be explained by four factors (Chart 12): The Global Policy Uncertainty Index5 Gross municipal bond issuance Net municipal mutual fund flows Ratings migration The Brexit shock to policy uncertainty has now mostly been reversed. Meanwhile, our Muni Excess Supply Indicator (Chart 12, panel 4) shows that gross issuance has been outpacing fund inflows of late. This should put upward pressure on yield ratios, although this pressure has been largely offset by still supportive ratings migration (Chart 12, bottom panel). Considering all factors, this short-term model shows that the average M/T yield ratio is close to fair value. A reading close to fair value is consistent with muni returns that should exceed those from duration-equivalent Treasuries most of the time (Table 1), even before adjusting for the muni tax advantage. In fact, Table 1 shows that the odds of muni underperformance only really increase once the M/T ratio appears more than one half standard deviation expensive on our model. Chart 12A Short-Term Muni Model Table 1Municipal Bond Excess Returns* Based On Fair Value Model** Residual: 2010 - 2016 The other near-term factor that supports a continued overweight allocation to municipal debt is the prospect of a Clinton victory in next month's election. Since the beginning of the year, the average M/T ratio has closely tracked the probability of a Trump election victory (Chart 13). The reasoning is entirely logical. Trump has promised large tax cuts for the highest earners. Such tax cuts would significantly de-value the tax advantage of municipal bonds and pressure yield ratios higher. In contrast, Clinton promises to raise taxes on high income individuals. This would make the tax advantage of municipal debt more valuable, and pressure yield ratios lower. Chart 13Trump Is Bad For Yield Ratios The average M/T yield ratio has not yet discounted Trump's recent plunge in the polls. This argues for the maintenance of an overweight allocation to municipal debt in the near term. Bottom Line: M/T yield ratios appear fairly valued in the near-term, and have not yet discounted Donald Trump's recent plunge in the polls. Maintain an overweight allocation to municipal bonds for the time being, but stand prepared to gradually reduce exposure as the muni credit cycle starts to turn in late 2017. Ryan Swift, Vice President U.S. Bond Strategy rswift@bcaresearch.com Alex Wang, Research Analyst alexw@bcaresearch.com Appendix: The BCA Municipal Health Monitor The BCA Municipal Health Monitor is an equal-weighted composite of eight indicators meant to quantify trends in state & local government budget gaps and debt service capability. The components consist entirely of data that are publicly available from the Bureau of Economic Analysis, Federal Reserve, Bureau of Labor Statistics and the National Association of State Budget Officers. The eight components are described below, and shown graphically in Charts A1 & A2. Chart A1Muni Health Monitor Components I Chart A2Muni Health Monitor Components II Leverage: The ratio of total state & local government liabilities (excluding unfunded pension liabilities) to total financial assets. Interest Coverage: State & local government current budget surplus (excluding interest expenditures) divided by interest expenditures. The current surplus is calculated as the difference between current revenues and current expenditures (i.e. investment spending is excluded). Pension Funded Ratio: Total assets of state & local government pension funds divided by total pension liabilities. Revenue: State & local government current revenue in nominal terms, as a deviation from its 18-quarter trend. Surplus Margin: State & local government current budget surplus as a % of current revenue. Liquidity: State & local government total financial assets less short-term liabilities, as a % of total financial assets. Employment Growth: Year-over-year % change in state and local government employment. Total Balance: Aggregate state government total year-end balance. The total balance is the general fund balance plus the rainy day fund, as a % of total expenditures. 1 The average M/T yield ratio shown in this report is calculated by taking an equal-weighted average of M/T yield ratios for 2-year, 5-year, 10-year and 30-year maturities. For each maturity point the yield ratio is calculated as the ratio between the Bloomberg Fair Value Aaa Municipal bond yield and the Federal Reserve's constant maturity Treasury yield. 2 http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-09-13/mega-deals-lead-ballo… 3 http://crr.bc.edu/briefs/will-pensions-and-opebs-break-state-and-local-… 4 Please see Global Investment Strategy Special Report, "Global Equity Valuations: Risks And Opportunities", dated July 1, 2016, available at gis.bcaresearch.com 5 The index was created by Professors Scott Baker, Nick Bloom and Steven Davis and is driven by the number of times terms related to economic and policy uncertainty are found in newspaper articles. Full details of the methodology are available at www.policyuncertainty.com

Hillary Clinton has a 65% chance of winning the election; she receives 334 electoral college votes according to our model. Trump still requires an exogenous shock to win. Meanwhile, the USD is poised to rally - and leftward-moving policymakers will applaud its redistributive effects while MNCs suffer the consequences.

Special Report

Xi Jinping has not overthrown China's consensual leadership model; The Communist Party is highly vulnerable to the emerging middle class; Factional struggles will re-emerge before the 2017 Party Congress; Economic structural reform is constrained by a host of factors; Geopolitical tail risks will remain elevated.

Special Report

In lieu of our regular report, we are publishing a <i>Special Report</i> titled "Five Myths About Chinese Politics" authored by our <i>Geopolitical Strategy</i> team, offering insight on the Chinese leadership and the political situation.

Special Report

With 88 days to go until the U.S. presidential election our client meetings are starting to steer towards "all Trump, all the time." In this report we present evidence that Trump's electability is correlated with the chief global safe haven, the 10-year Treasury. Markets may be overreacting, however. Trump has a chance, but Clinton is the clear favorite. We also bust five myths about China's political system, in a continuation of our coverage of rising geopolitical risks in East Asia.

With 88 days to go until the U.S. presidential election our client meetings are starting to steer towards "all Trump, all the time." In this report we present evidence that Trump's electability is correlated with the chief global safe haven, the 10-year Treasury. Markets may be overreacting, however. Trump has a chance, but Clinton is the clear favorite. We also bust five myths about China's political system, in a continuation of our coverage of rising geopolitical risks in East Asia.

There has not been much of an improvement/recovery in the Chinese economy. Credit growth is weakening anew, which warrants a downbeat cyclical outlook for China's industrial sectors. Malaysia is heading into a classic credit/banking downturn. Go short Malaysian banks stocks and short the ringgit versus the U.S. dollar. In South Africa, take profits on the yield curve flattening trade. Continue shorting the rand versus the U.S. dollar.

Signs that the median voter is moving to the left are everywhere. Markets will cheer the move as it means more government spending. In the long term, it depends if policymakers stop at fiscal stimulus. In this <i>Monthly Report</i>, BCA's <i>Geopolitical Strategy</i> reviews prospects for "Bremorse," latest in the U.S. election, Italian political crisis, tensions in South China Sea, and the long-term future of Europe.