India
Highlights Domino dynamics continue escalating within the EM universe confirming that a major bear market is underway. Several global cyclical market segments have recently experienced technical breakdowns. This confirms that global growth is slowing. It is not too late to short/sell EM risk assets. We reiterate the long Indian / short Chinese banks equity trade. Feature The selloff in global risk assets continues to exhibit a pattern of falling dominos. It began with the breakdown in the weakest spots of the EM world, Turkey and Argentina, and then spread to Brazil and Indonesia. Only weeks later it hit other vulnerable EM markets such as South Africa. During this period, north Asian stocks and currencies - Chinese, Korean and Taiwanese - displayed resilience. It was tempting to argue that the EM selloff was being driven by idiosyncratic risks and was limited to current account deficit countries vulnerable to U.S. Federal Reserve tightening. However, in recent weeks these north Asian markets have plunged - making the EM selloff largely broad-based and pervasive. In our June 14 report,1 we argued that major and drawn-out financial market downturns usually occur in phases and often resemble a domino effect. Since then, the domino effect has escalated confirming our bias that EMs are in a major bear market. Several important markets and cyclical market segments have recently broken down, and investors should heed messages from them: Copper prices fell below their 200-day moving average; they have also broken down the trading range that had persisted since last September (Chart I-1, top panel). The precious metals price index seems to be sliding through the floor of its trading range of the past 18 months (Chart I-1, bottom panel). Global cyclical equity sectors and sub-sectors such as mining, steel, chemicals and industrials have also broken their 200-day moving averages in absolute term (Chart I-2). They have also been underperforming the global equity index, which is consistent with the global trade slowdown that is beginning to escalate. Chart I-1Breakdown in Metals Prices Chart I-2Global Equities: Cyclicals Have Broken Down Although Chinese PMI data have not been particularly weak, anecdotal evidence from the ground suggests that the credit tightening of the past 18 months is taking its toll on China's financial system and economy. There are numerous reports about bankruptcies of Peer-to-peer lending platforms and struggles in other parts of the shadow banking system. The selloff in Chinese onshore A shares confirms this. Presently, this market has become less driven by retail investors as it was back in 2015. Hence, one can argue that portfolio managers on the mainland are selling their stocks because they believe economic conditions are worsening. Meanwhile, international investors have so far been more sanguine. Importantly, EM corporate and sovereign U.S. dollar bond yields are rising, heralding lower share prices (Chart I-3). Bond yields are shown inverted on this chart. The top panel is for EM overall and the bottom panel is for Asia only. Chart I-3EM Credit Markets Entail More Downside In EM Share Prices Chart I-4EM Versus U.S.: New Lows Lie Ahead Finally, the resilience of the U.S. equity index and corporate spreads has been due to robust domestic demand - the slowdown in global trade has not affected the U.S. However, odds are that the current global selloff continues to develop in a typical domino fashion. If so, the U.S. markets - equities and credit - will be the last dominos to fall but they will outperform their global peers. It is very unlikely that American stocks and credit markets will be able to sail through this EM storm unscathed. Notably, the resilience of the S&P 500 can be attributed to 10 large-cap stocks that are extremely overbought and likely expensive. This gives us more confidence to argue that this EM riot will meaningfully affect U.S. equity and credit markets. The link will be the U.S. dollar. The greenback will continue its unrelenting rally, which will trim U.S. multinationals' profits and weigh on the S&P 500. Bottom Line: EM risk assets are in a major bear market, and there is still a lot of downside. It is not too late to sell or underweight EM. This is despite EM's relative performance versus the S&P 500 is back to its early 2016 lows, as is the JP Morgan EM currency index (Chart I-4). News lows lie ahead. Arthur Budaghyan, Senior Vice President Emerging Markets Strategy arthurb@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report "EM: Sustained Decoupling, Or Domino Effect?" dated June 14, 2018 available on page 17. Chart II-1More Upside In Long Indian/Short ##br##Chinese Bank Stocks Reiterating Long Indian / Short Chinese Banks Trade This week we revisit our long Indian / short Chinese banks trade that we initiated on January 17.1 The trade is up only 5.7% since inception (Chart II-1), and with more monetary policy easing occurring in China and the recent sharp rise in non-performing loans (NPL) in India, it is appropriate to reassess this recommendation. Having updated the stress tests on the largest public banks in both countries and performed a new stress test on five Indian private banks, we are reiterating our strategy of being long Indian / short Chinese banks. A Perspective On Credit Cycles In India And China Both India and China have gone through major credit binges over the past 10-15 years, albeit over different time periods (Chart II-2A and Chart II-2B). Chart II-2ACredit Boom Was Smaller In India...Than In China Chart II-2BCredit Boom Was Smaller In India...Than In China India's public banks have, in recent years, recognized bad loans and provisioned meaningfully for them. Non-performing loans (NPLs) for Indian public banks now stand at a whopping 15% of total outstanding loans, while provisioning levels have spiked to 7% of total loans (Chart II-3). Chart II-3NPLs And Their Provisions: India And China By comparison, Chinese public banks - the largest five banks, excluding policy banks, where the central government owns 70-80% of equity - are at the early stages of dealing with their troubled assets. Their NPLs and provisions stand at mere 1.8% and 3.3% of total outstanding loans, respectively (Chart II-3). Does such a wide disparity in NPL ratios between Chinese and Indian banks make sense? We do not think so. It is unlikely that Indian public banks are more poorly managed vis-a-vis Chinese public banks. All are run by government-appointed officials and are equally prone to politically driven and inefficient lending. Further, the magnitude of the Chinese credit boom since 2009 was considerably greater than India's during the 2003-2012 period. It is therefore highly unlikely that the resulting NPLs are substantially smaller in China than in India. In fact, several cases of Chinese banks hiding bad assets have recently been publicized.2 We strongly believe this phenomenon is widespread on the mainland, and that NPLs among Chinese public banks are being grossly underreported. It's All About Regulation The true vindication for this disparity lies in the drastically different stances that financial regulators in both countries have adopted to deal with the non-performing and stressed assets that their banks sit on. The Chinese authorities have been exhibiting greater forbearance with their commercial banks. For instance, in March, they lowered the provision coverage ratio for commercial banks. This is ameliorating Chinese commercial banks' short-term profitability and capitalization ratios. In brief, Chinese regulators have been very accommodative by allowing commercial banks to pursue "window dressing" of their financial statements and ratios. Indian regulators, by contrast, have been exerting relentless pressure on their banks to swiftly deal with their stressed assets at the cost of short-term profitability. For instance, the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) recently introduced an extremely stringent framework for the recognition and resolution of NPLs. Indian commercial banks now have to immediately recognize stressed assets and find a resolution within 180 days. Failure to resolve a stressed account forces banks to take the defaulter to court in order to initiate bankruptcy procedures. Bottom Line: India has taken painful measures to push its banks to clean up their balance sheets. By comparison, China has so far been kicking the can down the road with respect to its banking system. As a result, the banks' balance sheet cleansing cycle is much more advanced in India than in China. Public Banks Stress Tests Below we present our updated stress tests which we performed on India's top seven public banks and China's top five public commercial banks (excluding policy banks). We used the following assumptions in our analysis (Tables II-1 and II-2): Table II-1Stress Test Of Top 7 Indian Public Banks Table II-2Stress Test Of Top 5 Chinese Public Banks Indian non-performing risk-weighted assets (NPA) to rise to 16% (optimistic), 18% (baseline), and 19% (pessimistic), up from 15% currently. For China, we assume NPAs to rise to 10% (optimistic), 12% (baseline), and 13% (pessimistic), up from 1.6% currently. Provided the magnitude and duration of China's credit boom has considerably surpassed that of India, the assumption of this stress test that NPAs will rise to 12% in China but 18% in India implies that Chinese public banks allocated credit much better than their Indian peers. Hence, this exercise in no way favored Indian banks over Chinese ones. We used risk-weighted assets to calculate losses. Risk-weighting adjusts bank assets for their riskiness which in turn makes comparisons between the two banking systems more sensible. Finally, we assumed a 30% recovery ratio (RR) for both countries. The RR on Chinese banks' NPLs from 2001 to 2005 was 20%. This occurred amid much stronger nominal and real growth. Thus, a 30% RR rate today is not low. The outcome of the tests are as follows: Under the baseline scenario of 18% NPA in India and 12% NPA in China, losses post recovery and provisions amount to 1.8 trillion rupees in the former (1.3% of GDP) and RMB 3.3 trillion in the latter (3.9% of GDP) (Tables II-1 and II-2, column 6). These losses would impair 41% of equity capital in India and 44% in China (Tables II-1 and II-2, column 7). Adjusting the current price-to-book value (PBV) ratios for public banks in both countries to the equity impairment under the baseline scenario lifts their PBV ratios to 1.5 in India and 1.7 in China (Tables II-1 and II-2, column 8). Assuming a 1.3 fair PBV ratio3 for banks in both countries, Indian banks appear overvalued by 15% and Chinese banks by 29% (Tables II-1 and II-2, last column). In other words, after the recognition and provisioning of reasonable levels of NPA, Indian public banks appear less overvalued than their Chinese counterparts. These results make sense to us; Indian public banks have been provisioning aggressively for their troubled assets, and bad news is somewhat discounted in their share prices. Chart II-4Loan Write-Offs Have Been Much ##br##Greater In India Than In China Remarkably, Indian public banks have also been writing off more bad loans than their Chinese counterparts. Chart II-4 shows cumulated write-offs of these public banks in India and China since 2010. Bad asset write-offs have so far amounted to RMB 1.2 trillion in China and 3 trillion rupees in India. This is equivalent to 2% and 8% as a share of current risk-weighted assets, respectively. Another way to compare and analyze NPA cycles between two countries is to assess the progress that each country has made toward resolving the full amount of outstanding bad assets - i.e. a full NPA cycle. We define a full NPA cycle in the following way: Total NPA losses under our baseline scenario, plus cumulated past write-offs. In order to measure progress toward resolving the full NPA cycle, we take the ratio of the stock of provisions plus cumulated write-offs and divide that by the full NPA cycle losses (i.e. [provisions + write-offs] / full NPA cycle losses). In India, assuming that NPAs on its largest public banks reach 18% of risk weighted assets - then the full NPA cycle for India would amount to 9.4 trillion rupees, or 26% of current risk-weighted assets (i.e. 6.4 trillion rupees in NPA remaining plus 3 trillion in write-offs made). Meanwhile, India's public banks' progress amounts to 5.6 trillion rupees. This is equal to 60% of India's full NPA cycle. By contrast, Chinese public banks' full NPA cycle would amount to RMB 8 trillion (or 14% of risk-weighted assets) under our baseline scenario. Further, China's banks progress amounts to RMB 2.6 trillion. This is equivalent to only 33% of the full NPA cycle in China. Hence, Indian public banks are closer to their peak NPA cycle versus their Chinese counterparts. Note that this particular analysis assumes no recovery in bad loans in either country. Further, the above analysis does not attune for the fact that Chinese banks have more risky off-balance sheet assets than their Indian peers. Incorporating off-balance sheet assets and liabilities would make the stress tests much more favorable for Indian public banks relative to China. Stress Test For India's Private Banks Private banks are a part of our long Indian / short Chinese banks trade. Indian private banks are also not insulated from regulatory clean-up efforts. In recent years, these lenders significantly boosted their credit to the consumer and service sectors. Higher than normal defaults have not yet transpired but this is a scenario that cannot be ruled out given the frantic pace of lending (Chart II-5). We performed a stress test on five4 large Indian private banks as well (Table II-3): Chart II-5India: Consumer And Service ##br##Credit Is Booming Table II-3Stress Test Of 5 Large Indian Private Banks We assumed the following NPA scenarios: 6% (optimistic), 8% (baseline), and 9% (pessimistic), up from 5% currently. Similar to the above analysis, we used risk-weighted assets to calculate asset losses, though we used a recovery ratio of 50% for private banks instead of 30% for public banks. The basis is that private banks' lending has been concentrated on consumer loans and mortgages and the recovery ratio on these loans will likely be higher - especially taking into consideration the quality of collateral. Our results are as follows: Under the baseline scenario of an 8% NPA ratio, 7% of these private banks' equity would be impaired (Table II-3, column 7). The adjusted PBV would move to 3.9. This compares to a fair value of 3.3 for Indian private banks (Table II-3, column 8), which is the historical PBV mean of private banks in India. In other words, Indian private banks are overvalued by 18% - slightly more than their public peers (Table II-3, column 9). Bottom Line: Indian private banks are overvalued too but less so than Chinese public banks. Investment Conclusions We reiterate our long Indian / short Chinese banks equity trade, initiated on January 17. We track the performance of this recommendation using the BSE's Bankex index for India and the MSCI Investable bank index for China in common currency terms - currency unhedged. In addition, among Chinese-listed banks, we maintain our short small / long large banks (Chart II-6). Smaller banks are more leveraged as well as exposed to non-standard assets and regulatory tightening than large public banks. Finally, the Indian bourse's relative performance against the EM equity benchmark negatively correlates with oil prices - the oil price is shown inverted on this chart (Chart II-7). Chart II-6Stay Short Chinese Small / Long Large Banks Chart II-7India's Relative Equity Performance To EM And Oil Prices Given BCA's Emerging Markets Strategy service expects oil prices to drop meaningfully in the second half of this year,5 this should help Indian equities outperform their EM peers. Besides, Indian banks are more advanced than many of their EM peers in terms of bad assets recognition and provisioning and that should also help the Indian bourse outperform the EM overall equity index in common currency terms. We reiterate our overweight stance on Indian equities within a fully invested EM equity portfolio. In contrast, we are neutral on China's investable stock index's relative performance versus the EM stock index. The main reason why we have not underweighted the Chinese bourse - despite our negative view on China - is the exchange rate; the potential downside in the value of the RMB versus the U.S. dollar in the next six months is less than potential downside in many other EM exchange rates. Ayman Kawtharani, Associate Editor ayman@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see Emerging Markets Strategy Special Report "Long Indian / Short Chinese Banks" dated January 17, 2018 available at ems.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see the following article: http://www.scmp.com/business/banking-finance/article/2139904/pressure-chinas-banks-report-bad-debt-good-news-foreign 3 It is the average PBV ratio for EM banks since 2011. 4 HDFC Bank, ICICI Bank, Axis Bank, Yes Bank, and IDFC Bank. 5 Please see Emerging Markets Strategy Special Report "China's Crude Oil Inventories: A Slippery Slope" dated June 21, 2018 available on page 17. Equity Recommendations Fixed-Income, Credit And Currency Recommendations
Highlights Major and drawn-out financial market downturns usually occur in phases and often resemble a domino effect. There have been a number of noteworthy divergences in the EM space of late. They are probably part of a domino effect - some tiles have begun to drop, but other tiles down the chain still remain standing. The selloff in EM risk assets will broaden and intensify. A defensive positioning is warranted. India's relative equity performance has by and large been undermined by rising oil prices. A potential roll-over in crude prices will aid the Indian bourse's relative performance versus its EM peers. The South African rand remains on shaky foundation; stay short. Feature There have been a number of noteworthy divergences in financial markets of late, in particular between emerging markets (EM) and commodities, as well as between Chinese investable stocks trading outside the mainland and equity prices listed domestically. In our view, these divergences are part of a domino effect - some tiles have begun to drop, but other tiles down the chain still remain standing. In dominos, tiles do not all fall simultaneously. They fall one by one, and there is a time lag between the first domino and the last-standing domino to drop. Also, unlike in natural sciences, time lags and speed in economics and finance vary with each experiment - because they are contingent on complex human psychology and behavior, not on well defined natural phenomena such as gravity or motions of objects. Hence, they are impossible to forecast with much precision. A Message From Our Risky Versus Safe-Haven Currency Ratio Although U.S. share prices have lately been firm, EM stocks have broken below their 200-day moving average (Chart I-1, top panel). So has our risky versus safe-haven currencies ratio 1 (Chart I-1, bottom panel). Indeed, while having held up at its 200-day moving average several times in the past two years, the ratio has recently decisively broken below this technical support line. This indicator correlates extremely well with EM share prices, and its message is presently unambiguous: The rally in EM is over, and a bear market has likely commenced. Crucially, this ratio measures commodities currencies versus the average of the Japanese yen and Swiss franc - two defensive currencies - not against the U.S. dollar. Hence, it is not impacted by the greenback's trend. Given that all six risky currencies used in the numerator of this ratio - AUD, CAD, NZD, BRL, ZAR and CLP - are commodity currencies, it is not surprising that the ratio also correlates with commodities prices. In this context, it currently suggests the outlook for both industrial metals and oil is troublesome (Chart I-2). Chart I-1Beware Of These Breakdowns Chart I-2A Red Flag For Commodities Prices The common denominator that links all these financial variables is global growth. The risky versus safe-haven currencies ratio typically leads world trade cycles by several months, and it currently points to a notable slowdown in global export volumes (Chart I-3). Chart I-3Global Export Growth Is Set To Slow Further, commodities prices have exhibited a rare decoupling from the U.S. dollar. It is very unlikely that this divergence can be sustained for much longer. Our bias is that global trade will slow as China/EM demand weakens despite robust U.S. growth. Growth dynamics shifting in favor of the U.S. entails that the