Inflation/Deflation
In Section I, we note that the Fed’s new interest rate projections show that US monetary policy is set to rise soon into restrictive territory even relative to what we consider to be the neutral rate of interest, and to a level that has been consistent with the onset of recession since the 1960s. Imminent supply-side and pandemic-related disinflation is crucial for the US to avoid a recession over the coming year. Stay neutral stocks versus bonds for now, but the next shift in our recommended asset allocation stance is more likely to be a downgrade to underweight rather than an upgrade to overweight. In Section II, a guest piece from our European Investment Strategy service discusses the outlook for European assets.
Executive Summary For the first time in a decade, it is much less attractive to buy than to rent a home. In both the UK and US, the mortgage rate is now almost double the average rental yield. To reset the equilibrium between buying and renting a home, either mortgage rates must come down by around 150 bps, or house prices must suffer a large double-digit correction. Or some combination, such as mortgage rates down 100 bps and house prices down 10 percent. In the US, a 10-year upcycle in housing investment has resulted in overinvestment relative to the number of households. Falling house prices coming hot on the heels of a combined stock and bond market crash will unleash a deflationary impulse in 2023, which will return economies to 2 percent inflation. This reiterates our ‘2022-23 = 1981-82’ template for the markets. A coordinated global recession will cause bond prices to enter a sustained rally in 2023, in which the 30-year T-bond yield will fall to sub-2.5 percent. Meanwhile, the S&P 500 will test 3500, or even 3200, before a strong rally will lift it through 5000 later in 2023. It Now Costs Twice As Much To Buy Than To Rent A UK Home! Bottom Line: Falling house prices coming hot on the heels of a combined stock and bond market crash will unleash a deflationary impulse in 2023, which will return economies to 2 percent inflation. Feature Mortgage rates around the world have skyrocketed. The UK 5-year fixed mortgage rate which started the year at under 2 percent has more than doubled to over 5 percent. And the US 30-year mortgage rate, which began the year at 3 percent, now stands at an eyewatering 7 percent, its highest level since the US housing bubble burst in 2008. This raises a worrying spectre. Is the recent surge in mortgage rates about to trigger another housing crash? (Chart I-1 and Chart I-2). Chart I-1UK Mortgage Rate Has Doubled Chart I-2US Mortgage Rate Has Doubled A good way to answer the question is to compare the cashflow costs of buying versus renting a home. This is because home prices are set by the volume of homebuyers versus home-sellers. If would-be homebuyers decide to rent rather than to buy – because renting gets them ‘more house’ – then it will drag down home prices. Here’s the concern. For the first time in a decade, it is much less attractive to buy than to rent a home. In both the UK and US, the mortgage rate is now almost double the average rental yield. Put another way, whatever your monthly housing budget, you can now rent a home worth twice as much as you can buy (Chart I-3 and Chart I-4). Chart I-3It Now Costs Twice As Much To Buy Than To Rent A UK Home! Chart I-4It Now Costs Twice As Much To Buy Than To Rent A US Home! The Universal Theory Of House Prices Buying and renting a home are not the same thing, so the head-to-head comparison between the mortgage rate and rental yield is a simplification. Buying and renting are similar in that they both provide you with somewhere to live, a roof over your head or, in economic jargon, the consumption service called ‘shelter’. But there are two big differences. First, unlike renting, buying a home also provides you with an investment whose value you expect to increase in the long run. Second, unlike renting, buying a home incurs you the costs of maintaining it and keeping it up-to-date. Studies show that the annual cost averages around 2 percent of the value of the home.1 So, versus renting, buying a home provides you with an expected capital appreciation, but incurs you a ‘depreciation’ cost of around 2 percent a year. Which results in the following equilibrium between buying and renting: Mortgage rate = Rental yield + Expected house price appreciation - 2 But we can simplify this. In the long run, the price of any asset must trend in line with its income stream. Therefore, expected house price appreciation equates to expected rental growth. Also, rents move in lockstep with wages (Chart I-5). Understandably so, because rents must be paid from wages. And wage growth itself just equals consumer price inflation plus productivity growth, which averages around 1 percent (Chart I-6). Pulling all of this together, the equilibrium simplifies to: Chart I-5Rents Track Wages Chart I-6Rent Inflation = Wage Inflation = Consumer Price Inflation + 1 Mortgage rate = Rental yield + Expected consumer price inflation - 1 So, here’s our first conclusion. Assuming central banks achieve their long-term inflation target of 2 percent, the equilibrium becomes: Mortgage rate = Rental yield + 1 Under this assumption, to justify the current UK rental yield of 3 percent, the UK mortgage rate must plunge to 4 percent. But given that the government has just triggered an incipient balance of payments and currency crisis, the mortgage rate is likely to head even higher. In which case the rental yield must rise to at least 4 percent. Meaning either house prices falling 25 percent, or rents rising 33 percent. Meanwhile, to justify the current US rental yield of 3.7 percent, the US mortgage rate must plunge to 4.7 percent. Alternatively, to justify the current mortgage rate of 7 percent, the rental yield must surge to 6 percent. Meaning either house prices crashing 40 percent, or rents surging 60 percent. More likely though, all variables will correct. The equilibrium between buying and renting will be re-established by some combination of lower mortgage rates, lower house prices, and higher rents. The Housing Investment Cycle Is Turning Down The relationship between buying and renting a home raises an obvious counterargument. What if central banks cannot achieve their goal of price stability? In this case, expected inflation in the equilibrium would be considerably higher than 2 percent. This would justify a much higher mortgage rate for a given rental yield. Put differently, it would justify rental yields to stay structurally low (house prices to stay structurally high), even if mortgage rates marched higher. In an inflationary environment, houses would become the perfect foils against inflation. In an inflationary environment, houses would become the perfect foils against inflation because expected rental growth would track inflation – allowing rental yields to stay depressed versus much higher mortgage rates. This is precisely what happened in the 1970s. When the US mortgage rate peaked at 18 percent in 1981, the US rental yield barely got above 6 percent (Chart I-7). Chart I-7In The Inflationary 70s, The Rental Yield Remained Well Below The Mortgage Rate... If the market fears another such inflationary episode, would it make the housing market a good investment? In the near term, the answer is still no, for two reasons. First, even if rental yields do not track mortgage rates higher point for point, the yields do tend to move in the same direction – especially when mortgage rates surge as they did in the 1970s (Chart I-8). Some of this increase in rental yields might come from higher rents, but some of it might also come from lower house prices. Chart I-8...But Even In The 70s, The Rental Yield And Mortgage Rate Moved Directionally Together Second, based on the US, it is a bad time in the housing investment cycle. Theoretically and empirically, residential fixed investment tracks the number of households in the economy. But there are perpetual cycles of underinvestment and overinvestment – the most spectacular being the overinvestment boom that preceded the 2007-08 housing crisis. US housing investment has just experienced a 10-year upcycle in which it has overshot its relationship with the number of households. Therefore, contrary to the popular perception, there is not an undersupply of homes, but a marked oversupply relative to the number of households. (Chart I-9). This is important because, as the cycle turns down now – as it did in 1973, 1979, 1990, and 2007 – the preceding overinvestment always weighs down housing valuations (Chart I-10). Chart I-9The US Housing Investment Cycle Has Moved Into Overinvestment Chart I-10A Housing Investment Downcycle Always Weighs On Housing Valuations The Investment Conclusions Let’s sum up. If the market believes that economies will return to price stability, then to reset the equilibrium between buying and renting a home, either mortgage rates must come down by around 150 bps, or house prices must suffer a large double-digit correction. Or some combination, such as mortgage rates down 100 bps and house prices down 10 percent. If the market believes that economies will not return to price stability, then house prices are still near-term vulnerable to rising mortgage rates – especially in the US, as a 10-year upcycle in housing investment has resulted in overinvestment relative to the number of households. US housing investment has just experienced a 10-year upcycle in which it has overshot its relationship with the number of households. Falling house prices coming hot on the heels of a combined stock and bond market crash will unleash a deflationary impulse in 2023, which will return economies to 2 percent inflation – even if the markets do not believe it now. This reiterates our ‘2022-23 = 1981-82’ template for the markets, as recently explained in Markets Still Echoing 1981-82, So Here’s What Happens Next. In summary, a coordinated global recession will cause bond prices to enter a sustained rally in 2023, in which the 30-year T-bond yield will fall to sub-2.5 percent. Meanwhile, the S&P 500 will test 3500, or even 3200, before a strong rally will lift it through 5000 later in 2023. Analysing The Pound’s Crash Through A Fractal Lens Finally, the incipient balance of payments and sterling crisis triggered by the UK government’s unfunded tax cuts has collapsed the 65-day fractal structure of the pound (Chart I-11). This would be justified if the Bank of England does not lean against the fiscal laxness with a compensating tighter monetary policy. But if, as we expect, monetary policy adjusts as a short-term counterbalance, then sterling will experience a temporary, but playable, countertrend bounce. Chart I-11The Pound Usually Turns When Its Fractal Structure Has Collapsed On this assumption, a recommended tactical trade, with a maximum holding period of 65 days, is to go long GBP/CHF, setting a profit target and symmetrical stop-loss at 4 percent. Chart 1Hungarian Bonds Are Oversold Chart 2Copper's Tactical Rebound Maybe Over Chart 3US REITS Are Oversold Versus Utilities Chart 4FTSE100 Outperformance Vs. Euro Stoxx 50 Is Vulnerable Chart 5Netherlands' Underperformance Vs. Switzerland Has Ended Chart 6The Sell-Off In The 30-Year T-Bond At Fractal Fragility Chart 7Food And Beverage Outperformance Is Exhausted Chart 8German Telecom Outperformance Has Started Is Fragile Chart 9Japanese Telecom Outperformance Vulnerable To Reversal Chart 10The Strong Trend In The 18-Month-Out US Interest Rate Future Is Fragile Chart 11The Strong Downtrend In The 3 Year T-Bond Is Fragile Chart 12The Outperformance Of Tobacco Vs. Cannabis Is Fragile Chart 13Biotech Is A Major Buy Chart 14Norway's Outperformance Has Ended Chart 15Cotton Versus Platinum Has Reversed Chart 16Switzerland's Outperformance Vs. Germany Is Exhausted Chart 17USD/EUR Is Vulnerable To Reversal Chart 18The Outperformance Of MSCI Hong Kong Versus China Has Ended Chart 19US Utilities Outperformance Vulnerable To Reversal Chart 20The Outperformance Of Oil Versus Banks Is Exhausted Dhaval Joshi Chief Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 The Rate of Return on Everything, 1870–2015 (frbsf.org) Fractal Trading System Fractal Trades 6-12 Month Recommendations 6-12 MONTH RECOMMENDATIONS EXPIRE AFTER 15 MONTHS, IF NOT CLOSED EARLIER. Structural Recommendations Closed Fractal Trades Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Euro Area Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Europe Ex Euro Area Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Asia Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields - Other Developed Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-5Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations
Executive Summary Biden And Democrats Arrest Fall In Public Opinion US policy is essential to the global macro, policy, and geopolitical outlook in the fourth quarter. Our three key views for 2022 are still in place: the Biden administration is facing congressional gridlock and shifting to executive action and foreign policy. Gridlock will be marginally positive for the stock market but foreign policy crises and additional energy shocks will be very negative. Stay defensive. Our three long-term strategic themes – Generational Change, Peak Polarization, and Limited Big Government – are still on track but the first two will take a back seat during the 2022-24 election cycle. Investors should stay overweight defensive sectors versus cyclicals, large caps versus small caps, cyber security, aerospace/defense, oil and gas transportation/storage, and renewable energy. Go tactically long US treasuries but keep the US dollar on watch for a downgrade. Recommendation (Tactical) INITIATION DATE Return Long DXY (Dollar Index) Feb 23, 2022 18.6% Bottom Line: US policy uncertainty will rise then fall over the course of the midterm election, which will produce gridlock. Gridlock is neutral toward inflation, or disinflationary, and a boon for stocks. But geopolitical risk can still wreak havoc and investors should stay defensive. Feature Market-relevant geopolitical analysis begins with the United States, which remains the critical actor in the international system – as reflected today by the US dollar’s extraordinary bull run both in times of global deflation and inflation (Chart 1). Investors need a base case for US national policy over the course of the 2022-24 election cycle to form a base case for global policy and the macroeconomic and financial outlook. Our annual outlook last December argued that the US had entered a period of greater government involvement in the economy and yet that the Biden administration would face rising checks and balances over the course of 2022 due to thin majorities in Congress, midterm elections, an inflationary macroeconomic environment, and an unstable geopolitical backdrop. Chart 1Dollar Strong During Deflation And Inflation This forecast is largely intact today so the question is whether these checks and balances will inhibit inflation going forward. Biden has achieved significant liberal policy spending but now looks to be seriously constrained, having little ability to pass domestic legislation going forward. However, he faces three foreign policy crises (Ukraine, Taiwan, Iran), all of which are inflationary on the margin. In the coming months Biden’s foreign policy crises could morph into larger global supply shocks, most notably energy shocks from Russia and/or Iran. New shocks could kill demand and tip the economy into recession. If these risks fail to materialize, tighter monetary policy will reduce inflation but likely also at the cost of higher unemployment and recession. While we will maintain our defensive positioning, we may book some gains on bearish trades over the course of the fourth quarter, namely if we see compelling signs of US political and geopolitical risk subsiding and inflation rolling over. But we do not see that yet. Checking Up On Our Three Key Views For 2022 Here we update our three key views for 2022. We show how they have developed so far this year and what we expect in the final quarter: 1. From Single-Party Rule To Gridlock: In the third quarter the Biden administration made a “last ditch effort” to turn around its fortunes ahead of the midterm election, mainly by focusing on fighting inflation. This effort succeeded in stabilizing support for Biden and the Democratic Party in opinion polls, albeit at low levels (Chart 2). The midterm is usually a check against the party in power and its major policy victories. In 2006 anti-war Democrats imposed a check on the Bush Republicans and the war in Iraq. In 2010 and 2014 Tea Party Republicans imposed a check on Obama Democrats and government intervention into health care. In 2018 anti-Trump Democrats imposed a check on Trump Republicans and tax cuts. In early 2022 the election was shaping up to be a referendum on the Biden Democrats and inflationary spending. But the Supreme Court’s reversal of Roe v. Wade has muddied the usually clear pattern of the “midterm curse.” In critical swing states a majority of voters opposes extensive new restrictions on abortion access (Chart 3). Chart 2Biden And Democrats Arrest Fall In Public Opinion Chart 3Swing States Support Abortion Access Young voters and women are especially motivated to vote for Democrats in reaction to the high court’s ruling (Chart 4). However, so far support for the Democrats among these groups is still lower than it was in 2020-21. And young people are not thrilled with old man Biden. Chart 4Youth And Women’s Support For Democrats Chart 5Voters Care Most About Economy … Where Biden Scores Lowest As we enter the final stretch of the campaign, the president and his party receive the lowest grades on the economy, which is still voters’ top priority (Chart 5). Democrats face a negative cyclical backdrop and macroeconomic headwinds – namely falling real wages, incomes, and consumer confidence (Chart 6). In the House of Representatives, our quantitative election model considers how many seats the ruling party is defending, Congress’s net approval rating, and popular support for the two parties (the generic congressional ballot). The resulting estimate is that Democrats should lose 21 seats, whereas they only need to lose six to yield to Republican control (Table 1). Democrats can achieve a positive surprise and yet fail to retain control of the lower chamber. Chart 6Pocketbook Voter Is Frowning Table 1Our House Election Quant Model Predicts GOP Victory Democrats are more likely to retain the Senate but they cannot afford to lose a single seat on a net basis. State-level economic data, previous Senate margins of victory, presidential approval, the generic congressional ballot, and the tenure of Senate incumbents all suggest that Democrats will lose seats in Arizona and Georgia without gaining any seats, thus yielding control to Republicans. Yet this prediction from our quantitative election model necessarily excludes some of the idiosyncrasies of the 2022 election (Chart 7). Chart 7Our Senate Election Quant Model Favors GOP … But Too Close To Call By contrast, state-level opinion polls suggest that Democrats will hold the Senate: several critical Republican-leaning races are tied while Democrats have a large lead in Arizona (Charts 8A & 8B). In short, the Senate is too close to call. Chart 8ADemocrats Tied In Red-Leaning States, Leading In Blue-Leaning States Chart 8BDemocrats Tied In Red-Leaning States, Leading In Blue-Leaning States As long as Republicans gain one chamber the effect is the same: gridlock. The prevailing wind is voter discontent over inflation. The Misery Index (headline inflation plus unemployment) is reminiscent of the stagflationary 1970s and points to a negative outcome for Democrats in the House overall (Table 2). Table 2Misery Index Signals Democratic Losses To Come Hence the House will fall to the Republicans and single-party control will be broken. The federal spending spree will grind to a halt in 2023-24, which is positive for investors in an inflationary environment. For example, it is the opposite fiscal outcome from what is happening in the UK and Italy, where bonds are selling off sharply. 2. From Legislative To Executive Power: We expected Biden and the Democrats to pass a second budget reconciliation bill, which ended up being the inaptly named Inflation Reduction Act, signed into law on August 16. After that we expected the president to shift to executive action as his legislative options dwindled. There have already been some signs of this shift to executive power, such as President Biden’s tapping of the US Strategic Petroleum Reserve to release 180 million barrels of oil, which helped lower gasoline prices before the election (Chart 9). Biden also relaxed some regulations on fossil fuel production in a reversal of his 2020 call for “phasing out” oil and natural gas. More generally Biden has imposed a large number of economically significant regulations relative to previous administrations (Chart 10). He also unilaterally forgave $420 billion worth of student debt over 30 years. Chart 9Biden Tapped Strategic Petroleum Reserve Chart 10Biden Flexes Regulatory Muscles This trend toward executive action will intensify if Congress is indeed gridlocked in 2023-24. It is marginally inflationary but likely to be outweighed by disinflationary fiscal drag in 2023. The same trend also feeds into the next point: Biden’s shift from domestic-oriented to foreign-oriented policy. 