greenback will continue to appreciate. Consistently, EM/China growth disappointments and U.S. dollar's persisting strength suggest that commodities will reverse their current trend sooner rather than later. A relapse in commodities prices will reinforce EM currency depreciation, triggering more outflows from EM equities and fixed-income markets. Decoupling Or A Time Lag? Chart I-4Domino Effect In 2007-08 Major and drawn-out financial market downturns usually occur in phases and often resemble a domino effect. The EM crises in 1997-98 did not occur simultaneously across all EM countries. It began in July 1997 with Thailand, then it spread to Korea, Malaysia and Indonesia and finally, to the rest of Asia. In August 1998, Russian financial markets collapsed triggering the LTCM debacle. The last leg of this crisis appeared in Brazil and culminated in the real's devaluation in January 1999. Similarly, the U.S. financial/credit crisis commenced with the selloff in sub-prime securities in March 2007. Following that, corporate spreads began widening and bank share prices rolled over in June 2007. In the meantime, the S&P 500 and EM stocks peaked on October 9 and 29, 2007, respectively. Despite all of these developments, commodities prices and EM currencies continued rallying until summer of 2008 and then quickly collapsed in the second half of that year (Chart I-4). Finally the Lehman crash took place on September 29 of 2008. That marked the apogee of the crisis, causing a complete unravelling of financial markets and the global economy, and lasting until March of 2009. It seems some sort of domino effect is now taking hold of the EM universe. Initially, it started with Turkey and Argentina. Then, it spread to Indonesia, India and Brazil. The currency weakness across the wider EM universe has already led to EM credit spread widening. Yet, there are a few EM financial markets, particularly Chinese, Korean and Taiwanese, that are still holding up relatively well. Moreover, U.S. share prices and high-yield credit spreads have done quite well too. How should investors interpret these divergences? Our view has been, and remains, that EM risk assets will do poorly regardless of the direction of the S&P 500. In fact, an escalation in EM turmoil and a slowdown in developing economies are among the main risks to American share prices themselves. The primary link from EM financial markets to the S&P 500 is via the exchange rate - a strong dollar along with an EM/China growth slump will weigh on American multinationals' profits. The following three questions are presently vital for investors: 1. Can EM and U.S. risk assets de-couple from each other, and has a sustainable divergence happened in the past? Although short-term moves in U.S. and EM equity indexes often appear correlated, from a big-picture perspective there have been considerable divergences. The overall EM stock index is now at the same level it was in 2007 (Chart I-5). Meanwhile, the S&P 500 index is a hair below its all-time high. Chart I-5EM Share Prices And The S&P 500: A Long-Term Perspective The same is true for many EM currencies and the S&P 500. A substantial decoupling did occur in the not-so-distant past: EM currencies depreciated from 2011 to early 2016, while U.S. share prices rallied strongly from late 2011 until 2015 (Chart I-6). With respect to U.S. credit spreads, Chart I-7 illustrates that EM and U.S. credit spreads have had a much higher correlation than their respective equity indexes. During the 1997-'98 EM crises and the 2014 -'15 EM turmoil, U.S. high-yield corporate spreads widened. In brief, there has historically been little decoupling between U.S. and EM credit markets. Hence, the U.S. high-yield credit market's latest resilience in the face of widening in EM credit spreads is historically exceptional. Chart I-6EM Currencies And The S&P 500 Chart I-7EM Sovereign And U.S. Corporate Credit Spreads: A Long-Term Perspective As EM currencies continue to depreciate versus the U.S. dollar, EM sovereign and corporate credit spreads will widen. Given their past high correlation with U.S. credit markets, odds point to widening corporate credit spreads in the U.S. On the whole, if EM risk assets continue to sell off, which is our baseline scenario, the S&P 500 and U.S. credit markets could defy gravity for a while, but not forever. At some point, risks stemming from EM turbulence will cause a selloff in American stocks and corporate bonds. It is impossible to know when and by how much U.S. stocks will suffer. Our bias is that a U.S. equity selloff will likely be on par with the 2015-'16 episode. 2. Can North Asian equity markets such as China, Korea and Taiwan remain relatively resilient if the turbulence in other EM countries continues? Based on history, they can, but only for a short period of time. There have been a few episodes when emerging Asian and Latin American stocks de-coupled: In 1997-'98, the home-grown Asian crisis devastated regional markets, but Latin American stocks continued to rally until mid-1998 - at which point they began plummeting (Chart I-8, top panel). In 2007-'08, emerging Asian equities started tumbling along with the S&P 500 in late 2007, but Latin American bourses fared well until the middle of 2008 due to surging commodities prices (Chart I-8, middle panel). Finally, the bottom panel of Chart I-8 illustrates that in early 2015, Asian stocks performed well, supported by the inflating Chinese equity bubble. Meanwhile, Latin American stocks plunged. In all of these episodes, the de-coupling between Asia and Latin America proved to be unsustainable, and the markets that showed initial resilience eventually re-coupled to the downside. Regarding Asia's business cycle conditions, the slowdown is already taking place and will likely intensify. Leading indicators of exports and manufacturing such as Korea's manufacturing shipments-to-inventory ratio and Taiwan's semiconductor shipments-to-inventory ratio herald further deceleration in their respective export sectors (Chart I-9). Chart I-8Asian And Latin American Equities: ##br##Unsustainable Divergences Chart I-9Asia's Export Slowdown Is In Making 3. Is there any other notable financial market decoupling that investors should be aware of? Chart I-10China: A Decoupling In Various Equity Segments Since early this year, there has been substantial decoupling between Chinese investable stocks and the onshore A-share market. First, the overall A-share index has dropped since early this year, but the MSCI Investable Chinese stock index has so far been resilient (Chart I-10). Second, while it might be tempting to explain this decoupling by discrepancies in the sectors' weights in these indexes, this has not been the case this time around. The fact remains that there has been considerable divergence between share prices of the same sectors. For example, onshore and offshore equity prices have diverged for the following sectors: real estate stocks, materials, industrials, technology, utilities and consumer discretionary (Chart I-11A and Chart I-11B). Only defensive sectors such as consumer staples and health care have done well in both universes. Share prices of financials and telecoms have dropped in both the onshore and offshore markets. Chart I-11AChinese Equity Sectors: Puzzling Decoupling Chart I-11BChinese Equity Sectors: Puzzling Decoupling Finally, a similar performance gap has appeared between Chinese small cap stocks trading onshore and in Hong Kong (Chart I-12). Chart I-12China's Small-Cap Stocks: A Perplexing Gap How do we explain these divergences? Our bias is that local investors in China are much more concerned about the mainland growth outlook than foreign investors. This is the opposite of what occurred in 2015. Back then, international investors were somewhat cautious on China - commodities prices and other China-related global financial market plays were in a bear market. Meanwhile, local investors were caught up in a full-fledged equity mania that ended with a crash. Given our downbeat outlook on China's capital spending and related plays in financial markets, we reckon that domestic investors in China will be proven right in the months ahead, while the international investment community will be left flat-footed. Importantly, there has been an unexplainable mismatch between monetary/credit tightening in China and complacency among international investors about the outlook for the mainland economy. Specifically, the cost of borrowing has gone up, and credit standards have tightened. Chart I-13 illustrates that both onshore and offshore corporate bond yields have risen to new cycle highs, Chinese banks' lending rates are rising, while banks' loan approvals are dropping. Consistently, money and credit growth have plunged. Importantly, this is occurring in an economy with immense credit excesses. Nevertheless, commodities prices have so far defied such a pronounced deceleration in money and credit aggregates in China (Chart I-14). Chart I-13China: Ongoing Credit Tightening Chart I-14China's Money/Credit And Commodities Prices All in all, we interpret these divergences by varying lead and lags rather than as a fundamental breakdown in the relationship between money/credit and the real economy. We continue to expect tightening liquidity and credit to escalate the growth slowdown in China. As a result, there continues to be considerable downside risks for Chinese investable stocks and commodities prices. Bottom Line: The dominos have begun to fall. We continue to recommend a defensive strategy and an underweight position in EM equities, credit and currencies versus their U.S./DM peers. High-yield local currency bonds that are a de-facto bet on the underlying currencies are vulnerable too. For investors willing to go short, it is not too late to short EM stocks and currencies. Arthur Budaghyan, Senior Vice President Emerging Markets Strategy arthurb@bcaresearch.com 1 Average of cad, aud, nzd, brl, clp & zar total return (including carry) indices relative to average of jpy & chf total returns. India's Equity Underperformance: Blame It On Oil Indian stocks have been underperforming their EM counterparts. Rising oil prices have created a toxic macro mix for India, triggering the equity underperformance (Chart II-1): Rising crude prices have led to widening current account and trade deficits. Oil price swings are often instrumental to trends in India's current account balance (Chart II-2). The deterioration in the nation's external accounts has been behind the rupee's poor performance. Chart II-1Higher Crude Oil Prices Hurt Indian Stocks Chart II-2Crude Oil And Current Account Deficit Given that India is a major oil importer, falling commodities prices - especially crude oil - will benefit India's stock market. The recent surge in oil prices has also reinforced inflation dynamics in India (Chart II-3). Chart II-3Higher Crude Oil Boosts Inflation The basis for the high correlation between core consumer price inflation (excluding energy and food) and oil prices is due to the fact that core inflation includes components that are heavily influenced by fluctuations in oil prices. For instance, the transportation and communication component of inflation is very sensitive to changes in oil prices. This component accounts for 18% of core consumer price index. Further, the personal care and effects component also correlates with crude oil. Personal care goods use petroleum products as an important input in their production process. This component accounts for 8% of core consumer price index. Together these components account for a non-trivial 26% of core consumer price index, and will likely subside as oil prices fall. On the inflation front, we highlighted in our April 19 Weekly Report that risks to inflation are tilted to the upside due to strong consumer and government spending in an otherwise under-invested economy.1 Domestic demand has been accelerating, providing tailwinds for higher inflation (Chart II-4). Higher inflation and currency weakness has led to a considerable rise in both government and corporates local currency bond yields (Chart II-5). Chart II-4Domestic Economy Is Strong Chart II-5Rising Borrowing Rates Given the very high equity valuations, share prices in India are especially sensitive to rising local borrowing costs. All in all, India's relative equity performance has by and large been undermined by rising oil prices. BCA's Emerging Markets Strategy team believes the risk-reward for oil prices is skewed to the downside due to the expected deterioration in EM/China oil demand, investors' extremely high net long positions in crude and appreciating dollar.2 That is why we are still reluctant to downgrade Indian stocks within the EM equity universe. It is vital to emphasize, however, that our overweight call is relevant to dedicated EM equity portfolios. We have been, and remain, negative on Indian share prices in absolute U.S. dollar terms. Bottom Line: Odds are that commodities prices will drop meaningfully in the months ahead and that will support India's relative equity performance versus the EM benchmark. EM dedicated investors should keep an overweight stance on Indian equities for now. Ayman Kawtharani, Associate Editor ayman@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report "Country Perspectives: India And Turkey," dated April 19, 2018, link available on page 21. 2 The Emerging Markets Strategy team's view on oil differs from BCA's house view which remains bullish. The South African Rand Remains On Shaky Foundations Although the rand has not been among the worse hit EM currencies, investors should remain cautious on it. The currency presently finds itself resting on very shaky foundations, raising odds of substantial depreciation for the remainder of the year: First, South Africa's external funding has solely been driven by portfolio inflows, leaving the exchange rate highly exposed to potential portfolio outflows. As illustrated in Chart III-1, net portfolio inflows reached all-time highs while net FDIs reached all-time lows at the end of 2017 (the latest available statistics). Meanwhile, foreign ownership of domestic bonds has reached new highs (Chart III-2). The total return in dollar terms on South Africa's local currency bond index1 has failed to break above its previous highs and has relapsed (Chart III-3). It seems this asset class has entered a new bear market. Further decline in the total return of bonds will spur more selling or hedging of currency risks by international bond investors. Chart III-1South Africa: Highly Exposed To Portfolio Flows Chart III-2Foreign Holdings Of South African Local Bonds Is Elevated Chart III-3South African Bonds Were Unable To Break Out Second, the country's trade balance is set to deteriorate. Despite continued episodes of currency weakness throughout last decade, there has been little to no import substitution in South Africa. Consequently, a reviving domestic demand will prompt higher imports. That, and a potential relapse in export (raw materials) prices, will lead to a widening trade balance. Chart III-4The Rand Is Not Cheap Finally, the rand is not cheap; its valuation is neutral (Chart III-4). When an exchange rate is close to its fair value, it can either appreciate or depreciate. In short, the rand's valuation is not extreme enough to be a major factor in driving the market right now. Bottom Line: Currency traders should stay short the ZAR versus both the USD and the MXN. Relative trade balance dynamics and valuations continue to play in favor of the Mexican peso relative to the South African rand. Predicated by our negative view on the rand, we recommend EM dedicated equity and fixed-income investors to maintain an underweight allocation to South Africa. Stephan Gabillard, Senior Analyst stephang@bcaresearch.com 1 JP Morgan GBI-EM Global Diversified Emerging Markets Government Bond Index for South Africa. Equity Recommendations Fixed-Income, Credit And Currency Recommendations
Our analysis is often focused on China, commodities prices and Asia's business cycle. The key points of these discussions are applicable to the majority of EM countries and their financial markets. Yet, there are some countries that are not exposed to China, commodities or global trade. India and Turkey are two prominent examples from the EM space that fall into this category. This week we re-visit our analysis on these economies and their financial markets. Feature India: Inflation Holds The Key Indian government bonds sold off sharply over the past eight months, with the yield gap widening significantly relative to EM local currency bonds (Chart I-1, top panel). During this time, the country's stock market has been underperforming the EM benchmark notably (Chart I-1, bottom panel). Rising Indian inflation was a main culprit behind the selloff. However, the most recent print for headline CPI was down (Chart I-2). Diminished inflation worries have recently led to a modest drop in bond yields. Chart I-1India Relative To EM: Bonds And Stocks Chart I-2Indian Inflation Has Accelerated The key question for investors is if inflation will rise or stay tame. This, by extension, will determine whether Indian stocks will outperform their EM counterparts. Risks: Inflation, Fiscal Balance And Bond Yields Odds point to upside inflation surprises ahead, and a potential rise in bond yields: The supply side of the economy has been stagnant. Chart I-3 illustrates that Indian consumption has been outpacing investments since 2012, creating a significant accumulated gap. Capex is now picking up (Chart I-4, top panel) but the fact that past investment was low means that the output gap could become positive sooner than later. Chart I-3Consumption Is Outpacing Investments Chart I-4Timid Pick Up In Capex Crucially, in order for the capex rebound to be robust and sufficient to expand the economy's productive capacity, Indian commercial banks need to finance corporate investments aggressively. The bottom panel of Chart I-4 shows that this is not yet the case. On the fiscal front, the Indian central government released a mildly expansionary 2018-2019 budget, and is pushing for fiscal consolidation beyond 2019. Importantly, this was the last budget announcement of the ruling National Democratic Alliance (NDA) coalition before the 2019 general elections. It therefore entails a 10% increase in government expenditures. Growing government expenditures are often inflationary in India; hence a 10% rise in government spending could boost inflation modestly (Chart I-5). Additionally, there are also non-trivial risks that the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) government might end up spending beyond the official budget announcement in order to appease voters in the run-up to the 2019 general elections. The risks of overspending extend to state governments as well. The latter plan to raise their employees' housing rental allowances (HRA). Depending on the magnitude and timing of these increases, inflation could accelerate significantly and have spillover effects. Turning to bond yields, excess demand for credit by borrowers against a restricted supply of financing by banks is also creating a ripe environment for higher bond yields: The combined Indian central and state fiscal deficit is very wide, signaling strong demand for credit by the government (Chart I-6, top panel). Yet broad money creation by banks has generally been weak (Chart I-6, bottom panel). Chart I-5Indian Government ##br##Expenditure Is Inflationary Chart I-6Large General Fiscal Deficit ##br##Amid Slow Money Creation Chart I-7 illustrates that the combined central and state government fiscal deficit plus the annual change in the total broad stock of money is negative. This signals that new money creation might be insufficient. Commercial banks' holdings of government bonds is also falling (Chart I-8, top panel). Indian banks are at the margin beginning to turn their focus to private sector lending (Chart I-8, bottom panel). Chart I-7Insufficient New Funding ##br##For The Economy Chart I-8Indian Commercial Banks Are Shifting ##br##Focus To The Private Sector This is expected as commercial banks' holdings of government bonds have reached 29% of total deposits, which is significantly above the minimum required Statutory Liquidity Ratio (SLR) of 19.5%. Given the ongoing improvement in private sector growth and hence demand for credit, Indian banks are now more inclined to augment their loan portfolios. Non-bank financial corporations such as insurance companies could offset banks' lower demand for government securities, but the former are not as large players as banks to make a meaningful impact. They own only 24% of government bonds compared to the banks' 42% ownership. Mutual funds and other non-bank