3. From Domestic To Foreign Policy: Biden did not seek out foreign policy crises. His primary focus lay on domestic legislation and the midterms. His foreign policy intention was merely to solidify US alliances after quarrels under the Trump administration. However, looming gridlock is forcing him to focus more heavily on foreign policy, where presidential powers are greatest. In particular Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has pushed foreign policy to the center of the agenda. Once Biden’s approval ratings collapsed he began to take on greater foreign policy risks, as we noted in May. His foreign policy is reactive and defensive in the sense that he is responding to foreign aggression and trying to avoid any blowback that hurts his party in the midterms. But he can no longer be said to be risk-averse. Instead Biden is doubling down on the enlargement of NATO and military support for Ukraine. He is arming Taiwan and pledging an unequivocal US willingness to defend it in the event of an “unprecedented attack.” He has expanded high-tech export controls on China while maintaining President Trump’s tariffs. And he is threatening to respond “decisively” to Russia in the non-negligible chance that it deploys a tactical nuclear weapon against Ukraine. The US-Iran attempt to rejoin the 2015 nuclear deal is faltering, as we expected, due to mutual distrust. Almost immediately after negotiations failed in August, widespread social unrest broke out in Iran. While Iran’s structural conditions are conducive to social unrest, the Iranian government suspects the US of fomenting unrest, which is possible. Iran is threatening to retaliate. Iran will also continuing making nuclear advances prompting Israel to publicly entertain military options. The Biden administration will be forced to counteract Iranian threats against regional political stability and oil infrastructure. Hence Biden can no longer avoid energy supply risks emanating from the Middle East. The shift from domestic to foreign policy will become even more pronounced in 2023-24, as foreign policy will become more proactive due to gridlock at home. Taken together, gridlock will bring neutral fiscal policy and hawkish foreign policy. Any post-election decline in policy uncertainty will be short-lived. The loss of the House will increase the odds of economic policy mistakes in 2023 and a ruling party change in 2024 (Chart 11). A Republican House can impeach (but not remove) President Biden, put pressure on the Federal Reserve, and engage in brinksmanship over the national debt limit, which will need to be renewed in the third quarter of 2023. Obstructionism will put a floor under policy uncertainty, which will skyrocket as the 2024 election cycle approaches. Chart 11Biden’s 2024 Odds Fall If GOP Wins House Meanwhile proactive US foreign policy is not positive for investors as it risks escalating global instability. None of America’s rivals will be willing to offer major concessions to forge agreements with the Biden administration in 2023-24 because they will fear that President Trump or another populist Republican will retake the White House in 2025 and impose tariffs or sanctions regardless. The US cannot offer credible guarantees. This is how the Iran deal failed and it is likely to prevent a substantial US-China thaw in relations. Bottom Line: The investment takeaways from our key views for 2022 are mostly on track: inflation and policy uncertainty are rising, stocks are performing poorly, bond yields have spiked, and defensive sectors have outperformed cyclicals. These trends could start to shift in the fourth quarter given that domestic policy uncertainty will at least temporarily abate in the US and China after the fall’s political events. However, geopolitical energy shocks could still escalate if Russia or Iran disrupts global oil supply. And investors must plan for the worst. Even without additional energy shocks, Fed rate hikes are likely to precipitate a recession. Gridlock will have a neutral fiscal impact over the course of the subsequent 24 months, which is marginally disinflationary, but proactive US foreign policy will keep high the risk of energy shocks and global policy uncertainty. Checking Up On Our Strategic Themes For The 2020s It is useless to predict specific policy outcomes too far in the future but investors need a framework for understanding the general drift of national policy amid the dramatic macro shifts occurring today. Here is a short update to our strategic themes for the decade: 1. Millennials/GenZ Rising: The death of the Silent Generation, the retirement of the Baby Boomers, and the rise of Generations X, Y, and Z are causing major shifts in the US economy and markets. First, US population growth is not great but better than its developed market peers. Immigration is robust, though it is likely to be restricted somewhat by future administrations (Chart 12). Relatively strong labor force growth implies higher potential growth than developed market peers, assuming US productivity meets or exceeds that of Europe, as it should (Chart 13). As long as this growth is accompanied by decent policy, i.e. not too inflationary, it will produce relatively attractive real returns for investors. Chart 12US Population Growth And Immigration Chart 13US Relative Labor Force And Potential Growth Second, however, inflation will be a recurring problem because population aging is driving a vast redistribution of wealth from older to younger and from generations with a high propensity to save to those with a high propensity to consume. The impact is inflationary since there will be fewer savings to fund investments, according to our Global Investment Strategist Peter Berezin. This trend will drive up equilibrium real interest rates and bond yields (Chart 14). Thus America will witness a tug of war in which a new inflation tendency engenders periodic policy backlashes to keep inflation in check, as is likely in the 2022 midterms. Chart 14Major Redistribution Of Wealth 2. Peak Polarization: There is a large gap when it comes to identity and core values both within the Baby Boomer generation and between the Silent Generation and the younger generations. America has seen rapid change in the population’s ethnicity, religion, education, location, and industry. It is also a free country where self-expression is fully indulged, leading to wide extremes in individual and group behavior. Rapid pluralistic change combined with stark income and wealth inequality have fueled political polarization, which has made it increasingly difficult to generate nationwide policy consensus in recent decades (Chart 15). However, the rising electoral weight of the younger generations will resolve some of the most extreme policy differences in favor of the younger generations. Millennials and Generation Z will become more conservative over time but they will still lean to the left of their parents and grandparents on the economic policy spectrum (positive rights, progressive taxes, social spending, proactive regulation). Meaning that social spending and higher taxes will become more, not less, feasible over the long run (Chart 16). Meanwhile the revival of competition among the world’s great powers (multipolarity) is forcing the US population and policymakers to recognize common foreign challenges. This is leading to a new consensus around certain strategic and national interests having to do with trade protectionism, industrial guidance, and foreign policy realism. Chart 15Inequality As A Driver Of Polarization Chart 16Younger Generations Less ‘Capitalist,’ More ‘Socialist’ This new consensus can be seen in the passage of bipartisan bills to build infrastructure, promote US manufacturing, shift supply chains to US-allied countries, and impose punitive measures against Russia, China, and Iran (Chart 17). Chart 17New Consensus: Nation Building At Home 3. Limited Big Government: The emerging policy consensus will be federalism but not authoritarianism – a larger but not overwhelming role for government in the economy. Popular opinion is demanding a larger role for the government to reduce domestic social grievances and political instability. It is also demanding greater protections from global trade. Elite opinion requires sustained high investment in national defense. All of this ostensibly points to a new era of Big Government but there are important caveats. The US constitution, private institutions, and popular opinion will continue to prevent the full adoption of a statist model, with its inefficient bureaucracy and excessive regulation. The cost of too much government has already appeared in this year’s surge of inflation, which is motivating a political backlash that will moderate the liberal spending trajectory. In short US governance is shifting from decentralization to centralization but it is a marginal not absolute change (Chart 18). The insurrection of 2021 failed but so did the cultural revolution of 2020. Chart 18New Consensus: Limited Big Government Demographics, politics, and economics all point to a new US policy paradigm in which new generations take over and form a new policy consensus – and yet that consensus is not truly socialist. It is rather a continuation of the American combination of federalism, liberalism, and nationalism. Civil war is likely to be avoided because the economy is stable enough and the political system is flexible enough to prevent the inevitable violent movements and domestic terrorism from causing state fragmentation. Bottom Line: US currency and equity markets have greatly outperformed the rest of the world as financial markets priced the US’s structural advantages in the unstable world after the 2008 financial crisis. This trend is intact for now but could suffer setbacks whenever global growth rebounds and the new US policy consensus leads to higher wages, higher taxes, and lower corporate profitability. Investment Takeaways In our annual forecast we noted that US midterm election years tend to produce a flat stock market, rising bond yields, and the outperformance of defensive sectors. This year has been even worse than normal with the S&P500 down 23% to date and the 10-year Treasury up 243 basis points to date (down 17% in terms of total return). Note, however, that stocks typically rise and bond yields typically fall in the year after the midterm, which may bring some relief in 2023 (Chart 19). We expect this bounce in 2023 but it cannot happen until inflation rolls over decisively. Chart 19Worse Than Average Market Performance In Midterm Election Year The dollar rally is in line with, but exceeding, the interest rate differential between US and European government bonds. This makes sense given the geopolitical risk premium. Dollar strength is not only about euro weakness but is broad-based, as becomes clear when looking at the trade-weighted dollar. We have long argued the dollar would rise in line with global policy uncertainty (Chart 20). While our long DXY trade is long in the tooth, momentum is strong. Defensive sectors will outperform in a strong dollar context. Cyclical sectors have more downside relative to defensives and small caps have more downside relative to large caps. But oil and gas equities have become defensive and have more upside relative to the broad market (Chart 21). Energy volatility will continue to be a driving macro force in the fourth quarter due to the crosswinds of geopolitical supply disruptions and global economic slowdown. We are re-initiating our recommendation to overweight oil and gas transportation and storage stocks relative to the S&P 500. Chart 20US Dollar Reaching Extremes, On Watch For Downgrade Chart 21Energy Volatility To Continue In Q4 Renewable energy stocks should also remain an overweight given the new political impetus behind energy security. Tech stocks have more downside in the near term but should bounce back once inflation rolls over and bond yields start to fall. Cyber-security companies will generally trade in line with tech but will also benefit from geopolitical tailwinds. Renewables, cyber-security, and aerospace/defense remain our key overweights (Chart 22), in addition to infrastructure stocks as mentioned earlier in the report. Given the sharp selloff in bonds, the disinflationary aspects of gridlock and eventual recession, and today’s extraordinary geopolitical risks, we recommending buying 10-year treasuries on a tactical basis. Chart 22Stick With Cyber Security, Defense, Renewables Over Long Run Matt Gertken Senior Vice President Chief US Political Strategy mattg@bcaresearch.com Jesse Anak Kuri Associate Editor Jesse.Kuri@bcaresearch.com Guy Russell Senior Analyst guyr@bcaresearch.com Yushu Ma Research Analyst yushu.ma@bcaresearch.com Alice Brocheux Research Associate alice.brocheux@bcaresearch.com Strategic View Open Tactical Positions (0-6 Months) Open Cyclical Recommendations (6-18 Months) Table A2Political Risk Matrix Table A3US Political Capital Index Chart A1Presidential Election Model Chart A2Senate Election Model Table A4House Election Model Table A5APolitical Capital: White House And Congress Table A5BPolitical Capital: Household And Business Sentiment Table A5CPolitical Capital: The Economy And Markets Footnotes
Executive Summary Upward Repricing Of Bond Yields Continues In this report, we discuss our move last week to shift to a below-benchmark overall global duration stance in more detail. Our strongest conviction view on developed market government bonds is underweighting US Treasuries. The outcome of last week’s FOMC meeting, where the Fed committed to a rapid shift to restrictive US monetary policy, supports that position. Our strongest conviction overweight is on Japan, with the Bank of Japan both willing and able to maintain its cap on longer-term JGB yields. We are also overweight countries where it will be difficult for central banks to lift rates as much as markets expect – core Europe, Australia and Canada. The explosion in UK bond yields, and collapse of the British pound, seen after last week’s UK “mini-budget” shows that investors have not lost the power to punish fiscal and monetary policies that are non-credible - like a massive debt-financed tax cut at a time of high inflation. As a result, the Bank of England will now be forced to raise rates much more than we had been expecting, and Gilts will remain extremely volatile in the near-term. Bottom Line: Maintain a below-benchmark overall duration stance in global bond portfolios. Stay underweight US Treasuries. Upgrade exposure to government bonds in Japan and Canada to overweight, but tactically downgrade UK Gilts to underweight until a more market-friendly policy mix leads to greater stability of the British pound. Feature We shifted our recommended stance on overall global portfolio duration to below-benchmark in a Special Alert published last week. In this report, we go into the rationale for that move in more detail, and present specific details of that shift in terms of allocations by country across the various yield curves. Related Report Global Fixed Income StrategyReduce Global Portfolio Duration To Below-Benchmark The global inflation and monetary policy backdrops remain toxic for bond markets. Last week saw interest rate increases from multiple developed economy central banks, including the Fed and Bank of England (BoE). The magnitudes of the rate hikes unnerved bond investors, with even the likes of perennial low yielders like the Swiss National Bank and Riksbank lifting rates by 75bps and 100bps, respectively. The Fed followed up its own 75bp hike by digging in its heels on the need for additional policy tightening after the 300bps of hikes already delivered this year (Chart 1). Fed Chair Jerome Powell strongly hinted that a policy-induced US recession is likely the only way to return overshooting US inflation back to the Fed’s 2% target. This triggered a breakout of the benchmark US 10-year Treasury yield above 3.5%. But the real fireworks in global bond markets occurred after the UK government announced its “mini-budget” last Friday that included massive tax cuts to be funded by debt issuance, triggering a sharp decline in the British Pound and spike in UK Gilt yields – a move that spilled over into other bond markets, pushing government bond yields to cyclical highs in the US and euro area. Chart 1Central Banks Keep Trying To “Out-Hawk” Each Other Chart 2Yields Are Now Driven By Rate Hike Expectations, Not Inflation We had been anticipating another move upward in global bond yields for this cycle, and we shifted to a below-benchmark overall global duration stance in advance of the Fed and BoE meetings last week. We see this next move higher in yields as being driven not by rising inflation expectations but by an upward repricing of interest rate expectations, leading to additional increases in real bond yields (Chart 2). Trying to pick a top in bond yields has now become a game of forecasting the level to which policy rates must rise in the current global monetary tightening cycle. On that front, there is still scope for rate expectations, and bond yields, to move higher in most developed market countries, justifying our downgrade of our recommended overall duration exposure to below-benchmark. Shifting rate expectations also lead to the changes in country bond allocations we announced last week. Rate Expectations And Country Bond Allocations Our proxy for medium-term nominal terminal rate expectations in developed market countries, the 5-year/5-year forward overnight index swap (OIS) rate, has been tracking 10-year bond yields very closely in the US and UK and, to a lesser extent, Europe (Chart 3). In those regions, the OIS curves are pricing in an increasing medium-term level of policy rates, leading to markets repricing government bond yields higher. In the US, the OIS curve is pricing in a 2023 peak for the fed funds rate of 4.67%, but with only a modest path of rate cuts in 2024 and 2025, leading to a 5-year/5-year OIS projection of 3.36% as of Monday’s market close. After the Gilt market rout, the UK OIS curve is now pricing in a 2023 peak Bank Rate over 6%, with our medium-term nominal rate proxy settling at 3.69%. In the euro area, the OIS curve is discounting a 2023 peak in the ECB policy rate of 3.22%, with a 5-year/5-year forward OIS rate of 2.7%. For all three of those regions, the market is now pricing in the highest peak in rates for the current tightening cycle. That is not the case in Canada or Australia, where rate expectations and longer-term bond yields are still below cyclical peaks (Chart 4). Japan remains the outlier, with the Bank of Japan’s yield curve control keeping 10-year JGB yields capped at 0.25%, even with the Japan OIS curve pricing in a medium-term terminal rate of 0.75%. Chart 3Rising Yields Reflect Higher Terminal Rate Expectations Chart 4Our High-Conviction Government Bond Overweights After looking at all the repricing of interest rate expectations and bond yields, we can determine our preferred government bond allocations within our strategic model bond portfolio framework. The US Remains Our Favorite Government Bond Underweight The new set of interest rate forecasts (“the dots”) presented at last week’s Fed meeting showed that the median FOMC member was forecasting the fed funds rate to rise to 4.4% by the end of 2022 and 4.6% by the end of 2023, before falling to 3.9% and 2.9% and the end of 2024 and 2025, respectively. Those are all significant increases from the June dots, where the expectations called for the funds rate to hit 3.4% by end-2022 and 3.8% by end-2023. The median Fed forecasts are now broadly in line with the pricing in the US OIS curve for 2022-2024, although the market expects higher rates than the FOMC in 2025 (Chart 5). Chart 5USTs Still Vulnerable To Additional Fed Hawkish Surprises There has been a lot of back and forth between the Fed and the markets this year, but the market has generally lagged the Fed interest rate projections for 2023 and 2024 before last week. Market pricing is now in line with the Fed dots, as investors have adjusted to the increasingly hawkish message from Fed officials that are focused solely on slowing growth, and tightening financial conditions, in an effort to bring US inflation down. We see the US Treasury curve as still vulnerable to additional hawkish messaging from the Fed, and a potentially higher-than-anticipated peak in the funds rate versus the FOMC dots. The US consumer is facing a lot of headwinds from higher interest rates and rising food and gasoline prices. However, the latter has fallen 26% from the June 13/2022 peak and is acting as a “tax cut” that also helps reduce US inflation expectations (Chart 6). Consumer confidence measures like the University of Michigan expectations survey have already shown improvement alongside the fall in gas prices, which has boosted real income expectations according to the New York Fed’s Consumer Survey (bottom panel). Even a subtle improvement in consumer confidence due to some easing of inflation expectations can help support a somewhat faster pace of consumer spending at a time of robust labor demand and accelerating wage growth. The Atlanta Fed Wage Tracker is now growing at a year-over-year pace of 5.7%, while the ratio of US job openings to unemployed workers remains near a record high (Chart 7). Fed Chair Powell has noted that the Fed must see significant weakening of the US jobs market for the Fed to consider pausing on its current rate hike path. So far, there is little evidence pointing to a loosening of US labor market conditions that would ease domestically-generated inflation pressures. Chart 6Lower Gas Prices Can Provide A Lift To US Consumer Spending Chart 7A Tight US Labor Market Will Keep The Fed Hawkish Chart 8Stay Underweight US Treasuries We expect overall US inflation to decelerate next year on the back of additional slowing of goods inflation, but will likely settle in the 3-4% range in 2023 given stubbornly sticky services inflation and wage growth. The Fed should follow through on its current interest rate projections, with a good chance that rates will need to be pushed up even higher in response to resilient labor market conditions in the first half of 2023. The risk/reward still favors higher US Treasury yields over at least the next 3-6 months, particularly with an improving flow of US data surprises and with bond investor duration positioning now much closer to neutral according to the JPMorgan client survey (Chart 8). Bottom Line: The US remains our highest conviction strategic government bond underweight in the developed markets. Recommended Allocations In Other Countries The path for monetary policy rates outside the US shows a similar profile as in the US, with a “front loading” of rate hikes to mid-2023 followed by modest rate cuts over the subsequent two years (Chart 9). The OIS-implied path for the level of rates is nearly identical in the US, Australia and Canada. On the other hand, markets are discounting much lower of levels of policy rates in Europe and