finance corporations' ownership of government bonds is even smaller than that of insurance companies. Chart I-9India's Cyclical Profile Bottom Line: Upside risks to government spending, the budget balance and inflation will likely keep upward pressure on domestic bond yields. That amid high equity valuations might lead to lower share prices in absolute terms. India Can Still Outperform The EM Benchmark While Indian government bonds could sell off and stocks could fall in absolute terms, India is in a better position relative to its EM counterparts. Our view remains that we will see a material slowdown in Chinese growth this year - which is negative for commodities prices and EM economies. This scenario will be beneficial for India at the margin relative to other EM bourses. Importantly, Indian economic activity is gaining upward momentum: Overall loan growth has picked up meaningfully, and consumer loan growth in particular is accelerating at a double-digit pace (Chart I-9, top panel). Motorcycle sales have resumed their upward trend (Chart I-9, panel 2). Commercial vehicle sales are now accelerating robustly (Chart I-9, panel 2) and manufacturing production has picked up noticeably (Chart I-9, panel 3). Bottom Line: We recommend investors keep an overweight position in Indian equities versus the EM benchmark. Ayman Kawtharani, Associate Editor ayman@bcaresearch.com Turkish Markets Are In Freefall The lira has been in freefall and local bond yields have spiked (Chart II-1) following the Turkish government's announcement that it wants to stimulate growth even further by implementing a new investment incentive package worth $34 billion, or 5% of GDP. Our view is that the recent lira depreciation as well as the selloff in stocks and bonds have further room to go. Stay short/underweight Turkish risk assets. The Turkish economy is clearly overheating and inflation has broken out into double digit territory (Chart II-2). This comes as no surprise, given high and accelerating wage growth together with stagnant productivity gains (Chart II-3, top panel). Unit labor costs are surging in both manufacturing and services sectors (Chart II-3, bottom panel). Demand is booming, as such firms will likely succeed in hiking selling prices further, reinforcing the wage-inflation spiral. Chart II-1Turkey: Currency Is Falling And ##br##Bond Yields Are Rising Chart II-2Turkey: Genuine Inflation Breakout Chart II-3Turkey: Wage Growth Is Too High Most alarmingly, Turkish policymakers are doing the opposite of what is currently needed - instead of tightening, they have been easing policy: On the fiscal side, government expenditures excluding interest payments have accelerated significantly (Chart II-4). On the monetary policy side, Turkey's banking system has been relying on enormous amounts of liquidity provisions by the central bank (Chart II-5, top panel) to sustain its ongoing credit boom and hence economic growth. Chart II-4Turkey: Fiscal Policy Is Easing Chart II-5Turkey: Monetary Policy Is Too Accommodative On the whole, the central bank's net liquidity injections into the banking system continue to increase rapidly. The nature of the central bank's reserves provisions to commercial banks has shifted away from open market operations and more towards direct lending to banks (Chart II-5, bottom panel). Yet, the essence remains the same: to provide liquidity to banks so that the latter can continue expanding their balance sheets. Adding all the liquidity facilities - the intraday, overnight and late window facilities - the Central Bank of Turkey's (CBT) outstanding funding to banks is TRY 90 billion, or 3% of GDP, abnormally elevated on a historical basis. All this entails that monetary policy is too loose. Consistently, even though local currency bank loan growth has moderated, it still stands at 18% (Chart II-6). With the newly announced government stimulus plan, bank loan growth will likely accelerate from an already high level. As debt levels rise, so are debt servicing costs (Chart II-7). Notably, debt (both domestic/local currency and external debt) servicing costs will continue to escalate as the currency plunges. The reason is that Turkish private sector external debt stands at 40% of GDP, with 13% of GDP being short-term, the highest among EM countries. Currency depreciation will make external debt more expensive to service. Chart II-6Turkey: Rampant Credit Growth Chart II-7Higher Debt Servicing Costs Lastly, the Turkish authorities are expanding the Credit Guarantee Fund, what we would call the "free money" program. The aim of this fund is to incentivize banks to lend more, making the government essentially assume credit risk on loans extended to small and medium enterprises. Under this scheme, the government is effectively giving a green light to flood the economy with more money/credit. This will only heighten inflationary pressures and lead to much more currency devaluation. So far, the scheme has been responsible for the creation of TRY 250 billion, or 8% of GDP worth of new credit. The new tranche of this program announced in January of this year entails another TRY 55 billion. While smaller than the previous tranche, it is still significant at 1.8% of GDP. Fiscal and monetary policies are overly simulative and the country's twin deficits - both fiscal and current account - are widening (Chart II-8). The current account deficit now exceeds 6% of GDP. With foreign holdings of equities and government bonds already at historic highs (Chart II-9), it is questionable whether Turkey has the capacity to attract more capital inflows to finance a widening current account deficit on a sustainable basis. Chart II-8Turkey: Large Twin Deficits Chart II-9Turkey: Foreign Holdings Of ##br##Stocks And Bonds Are Large Remarkably, despite extremely strong exports due to robust growth in the euro area, the current account deficit in Turkey has been unable to narrow at all. This confirms the excessive domestic demand boom. Chart II-10The Turkish Lira Is Not Cheap Even after undergoing large nominal depreciation, Chart II-10 demonstrates that the Turkish lira is still not cheap, according to unit labor cost-based real effective exchange rate, which in our opinion is the best valuation measure for currencies. With wage and general inflation in the double digits and escalating, it will take much more nominal deprecation for the lira to become cheap. At this point, the Turkish authorities are clearly over-stimulating growth while disregarding inflation. The current policy stance will all but ensure that the lira depreciates much further. Excessive money creation is extremely bearish for the local currency. To put the amount of outstanding money into perspective and gauge exchange rate risk, one can compute the ratio of foreign exchange reserves to broad money (local currency money supply). Chart II-11 illustrates that the current net level of foreign exchange reserves (excluding banks' foreign currency deposits at the central bank) including gold currently stands at US$30 billion, which is equivalent to a mere 11% of broad local currency money M3. The ratio for other EM countries is considerably higher (Chart II-12). Chart II-11Turkey: Central Bank FX ##br##Reserves Level Is Inadequate Chart II-12Foreign Exchange Reserves Adequacy In EM Given the inflationary backdrop and the risk of further currency depreciation, interest rates will have to rise. With time this will inevitably trigger another upward non-performing loan (NPL) cycle. Banks are very under-provisioned for non-performing loans (NPLs). Even worse, banks have been reducing the ratio of NPL provisions to total loans in order to book strong profits. NPLs and NPL provisions are set to rise substantially, and banks' equity will be considerably eroded as a result. Lastly, as Chart II-13 demonstrates, rising interest rates are bearish for bank share prices. Investment Implications The government is doubling down on pro-growth policies and is disregarding inflation. Hence, inflation will spiral out of control and the central bank will fall even more behind the curve. This is extremely bearish for the lira. We are reiterating our short position on the lira. We remain short the lira versus the U.S. dollar, but the lira will likely also continue to plummet versus the euro as well. As such, we are also reiterating our underweight/short stance on Turkish stocks in general, and banks in particular (Chart II-14). Chart II-13Turkey: Higher Interest Rates ##br##Will Hurt Bank Stocks Chart II-14Stay Short/Underweight Turkish Stocks A weaker lira will undermine returns for foreign investors on Turkish domestic bonds and assures widening sovereign and corporate credit spreads. Dedicated EM fixed income and credit portfolios should continue to underweight Turkey within their respective EM universes. Stephan Gabillard, Senior Analyst stephang@bcaresearch.com Equity Recommendations Fixed-Income, Credit And Currency Recommendations
Please note that in addition to today's abbreviated Weekly Bulletin, we are also publishing a Special Report on Argentina. Feature Regarding recent financial market dynamics, it appears that the high-yielding EM currencies are breaking down as U.S. bond yields march higher. Several EM exchange rates have formed a tapering wedge pattern, as shown in Chart I-1. Such patterns eventually lead a major break out or break down. Our bias remains that we are witnessing a major breakdown in several EM high-yielding currencies. If this transpires, it would be a precursor for a wider selloff in EM risk assets. Below we discuss interesting dynamics that have emerged in India's onshore fixed-income market lately, and their implications for the nation's equity market. India Several signals tentatively indicate that the price of liquidity has risen at the margin in India. Onshore BBB corporate bond yields have increased and their respective credit spreads have widened (Chart I-2). In addition, the yield curve has steepened modestly. Chart I-1A Tapering Wedge: ##br##A Breakout Or Breakdown? Chart I-2India: Onshore BBB Corporate Bond ##br##Yields And Spreads Have Spiked Rising corporate bond yields and widening corporate credit spreads have been negative for share prices in the past (Chart I-3). Similarly, steepening yield curves have been associated with a pullback in equity prices in recent years (Chart I-4). Note that yields, spreads and the yield curve are shown inverted on Charts I-3 and I-4. Chart I-3India: Corporate Bond Yields ##br##And Spreads Versus Stocks Chart I-4India: Yield Curve ##br##And Share Prices Why has the market price of liquidity risen in India? In our opinion, it has to do with both the domestic and external environments. On the domestic side, the fiscal deficit has widened, implying that borrowing requirements by central and state governments have risen (Chart I-5). Increased demand for credit from the government would not have been a problem had the commercial banks accommodated for it by creating enough new money. Yet, broad money supply growth remains depressed (Chart I-6). Chart I-5India: Ballooning Fiscal Deficits ##br##And Weak Money Creation Chart I-6Indian Money Growth: ##br##New Record Low As a result, the diminished amount of new money relative to demand for money, among other reasons, pushed marginal borrowing costs higher. Chart I-7 shows our proxy for new money available to the private sector has dipped into negative territory. On the external side, the recent rise in U.S. bond yields and the rebound in the U.S. dollar against several EM currencies might have also contributed to higher borrowing costs in India. We expect this U.S. dollar rebound versus EM currencies to persist and U.S. Treasury yields to continue drifting higher. Hence, the global backdrop heralds marginally higher bond yields in India. Although the onshore corporate bond market - and its BBB segment - is not very large, investors should heed to its signals because it reflects the cost of borrowing for the marginal corporate borrower. Besides, its signals have worked quite well in the past as shown in previous Chart I-3 on page 2. Some commentators might argue that the mild rise in government bond yields has been driven by a rise in inflation and growth expectations. We will not disagree with that, but both economic growth and inflation variables are still muted. Chart I-8 shows economic activity is lukewarm at best. Chart I-7India: Proxy For New Money ##br##Available To Private Sector Chart I-8India's Growth Is ##br##Lukewarm At Best On the inflation outlook, the picture is mixed as well. Consumer price inflation, especially core measures, might have bottomed (Chart I-9). Critically, the government approved a draft bill in July that allows the central government to set minimum wages across all sectors and states. The central government is currently reviewing the formula used to set minimum wage and the new formula might lead to significant increases in minimum wages. These policy changes come on top of the pay raises that public sector workers saw earlier this year. Importantly, if consumer demand accelerates while capital spending remains in the doldrums, inflationary pressures will mount. Chart I-10 shows that since 2012 consumer spending has outpaced investment by a large margin. Chart I-9India: Consumer Inflation ##br##Might Be Bottoming Chart I-10India: Consumer Spending ##br##Has Outpaced Investment Provided India has been, and remains, an underinvested economy, if this gap persists, it will produce either inflation or a widening current account deficit. Rising consumption without an equal increase in the supply of goods and services will either lead to higher prices or mushrooming consumer goods imports. Both scenarios bode ill for the macro dynamics, the currency, and ultimately equity multiples. As to financial markets, the Indian bourse is one of the most expensive in the EM space, so it is not very surprising that share prices could react negatively to marginally higher interest rates. For dedicated EM equity investors, we downgraded India from overweight to neutral on August 23, and this stance remains intact. While near-term underperformance cannot be ruled out, the medium-term outlook for relative performance warrants a neutral stance. Bottom Line: There are signals that liquidity is tightening on the margin in India's fixed-income markets due to domestic and external reasons. This will likely hurt share prices. Dedicated EM equity investors should keep a neutral allocation on India's bourse. Mexico: Close Currency, Rates, And Credit Overweights NAFTA risks to Mexico are escalating again. According to our Geopolitical Strategy team, there is non-trivial probability that the NAFTA negotiations will become negative for Mexican financial markets. The recent relapse in Mexico's financial markets will likely endure. We are closing the following positions: long MXN / short BRL; long MXN / short ZAR; receive Mexican 2-year / pay 2-year swap rates as well as overweight positions in Mexican sovereign credit versus Colombia and Indonesia. Dedicated equity investors should stay neutral on this bourse. Arthur Budaghyan, Senior Vice President Emerging Markets Strategy arthurb@bcaresearch.com Ayman Kawtharani, Associate Editor ayman@bcaresearch.com Equity Recommendations Fixed-Income, Credit And Currency Recommendations
Highlights Recommendation Allocation The global growth outlook remains strong, with corporate earnings likely to beat expectations for a couple more quarters. Inflation and Fed policy are key to asset allocation. We expect inflation to recover, which will push up interest rates and the dollar. But uncertainty is rising too: for example the composition of the FOMC next year, Chinese policy post the Party Congress, Geopolitics. We keep our pro-risk tilts, particularly overweights in euro area and Japanese equities, U.S. high-yield bonds, private equity, and cyclical sectors. But we reduce portfolio risk by bringing some allocations closer to benchmark, for example downgrading U.S. equities to neutral and reducing the underweight in EM. Feature Overview Growth Is Picking Up - But So Is Uncertainty The outlook for global economic growth remains almost unarguably positive (Chart 1). The key for asset allocation, then, comes down to whether inflation in the U.S. will rebound, and whether therefore the Fed will continue to tighten monetary policy in line with its current projections. This would likely cause long-term interest rates to rise and the dollar to appreciate, which would be positive for developed market equities and credit, but negative for government bonds, emerging market equities and commodities. This scenario has been our expectation - and the basis of our recommendations - for some time, and it remains so. In September, the market started coming around to our view - after months of pricing in that inflation would stay sluggish (which, therefore, had caused the euro and yen, government bonds, EM equities and commodities to perform well). In just a couple of weeks, the futures-market-priced probability of a December Fed hike has moved from 31% to 75%. This was triggered by little more than stabilization of core CPI (Chart 2), due mainly to shelter inflation, which anyway has a low weight in the core PCE inflation data that the Fed most closely watches. To us, this demonstrates just how sensitive the market is to any slight pickup in inflation, due to the fact that its expectations of Fed rate hikes over the next 12 months are so far below what the FOMC is signaling (Chart 3). Chart 1Lead Indicators Looking Good Chart 2Is The Softness In Inflation Over? Chart 3The Market Still Doesn't Believe The Fed However, a risk to BCA's view is that the Fed turns dovish. Even Janet Yellen, in the press conference after the FOMC meeting on 20 September, admitted that the Fed needs "to figure out whether the factors that have lowered inflation are likely to prove persistent". If they do, she said, "it would require an alteration of monetary policy." FOMC member (and notable dove) Lael Brainard, in an important speech earlier in September, laid out the argument that, since inflation has missed the Fed's 2% target for five years, inflation expectations have been damaged (Chart 4) and that only a period during which inflation overshot could repair them. With Yellen's term due to expire next February and four other vacancies on the FOMC, personnel changes could significantly change the Fed's direction. Online prediction sites give a somewhat high probability to President Trump's replacing Yellen, with (the rather more hawkish) Kevin Warsh, a Fed governor in 2006-11 (Chart 5). However, presidents tend to like loose monetary policy - President Trump has said as much himself - which raises the possibility of his trying to steer the Fed in a direction that is more tolerant of rising inflation. A possible scenario, then, is of an accommodative Fed which allows equities markets to have a final meltup for this cycle, similar to 1999. Chart 4Have Inflation Expectations Been Damaged? Chart 5Who Will Trump Choose To Lead The Fed? Another current source of uncertainty is China. Money supply growth there has slowed sharply this year, after being pushed upwards by the government's reflationary policies in late 2015. This historically has been a good lead indicator of growth and, indeed, many cyclical indicators have surprised to the downside recently (Chart 6). It is also hard to predict whether, after October's five-yearly Communist Party congress, newly re-elected President Xi Jinping will move ahead with implementing structural reforms, even at the expense of a short-term slowdown of growth.1 We continue to think that risk assets have further upside for this cycle. Growth is likely to remain strong, the probability of a U.S. tax cut is rising, and corporate earnings should surprise to the upside for another couple of quarters (Q3 S&P500 EPS consensus forecasts remain cautious at 5% YoY, versus our model which suggests double-digit growth). Nonetheless, the cycle is now mature, global equities have already produced a total return of almost 40% since their recent bottom in February last year, and valuations in almost every asset class are stretched (Chart 7). Moreover, geopolitical risks - such as that from North Korean missiles - will not disappear quickly. We continue to pencil in the possibility of a recession in 2019 or 2020, caused by a sharp rise in inflation, especially in the U.S., which the Fed - whoever is running it - would have to stamp on by raising rates above the equilibrium level. Chart 6Is A Downturn Coming In China? Chart 7Nothing Looks Cheap Therefore, on the 12-month horizon we continue to recommend pro-risk and pro-cyclical positioning, for example an overweight in equities versus fixed income. However, given the rising uncertainty, we are reducing the scale of our bets a little and so, for example among our equity country and regional recommendations, move a little closer to benchmark by lowering the U.S. to neutral and reducing the degree of our underweight in EM. Garry Evans, Senior Vice President Global Asset Allocation garry@bcaresearch.com What Our Clients Are Asking How worried should we be about North Korea? Chart 8Threats - But Eventually A Diplomatic Solution President Obama reportedly warned President Trump just prior to inauguration that North Korea would be his biggest headache. After 15 missile launches and a nuclear test this year (Chart 8, panel 1), investors are beginning to think the same. How big is the risk that the tension turns into warfare? BCA's Geopolitical strategists have written about the subject extensively.2 They conclude that military action is unlikely. An U.S. attack on North Korean missile or nuclear sites would simply provoke an attack with conventional weapons on Seoul, which is only 50 km from the border. Kim Jong-un undoubtedly knows that if he were to attack Guam or Japan, his country would be wiped out. In the end, then, a diplomatic solution is likely - but this will only be achieved after tension has risen sufficiently to force the two sides to the negotiating table. The analogy is Iran in 2012-15, where sanctions finally forced it to agree to a 10-year freeze in its nuclear plans. For the moment, sanctions seem unlikely to bite. North Korea's trade with China is not yet notably slowing (Chart 8, panel 2) and its GDP growth actually accelerated last year, albeit from stagnating levels, according to estimates from the Bank of Korea (Chart 8, panel 3). So the cycle of new threats and tougher sanctions will continue for a while. Historically, North Korean provocations caused related markets (such as South Korea stocks) to fall sharply for a few days, but this always represented a buying opportunity (Chart 8, panel 4). Given the likelihood of a diplomatic outcome, we think this remains a good rule of thumb. What will happen after China's 19th Party Congress, and will there be a slowdown in the economy? China's twice-a-decade National Party Congress will be held October 18-25. The outcome of the meeting could have important economic and market consequences. The key purpose of the Congress is to rotate China's political leaders. The 19th Party Congress is crucial because it marks the passing of a generation: President Xi Jinping will receive a second five-year term, but is predicted to consolidate his power by placing a younger generation of leaders who support his structural reforms into key positions. When Xi came to power, his reform agenda included de-emphasizing GDP targets; injecting private capital, competition and market discipline into the state-owned corporate sector; and fighting pollution. This agenda has since been compromised, with Xi reverting to infrastructure spending and credit growth to avoid painful adjustments. However, recently, there have been signs of a pullback in reflationary policies (Chart 9). Financial tightening is a key to reviving reform. Tighter controls on banks and leverage will translate into greater market discipline, and will put pressure on the sector most in need of change: SOEs. During the twice-a-decade National Financial Work Conference In late July, Yang Weimin, a key economic policymaker who is close to Xi, said, "The nation can't let leverage rise for the purpose of boosting economic expansion," signaling that the administration is willing to tackle difficult reform issues. He also mentioned the potential risks in the economy such as shadow banking, property bubbles, high leverage in SOEs, and local government debt, adding that the nation should set out its priorities and tackle them. Though it is impossible to predict the precise outcome of the Congress, the leadership reshuffle is likely to benefit Xi's reform agenda. The new leadership is likely to work on rebalancing growth toward consumption and services while encouraging private entrepreneurship and cutting back state-owned enterprises and, most importantly, deleveraging corporate debt. If China's credit impulse rolls over, the recent improvement in industrial profits and domestic demand will come under threat (Chart 9). As a result, China's cyclical growth is set to slow in 2018 as Xi reboots reform. Although economic risks will rise as the reform takes place, we still believe China H shares are attractive relative to other EM markets. In the long run, Xi's renewed reform drive should help China to get out of the "middle income trap'', which could help Chinese stocks to outperform EMs such as South Africa, Turkey and Brazil, where reforms are absent.3 Are Indian equities still a buy? In the three years since Prime Minister Narendra Modi's election, Indian stock prices have outperformed their emerging market peers by more than 20%. But the underlying growth dynamics do not justify this performance. We are turning cautious on India and downgrade Indian equities to neutral for the following reasons. India's GDP growth rate fell to a three-year low of 5.7% yoy in the April-June quarter. The administration's "Make In India" campaign is having limited impact, as seen in the near-zero growth of the manufacturing sector. Capital spending by firms has been dismal, further weighing on the outlook for productivity. Increasing layoffs and business shutdowns have produced considerable slack in the economy. Non-performing loans in the banking system have reached 11.8% of assets. As a result, credit growth to business has fallen almost to zero. This has slowed infrastructure development, as seen in the high level of stalled capital projects. The Reserve Bank of India has only just started the process of pushing banks to raise provisioning for distressed assets. The negative impact of last year's demonetization program is finally showing through. Less than 10% of Indians have ever used non-cash payment methods, and so demand for cyclical goods is slowing. Finally, Indian stocks have risen significantly in recent years, making them expensive relative to EM peers. In addition, profit growth has slowed, and return on equity converged with the EM average. Indian equities have been riding on expectations of reforms from the Modi administration. But, with the exception of the Goods & Services Tax (GST), the reform progress has been disappointing. We are turning cautious on Indian equities until we see improvements in the macro backdrop (Chart 10). Chart 9Sign of slowdown in Chinese Economy Chart 10India: Loosing Steam? How should global equity investors hedge foreign currency exposures? Chart 11Dynamic Hedging Outperforms Static Hedging There have been many conflicting views on how to hedge foreign currency exposures in a global equity portfolio. Full hedge,4 no hedge,5 or simply 50% hedge?6 Or should all investors hold the reserve currencies (USD, euro and Swiss Franc), avoid commodities currencies (AUD and CAD) while being neutral on GBP and JPY?7 As published in a Special Report 8 on September 29, 2017, our research has found that not only should investors with different home currencies manage their foreign currency exposures differently, but also a dynamic hedging framework based on the indicators from BCA's Foreign Exchange Strategy service's Intermediate Timing Model (ITTM)9 outperforms all the static hedging strategies for all investors with six different home currencies (USD, EUR, JPY, GBP, AUD and CAD) (Chart 11). A few key observations from Chart 11 Static hedges reduces risk with little impact on returns for the USD and JPY investors only. Unlike the CAD investors, the AUD investors are much better off to hedge than not to, on a risk adjusted basis, even though AUD is also a commodity currencies, like the CAD. The 50% "least regret" hedge ratio has lived up to its reputation as it reduced risk by more than 50% without severely jeopardizing returns. And for the USD based investors, the 50% static hedge has a similar risk/return profile as the dynamic hedge. For all other five home currencies, however, the 50% static hedge underperforms the dynamic hedge. Global Economy Overview: Globally growth has accelerated, with inflation quiescent. We expect growth to continue to be strong, but U.S. inflation will start to normalize, which should trigger further Fed hikes and a rise in long-term rates. Japanese and euro zone growth will be less inflationary, given continued slack in these economies. U.S.: Growth has rebounded sharply after the seasonally weak Q1 and excessive expectations following the presidential election. The Citi Economic Surprise Index (Chart 12, panel 1) shows strong upward surprises. First-half GDP growth came in at 2.2% (above trend, which is estimated at 1.8%), and the manufacturing ISM reached 57.7 in September. The two big hurricanes will probably knock around 0.5 points off Q3 growth but the lesson from previous disasters is that this will be more than made up over the following three quarters. Rebounding capex, and consumption aided by a probable acceleration in wages, should keep GDP growth strong. Euro Area: Due to Europe's greater cyclicality and dependence on the global cycle, growth momentum is unsurprisingly even stronger than in the U.S., with Q2 GDP growth 2.3% YoY and the manufacturing PMI at 57.4. German growth has been particularly robust with the IFO index at 115.9, close to an all-time high, and German manufacturing wages growing by 2.9% YoY. The credit impulse suggests that the strong growth should continue, although the euro appreciation this year (and consequent tightening of financial conditions) might dampen it a little. Japan: Growth continues to be good in the external sector (with exports rising 18% YOY and industrial production 5%), but weak in the domestic economy, where household spending and core inflation continue to flatline. We do, though, see some first tentative signs of inflation: the Bank of Japan's estimate suggests the output gap has now closed, and the tight labor market is showing through in part-time hourly wages, which are rising 2.9%. Emerging Markets: China's PMI has oscillated around 50 all year (Chart 13, panel 3), as the authorities tried to stabilize growth ahead of October's Party Congress. But money supply and credit growth have been slowing all year, and this is now showing through in downside surprises in fixed asset investment and retail sales data. Especially if the congress moves towards structural reform and short-term pain, growth may slow further. This would be negative for other emerging markets, which depend on China for growth. Bank loan growth and domestic consumption generally remain weak throughout EM ex China. Chart 12Global Growth Is Accelerating... Chart 13...Propelling Europe And Japan Interest Rates: Inflation has been soft this year in the U.S. but is likely to pick up in coming months reflecting stronger economic growth and dollar depreciation. We expect the Fed to raise rates in December and confirm its three hikes next year. That should be enough to push the 10-year Treasury yield up to close to 3%. In Japan and the euro area, however, underlying inflationary pressures are much weaker. So we expect the Bank of Japan to stick to its yield curve control policy, and for the ECB to emphasize, when it announces in October next year's (reduced) asset purchase program, that it will be cautious about raising rates. Global Equities Chart 14Earnings Have Been Strong... Q3 2017 was the second quarter in a row when the price appreciation in global equities was driven entirely by earnings growth, since the forward price-to-earnings ratio contracted by 2% compared to Q2 (Chart 14). Chart 15No Compelling Reasons To Make Large Bets The scope of the improvement in earnings so far in 2017 has been wide. Not only are forward earnings being revised up, but 12-month trailing earnings growth has also been very strong, with all 10 top-level sectors registering positive earnings growth. Margins have steadily improved globally from the lows in early 2016. Despite the slight multiple compression in Q3, equity valuations are not cheap by historical standards. As an asset class, however, equities are still attractively valued compared to bonds, especially after the recent safe-haven buying drove global bond yields to very depressed levels. We remain overweight equities versus bonds on the 9-12 month horizon. Within equities, however, we think it's prudent to reduce portfolio risk by bringing allocations closer to benchmark weighting because 1) equities are not cheap, 2) volatility is low, 3) geopolitical tension is rising, and 4) year-on-year earnings growth over coming quarters may not be as strong as it has been so far this year because earnings in the first half of the 2016 were very depressed. As such, we downgrade the U.S. to neutral from overweight (+3 percentage points), and reduce the underweight in EM (to -2 from -5). We remain overweight the euro area and Japan (but hedge the yen exposure). Within EM, we have been more positive on China and remain so on a 6-9 month horizon. Sector-wise, we maintain our pro-cyclical tilt. Country Allocations: Downgrade U.S. To Neutral We started the year being "cautiously optimistic" with a maximum overweight (+6 ppts) in U.S. equities.10 We added risk at the end of the first quarter by reducing by half the U.S. overweight in order to upgrade the higher-beta euro area to overweight (+3) from neutral.11 The change has worked well, as the euro area outperformed the U.S. by 542 basis points (bps) in Q2 and then by 370 bps in Q3 in unhedged USD terms. Our DM-only quant model also started the year with a maximum overweight in the U.S., but the overweight was gradually reduced each month until July when the model indicated a benchmark weight for the U.S. The model continued its shift away from the U.S. in August and September, and now the U.S. is the largest underweight in the model. As we have previously stated, we use the quant model as one key input into our decision-making process, but we do not follow it slavishly because 1) no model can capture all the ever-changing driving forces in the market, and 2) the model moves more often than we prefer. In light of the rising geopolitical risks and low levels of volatility in all asset classes, we conclude that there are no longer compelling reasons to make large bets among the countries (Chart 15). Valuation in the U.S. is stretched, but neither is it cheap in EM anymore; both trailing and forward earnings growth in the U.S. are below the global average. Forward earnings in the EM look likely to outpace the global average, but EM trailing earnings growth seems to be losing steam. As such, we recommend investors to be neutral in the U.S. and use the funds to reduce the underweight in EM. Sector Allocation: Stay Underweight Global Utilities Overall, our sector positioning retains its tilt towards cyclicals and against defensives (see Table 1). Our global sector quant model, however, in September reduced its underweight in defensives by upgrading utilities to overweight from underweight, mainly due to the momentum factor. We have decided to overwrite the model result and maintain our underweight recommendation for the following reasons. In October, the model again downgraded utilities to underweight. In the most recent cycle post the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), the relative performance of utilities has been closely correlated with the performance of bonds vs. equities (Chart 16, top panel). This is not surprising given the bond-like nature of the sector. The sector enjoys a higher dividend yield than the global average: other than during the GFC, the excess yield has been in the range of 1-2%. In a low bond-yield environment, this yield pick-up is no doubt attractive. However, our house view is for global bond yields to rise over the next 9-12 months and we maintain our overweight on equities vs. bonds. As such, underweight utilities is in line with our overall risk/return assessment. In addition, even though the utilities sector has a higher dividend yield, the current reading is not particularly attractive compared to the five-year average (panel 4); valuation measures such as price to book (panel 3) show a neutral reading as well. The other sector where we override our quant model is Healthcare, which we favor as a long-term play because of favorable demographic trends, while the quant model points to an underweight due to short-term factors such as momentum and valuation. Smart Beta Update Year-to-date, the equal-weighted multi-factor portfolio has outperformed the global benchmark by 54 basis point (bps). (Table 1 and Chart 17) Among the five most enduring factors - size, value, quality, minimum volatility, and momentum - momentum is the only factor that has prevailed in both DM and EM universes, while quality has outperformed in the DM, but underperformed in EM. (Table 1) Chart 16Maintain Underweight Utilities Chart 17MSCI ACW: Factor Relative Performance Value has underperformed growth across the board (Table 1). The size performance, however, has large regional divergences in both value and growth spaces. Small cap has outperformed large cap consistently in both the value and growth spaces in the higher-beta euro area, Japan and U.K., while underperforming in the lower-beta U.S. (Table 2) We maintain our neutral view on styles and prefer to use sector positioning to implement the underlying factors given the historically close correlation between styles and cyclicals versus defensives (Chart 17, bottom two panels). Year-to-date cyclicals have outperformed defensives (Table 1). Table 1YTD Relative Performance* Table 2YTD Total Returns* (%) Small Cap - Large Cap Government Bonds Maintain Slight Underweight Duration. U.S. bond yields declined significantly in Q3 to below fair-value levels in response to heightened geopolitical risks and hurricanes (Chart 18, top panel). This safe-haven buying spread globally, despite ample evidence of faster global growth (middle panel) and less accommodative monetary policies from the major central banks. There is now considerable upside risk for global bond yields from these current low levels. Maintain Overweight TIPS Vs. Treasuries. The fall in nominal U.S. Treasury yields, however, was concentrated in the real yields, as 10-year break-even inflation widened in Q3 (Chart 18, panel 3). In terms of relative value, TIPS are now fairly valued vs. nominal bonds. However, our U.S. Bond Strategy's core PCE model, which closely tracks the 10-year TIPS breakeven rate (Chart 18, panel 3), is sending the message that inflationary pressures are building in the economy and that core PCE should reach the Fed's 2% target by the end of this year. This suggests that the bond markets are not providing adequate compensation for the inflationary economic backdrop. Underweight Canadian Government Bonds. The Bank of Canada (BOC) delivered another surprise 25 bps rate hike in September, due to "the impressive strength of the Canadian economy" and "the more synchronized global expansion that was supporting higher industrial commodity prices." BCA's Global Fixed Income Strategy has been underweight Canada in its hedged global portfolio and recommends investors not to fight the BOC despite little inflation pressure in the Canadian economy (Chart 19). Chart 18Poor Value in Nominal Government Bonds Chart 19Bank of Canada: Shock Hawks Corporate Bonds As inflation recovers and the Fed moves ahead with rate hikes, we expect long-term risk-free rates to rise moderately. Fair value for the 10-year U.S. Treasury yield is currently close to 2.7%. In the context of rising rates and continued economic expansion, we continue to prefer spread product over government bonds. Investment grade bonds in the U.S. trade at an average option-adjusted spread over Treasuries of 110 bps. While Aaa corporate spreads are expensive, other investment grade credit tiers appear fairly valued. Given the deterioration in our U.S. Corporate Health Monitor (Chart 20), amid a rise in leverage, over the past two years (Chart 21) we do not expect the spread to contract further or fall back close to historic lows. However, investors should still be moderately attracted by the carry in a low interest rate environment. Our preference is for U.S. investment-grade corporate bonds over European ones, since the latter could be negatively impacted when the ECB announces its tapering of asset purchases in October. High-yield bonds look attractive after a small rise in spreads and an improvement in the cyclical outlook over the past quarter. The current spread of U.S. high-yield, 360 bps, translates into a default-adjusted yield (assuming a 