Japan compared to the US, and a considerably higher path for rates in the UK (more on that in the next section). Chart 9Markets Priced For Global 'Front-Loaded' Rate Hikes We would lean against the US-like pricing of interest rates in Australia and Canada. Based on work we published in a recent Special Report along with our colleagues at BCA Research European Investment Strategy, the neutral real interest rate (“r-star”) is estimated to be deeply negative in Australia and Canada after adjusting for the high level of non-financial debt in those countries (Table 1). That financial fragility makes it much less likely that the Bank of Canada and Reserve Bank of Australia can raise rates as much as the Fed. Table 1Some Big Swings In Our R* Estimates When Including Debt US-like interest rates would almost certainly trigger a major downturn in house prices and household wealth given the inflated housing values in those two countries – the growth of which is already slowing rapidly in response to rate hikes delivered in 2022. We are maintaining our overweight recommendation on Australian government bonds, while we upgraded Canada to overweight from neutral after last week’s duration downgrade. Chart 10Move To Overweight Japan We are also staying overweight on German and French government bonds, as the ECB is unlikely to deliver the full extent of rate increases discounted in the European OIS curve. Our estimated debt-adjusted r-star is also quite negative in the euro area, suggesting that financial fragility issues (due to high government debt in Italy and high corporate debt in France) will likely limit the ECB’s ability to continue with recent chunky rate increases for much longer. In Japan, we continue to view JGBs as an “anti-duration” instrument, given the Bank of Japan’s persistence in maintaining negative interest rates and yield curve control. That makes JGBs a good overweight when global bond yields are rising and a good underweight when global bond yields are falling (Chart 10). Given our decision to reduce our recommended duration exposure to below-benchmark, the logical follow through decision is to upgrade JGBs to overweight. The only remaining country to consider is our view on UK Gilts, which has now become more complicated. Anarchy In The UK The selloff in the UK Gilt market has been stunning in its ferocity. Dating back to last Thursday’s 50bp rate hike by the BoE, the 10-year UK Gilt yield has jumped 120bps and now sits at 4.52%. The increase in yields was identical at the front-end of the Gilt curve, with the 2-year yield jumping 120bps to 4.68%. The surge in longer-term Gilt yields stands out to the rise in bond yields seen outside the UK, as it also incorporates an increase in our estimate of the UK term premium – a move that was not matched in other countries (Chart 11). The rise in Gilt yields was also much more concentrated in real yields compared to inflation expectations (Chart 12), as markets aggressively repriced the path for UK policy rates after the UK government’s announced debt-financed fiscal package, including £45bn of tax cuts. Chart 11Upward Repricing Of Bond Yields Continues Chart 12The Gilt Market Becomes Unhinged The UK’s National Institute for Economic And Social Research (NIESR) estimates that the combined impact of the tax cuts and additional spending measures would increase the UK government deficit by a whopping £150bn, or 5% of GDP. The NIESR also estimated that the fiscal measures, including the previously-announced plan for the UK government to cap energy price increases, would result in positive UK GDP growth in the 4th quarter and also lift annual real GDP growth to 2% over 2023-24. The UK government now faces a major credibility issue with markets on its announced fiscal plans. The sheer size of the package, coming at a time when the US economy was already operating at full employment with high inflation, invites a greater than expected monetary policy tightening response from the BoE. The UK OIS curve now forecasts a peak in rates of 6.3% in October 2023, up from the current 2.25%. That would be a massive move in rates in just one year from a central bank that has been relatively gun shy in lifting rates since the 2008 financial crisis, even during the current inflation overshoot. New UK Prime Minister Liz Truss, and her new Chancellor of the Exchequer Kwasi Kwarteng, have both noted they would prefer a mix of looser fiscal policy (aimed at boosting the supply side of the economy to lift potential growth) with tighter monetary policy that would prevent asset bubbles and inflation overshoots. While there is certainly merit in any plan designed to boost medium-term growth by lifting anemic UK productivity through supply-side reforms, the timing of the announcement could not have been worse. Just one day earlier, the BoE announced a plan to go forward with the sale of Gilts from its balance sheet accumulated during quantitative easing. The Truss government needs to find buyers for all the Gilts that must be issued to pay for the tax cuts and stimulus, but the BoE will not be one of them. In the end, however, the BoE’s expected path for interest rates matters more than the increase in Gilt supply in determining the level of Gilt yields and the slope of the Gilt curve. The NIESR estimates that the UK public debt/GDP ratio will rise to 92% by 2024-25, versus its pre-budget forecast of 88%. While that is a meaningful increase, the correlation between the debt/GDP ratio and the slope of the Gilt curve has been negative for the past few years (Chart 13, top panel). The stronger relationship is between the slope of the curve and the level of the BoE base rate (bottom panel), which is pointing to an inversion of the 2-year/30-year curve if the BoE follows market pricing and lifts rates to 6%. Our view dating back to the early summer was that a low neutral interest rate would prevent the BoE from lifting rates as much as markets were discounting without causing a deep recession, lower inflation and, eventually, a quick reversal of rate hikes. The huge UK fiscal stimulus package changes that calculus, as the nominal neutral rate that will be needed to bring UK inflation back to target is likely now much higher. We have always believed that when a thesis underlying an investment recommendation is challenged by new information, it is best to adjust the recommendation to reflect the new facts. Thus, this week, we are tactically downgrading UK Gilts to underweight in our model bond portfolio framework. We still see a significant medium-term opportunity to go overweight Gilts, as UK policy rates pushing into the 4-6% range are not sustainable. However, the BoE will likely have no choice to begin lifting rates at a much more aggressive pace to restore UK policy credibility, especially with the British pound under immense selling pressure (Chart 14). Despite rumors of an inter-meeting rate hike by the BoE this week to try and support the pound, that is likely too risky a step for the BoE to take as it would invite a battle with investors and currency speculators. Such a battle would be difficult to win without a more credible and market-friendly medium-term fiscal policy from the Truss government. Chart 13The BoE Matters More Than Debt Levels For Gilts Chart 14Tactically Move To Underweight UK Gilts Bottom Line: We will review our UK Gilt stance once there are more clear signals of stability in the pound, but for now, we will step aside and limit our recommended exposure to Gilts – even after the huge selloff seen to date, which likely has more to go. Summarizing All The Changes In Our Model Bond Portfolio All the changes to our recommended duration exposure and country allocations after the past week, including the new weightings in our model bond portfolio, are shown in the tables on pages 14-16. To summarize: We moved the overall recommended global duration exposure to below-benchmark, and shifted the model bond portfolio duration to 0.9 years below that of the custom benchmark index. We increased the size of the US Treasury underweight, and moved Canada and Japan to overweight. We moved the UK to underweight, on top of the reduction in UK duration exposure that was part of last week’s move to reduce overall portfolio duration. We are also cutting exposure to UK investment grade corporates to underweight, as part of an overall move to reduce UK risk in the portfolio. We slightly increased the overweight in Germany. In next week’s report, we will present the quarterly performance review of our model bond portfolio and, more importantly, we will present out scenario-based return expectations after all the changes made this week. Robert Robis, CFA Chief Fixed Income Strategist rrobis@bcaresearch.com GFIS Model Bond Portfolio Recommended Positioning Active Duration Contribution: GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. Custom Performance Benchmark The GFIS Recommended Portfolio Vs. The Custom Benchmark Index Global Fixed Income - Strategic Recommendations* Cyclical Recommendations (6-18 Months)
Executive Summary There’s Value In TIPS A survey of economic and financial market indicators suggests that we are not yet close to the end of the Fed’s tightening cycle. This argues for a continued flattening of the yield curve and one more push higher in bond yields before the end of the cyclical bond bear market. While headline inflation has rolled over, there is so far little indication of a slowdown in core price appreciation. We see core CPI reaching 3.6% during the next 12 months, driven by decelerating goods prices but sticky wage growth and services inflation. The TIPS market is discounting an overly sanguine view of headline inflation for the next 12 months, and there is value in owning TIPS versus nominal Treasuries. Bottom Line: Investors should reduce portfolio duration to ‘below-benchmark’ and hold a position in 5-year/30-year Treasury curve flatteners. Investors should also overweight TIPS versus nominal Treasuries and own 2-year/10-year TIPS breakeven inflation curve flatteners. Feature US bond yields continued their ascent last week, spurred on by August’s surprisingly high core CPI print and the perception that the Fed will have to tighten policy even more quickly to bring inflation back down. Currently, the market is discounting that the Fed will lift the funds rate to 4.61% by April of next year and then bring it back down to 4.26% by the end of 2023 (Chart 1). Chart 1Rate Expectations This market-implied interest rate path would involve 225 bps of tightening at the next 5 FOMC meetings, or an average rate increase of +45 bps per meeting. With a 75 basis point rate increase looking like a lock for this week, market pricing is consistent with additional 50 basis point increases at the final two meetings of this year (November and December) and then two more 25 basis point rate hikes in Q1 2023. After that, the market anticipates that the tightening cycle will be over. Our view continues to be that the peak in the fed funds rate will occur later than April 2023 and that, while a pause in the Fed’s tightening cycle is likely at some point next year, inflation will be strong