2.6% default rate and 49% recovery rate over the next 12 months) of 250 bps - close to the long-run average (Chart 22). European junk debt looks less attractive from a valuation perspective. Chart 20Corporate Health Is A Worry In The U.S. Chart 21IG Spreads Unlikely To Contract Further Chart 22High-Yield Debt Valuations Look Attractive Commodities Chart 23Mixed View Towards Commodities Secular perspective: Bearish We hold a bearish secular outlook for commodities, mainly due to our view on China's slowing economic growth and the increasing shift from traditional energy sources to alternatives. Cyclical perspective: Neutral Our short-term commodities view remains neutral since oil inventory drawdowns will push up the crude oil price further, and because low real interest rates will keep gold from falling this year. But industrial metals are likely to react negatively to the winding down of China's reflation after the Party Congress in mid-October. Precious metal: Short-term bullish, long-term bearish. We expect the Fed to tighten rates only slowly which, over time, will mean the central bank finds itself behind the curve on inflation. Real rates are expected to remain relatively low for the foreseeable future, which will be supportive of gold. Rising tension between North Korea and the U.S. could also give gold a lift. Industrial metals: Bearish The copper price has rallied by 10% during Q3 2017, thanks to supply-side disruptions at some of the world's largest copper mines, along with better-than-expected performance of the Chinese economy. However, mine interruptions will be transitory, and the world copper market is already back in balance (Chart 23, panel 3). Although the rebound in the Chinese PMI is keeping metal prices up, we believe China after the Party Congress will try to reengineer its economy towards being more consumption and services-led, which will temper demand for industrial metals. Energy: Bullish We believe that market has been overly pessimistic on oil, and that this will change due to declining inventories and better demand and supply dynamics. (Chart 23) The U.S. Energy Information Administration revised down its shale production forecast for 2H 2017 by 200,000 barrels/day, which should lower investors' concerns over shale overproduction. Libyan oil production, the biggest threat to our bullish oil view, faltered by 300,000/day in August, keeping OPEC in compliance with its promised cuts. Currencies U.S. Dollar: Year to date, the dollar is down by 8% on a trade-weighted basis (Chart 24). However, after a period of underperformance, the U.S. economy is improving relative to its G10 peers, as seen by the strong rebound in the U.S. ISM manufacturing index. Additionally, the pick-up in money velocity points to a recovery in core inflation. As inflation starts to pick up again, markets will discount additional Fed rate hikes. Stay bullish U.S. dollar over the next 12 months. Chart 24U.S. Dollar Recovery? Pound: After a weak start to the year, sterling has recovered all its losses. Strong net FDI inflows have pushed the basic balance back into positive territory. However, Brexit negotiations will impact the financial sector, the largest target for FDI. Additionally, the recent sharp increase in inflation came from the pass-through effect of the weaker currency, and is not reflective of domestic economic activity. We expect increased political uncertainty to weigh down on future growth, forcing the Bank of England to maintain a dovish stance. Stay bearish over the next 12 months. Dollar: On a trade-weighted basis the currency is up 4% year to date, primarily driven by the rally in select metal prices. OECD's measure of output gap still points to substantial slack in the domestic economy, as seen in the downtrend in core inflation and nominal retail sales. However, despite improvements in global trade and domestic real estate activity, the Reserve Bank of Australia will keep policy easy in response to volatile commodity markets. Stay bearish over the next 12 months. Canadian Dollar: Driven by net portfolio inflows near record highs, the currency is up 6% on a trade-weighted basis so far this year. With improving economic activity, as seen in strong retail sales, the Bank of Canada expects the output gap to close in 2018. However, going forward, oil prices are unlikely to double again, and the combination of elevated indebtedness, bubby house prices and rising rates will create headwinds for the household sector. Stay bearish over the next 12 months. Alternatives Chart 25Favor PE, Real Assets Return Enhancers: Favor private equity vs. hedge funds In 2017 so far, private equity has returned 9%, whereas hedge funds have managed only a 3.5% return (Chart 25). Given their strong performance, private equity firms are raising near-record amounts of capital from investors starved for yield. By contrast, hedge funds continue to underperform both global equities and private equity, as is typical outside of recessions or bear markets. However, increasing concerns about valuations in private markets have pushed private equity dry powder to new highs of $963 billion. We continue to favor private equity over hedge funds, albeit with a more cautious outlook. Within the hedge fund space, we favor event-driven funds over the cycle, and macro funds heading into a recession. Inflation Hedges: Favor direct real estate vs. commodity futures In 2017 to date, direct real estate has returned 3.3%, whereas commodity futures are down over 10%. With energy markets likely to continue to recover lost ground over the coming months, we stress the structural nature of our negative recommendation on commodities. Depressed interest rates will keep financing cheap, making the spread between real estate and fixed income yields attractive. However, the slowdown in commercial real estate has made us more cautious on the overall real estate space. With regards to the commodity complex, the long term transition of China to a service-based economy will continue the structural decline in commodity demand. Continue to favor direct real estate vs. commodity futures. Volatility Dampeners: Favor farmland & timberland vs. structured products In 2017 to date, farmland and timberland have returned 2.2% and 1.5% respectively, whereas structured products have returned 1.4%. Farmland continues to outperform timberland given the latter's lower correlation with growth. Timberland returns have also lagged farmland given the weak recovery in the U.S. housing market. Investors can reduce the volatility of a multi-asset portfolio with the inclusion of farmland and timberland. With regards to structured products, rising rates and deteriorating credit quality in the auto loan market will weigh on returns. Given the Fed's plans to start unwinding its balance sheet this year, increased supply will put upward pressure on spreads. Risks To Our View Our pro-risk positioning would be incorrect if global growth were to slow sharply. But we see little sign that this is a significant risk over the next six to 12 months. Of our three favorite indicators of recession risk, global PMIs remain strong, and the U.S. 10-minus-2 year yield curve is still solidly positive at around 80 BP. Only a small blip up in junk bond spreads in August (Chart 26) is of any concern, and it was probably caused just by geopolitical tensions. With U.S. and European consumption and capex looking strong, probably the biggest risk to global growth would come from China, similar to 2015, if October's Party Congress signals a shift to short-term pain to achieve structural reforms. Perhaps more likely is an upside surprise to growth, with BCA's models - based on consumer and business sentiment - pointing to around 3% real GDP growth in the U.S. and 2½% in the euro area over the coming couple of quarters (Chart 27). Such an acceleration of growth would raise the risk of upside surprises to inflation, which could cause a bigger sell off in bond markets than we currently anticipate. Chart 26Any Need To Worry About Credit Spreads? Chart 27Could Growth Surprise On The Upside? Chart 28Suppose Inflation Stays Stubbornly Low Our positioning is not based on inflation remaining chronically low. But structural changes in the economy could cause this. While the Philips curve has not broken down completely, wage growth in the U.S. is 1-1½% lower than in previous expansions when the unemployment gap was at its current level (Chart 28). Could the Nairu be lower than the Fed's estimate of 4.6%? Has the gig economy somehow changed worker and employer behavior? 1 Please see What Our Clients Are Asking: "What Will Happen After China's 19th Party Congress, And Will There Be A Slowdown In The Economy?" of this report. 2 For their most comprehensive analysis, please see Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "North Korea: Beyond Satire," dated April 19, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see Geopolitical Strategy Special Report "China: Looking Beyond The Party Congress'' dated July 19, 2017. available at gps.bcaresearch.com). 4 Perold, A and E. Schulman, 1988, "The free lunch in currency hedging: Implications for investment policy and performance standards," Financial Analyst Journal 44, 45-50. 5 Froot K., 1993, "Currency hedging over long horizons," NBER working paper 4355. 6 Michenaud, S., and B., Solnik, 2008, "Applying Regret Theory to Investment Choices: Currency Hedging Decisions," Journal of International Money and Finance 27, 677-694. 7 Campbell, J., K. de Medeiros and L. Viceira, 2010, "Global Currency Hedging," Journal of Finance LXV, 87-122. 8 Please see Global Asset Allocation Special Report, "Currency Hedging: Dynamic Or Static? - A Practical Guide For Global Equity Investors," dated September 29, 2017, available at gaa.bcaresearch.com. 9 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy "In Search of A Timing Model," dated July 22, 2016, available at fes.bcaresearch.com. 10 Please see Global Asset Allocation, "Quarterly - December 2016," dated December 15, 2016. 11 Please see Global Asset Allocation, "Quarterly - April 2017," dated April 3, 2017. GAA Asset Allocation
Highlights Social unrest and populism are on a secular rise in the U.S.; However, the "Breitbart clique" has suffered a critical defeat in the current Administration; This will make headway for upcoming tax legislation and resolution of the debt ceiling imbroglio; We continue to stress that domestic politics will not hurt U.S. equities, but more downside to USD may exist this year; India-China military tensions are not strategic or market relevant, yet. Feature "Most Americans do not find themselves actually alienated from their fellow Americans or truly fearful if the other party wins power. Unlike in Bosnia, Northern Ireland or Rwanda, competition for power in the U.S. remains largely a debate between people who can work together once the election is over." - Newt Gingrich, January 2, 2001 This is the second time we have begun a report with this classic Gingrich quote from 2001, which now seems to come from a different era. On November 9, 2016 we used it to open our election post-mortem in which we argued that American party identifications were ossifying into tribal markers that could cause run-of-the-mill polarization to mutate into something scarier.1 Chart 1 shows that party identification (Republicans vs. Democrats) is now responsible for the greatest difference in attitudes towards 48 values, something historically determined by race and education. Over the long term, these trends are concerning and may spur further social unrest in the U.S. As we wrote in June, the gulf between America's patricians and plebeians has never been as wide as it is now. It is being complemented by a gulf in ideology and worldview.2 Part of the problem is that migration from the traditionally liberal-leaning coastal America as well as the Great Lakes region have significantly altered the demographic makeup of the American South (Chart 2). The combination of pro-business regulation, low taxes, sunshine, affordable real estate, southern charm, and excellent higher-education institutions has been difficult to resist.3 Thus, an influx of young and educated migrants has altered the political makeup of many traditionally conservative states. There are many cities - much like Charlottesville, Virginia - where these recent migrants will come into conflict with the values and traditions of the south. Chart 1Rise Of A Tribal America Chart 2Internal Migration Is A Risk... Given America's history of internal population movements, these patterns of migration should not be a problem. However, today's polarization is extreme (Chart 3), and it is deepening thanks to radically different information and media streams made available by cable television and especially the Internet (Chart 4). Chart 3... In A Polarized Context... Chart 4... Where 'Fake News' Proliferates What does all of this mean for investors? America is geopolitically very well endowed. It has benign neighbors, strong demographics, and almost all the natural resources it needs. However, hegemons are not born out of plenty, but rather out of need and want. The U.K. built a global empire largely because its rain-drenched island lacked basic materials for superpower status. Spain and Portugal discovered new worlds because stronger empires barred lucrative trading routes. Geography does not preordain hegemony. Strong domestic institutions, luck, and guts and glory do. The USD remains weak despite the fact that the Fed was the first major central bank to start hiking this cycle and despite strong economic data out of the U.S. relative to the rest of the world (Chart 5). Perhaps investors have caught the whiff of something rotten in the American Empire? If so, we may be seeing the beginning of a major USD bear market. Chart 5USD Should Be Outperforming In The Current Global Macro Context BCA's Foreign Exchange Strategy sees the current DXY weakness as temporary. We agree, given that the current trajectory of BCA's ECB months-to-hike measure is discounting way too much hawkishness (Chart 6). The dollar index will likely rally in 2018 as inflation data improves and risks in Europe (Italian election) and Asia (Chinese structural reforms) deepen. Chart 6The ECB Hawkishness Is Overstated The scope and pace of the 2018 USD rally, however, will depend on whether investors have confidence in America's economy and institutions. If the Republican tax reform agenda stalls later this year, and if social unrest continues, sovereign and long-term investors may begin to think about diversifying away from the dollar. The "Trump Put" Continues We do not expect domestic politics to play a role in an equity correction. At least not yet. First, investors seem to be completely discounting any possibility of tax reform judging by the performance of the high tax-rate basket (Chart 7). This is likely a mistake. Tax reform is a major component of both Trump's and congressional Republicans' agenda. If it fails, Republicans will have to go to their home districts empty-handed to campaign for the November 2018 midterm elections. Second, the market fell 1.58% after President Trump's combative press conference on August 15. The move was not a reprimand for Trump's rhetoric, but concern that Gary Cohn, the scion of the "Goldman clique" and likely the next Fed Chair, would resign over the comments.4 These concerns have now been allayed by the firing of Stephen Bannon, the White House Chief Strategist and leader of the "Breitbart clique." Bannon's departure puts Cohn, Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin, and Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross firmly in charge of economic policy. Meanwhile, three generals are now in charge of foreign and national policy: Defense Secretary James Mattis, National Security Advisor H.R. McMaster, and Chief of Staff John F. Kelly. Between the six of them, and Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, there is not a drop of populism left in the White House. Chart 7What Tax Reform? Although nationalists and populists may be on the retreat, it is still not clear what form tax legislation will take. The only thing that has certainly changed since earlier this year is that the border adjustment tax is officially dead, which would have raised ~$1 trillion in revenue over ten years.5 This requires the GOP either to moderate its tax cuts by the same amount, or to add more to the deficit, which, according to legislative rules, would make the cuts temporary. It is likely at this point that whatever bill the GOP passes, it will expire after a "budget window" of around ten years. The divergence between the White House and Congress remains the same: the White House wants gigantic tax cuts, while Congress wants tax reform, i.e. to broaden the tax base and reduce inefficiencies and distortions. The White House would blow out the budget deficit by more than would the House GOP. There are two key questions that investors want to know from the upcoming tax legislation. First, how significant will the fiscal thrust be? This will determine the impact to the economy and hence will affect the Federal Reserve's response. The GOP Plan: Both the White House and the House GOP claim that they will reduce the budget deficit over the next ten years despite cutting taxes. They project an average budget deficit of 1.3%-1.4% from 2018-2027, down from a 3%-4% baseline. This projection is rationalized via expectations of faster economic growth as well as "dynamic scoring" to capture the macroeconomic feedback of the tax cuts. The White House and GOP claim that economic feedback will reduce the deficit by $1.5-$2 trillion over the ten-year budget window, which is 26%-37% of the total deficit reduction they are proposing (i.e., likely very optimistic).6 The Tax Policy Center Response: Outside analysis of the budget plan argues the opposite. The Tax Policy Center argues that the White House plan, insofar as the details are known, would add a minimum of $3.4 trillion to the deficit over the next ten years, and that the macroeconomic feedback could even be negative (i.e., add to the deficits). The deficit would rise from 3.2% of GDP to 6.4% by 2026, if we factor in the Congressional Budget Office assumptions that a 4% real growth rate leads to a GDP of $26.9 trillion in 2026.7 The GOP Retort: Republicans claim they will reduce the deficit by means of proposed "revenue offsets," or savings measures, over the ten-year period. The Tax Policy Center highlights the following in particular: $1.6 trillion from repealing personal exemptions; $1.5 trillion from abolishing all itemized deductions (other than the politically sensitive mortgage interest deduction and charity deduction); $622 billion from treating some income from pass-through businesses as dividends; $272 billion from repealing corporate tax breaks; $208 billion from repealing the "head of household" status for tax filers; $49 billion from taxing capital gains upon death (above the $5 million threshold). The total is $4.3 trillion in savings, against $7.8 trillion of losses, for a total deficit that is increased by $3.4 trillion over the ten years. This would amount to around $340 billion of "stimulus" each year, with the biggest thrust felt in 2018-19. We very much doubt that the White House will achieve this slate of proposals. It has not shown an inkling of the ability to coordinate such a difficult legislative feat. Therefore, we expect the tax legislation to be watered down. The budget deficit may rise to something closer to 6%, over the next ten years, than to the gigantic 12% of GDP implied by Trump's proposals on the campaign trail (Chart 8). Chart 8Question Of The Year: Will Tax Reform Be Stimulative? The second question asked by investors is about the impact of tax legislation on assets. It is clearly positive for inflation and growth given that even tepid tax cuts will provide economic stimulus when unemployment is already very low. Our colleagues at BCA already believe, without a tax bill, that inflation is likely to surprise to the upside in 2018-19.8 Fiscal stimulus via tax cuts would obviously add to that. The equity market will cheer any promising developments on tax cuts or reform, especially given that so little is currently priced in. However, whether the USD rallies as it did on hopes of tax legislation earlier this year will largely depend on how the Fed reacts to the legislation. There is a lot of uncertainty, particularly if President Trump decides to go with Gary Cohn as the next Fed chair. Bottom Line: Congressional Republicans cannot gamble with tax legislation. The failure to cut taxes, or reform the tax code, would be a major policy misstep ahead of the midterm elections. If legislation passes, we