enough to preclude outright rate cuts. In terms of investment strategy, last week’s report presented empirical evidence showing that, on average, Treasury yields peak 1-2 months before the last rate hike of the cycle.1 In fact, in the seven Fed tightening cycles that we analyzed, the 10-year Treasury yield always peaked within a window spanning four months before the last rate hike and four months after (Table 1). This analysis suggests that even if the fed funds rate peaks in April, as is implied by the market, bond yields likely have one more leg higher before the end of the cyclical bear market. Table 1Timing Fed Tightening Cycles While we have been consistently highlighting that the market is not pricing-in a sufficiently high average fed funds rate for 2023, we have been recommending an ‘at benchmark’ portfolio duration stance on the view that falling inflation could briefly send bond yields lower in the near term. The 10-year Treasury yield did fall back to 2.60% on August 1, but it then rebounded quickly and has continued to head higher since. With Treasury yields unlikely to re-test those depths anytime soon, we recommend shifting to a ‘below-benchmark’ portfolio duration stance to play the final leg higher in bond yields before a US recession ends the cyclical bond bear market. The next section of this report surveys nine cyclical economic indicators and argues that the balance of evidence suggests that the fed funds rate’s peak will occur later than April 2023. Then, the final section of this report discusses our recommended TIPS investment strategy in light of last week’s CPI report and our outlook for inflation. Tracking The Tightening Cycle One of the most useful tools in our arsenal for assessing the state of the interest rate cycle is our Fed Monitor. The Fed Monitor is a composite of 47 economic and financial market variables that has been designed to output a positive value when the data recommend interest rate hikes and a negative value when rate cuts are required. Historically, the Monitor does a good job of lining up with the actual path of the fed funds rate (Chart 2). Chart 2Fed Monitor Says More Tightening Required The Fed Monitor is currently down off its highs, but at 1.03 it is well above the zero line. Looking at past tightening cycles, we find that the Monitor has averaged 0.41 on the day of the last rate hike of a cycle, with a range of outcomes spanning -0.49 to +0.93. Notably, the +0.93 upper-end of that range occurred in 1995, a time when the Fed only delivered a modest amount of policy easing before pivoting back to tightening in 1999. The variables in our Fed Monitor can be grouped into three categories: (i) economic growth variables, (ii) inflation variables and (iii) financial market variables. Interestingly, we observe that the Economic Growth component of our Monitor has dipped into negative territory while the Inflation and Financial Conditions components continue to argue for tighter policy (Chart 2, bottom 3 panels). A negative Economic Growth component suggests that we are getting closer to the end of the tightening cycle, but the Fed will likely stay hawkish and tolerate an even deeper negative reading from Economic Growth as long as inflation remains high. In addition to our Fed Monitor, we have identified nine economic indicators (some included in the Fed Monitor and some not) that are particularly relevant for the Fed’s policy stance. In this week’s report, we look at the message these indicators were sending on the day of the last rate hike of seven past tightening cycles. The indicators are: The Sahm Rule: Economist Claudia Sahm has noted that a recession always occurs when the 3-month moving average of the unemployment rate rises by more than 0.5% off its trailing 12-month low.2 We include the unemployment rate’s deviation from its 12-month low as a measure of labor market utilization. Employment Momentum: We look at the 6-month growth rate in nonfarm payrolls as a measure of momentum in the labor market. Inflation: We use 12-month core PCE as a measure of inflation that is most closely related to the Fed’s target. Inflation Momentum: To measure momentum in inflation we look at the difference between 3-month core PCE and 12-month core PCE. Labor Market Tightness: Using responses from the Conference Board’s Consumer Confidence Survey, we look at the number of people who describe jobs as “plentiful” minus the number who describe jobs as “hard to get”. Economic Growth: We use the ISM Manufacturing PMI as a simple measure of the trend in aggregate demand in the US economy. Housing: To assess trends in the housing market we look at the 12-month moving average in housing starts minus the 24-month moving average. Financial Conditions: We use the Goldman Sachs Financial Conditions Index to assess whether financial conditions are accommodative or restrictive. The Yield Curve: We look at the 2-year/10-year Treasury slope to ascertain whether the bond market perceives the monetary policy stance as accommodative or restrictive. Table 2A lists the nine indicators described above and shows their values on the day of the last rate hike of seven past tightening cycles. We also include the current reading from each indicator. Finally, we shade in red every cell that we deem consistent with the Fed stopping its tightening cycle. To make this determination we compare the value on the day of the last rate hike to the median value witnessed on the day of the last hike across all seven tightening cycles. We don’t use median values for the Goldman Sachs Financial Conditions Index or the Treasury slope. Rather, we say that an inverted yield curve and a Financial Conditions reading above 100 are both consistent with the end of rate hikes. Table 2AEconomic Indicators At The End Of Fed Tightening Cycles The last column of Table 2A simply adds up the number of red cells in each row. As of today, we see that only 2 out of nine indicators are consistent with the end of the tightening cycle. The end of a tightening cycle has never occurred with less than four indicators flashing red. Table 2B takes a slightly more sophisticated approach to the same exercise. Rather than simply comparing above or below the median, we rank each indicator as a percentile relative to its value on the day of the last rate hike across seven different tightening cycles. We then combine those percentile ranks with an equal weighting to get an “End of Tightening Score”. Larger values are consistent with a greater likelihood that the tightening cycle will end and lower values are consistent with a lower likelihood. Currently, the End of Tightening Score stands at 28%, lower than on the day of the last rate hike in all of the cycles we analyzed. Table 2BEconomic Indicators At The End Of Fed Tightening Cycles: Percentile Ranks As is the case with our Fed Monitor, the closest End of Tightening Score to today’s occurred in 1995. One key difference between 1995 and today is that core inflation was running much closer to target in 1995. This gave the Fed scope to fine tune its policy stance without risking its inflation fighting credibility. That flexibility is not available to the Fed in today’s high inflation environment. Bottom Line: A survey of economic and financial market indicators suggests that we are not yet close to the end of the Fed’s tightening cycle. This argues for a continued flattening of the yield curve and one more push higher in bond yields before the end of the cyclical bond bear market. Investors should set portfolio duration to ‘below benchmark’ and maintain a position in 5-year/30-year Treasury curve flatteners.3 The TIPS Market Is Too Complacent August’s month-over-month core CPI print came in well above expectations at +0.57%, sending bond yields higher and risk assets lower last week. Zooming out, while falling gasoline prices appear to have shifted the trend in headline inflation, there is so far little evidence of a meaningful move down in core or trimmed mean measures of CPI (Chart 3). Chart 3No Slowdown In Core CPI Chart 4Core CPI Forecast In a recent Special Report, we went through the five major components of CPI (energy, food, shelter, goods and services) and came up with 12-month forecasts for both core and headline inflation.4 For core inflation, we forecast that it will fall to 3.6% during the next 12 months (Chart 4). The main driver of the drop will be a return of goods inflation to pre-pandemic levels (Chart 4, panel 3). We anticipate only a minor pullback in shelter inflation (Chart 4, panel 2) and that services inflation will remain elevated, driven by strong wage growth (Chart 4, bottom panel). Recently, we have seen some evidence that home prices and rents on new leases are decelerating, no doubt a response to high and rising mortgage rates. That said, we don’t anticipate much pass through from those trends into shelter inflation during the next 12 months. First, home price appreciation leads shelter CPI by 18 months (Chart 5A). This means that we shouldn’t expect falling home prices to meaningfully impact shelter inflation until the end of 2023. Second, rental growth on new leases as measured by Zillow and Apartment List has clearly decelerated, but it is still running much hotter than shelter CPI (Chart 5B). Given the limited historical track record, it’s very difficult to say how much (if any) of the recent deceleration in rental growth will ultimately pass through to the CPI. Chart 5AHome Prices & Shelter CPI Chart 5BDecelerating Rents In our research, we have found that measures of labor market utilization are the most important variables to include in any model of shelter inflation. For ease of forecasting, the model shown in Chart 4 and in the top panel of Chart 6 uses the unemployment rate as its measure of labor market tightness. This model works well, but it arguably understates shelter inflation because it doesn’t include a variable capturing wage growth. If we replace the unemployment rate in our model with the more comprehensive aggregate weekly payrolls measure, then we get a much tighter fit and a model that does a better job explaining the recent surge in shelter CPI (Chart 6, bottom panel).5 All in all, we conclude that our expectation that shelter inflation will fall from 6.3% to 4.7% during the next 12 months may wind up being a tad optimistic. When we combine our forecast for 3.6% core inflation with two scenarios for the oil price – a benign one based on what is priced into the futures curve and another based on the forecasts of our commodity strategists – we get an expected range of 2.1% to 4.7% for headline CPI during the next 12 months (Chart 7). According to our Golden Rule of TIPS Investing, if 12-month headline CPI comes in above the current 1-year CPI swap rate then TIPS will outperform nominal Treasuries during the 12-month investment horizon.6 Chart 6Modeling Shelter Inflation Chart 7There's Value In TIPS At present, the 1-year CPI swap rate is 2.76%, near the bottom of our expected range of outcomes for 12-month headline CPI. It seems to us that a lot of things will have to go right for inflation to come in below market expectations during the next year. For this reason, we think it makes sense for investors to overweight TIPS versus nominal Treasuries in US bond portfolios. Chart 8Own Inflation Curve Flatteners Additionally, we see a lot of value in owning TIPS breakeven curve flatteners (Chart 8). The 2-year and 10-year TIPS breakeven inflation rates are both currently 2.38%, meaning that the 2-year/10-year TIPS breakeven slope is at zero. Higher-than-expected inflation during the next 12 months will put more pressure on the front-end of the breakeven curve than the long end, flattening the curve. Further, logic dictates that an inverted inflation curve is more consistent with an environment where the Fed is fighting above-target inflation than a positively sloped one. There will come a time when it makes sense for the inflation curve to move back into positive territory, but that won’t be until the Fed has brought inflation down much closer to its target. Bottom Line: The inflation outlook priced into markets for the next 12 months is too benign. Investors should overweight TIPS versus nominal Treasuries and own TIPS breakeven inflation curve flatteners. Ryan Swift US Bond Strategist rswift@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “A Brief History Of Fed Tightening Cycles”, dated September 13, 2022. 