expect that Congress will have had greater control over the plan than the White House, reducing the eventual magnitude of the tax cut and the fiscal stimulus. Congress controls the purse strings and will reassert that authority in the context of an ineffective executive. Should You Care About The Debt Ceiling? Clients are beginning to fret about the upcoming debt ceiling fight. There is good reason to be nervous. The Republican-held Congress has failed to pass legislation, notably on this year's priority item, Obamacare. The last thing Republicans want is to shut down the government or cause a technical default entirely of their own doing! Clients should note that while government shutdowns have occurred in the past, the debt ceiling has never been breached. This is because the debt ceiling is an anachronism. In other countries, when a budget is passed it automatically contains the implicit authority to issue whatever debt is required to finance the resulting deficit.9 To require separate legislation for a budget and an authorized level of debt is a product of politics and has little bearing on the actual financing needs of the U.S. government. At the end of the day, the debt ceiling will almost inevitably be raised in the U.S. because no government could stand the popular pressure that would result from social security checks not being mailed out to seniors (who vote!) or a halt to other entitlement programs. Only a disastrous chain of events resulting from polarization and brinkmanship, even worse than in the Obama years, would lead to such an outcome. Today, given that Republicans control both chambers of Congress and the White House, there is no way for the Republicans to share the blame with the Democrats, as they did under Obama. Investors are therefore mistaking the game-theoretical paradigm: It is not a "game of chicken," but rather a cooperative game given that Republicans in Congress are largely on the same side. Members of the GOP are starting to "get it," including the fiscally conservative House Freedom Caucus. David Schweikert, influential member of the Freedom Caucus who sits on the House Ways and Means Committee, said last week that he is in favor of a clean bill to raise the debt ceiling. Mark Meadows, North Carolina representative who chairs the group, has also said that he is "bullish" on raising the debt limit, although he added that he preferred to attach some reforms to the bill. On August 2, he said "Either that will get done [some spending cuts attached to the debt ceiling bill] or a clean debt ceiling will get done. We will raise the debt ceiling and there shouldn't be any fear of that." Other members of the Caucus, including its founder Jim Jordan of Ohio, have retorted that no debt limit hike without spending cuts should be contemplated, prompting the media to focus on the brinkmanship. But we note that the Freedom Caucus, the most fiscally conservative grouping in the House, is itself considerably divided on the issue. This augurs well for a clean bill since the Republican majority in the House is 22 and the Freedom Caucus has 31 members. If Schweikert and Meadows are indicative of how the group will vote, the fiscal conservatives may not have enough votes to deprive the GOP of a majority. (The latter would force GOP moderates to go to the Democrats for votes, complicating the negotiations and increasing the risk of mistakes.) What about the Democrats in the Senate? To pass a clean bill on the debt ceiling, Republicans would need at least eight Democrat Senators to get to 60 votes, and probably more given that Rand Paul (R-Kentucky) would likely vote against a clean bill. We doubt that Democrats would remain united in voting against a clean bill. It would allow President Trump and Republicans in Congress to accuse them of hypocrisy and holding U.S. credit hostage, much as Democrats did to Republicans between 2011-2016. As such, the market's fear that Democrats could play the spoiler is a red herring. While some grassroots activists in the Democratic Party are sure to want a confrontation, its median voters tend to be educated and well-informed. The worst-case scenario for the market would be a two-week shutdown, between October 1, when the current funding for the government expires, and sometime in mid-October when the debt ceiling is hit, according to the Congressional Budget Office. Odds of such a scenario are probably around 25%. But the contingent probability of a debt ceiling failure following a government shutdown would be reduced, not increased, given that it would focus public attention on Republican incompetence. In other words, if a shutdown occurs on October 1, we would expect the odds of a debt ceiling crisis to be reduced. Finally, our assessment that the "Goldman Sachs clique" has reasserted control over White House economic policy should also be positive for the likelihood of a clean debt ceiling bill. While we have no evidence that Stephen Bannon was in favor of using the debt ceiling for fiscal cuts (given his opposition to government spending cuts in toto), he did say following his resignation that Trump would be "moderated" by remaining White House staffers. He went on to say "I think he'll sign a clean debt ceiling; I think you'll see all this stuff." The only remaining holdover in the White House on the debt ceiling issue is the Office of Management and Budget Director Mick Mulvaney. Mulvaney has suggested earlier in the year that Republicans should try to tie spending restraint to a debt ceiling bill. However, at a meeting between President Trump and GOP leaders in early June, President Trump said that congressional leaders should take Steven Mnuchin's position as the White House position. "Mnuching is that guy," Trump told party leaders at the meeting, according to GOP sources who spoke to Politico in the summer. Mulvaney's office has also confirmed that the Treasury Department "has point on the debt ceiling," i.e., that Mnuchin is in charge. Bottom Line: Concern over the debt ceiling is natural, given the failure of Republican-held Congress to pass any legislation of note this year. However, it is also overstated. The U.S. government would default on its obligations to its voters, first and foremost. Such a scenario - given Republican control of all branches of government - would put the final nail in the coffin of the Republican-held Congress ahead of the midterm elections. Fade any fear of a U.S. default. Will India And China Fight A War? Clients, particularly in China, have shown considerable concern about geopolitical conflict between China and India. Since early June, a border dispute between China and India has flared up in the Doklam region. Doklam, or rather the India-China-Bhutan border region, is one of three main border disputes in the Himalayas that flare-up from time to time - along with Kashmir and Arunachal Pradesh. The 1962 border war between the two Asian behemoths over the latter two areas marked the biggest flare in recent memory. Today, India is fearful of China's growing military and logistical capabilities and concerned about the long-term security of the Siliguri Corridor, the narrow stretch of land connecting the subcontinent to the Northeast (Map 1). Control of the Doklam Plateau and Chumbi Valley would give China access to Siliguri; they are therefore important areas to monitor.10 India is also threatened by China's improving bilateral relations with neighbors like Pakistan,Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal, and potentially Bhutan. The latter does not have formal relations with China, has always been under India's sphere of influence, and is at the center of the current dispute. And ultimately, India fears that China seeks to create an economic corridor through Bangladesh to the Indian Ocean, which would, in combination with the Pakistan corridor, surround India. Map 1Too Close For Comfort: Tensions Threaten India's Control Over Vital Siliguri Corridor The current dispute ostensibly began - as many do - with contested infrastructure construction. India built some bunkers at a forward outpost in Lalten in 2012; China allegedly bulldozed them on June 6-8 of this year. The same month, Indian troops confronted Chinese troops building a road along the border with Bhutan that would have connected an existing road to a People's Liberation Army outpost and to the border crossing of Doka La. While the territorial dispute is old, China is expanding its pressure tactics on Bhutan, while India has sent troops into disputed Sino-Bhutanese territory in a more assertive defense of Bhutan. Broadly, China is making inroads with infrastructure as it develops its far-flung western regions and seeks to improve connectivity with neighbors via the One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative. China is capital-rich and can afford to improve its access to regions of strategic value that yield access to key Indian territories or supply water and hydropower to India. India is capital-poor and downstream, so its ability to respond is often limited to military gestures. India also wants to retain its dominance over Bhutanese foreign policy, in place since 1949 and especially 1960, and this dispute is marked by India taking an active military role on Bhutanese territory on Bhutan's behalf. There are several reasons we do not expect this conflict to be market-relevant. First, the Himalayas are isolated and poor, so that China or India would have to make a very dramatic move that poses a genuine strategic threat (e.g., to the Siliguri Corridor, or Chinese control of Tibet, or Indian relations with Pakistan, or Indian water sources) to trigger a larger conflict. Second, while it is true that nationalism is flaring up on both sides, China has a clear interest in pursuing some "rallying around the flag" strategy amid the standoff over North Korea, and ahead of the Communist Party's nineteenth National Party Congress. That it chose to do so in Doklam, where conflict is more easily contained than in the Koreas or the East or South China Seas, suggests that political opportunism and China's desire to make incremental gains, rather than a sweeping Chinese plan to seize strategic territory, is driving the current episode. Meanwhile, India needs to attract capital to build its manufacturing base, and Prime Minister Narendra Modi has reached out to China for this reason. India will undoubtedly defend its strategic interests if attacked, but otherwise it is not eager to clash with China, which has bulked up its military far more than India has done in recent decades. Chart 9India Would Bolster Containment Of China However, we do see India-China relations as fitting into the larger, negative geopolitical dynamic where the U.S. and its allies encourage India as a balance to China, while China suspects the U.S. alliance of using India and others to encircle and entrap China (Chart 9). Not that the U.S. stirred up the current dispute, but that the U.S. (and Japan) will generally seek to improve relations with India and to strengthen its military and economy, and China will use its regional influence to try to keep India off balance.11 This structural dynamic, in addition to China's territorial assertiveness, is likely to keep generating frictions. Bottom Line: A conflict between India and China is only market-relevant if it extends beyond disputed territories in the Himalayas to affect core strategic interests like the Siliguri Corridor, Tibetan stability, the Indo-Pakistani balance of power, or water supply and hydropower. It could also become market-relevant by worsening U.S.-China relations - and delaying Chinese economic reforms - if China should come to feel embattled on all geopolitical fronts. For instance, should an adventurous, "lame duck" Donald Trump attempt to combine with India and other neighbors in ways that threaten to cause problems in China's western regions as well as in its East Asian periphery. Marko Papic, Senior Vice President Chief Geopolitical Strategist marko@bcaresearch.com Matt Gertken, Associate Vice President Geopolitical Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com Martin H. Barnes, Senior Vice President Economic Advisor mbarnes@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "U.S. Election: Outcomes And Investment Implications," dated November 9, 2016, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Populism Blues: How And Why Social Instability Is Coming To America," dated June 9, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 3 Hook 'em Horns! 4 We recently argued that the White House is torn between two groups, the "Goldman" and the "Breitbart" cliques. The Goldman clique is led by Gary Cohn, Director of the National Economic Council and is pragmatic, un-ideological, and focused on passing tax reform and pro-business regulation. The Breitbart clique is populist, nationalist, and leans to the left on economic matters. Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "The Wrath Of Cohn," dated July 26, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 5 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Will Congress Pass The Border Adjustment Tax?" dated February 8, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 6 Please see Congressional Budget Office, "An Update to the Budget and Economic Outlook: 2017 to 2027," June 2017, available at www.cbo.gov and U.S. Office of Management and Budget, "Budget of the U.S. Government: A New Foundation For American Greatness, Fiscal Year 2018," available at www.whitehouse.gov. 7 Please see the Tax Policy Center, "The Implications Of What We Know And Don't Know About President Trump's Tax Plan," July 12, 2017, and Benjamin R. Page, "Dynamic Analysis of the House GOP Tax Plan: An Update," June 30, 2017, available at www.taxpolicycenter.org. Using White House growth assumptions of 4.7% would lead to a deficit of 5.7% in 2026. 8 Please see BCA U.S. Bond Strategy Portfolio Allocation Summary, "On Hold, But Not For Long," dated August 8, 2017, and U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Two Challenges For U.S. Policymakers," dated May 23, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com. 9 Denmark also has a debt ceiling, but it has set it so high that it does not need to be addressed. 10 Please see Sudha Ramachandran, "Bhutan's Relations With China And India," Jamestown Foundation, China Brief (17:6), April 20, 2017, available at Jamestown.org. 11 In fact, Japan already waded into the India-China dispute. The Japanese ambassador to India issued a statement critical of China, which the Chinese Foreign Ministry immediately rebuked.
Highlights Beware of asset managers' and leveraged funds' large net long positions in EM currencies. Overextended net long positions in EM and commodities currencies signify overbought conditions in EM risk assets in general. This in tandem with the poor outlook for EM/China growth makes the risk-reward of EM financial markets unattractive. Downgrade Korean equities from overweight to neutral, but continue to overweight Korean technology stocks relative to the EM benchmark. Also, maintain the short KRW / long THB trade. Take profits on the long Indian / short Indonesian stocks position. Consistently, downgrade Indian stocks to neutral and upgrade Indonesian bourses to neutral within an EM equity portfolio. Feature Investor positioning in EM currencies is elevated. From a contrarian perspective, this at minimum warrants a correction. Chart I-1 illustrates that asset managers' and leveraged funds' combined net long positions in the Mexican peso, the Brazilian real, the Russian ruble and South African rand are very elevated.1 This aggregate is weighted by notional value of outstanding open interest of each currency, and is shown as a percentage of open interest. Importantly, we have refined positioning data to separate asset managers and leveraged funds from other non-commercial and commercial institutions. Asset managers and leveraged funds reflect investment community sentiment the best. Besides, they are the most inclined to scale back their net long positions if and when these currencies begin to depreciate, i.e., they are more momentum driven. By doing so, they will reinforce the selloff. Currently bullish sentiment on EM and commodities is corroborated by the fact that asset managers' and leveraged funds' aggregate net long positions in non-EM commodities currencies such as the CAD, the AUD and the NZD are at the highest level since 2011 (Chart I-2). Typically, these currencies are at risk of a correction when positioning reaches such excessive levels. Chart I-1Asset Manager's And Leveraged Funds' Net Long Positions In EM Currencies Are Large Chart I-2Asset Manager's And Leveraged Funds' Net ##br##Long Positions In Commodities Currencies Chart I-3A and Chart I-3B show the same for individual currencies such as the MXN, the BRL, the RUB, the ZAR, the CAD, the AUD and the NZD. The overarching message is that investors' net long exposure to both EM and commodities currencies is large and depreciation risk for these exchange rates is substantial, at least in the near term. Chart I-3AAsset Managers And Leveraged Funds' Net ##br##Long Positions In Select Currencies Chart I-3BAsset Managers And Leveraged Funds' Net ##br##Long Positions In Select Currencies Yet, these positioning data do not reveal whether potential weakness will be a bull market correction or the beginning of bear market. Our bias remains that the potential selloff will evolve into a new phase of the bear market in EM currencies that began in 2011. In turn, as EM currencies depreciate, they will erode foreign investors' returns and trigger a selloff in other EM risk assets such as stocks, domestic bonds and credit markets. In short, investor sentiment on EM risk assets correlates with sentiment toward both EM and commodities currencies. Hence, bullish sentiment and overextended net long positions in EM and commodities currencies signify overbought conditions in EM risk assets in general. The Cyclical Outlook Chart I-4EM Currency Valuations Are Close To Neutral We are negative on the cyclical outlook for EM currencies for the following reasons: With a few minor exceptions, EM currencies are not cheap; their valuations are close to neutral Chart I-4 demonstrates the real effective exchange rate for aggregate EM excluding China, Korea and Taiwan. This is an equity market cap-weighted aggregate. It shows that EM exchange rate valuations are not depressed. The reason why we remove China, Korea and Taiwan from the calculation is because their respective bourses have large equity market-cap weights in the MSCI EM stock index, and thereby dominate the EM aggregate. Excluding these three markets, we get a less skewed perspective on EM currency valuations and assign higher weight to the high-yielding ones. Importantly, the best measure of currency valuation is, in our opinion, the real effective exchange rate based on unit labor costs (ULC). The rationale is that this measure captures changes in wages and productivity. The latter two are critical to competitiveness and, hence, reveal the true valuation of currencies. Unfortunately, there is no available ULC-based real effective exchange rate data for all individual EM currencies. Chart I-5A and Chart I-5B presents the measure for countries where data from reputable sources are available. By and large, the message is that, with the exception of the Mexican peso, EM currencies are not particularly cheap. Chart I-5AReal Effective Exchange Rates ##br##Based On Unit Labor Costs Chart I-5BReal Effective Exchange Rates ##br##Based On Unit Labor Costs The outlook for EM exchange rates has historically been contingent on growth and corporate profitability in developing economies. That said, EM exchange rate fluctuations have in recent years become dependent on U.S. real interest rates as the importance of portfolio fixed-income flows into EM has dramatically surged. Both drivers - EM growth and U.S. real yields - are likely to become headwinds for EM exchange rates going forward. EM growth will relapse anew as Chinese growth slows and EM shipments to China decline. Our new money impulse for China2 has historically been a good leading indicator for EM exchange rates, and it points to potentially considerable EM currency depreciation in the next six to nine months (Chart I-6). Meanwhile, U.S. interest rate expectations are very depressed. It will take only slightly stronger U.S. growth and inflation readings or some non-dovish guidance from the Federal Reserve for U.S. interest rate expectations to move higher. The latter will support the U.S. dollar and hurt EM currencies. Although industrial metals prices have recently spiked to new cyclical highs, we believe commodities prices - both for energy and industrial