2 https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/ES_THP_Sahm_web_20190506.pdf 3 For more details on this curve trade please see US Bond Strategy Weekly Report, “The Great Soft Landing Debate”, dated August 9, 2022. 4 Please see US Bond Strategy Special Report, “The Golden Rule Of TIPS Investing”, dated August 23, 2022. 5 Aggregate weekly payrolls = nonfarm employment x average weekly hours x average hourly earnings 6 Please see US Bond Strategy Special Report, “The Golden Rule Of TIPS Investing”, dated August 23, 2022. Recommended Portfolio Specification Other Recommendations Treasury Index Returns Spread Product Returns
Executive Summary Turbulence remains the signal feature of 2022 as worries about inflation and the Fed’s reaction to it continue to haunt investors and plague financial markets. Despite four-decade highs in measured inflation, long-run inflation expectations have held fast, keeping an inflation vicious circle from taking hold. As the diminishing threat from COVID helps unsnarl supply and transportation bottlenecks, it will also reduce the potential for expectations to become unmoored. The labor market has been sending encouraging signals for the economy and corporate profit margins. Although payrolls continue to expand at a robust pace and job openings remain near record highs, upward wage pressures appear to be losing momentum. Households have proven willing to spend their excess pandemic savings and maintain a sizable cushion to keep the economy growing near its long-run trend pace. All Is Not Yet Lost Bottom Line: Markets remain volatile, subject to sharp swings upon any data points that portend a shift in the Fed’s tightening campaign. The August CPI report did not change our view that the consensus is underestimating the potential for positive earnings surprises in the next two quarters and we continue to recommend overweighting equities over the next three to six months. Feature Will the real inflation trend please stand up? Financial markets were emboldened by July’s CPI release, which reported a 0.1% month-over-month decline in inflation, 10 basis points below expectations, and demoralized by August’s edition, which reported a 0.1% month-over-month increase, 20 basis points above expectations. Core inflation, which backs out changes in volatile food and energy prices, came in at 0.6% in August after a 0.3% reading in July. In the harsh light of the August release, the July data point looked anomalous to the naked eye after holding between 0.6 and 0.7% in the three previous months. Related Report US Investment StrategyChartbook Equities swooned after the release, but policymakers and economic participants should focus on data trends rather than data points. Though we share in the general disappointment that inflation remains elevated, we continue to expect that headline CPI growth will abate to around 4% over the coming months. The supply of goods and services will increase as COVID’s threat continues to recede, while demand will slacken as the Fed and other major central banks continue to tighten monetary policy. The end of COVID restrictions will help to facilitate the ongoing shift in demand from goods to services. All in all, the underlying trend toward decelerating inflation will not be upended by noisy one-off data points. Stubbornly high inflation prints increase the risk that inflation expectations will become unmoored, feeding a self-reinforcing cycle in which high prices beget even higher prices, but there is no sign yet that they are poised to break out. Persistent inflation also increases the risk that the Fed will overdo the tightening and induce a deeper recession than would otherwise occur. We remain vigilant on both fronts, but believe markets are overestimating the probability of each risk. The charts that follow – tracking COVID’s course, inflation expectations, the labor market, household balance sheets and the outlook for S&P 500 earnings – show the data underpinning our stance. We will abandon our sanguine tactical view if consumers show signs of retrenching, which would torpedo our better-than-consensus growth outlook, or if inflation expectations show signs of becoming unmoored, which would force the Fed to move to throttle the economy immediately. Neither condition has yet been met, however, and we continue to believe that the consensus is underestimating the potential for upside earnings surprises. Chart 1Omicron Has Come And Gone ... Chart 2... With Much Less Of An Impact Than Delta Chart 3The Picture Looks Even Better Outside The US ... Chart 4... Though Ancillary Counts May Not Be So Rigorously Maintained Chart 5Watch This Space Chart 6Consumers Are Still Not Chasing Big-Ticket Items Chart 7Near-Term Expectations Are Way Down ... Chart 8... And Long-Term Expectations Remain Contained Chart 9Steady As She Goes Chart 10We're All Doomed! Chart 11Oh, Wait, Never Mind Chart 12Initial Claims Are Nearly 20% Below Their Mid-July Peak ... Chart 13... And Openings Have Come Only Slightly Off Of Theirs Chart 14Ready, Willing And Able To Keep The Economy Going Chart 15Down, But Not Out Chart 16Margins Remain Elevated ... Chart 17... And Profit Warnings Are Few And Far Between Doug Peta, CFA Chief US Investment Strategist dougp@bcaresearch.com
Executive Summary The US inflation surprise increases the odds of both congressional gridlock and recession, which increases uncertainty over US leadership past 2024 and reduces the US’s ability to lower tensions with China and Iran. Despite the mainstream media narrative, the Xi-Putin summit reinforces our view that China cannot reject Russia’s strategic partnership. The potential for conflict in Taiwan forces China to accept Russia’s overture. For the same reason the US and China cannot re-engage their economies sustainably, even if Biden and Xi somehow manage to reduce tensions after the midterm elections and twentieth national party congress. Russia could reduce oil exports as well as natural gas, intensifying the global energy shock. Ukraine’s counter-offensive and Europe’s energy diversification increase the risk of Russian military and economic failure. The Middle East will destabilize anew and create a new source of global energy supply disruptions. US-Iran talks are faltering as expected. Russian Oil Embargo Could Deliver Global Shock Asset Initiation Date Return LONG GLOBAL DEFENSIVES / CYCLICALS EQUITIES 2022-01-20 19.1% Bottom Line: Stay long US stocks, defensive sectors, and large caps. Avoid China, Taiwan, eastern Europe, and the Middle East. Feature Several notable geopolitical developments occurred over the past week while we met with clients at the annual BCA Research Investment Conference in New York. In this report we analyze these developments using our geopolitical method, which emphasizes constraints over preferences, capabilities over intentions, reality over narrative. We also draw freely from the many valuable insights gleaned from our guest speakers at the conference. China Cannot Reject Russia: The Xi-Putin Summit In Uzbekistan Presidents Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin are meeting in Uzbekistan as we go to press and Putin has acknowledged China’s “questions and concern” about the war in Ukraine.1 They last met on February 4 when Xi gave Putin his blessing for the Ukraine invasion, promising to buy more Russian natural gas and to pursue a “no limits” strategic partnership (meaning one that includes extensive military cooperation). The meeting’s importance is clear from both leaders’ efforts to make it happen. Putin is leaving Russia despite rising domestic criticism over his handling of the Ukraine war and European energy war. Ukraine is making surprising gains in the battlefield, particularly around Kharkiv, threatening Russia’s ability to complete the conquest of Donetsk and the Donbas region. Meanwhile Xi is leaving China for the first time since the Covid-19 outbreak, despite the fact that he is only one month away from the most important political event of his life: the October 16 twentieth national party congress, where he hopes to clinch another five, ten, or fifteen years in power, expand his faction’s grip over the political system, and take over Mao Zedong’s unique title as chairman of the Communist Party. We do not yet know the full outcome of the Uzbek summit but we do not see it as a turning point in which China turns on Russia. Instead the summit reinforces our key point to investors all year: China cannot reject Russia. Russia broke energy ties with Europe and is fighting a proxy war with NATO. The Putin regime has lashed Russia to China’s side for the foreseeable future. China may not have wanted to move so quickly toward an exclusive relationship but it is not in a position to reject Russia’s diplomatic overture and leave Putin out to dry. The reason is that China is constrained by the US-led world order and like Russia is attempting to change that order and carve a sphere of influence to improve its national security. Beijing’s immediate goal is to consolidate power across the critical buffer territories susceptible to foreign interests. It has already consolidated Tibet, Xinjiang, Hong Kong, and to some extent the South China Sea, the critical approach to Taiwan. Taiwan is the outstanding buffer space that needs to be subjugated. Xi Jinping has taken it upon himself to unify China and Taiwan within his extended rule. But Taiwanese public opinion has decisively shifted in favor of either an indefinite status quo or independence. Hence China and Taiwan are on a collision course. Regardless of one’s view on the likelihood of war, it is a high enough chance that China, Taiwan, the US, and others will be preparing for it in the coming years. Chart 1US Arms Sales To Taiwan The US is attempting to increase its ability to deter China from attacking Taiwan. It believes it failed to deter Russia from invading Ukraine – and Taiwan is far more important to US economy and security than Ukraine. The US is already entering discussions with Taiwan and other allies about a package of severe economic sanctions in the event that China attacks – sanctions comparable to those imposed on Russia. The US Congress is also moving forward with the Taiwan Policy Act of 2022, which will solidify US support for the island as well as increase arms sales (Chart 1).2 Aside from China's military preparation – which needs to be carefully reviewed in light of Russia’s troubles in Ukraine and the much greater difficulty of invading Taiwan – China must prepare to deal with the following three factors in the event of war: 1. Energy: China is overly exposed to sea lines of communication that can be disrupted by the United States Navy. Beijing will have to partner with Russia to import Russian and Central Asian resources and attempt to forge an overland path to the Middle East (Chart 2). Unlike Russia, China cannot supply its own energy during a war and its warfighting capacity will suffer if shortages occur or prices spike. 