materials - will be lower in the medium term. Global oil stocks are breaking to new cyclical lows, heralding weakness in crude prices (Chart I-7). The fact that oil has failed to post gains amid a notable rally in the euro could be a sign of fundamental vulnerability. Chart I-6China's Money Impulse And EM Currencies Chart I-7Oil Prices Are Vulnerable As for industrial metals prices, our analysis has not changed: the considerable slowdown in China's broad money heralds a major top in industrial metals prices, as per Chart I-8. The mainland accounts for 50% of global industrial metals consumption, and its capex cycle is of critical importance. What explains the latest spike in base metals prices? Chart I-9 reveals that since early this year, iron ore prices have been negatively correlated with Chinese money market rates (interest rates are shown inverted and are advanced by 30 days Chart I-9). This year's correction and subsequent rebound in iron ore prices might be attributed to changes in mainland traders' positioning due to swings in domestic interest rates. Chart I-8China-Plays Are At Risk Chart I-9Chinese Interest Rates And Iron Ore Prices Going forward, either China's growth will decelerate sufficiently enough to weigh on industrial metals prices, or the authorities will resume policy tightening to rein in financial excesses. All in all, the risk-reward for iron ore and other industrial metals is negative. On the whole, lower energy and industrial metals prices will weigh on EM commodities currencies. As for Asian currencies, they are sensitive to global trade. We expect global trade and tradable goods prices to relapse due to the resumption of a slowdown in China/EM demand. Manufacturing-based Asian currencies will depreciate amid budding weakness in their manufacturing sector (Chart I-10). In addition, Chart I-11 shows global auto sales lead global semiconductor sales by several months. The basis for this correlation is that autos nowadays use a lot of semiconductors, and therefore auto cycles affect semiconductor demand. The boom in semi-cycle has been one of the pillars of Asian exports recovery. As the former moderates, the latter will relapse weighing on Asian non-commodities currencies. Chart I-10Asian Manufacturing ##br##And Exchange Rates Chart I-11Global Auto Sales Lead ##br##Global Semiconductor Sales Bottom Line: Our bet remains that EM currencies will depreciate versus both the U.S. dollar and the euro - and regardless of euro/U.S. dollar exchange rate fluctuations. We recommend a short position in a basket of the following EM currencies: ZAR, TRY, COP, CLP, BRL, IDR, MYR and KRW. For market-neutral portfolios, our currency overweights are MXN, RUB, PLN, CZK, TWD, INR and THB. Korean Equities: Downgrading To Neutral We recommend downgrading Korea to neutral from overweight within EM equity portfolios. North Korea will likely remain a source of uncertainty and volatility. BCA's Geopolitical Strategy service does not expect war on the Korean peninsula as long-standing constraints to conflict are still in place, starting with Pyongyang's ability to cause massive civilian casualties north of Seoul via an artillery barrage. As such, the ultimate resolution to the conflict will be a peaceful one. However, getting from here (volatility) to there (negotiated resolution) requires more tensions. The U.S. has to establish a "credible threat" of war in order to move China and North Korea towards a negotiated resolution.3 And that process could take more time, which means more volatility in the markets.4 The overwhelming portion of Korea's equity rally has been driven by a phenomenal surge in one company's share price: Samsung. Excluding technology companies, the performance of MSCI Korea stock prices and their EPS has been mediocre. Samsung's explosive rally has been partially due to the exponential surge in DRAM prices (Chart I-12). On a macro level, we cannot forecast prices of individual semiconductors (such as DRAM). Nevertheless, our assessment is that the global semi cycle is entering a soft patch as per Chart I-11 above. Furthermore, Korea's cyclical growth has already peaked, and will slow going forward (Chart I-13). Broad money growth is still decelerating, entailing that no turnaround is in the cards (Chart I-13, bottom panel). Chart I-12Samsung Share Prices And DRAM Chart I-13Korea: Cyclical Profile Importantly, the new government has enacted a law to boost minimum wages by 16% in January 2018 and would need to increase by a similar rate annually to reach its 2020 target. Even though there are fiscal subsidies for businesses and minimum wages affect smaller businesses much more than larger ones, odds are that this will still boost overall wage growth, and hence weigh on companies' profit margins. Chart I-14Korean Won Is Expensive Versus The Yen Finally, the Korean won is modestly expensive, based on the unit labor costs-based real effective exchange rate (Chart I-14, top panel). The won is especially expensive versus the yen (Chart I-14, bottom panel). This is negative for Korean manufacturers and the currency. Investment Recommendations Downgrade Korean stocks from overweight to neutral, but continue to overweight Korean technology stocks relative to the EM benchmark. Close long Korea / short EM equities and long Korean banks / short Indonesian banks positions. These positions have produced small gains since their initiation (details on all our open positions are available at the end of each week's report on page 17). Maintain a short KOSPI / long Nikkei in common currency terms trade: Either the won will depreciate substantially versus the yen or the KOSPI will underperform the Nikkei in local currency terms. In both cases, this trade will be profitable. Continue to bet on lower bond yields in Korea via receiving 10-year swap rates. Deflationary pressures from weaker exports - that make up 35% of GDP - will weigh on economic growth, and the central bank will be forced to cut rates. Maintain a short Korean won / long Thai baht position. The won is a high-beta currency and will underperform the Thai baht in a selloff / Asian exports slowdown. The Thai currency will likely trade in a low beta fashion due to the country's large current account surplus and low exposure to both China and commodities. Arthur Budaghyan, Senior Vice President Emerging Markets Strategy arthurb@bcaresearch.com Take Profits On Long Indian / Short Indonesian Equities Position This recommendation has generated 8.4% gain since its initiation on July 30, 2014, and we recommend booking profits. Indian share prices have outperformed their Indonesian peers over the past year (Chart II-1) but the outlook for top line growth appears to be slightly better in Indonesia than in India. Specifically: We have combined bank credit to businesses and households with government expenditures to calculate a credit and fiscal spending impulse for both countries. Chart II-2 illustrates that this impulse heralds a more positive outlook for listed companies' revenues in the case of Indonesia than India. Chart II-1Book Profits On Long Indian / ##br##Short Indonesian Stocks Position Chart II-2Credit And Fiscal Spending ##br##Impulse Favor Indonesia Over India Other cyclical variables are mixed in both economies: vehicle and two-wheeler sales are sluggish, manufacturing PMIs have rolled over, but imports of capital goods are improving (Chart II-3). In regard to valuation and profitability, both bourses are expensive in absolute terms (Chart II-4, top panel) but India's return on equity (RoE) is well below Indonesia's (Chart II-4, bottom panel). Such a 14% premium of Indian stocks over Indonesian ones along with a poor revenue outlook and lower RoE might prevent further share price outperformance by India. Chart II-3Mixed Cyclical Growth Dynamics Chart II-4India And Indonesian Equities: P/E Ratios And RoEs Although our negative outlook for commodities prices and expensive equity valuations entail a negative stance on Indonesian risk assets in absolute terms, we believe this bourse's underperformance versus the EM overall equity index and Indian stocks is late. It makes sense to reduce/eliminate an underweight allocation to Indonesian equities. Bottom Line: We recommend booking gains on the long Indian / short Indonesia equity position initiated on July 30, 2014. Consistently, we downgrade Indian stocks from overweight to neutral and upgrade Indonesian ones from underweight to neutral within an EM equity portfolio. Ayman Kawtharani, Associate Editor ayman@bcaresearch.com 1 CFTC is the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission. The data on South African rand is available from May 2015. 2 Presented and discussed in detail in July 26, 2017 and August 16, 2017 reports; the links are available on page 18. 3 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "North Korea: Beyond Satire," April 19, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Can Pyongyang Derail The Bull Market?," August 16, 2017, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. Equity Recommendations Fixed-Income, Credit And Currency Recommendations
Highlights Unsurprisingly, OPEC 2.0's leadership agreed on the need to extend the coalition's 1.8mm b/d production-cutting agreement to end-March 2018. Leaders of the coalition - the energy ministers of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and Russia - will recommend as much when the coalition meets next week in Vienna. Meanwhile, sequential production in U.S. shales during the first four months of the year is up just under 100k b/d, based on the EIA's latest estimates. This was led by surging Permian production. We expect shale-oil production growth to continue, and are revising our year-end 2017 light-tight-oil (LTO) production estimate for the four main shale-oil plays to 5.66mm b/d, up from our earlier assessment of 5.39mm b/d. We also are lifting our year-end 2018 estimate of shale production to 6.64mm b/d. This means December-to-December LTO production will increase ~ 1mm b/d by Dec/17 and by another ~1mm b/d by Dec/18. Energy: Overweight. As of last Thursday's close, we are long Dec/17 Brent $65/bbl calls vs. $45/bbl puts at -$1.16/bbl, and long Dec/17 vs. Dec/18 Brent at -$0.21/bbl. These positions were up 16.4% and 242.9%, respectively. Base Metals: Neutral. The physical deficit in zinc appears to be widening slightly, based on supply-demand estimates from the International Zinc Study Group. Usage totaled 2.282mm MT in Jan-Feb 2017 vs. refined production of 2.28mm MT. For 2016, usage was 13.89mm MT vs. supply of 12.67mm MT. Precious Metals: Neutral. Metal refiner Johnson Matthey expects a 790k oz. palladium deficit this year, up from a little over 160k oz. last year. Separately, the World Platinum Investment Council expects platinum supply to fall 2% this year to 7.33mm oz. Ags/Softs: Underweight. The USDA reported corn planting stood at 71% for the week ended May 14, vs. an average of 70% over the 2012 - 16 period. We remain bearish. Feature The determination of the leaders of OPEC 2.0 to clear the storage overhang could not have been made more clear, following comments earlier this week from KSA's and Russia's energy ministers the coalition's 1.8mm b/d production-cutting agreement would be extended to end-March 2018. This is three months beyond earlier speculation the deal would be extended to year-end 2017. Chart of the WeekBalances Chart Still, when dealing with a political organization of any sort - and OPEC 2.0 is nothing if not a political entity - our bias is to assume less-than-complete compliance with production cuts, and an earlier return to pre-agreement production levels than proffered by the leadership of the coalition. Hence, in our updated balances model (Chart of the Week), in addition to assuming higher U.S. production out of the shales, we have Russian production returning to a level just below 11.30mm b/d by October 2017, up roughly 150k b/d from the 11.15mm b/d we assume they'll be producing until the end of September. We also assume Iraq's production will move up to 4.45mm b/d (up 50k b/d) beginning in January, and that Iran will be steadily, yet slowly, increasing production by 5-10k b/d per month beginning this month. The only assumption we're making for staunch compliance to the OPEC 2.0 accord after our assumed extension to year-end 2017 at next week's Vienna meeting is that KSA and its GCC allies - Kuwait, Qatar, and the UAE - will continue to abide by their voluntary production cuts. This group has maintained solidarity on past production-management deals, we expect them to do so again in this round. Of course, the other members of the coalition could vote against this proposal next week, and instead decide to end the production deal in June under its original conditions. Or, they could agree to extend the deal, but only until year-end 2017. Regardless of whichever policy decisions are agreed to during next week's meeting, come November, when OPEC meets again, they might tweak/change those agreements to reflect their updated outlook at that time. Given this uncertainty, we believe the assumptions we've made are realistic, but we will be monitoring conditions closely so that we can modify our view quickly. Shale Coming On Strong Part of OPEC 2.0's desire to extend its deal likely is the improvement in the performance of shale-oil producers in the U.S. In its latest Drilling Productivity Report (DPR), the EIA noted that sequential production in the first four months of the year has risen ~ 100k b/d per month in the U.S. shales. This surge was led by higher Permian production, which accounted for ~ three-quarters of the increased output (Chart 2). Interestingly, rig-weighted production per rig dropped for the first time in April 2017, but it still is high at 732 b/d, down from 735 b/d in March. We will be watching this closely to see if it is the beginning of a trend of stagnating productivity amid a rapid expansion of industry activity. The resurgence in the shales can be seen in the year-on-year (yoy) growth in total production in the seven basins the EIA tracks, which broke back above 5.0mm b/d in February and crossed into positive yoy growth in March (Chart 3). Net, we expect 2017 global supply to average 97.65mm b/d, for an increase 610k b/d this year, and for demand to average 98.3mm b/d, for an increase of 1.5mm b/d. EM demand, which we proxy using non-OECD consumption, accounts for 1.27mm b/d of this year's global demand growth, and continues to lead overall growth in oil demand (Chart 4, panel 2). Of this, China and India account for 350k and 210k b/d, respectively, of the growth in EM demand. Chart 2Permian Basin Leads##br##U.S. Shale's Resurgence Chart 3Year-On-Year LTO Production##br##Breaks Out In 1Q17 Chart 4EM Growth Continues##br##To Lead Global Demand China, India Lead EM Oil Consumption Non-OECD countries represent more than 50% of global oil consumption. Indeed, within the ~1.6mm b/d global oil demand growth we expect for 2017 and again in 2018, slightly more than 87% of it comes from EM economies. Table 1 below shows the average yoy growth by year for different regions - DM and EM - and countries from 2011 to 2018. Over this period, almost all of the world's oil-demand growth comes from non-OECD countries. From 2011-2018, the average p.a. demand growth for non-OECD countries is 2.79%, while for OECD countries it is only 0.12%. Table 1EM Leads Oil-Demand Growth Looking more closely at the composition of the EM economies, we see that, on average, between 2010 and 2018 Chinese oil consumption accounts for 24% of non-OECD demand, while the Indian oil consumption represents 8.3%, for a combined total of 32.37% of non-OECD average consumption. These two countries alone contributed on average to around 50% of the world oil consumption growth from 2010 to 2018. China has been the fastest-growing oil market in the world since the early 2000s. However, since 2015, when it emerged as an important growth market on the world stage, India's consumption has been increasing at a faster pace than China's. One of the reasons for this likely is the desire of the Chinese government to resume its pivot to a more service-oriented economy, which is less commodity-intensive than the export-oriented economy dominated by heavy industry. India, meanwhile, is looking to increase its manufacturing output, lifting it from the low-teens to 25% of GDP by 2022 under Prime Minister Narendra Modi's "Make in India" campaign. This change in the composition of global oil-demand growth is reducing demand for residual fuel oil and distillates. Indeed, IEA data continues to show a steady decline in yoy consumption for these two types of fuel in China, with residual fuel oil consumption down 26.5% yoy in 2016, and gasoil and diesel (distillates) consumption down close to 3% yoy. By contrast, gasoline consumption, is up more than 8% yoy along with jet fuel and kerosene. LPG demand (propane and butane, along with other light ends) and ethane demand (a petrochemical feedstock) is surging, up 24% in 2016, according to the IEA. In relative terms, China will remain the main driver of global oil consumption. At ~ 12.5mm b/d, China's oil demand is close to three times as high than India's. However, India likely will surpass China in terms of its contribution to global oil demand growth in coming years. A combination of structural and policy-driven factors points toward a possible sustainable growth path for Indian oil consumption for the coming years (oil consumption per capita is increasing, as is vehicle usage, particularly motorcycles (Chart 5); and, the government's desire to increase the share of the manufacturing to 25% of GDP by 2022 will boost oil demand growth as well). Chart 5India Passenger Car Sales Are Soaring Recent studies assessing the "take-off" of an economy look at its per capita oil consumption in transportation, in particular, given that this sector accounts for more than half of the world's oil consumption (63% according to IEA Energy Statistics 2014). The theory boils down to the following: As income grows, a larger share of the population becomes vehicle owners. This is referred to as the "motorization" of an economy. In India, the transportation sector represents around 40% of total oil consumption.1 According to Sen and Sen (2016), the level of vehicle-ownership per capita is still low in India compared to other economies that have experienced similar take-offs. The government's targeted increase in manufacturing as a share of GDP to 25% under the "Make In India" program (from a current level of ~ 15%) would, according to the Sen and Sen (2016) formulation, lead to an increase in oil consumption. The "Make in India" campaign was launched in 2014 by Prime Minister Narendra Modi and aims to transform the country's manufacturing sector into a powerhouse for growth and employment. Other key objectives of this campaign include a target of 12-14% annual growth in the manufacturing sector, and the creation of 100 million new jobs by 2020 in the sector.2 In 2017Q1, India's liquid fuels consumption declined by 3% yoy. This decline was, for the most part, caused by the government's "demonetization" program, which was designed to streamline the economy and reduce rampant black-market transactions. The government chose to invalidate the 500- and the 1,000-rupee banknotes, the most-used currency denominations in the economy (around 86% of the total value of currency in circulation). This represented a huge shock to the average citizen, since it limited the purchasing power of a large part of the consumer economy for an extended period of time and impacted India's overall economic activity. Recent data show Indian oil and liquids consumption up 3% in April (yoy), and its money supply is almost back to its pre-demonetization levels, according to the EIA. This suggests economic activity and liquid-fuel consumption will get back to their previous levels. Bottom Line: We believe OPEC 2.0's deal will be extended at next week's Vienna meeting to March 2018. However, after September, we are expecting compliance to fall off meaningfully, leaving KSA and its allies as the only producers adhering to their voluntary cuts past year-end 2017. Even so, we expect the storage overhang to be worked off - mostly this year - but also into next. Even though U.S. shale production is surprising on the upside, the commitment of a majority of OPEC 2.0 to production cutbacks at least through September of this year will force the storage overhang to draw down by year end. KSA and its core allies will maintain production discipline to March 2018, which will keep storage from refilling too quickly during the seasonally weak consumption period in the first quarter next year. We continue to expect oil forward curves to backwardate by December 2017, and remain long Dec/17 Brent vs. short Dec/18 Brent. In addition, we remain long Dec/17 Brent $65/bbl calls vs. short Dec/17 Brent $45/bbl puts, expecting prices to rally toward $60/bbl by the time Brent delivers in December. Robert P. Ryan, Senior Vice President Commodity & Energy Strategy rryan@bcaresearch.com Hugo Bélanger, Research Assistant Commodity & Energy Strategy hugob@bcaresearch.com 1 Sen, Amrita; Anupama Sen (2016), "India's Oil Demand: On the Verge of 'Take-Off'?". Oxford Institute for Energy Studies. 2 Some of the recent policies to enhance the manufacturing growth include: Government subsidies of up to 25% for specific manufacturing sub-sectors; area-based incentives to increase the manufacturing development in key regions; allowances for companies that invest a predetermined amount in new plant and machinery; deductions for additional wages paid to new regular employees; deductions for R&D expenditures; and other incentives aimed at promoting the manufacturing sector and improving the India's ease of doing business to attract foreign direct investments. Please see http://www.makeinindia.com/article/-/v/direct-foreign-investment-towards-india-s-growth. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed In 2017 Summary of Trades Closed in 2016
Highlights Chinese capex and EM domestic demand will falter again in the second half of this year. This is not contingent on a growth slowdown in the advanced economies, but due to a further slowdown in bank lending in EM and lower commodities prices. The direction of EM share prices in absolute terms and relative to the S&P 500 is determined by EPS trajectory, not equity valuations. We expect EM EPS to drop in absolute terms and to underperform U.S. EPS. India's deleveraging cycle is well advanced, especially when compared with other EM economies. Maintain an overweight position in Indian equities within the EM universe. Continue betting on yield curve steepening. Stay long the Czech koruna versus the euro. Feature EM/China growth will relapse in the second half of this year. Share prices, presuming they are forward-looking, will roll over beforehand. Chinese interest rates have risen, which typically heralds a downtrend in the mainland's credit impulse and business cycle (Chart I-1). Chinese interest rates are shown as an annual percentage change, inverted and advanced. This is a typical relationship between interest rates and credit cycles, and there is currently no reason why it will play out any differently in China. Given the mainland has a lingering credit bubble, rising borrowing costs and regulatory tightening of banks and the shadow banking system are guaranteed to lead to a relapse in credit origination, and in turn economic growth. China's yield curve has been flattening in recent months. This often precedes a selloff in both EM share prices and industrial metals (Chart I-2). Chart I-1China: Interest Rates ##br##And Credit/Business Cycles Chart I-2A Flattening Yield Curve In China Is ##br##A Bad Omen For EM And Commodities The Chinese yield curve has been experiencing bear flattening - front-end rates have risen more than long-term rates. Bear flattening in yield curves typically occurs before a major top in growth, when current conditions are still robust but the fixed-income market begins to question growth sustainability going forward. A flattening yield curve is consistent with our assessment: a lack of follow-through from last year's stimulus combined with the recent policy tightening will cause growth to downshift materially very soon. EM narrow (M1) money growth has rolled over decisively, and historically it has been a good leading indicator for EM earnings per share (EPS) (Chart I-3). The former has historically led the latter by about nine months. Chart I-3EM EPS To Roll Over In the Second Half 2017 The same is true in the case of China - the M1 impulse (the second derivative of M1) leads industrial profits by about six months and heralds an imminent reversal (Chart I-4). Chart I-4China's Industrial Profit Growth Recovery Is At A Risk The commodities currency index (an equally weighted average of AUD, NZD and CAD) has relapsed against the greenback. This index points to global growth deceleration in the second half of this year (Chart I-5). Similarly, these commodities currencies also lead commodities prices, and presently signal a top in the commodities complex (Chart I-6). Chart I-5Commodities Currencies Signify Weakness In Global Trade Chart I-6Commodities Currencies Point To Relapse In Commodities Prices In EM ex-China, Korea and Taiwan, bank loan growth has still been decelerating despite the global growth recovery of the past 12 months (Chart I-7, top panel). Besides, retail sales volume growth in EM ex-China, Korea and Taiwan has not ameliorated yet (Chart I-7, bottom panel). All of these economic aggregates are equity market cap-weighted. Similarly, auto sales in EM ex-China, Korea and Taiwan have been stabilizing at very low levels but have not recovered at all (Chart I-8). Hence, we infer that domestic demand in EM ex-China has stabilized, but it has not recovered. For example, manufacturing production in Brazil, Russia, South Africa and Indonesia has been rather subdued (Chart I-9). Chart I-7EM Ex-China, Korea And Taiwan: ##br##Domestic Demand Has Not Recovered Chart I-8EM Ex-China, Korea And Taiwan: ##br##Auto Sales Are Stabilizing At Low levels Chart I-9Synchronized Global Recovery? As EM ex-China credit growth decelerates further due to the lingering credit excesses and poor banking system health, their domestic demand will disappoint. This is a major risk to the EM profit outlook. Bottom Line: Chinese and EM domestic demand and by extension corporate earnings will falter again in the second half of this year. This view is not contingent on a growth slowdown in the advanced economies but will be the outcome of further slowdown in bank lending in EM and lower commodities prices. A reversal in Chinese imports from other EM is the link that explains how a relapse in the mainland's growth in the second half this year will hurt the rest of the world in general, and EM in particular. Profits Hold The Key Chart I-10Profits, Not Valuations, Hold The Key Emerging markets' relative performance versus the S&P 500 has historically been driven by EPS (Chart I-10). In the past 12 months, EM EPS has improved modestly but has not outperformed U.S. EPS in U.S. dollar terms. Consistently, EM stocks have failed to outperform the S&P 500 in common currency terms; they have been flat at low levels in the past 12 months. An important message from this chart is that equity valuations are not critical to EM versus U.S. relative equity performance. It is all about corporate profit cycles. The widely held view within the investment community is that EM stocks are cheaper than those in the U.S., and therefore will outperform based on more attractive valuations. The fact that EM stocks are indeed cheaper versus the S&P 500 only reflects the fact that U.S. equity valuations are expensive and EM equity valuations are neutral in absolute terms. Equity valuations may affect the degree of out- and underperformance, but they do not determine the direction of relative performance as vividly illustrated by Chart I-10. The same can be said about EM stocks' absolute performance. Equity valuations do not determine the direction of share prices; the latter rise when profits expand, and fall when EPS contracts. However, valuations affect the magnitude of the move in equity prices: cheap valuations and growing EPS will produce a larger rally compared to neutral equity valuations and identical growth in EPS. We discussed EM equity valuations at great length in our Weekly Report published two weeks ago.1 In absolute terms, EM equity valuations are presently neutral. Therefore, they have no bearing on the direction of share prices. If EM EPS expands, stocks will continue to rally. If EPS growth stalls or turns negative, EM stocks will stumble. As Charts I-3 and I-4 on page 3 illustrate, EM EPS will soon relapse. In addition, U.S. return on equity (RoE) remains well above EM's RoE (Chart I-11), reflecting better equity capital utilization in the U.S. versus the EM. Looking forward, one variable that has had a reasonably good track record in gauging relative performance of EM versus U.S. share prices is the ratio of industrial metals to U.S. lumber prices (Chart I-12). Industrial metals prices are a proxy for economic growth in China/EM, while U.S. lumber prices are indicative of America's business cycle. Industrial metals prices (the LMEX index) have lately underperformed U.S. lumber prices, pointing to renewed EM underperformance versus the S&P 500. Chart I-11EM RoE Is Below U.S. RoE Chart I-12EM Stocks To Underperform The S&P 500 Our view is that EM EPS growth will contract again within a cyclical investment horizon (over the next 12 months). While not all sectors' earnings are set to shrink, our view is that banks' profits will decline driven by credit growth deceleration and a rise in non-performing loans in a number of countries. Besides, commodities producers' EPS will drop anew if, as we expect, commodities prices head south again. Table I-1 illustrates the weights of each EM equity sector within total EM-listed companies' profits. Financials account for 24%, while energy and materials comprise 7.5% each of the aggregate EM equity market cap, respectively. In aggregate, these sectors make up 50% of EM EPS and 40% of the stock index. Table I-1EM Sectors: Equity Market Caps ##br##And EPS's Share Of Total EPS We remain positive on the technology/internet sector's growth outlook. While this sector's weight in terms of both market cap and EPS is very large, it is not yet sufficient to lift the overall EM equity index if other large sectors falter. In fact, technology/internet stocks have already rallied dramatically and are presently overbought. They will likely correct along with the rest of the universe. Nevertheless, we continue to recommend an overweight stance in technology stocks within the EM benchmark. Bottom Line: The direction of EM share prices in absolute terms and relative to the S&P 500 is determined by EPS trajectory, not equity valuations. We expect EM EPS to drop in absolute terms and to underperform U.S. EPS. Consistently, we maintain our long-standing strategy of being short EM / long the S&P 500. Taking Profits On Short Korean Auto Stocks Initiated on July 3, 2013, this recommendation has generated a 35% gain (Chart I-13, top panel). Notably, Korean auto stocks have failed to rally in the past 12 months. Furthermore, Korean auto stocks have underperformed the overall EM equity index by a whopping 22% since our recommendation (Chart I-13, bottom panel). For dedicated investors, we recommend lifting the allocation to this sector from underweight to neutral. In regard to allocation to the KOSPI overall, we maintain our overweight stance within an EM equity portfolio for now. Geopolitical volatility could create near-term disturbance but the primary trend in Korea's relative performance against the EM benchmark is up (Chart I-14). Within the KOSPI, we continue to overweight technology stocks, companies with exposure to DM growth and domestic industries. Meanwhile, companies with exposure to China's capital spending should be avoided. Chart I-13Take Profits On Short ##br##Korean Stocks Recommendation Chart I-14Korean Equities ##br##Relative To EM Overall Arthur Budaghyan, Senior Vice President Emerging Markets Strategy arthurb@bcaresearch.com 1 Please refer to the Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report, titled "EM Equity Valuations Revisited", dated March 29, 2017, link available on page 21. India: Beyond De-Monetization The growth-dampening effects from India's de-monetization program are beginning to dissipate. Both services and manufacturing PMIs are recovering (Chart II-1). As more cash is injected back into the system, consumer sector growth will improve. Beyond the recovery in consumption, however, capital spending - the key driver of productivity and non-inflationary growth - is still anemic because of structural reasons that began well before de-monetization was announced (Chart II-2). Chart II-1PMIs Are Recovering Chart II-2Capital Spending Is Depressed Public Banks: Is Deleveraging Advanced? The Indian authorities appear serious about restructuring their public banks, and the banking downturn cycle is likely approaching its final stages (Chart II-3). As and when India's public banks find themselves on more solid footing, industrial credit growth will pick up meaningfully and capital expenditures will follow. The previous credit boom that occurred in the infrastructure, mining, and materials sectors left a large number of failed and stalled projects. Chart II-4 shows the number of stalled projects remains stubbornly high and is not yet declining. These mal-investments have ended up as non-performing loans primarily on public banks' balance sheets: Non-performing loans (NPLs) currently amount to 11.8% and distressed assets (DRA) stand at around 4% of total loans on Indian public banks' balance sheets. This has forced public banks to curtail credit growth to the industrial sector (Chart II-5). Chart II-3Bank Credit Growth Is At All Time Low Chart II-4Plenty Of Projects Stalled Chart II-5Bank Credit Growth To Industries Is Contracting Public banks' NPLs and DRAs have spiked because the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) is forcing commercial banks to acknowledge and provision for these bad loans via the central bank's Asset Quality Review (AQR) program. This is eroding public banks' capital and constraining their ability to grow their loan book. However, the program is bullish for India's economy in the long run and stands in stark contrast to other EM countries where authorities are turning a blind eye on banks attempting to window dress their NPLs. India's government and the RBI are currently working with commercial banks and proposing measures to recover loans from defaulters. The government is also injecting capital into public banks. It has announced 100 billion INR in capital injections for this fiscal year and will inject more if needed. It is also forcing banks to raise more capital by ridding their books of non-core businesses. We have performed a scenario analysis on public banks (presented in Table II-1) to gauge their stock valuations. In all scenarios, we assume that DRAs will be constant at 5% of total loans, and also assume a 70% recovery rate on DRAs. We examine various scenarios for NPLs - the latter vary from 12-15% of total loans (the current actual NPL rate is 11.8%). Equity valuations are very sensitive to the recovery rate on NPLs. We stress test for recovery rates of 30%, 40%, 50% and 60%. If one assumes a 12% NPL ratio and a recovery rate of 60%, public bank stocks would be 30% cheap - their adjusted (post provisions, capital impairment, and recapitalization) price-to-book value (PBV) ratio will be 0.7, which is 30% less than its historical mean PBV ratio for public banks of 1.0. By contrast, assuming a 15% NPL ratio and a 30% recovery rate, banks' equity valuations would be 50% expensive - their adjusted (post provisions, capital impairment, and recapitalization) PBV ratio would be 1.5. Table II-1Under/Overvaluation (In %) Of Public Banks Stocks For A Given NPL Ratio And Recovery Ratio* Our bias is to believe that the NPL ratio is somewhere between 14-15% and the recovery rate near 40%. In such a case, public bank stocks would presently be 10-20% expensive. This does not offer a great buying opportunity at current levels, but suggests the downside is probably smaller than in other EM bank stocks. Overall, India is much more advanced in terms of recognizing and provisioning for NPLs as well as re-capitalization of its banking system than many other EM countries. Therefore, we believe India's deleveraging cycle is well advanced, especially when compared with other EM economies. Due to this and the fact that this economy is not exposed to China/commodities prices, we still recommend an overweight position in Indian equities within the EM universe. Inflation And Fixed-Income Strategy While headline inflation is easing due to temporarily lower food prices, core inflation remains sticky. The central government's overall and current expenditures - which often drive inflation - are rising rapidly (Chart II-6). Likewise, state governments' current expenditures are also booming and state development loans - borrowing by state governments - are growing at an extremely fast pace. In addition, in June 2016, the Indian central government announced it will raise salaries, allowances and pensions of government employees by 23%. The central government also raised the minimum wage for non-agriculture laborers by 42% in August 2016, and the Ministry of Labor followed by doubling the minimum wage of agricultural workers in March 2017. All of this will entail accumulating inflationary pressures, even if oil and food prices remain tame. The central bank hiked the reverse repo rate last week to absorb excess liquidity from the banking system. Even though it cited service sector inflation as a concern, we believe it will lag behind accumulating inflationary pressures. This warrants a steeper yield curve. Investors should continue to bet on yield curve steepening by paying 10-year swaps / receiving 1-year swap rates (Chart II-7). Chart II-6Government Expenditures Are Rising Chart II-7Bet On A Yield Curve Steepening Rising inflationary pressures and higher bond yields could weigh on Indian stocks in absolute terms, but will likely not preclude them outperforming the EM equity benchmark. Ayman Kawtharani, Associate Editor aymank@bcaresearch.com Stay Long Czech Koruna Versus Euro On September 28th 2016, we recommended going long CZK / short EUR on the back of expectations that the Czech National Bank (CNB) would abandon its currency peg. Last week, the CNB has floated the koruna. We expect this currency to appreciate versus the euro further and suggest keeping this position. Inflationary pressures in the Czech economy are genuine and heightening. The 1.5% appreciation in the koruna versus the euro since last week will not tighten monetary conditions enough to cap inflation. As such, we expect the CNB to eventually start raising interest rates, leading to further koruna appreciation versus the euro (Chart III-1). The output gap is turning positive, which historically has led to a rise in core inflation (Chart III-2). Chart III-1The Czech Koruna Has More Catch-Up To Do Chart III-2Output Gap And Inflation The labor market is tight - the Czech unemployment rate is the lowest in Europe. Both wages and until labor costs growth are robust and trimmed-mean consumer price inflation is accelerating (Chart III-3). The CNB's foreign exchange reserve accumulation has generated an overflow of liquidity in the Czech financial/banking system (Chart III-4). Chart III-3Inflationary Pressures Are Broad-Based Chart III-4Money And Credit Growth Are Very Strong The rapid expansion of liquidity has led to strong credit growth (Chart III-4, bottom panel), and a rapid appreciation in real estate prices. This warrants higher interest rates to prevent the formation of a bubble. Furthermore, the Czech economy has been benefiting from the recovery in European economic growth in general and manufacturing in particular. Tourist arrivals have also been robust. Notably, the nation's current account surplus stands at 1% of GDP. Chart III-5The Koruna Is Mildly Cheap With regards to currency valuations, the koruna is silently cheap and as such has further room to appreciate (Chart III-5). Either the koruna will gradually appreciate over the next few months, tightening monetary conditions to an extent where the CNB does not need to hike interest rates, or the CNB is eventually forced to hike rates considerably. The latter will push up the value of the Czech currency. We suspect that the CNB is still intervening in the forex market in order to prevent a dramatic appreciation in the koruna. The central bank has stated in its last press conference that it stands ready to intervene to mitigate exchange rate fluctuations if needed. However, in an economy with open capital account, the central bank cannot target the exchange rate and interest rates simultaneously. If the CNB desires to cap inflation, it has to hike interest rates or allow the currency to appreciate considerably. If it chooses the former, the koruna will still rally dramatically. Bottom Line: Stay long the Czech koruna versus the euro. Stephan Gabillard, Senior Analyst stephang@bcaresearch.com Equity Recommendations Fixed-Income, Credit And Currency Recommendations