2. Computer Chips: China has committed at least $200 billion on a crash course to build its own semiconductors since 2013 due to the need to modernize its military and economy and compete with the US on the global stage. But China is still dependent on imports, especially for the most advanced chips, and its dependency is rising not falling despite domestic investments (Chart 3). The US is imposing export controls on advanced microchips and starting to enforce these controls on third parties. The US and its allies have cut off Russia’s access to computer chips, leading to Russian shortages that are impeding their war effort. Chart 2China’s Commodity Import Vulnerability Chart 3China's Imports Of Semiconductors 3. US Dollar Reserves: China is still heavily exposed to US dollar assets but its access will be cut off in the event of war, just as the US has frozen Russian, Iranian, Venezuelan, and Cuban assets over the years. China is already diversifying away from the dollar but will have to move more quickly given that Russia had dramatically reduced its exposure and still suffered severely when its access to dollar reserves was frozen this year (Chart 4). Where will China reallocate its reserves? To developing and importing natural resources from Russia, Central Asia, and other overland routes. Chart 4China's US Dollar Exposure Russia may be the junior partner in a new Russo-Chinese alliance but it will not be a vassal. Russia has resources, military power, and regional control in Central Asia that China needs. Of course, China will maintain a certain diplomatic distance from Russia because it needs to maintain economic relations with Europe and other democracies as it breaks up with the United States. Europe is far more important to Chinese exports than Russia. China will play both sides and its companies will develop parallel supply chains. China will also make gestures to countries that feel threatened by Russia, including the Central Asian members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). But the crucial point is that China cannot reject Russia. If the Putin regime fails, China will be diplomatically isolated, it will lose an ally in any Taiwan war, and the US will have a much greater advantage in attempting to contain China in the coming years and decades. Russo-Chinese Alliance And The US Dollar Many investors speculate that China’s diversification away from the US dollar will mark a severe downturn for the currency. This is of course possible, given that Russia and China will form a substantial anti-dollar bloc. Certainly there can be a cyclical downturn in the greenback, especially after the looming recession troughs. But it is harder to see a structural collapse of the dollar as the leading global reserve currency. The past 14 years have shown how global investors react to US dysfunction, Russian aggression, and Chinese slowdown: they buy the dollar! The implication is that a US wage-price spiral, a Russian détente with Europe, and a Chinese economic recovery would be negative for the dollar – but those stars have not yet aligned. Related Report Geopolitical StrategyThe Geopolitical Consequences Of The Ukraine War The reason China needs to diversify is because it fears US sanctions when it invades Taiwan. Hence reducing its holdings of US treasuries and the dollar signals that it expects war in future. But will other countries rush into the yuan and yuan-denominated bonds if Xi is following in Putin’s footsteps and launching a war of choice, with damaging consequences for the economy? A war over Taiwan would be a global catastrophe and would send other countries plunging into the safe-haven assets, including US assets. Nevertheless China will diversify and other countries will probably increase their yuan trade over time, just as Russia has done. This will be a cyclical headwind for the dollar at some point. But it will not knock the US off the premier position. That would require a historic downgrade in the US’s economic and strategic capability, as was the case with the United Kingdom after the world wars. China will continue to stimulate the economy after the party congress. A successful Chinese and global economic rebound next year – and a decision to pursue “jaw jaw” with the US and Taiwan rather than “war war” – would be negative for the dollar. Hence we may downgrade our bullish dollar view to neutral on a cyclical basis before long … but not yet and not on a structural basis. Bottom Line: Favor the US dollar and the euro over the Chinese renminbi and Taiwanese dollar. Underweight Chinese and Taiwanese assets on a structural basis. Ukraine’s Counter-Offensive And A Russian Oil Embargo Ukraine launched a counter-offensive against Russia in September and achieved significant early victories. Russians fell back away from Kharkiv, putting Izyum in Ukrainian hands and jeopardizing Russia’s ability to achieve its war aim of conquering the remaining half of Donetsk province and thus controlling the Donbas region of eastern Ukraine. Russian positions also crumbled west of the Dnieper river, which was always an important limit on Russian capabilities (Map 1). Map 1Status Of Russia-Ukraine War: The Ukrainian Counter-Offensive (September 15, 2022) Some commentators, such as Francis Fukuyama in the Washington Post, have taken the Ukrainian counter-offensive as a sign that the Ukrainians will reconquer lost territory and Russia will suffer an outright defeat in this war.3 If Russia cannot conquer the Donbas, its control of the “land bridge” to Crimea will be unsustainable, and it may have to admit defeat. But we are very skeptical. It will be extremely difficult for Ukrainians to drive the Russians out of all of their entrenched positions. US military officials applauded Ukraine’s counter-offensive but sounded a cautious note. The chief problem is that neither President Putin nor the Russian military can afford such a defeat. They will have to double down on the Donbas and land bridge. The war will be prolonged. Ultimately we expect stalemate, which will be a prelude to ceasefire negotiations. But first the fighting will intensify and the repercussions for global economy and markets will get worse. Russia’s war effort is also flagging because Europe is making headway in finding alternatives for Russian natural gas. Russia has cut off flows through the Nord Stream pipeline to Germany, the Yamal pipeline to Poland, and partially to the Ukraine pipeline system, leaving only Turkstream operating normally. Yet EU gas storage is in the middle of its normal range and trending higher (Chart 5). Chart 5Europe Handling Natural Gas Crisis Well … So Far Of course, Europe’s energy supply is still not secure. Cold weather could require more heating than expected. Russia has an incentive to tighten the gas flow further. Flows from Algeria or Azerbaijan could be sabotaged or disrupted (Chart 6). Chart 6Europe’s NatGas Supply Still Not Secure Chart 7Europe Tipping Into Recession Anyway Russia’s intention is to inflict a recession on Europe so that it begins to rethink its willingness to maintain a long-term proxy war. Recession will force European households to pay the full cost of the energy breakup with Russia all at once. Popular support for war will moderate and politicians will adopt more pragmatic diplomacy. After all they do not have an interest in prolonging the war to the point that it spirals out of control. Clearly the economic pain is being felt, as manufacturing expectations and consumer confidence weaken (Chart 7). Europe’s resolve will not collapse overnight. But the energy crisis can get worse from here. The deeper the recession, the more likely European capitals will try to convince Ukraine to negotiate a ceasefire. However, given Ukraine’s successes in the field and Europe’s successes in diversification, it is entirely possible that Russia faces further humiliating setbacks. While this outcome may be good for liberal democracies, it is not good for global financial markets, at least not in the short run. If Russia is backed into a corner on both the military and economic fronts, then Putin’s personal security and regime security will be threatened. Russia could attempt to turn the tables or lash out even more aggressively. Already Moscow has declared a new “red line” if the US provides longer-range missiles to Ukraine. A US-Russia showdown, complete with nuclear threats, is not out of the realm of possibility. Russia could also start halting oil exports, as it has threatened to do, to inflict a major oil shock on the European economy. Investors will need to be prepared for that outcome. Bottom Line: Petro-states have geopolitical leverage as long as global commodity supplies remain tight. Investors should be prepared for the European embargo of Russian oil to provoke a Russian reaction. A larger than expected oil shock is possible given the risk of defeat that Russia faces (Chart 8). Chart 8Russian Oil Embargo Could Deliver Global Shock US-Iran Talks Falter Again This trend of petro-state geopolitical leverage was one of our three key views for 2022 and it also extends to the US-Iran nuclear negotiations, which are faltering as expected. Tit-for-tat military action between Iran and its enemies in the Persian Gulf will pick up immediately – i.e. a new source of oil disruption will emerge. If global demand is collapsing then this trend may only create additional volatility for oil markets at first, but it further constrains the supply side for the foreseeable future. It is not yet certain that the talks are dead but a deal before the US midterm looks unlikely. Biden could continue working on a deal in 2023-24. The Democratic Party is likely to lose at least the House of Representatives, leaving him unable to pass legislation and more likely to pursue foreign policy objectives. The Biden administration wants the Iran deal to tamp down inflation and avoid a third foreign policy crisis at a time when it is already juggling Russia and China. The overriding constraints in this situation are that Iran needs a nuclear weapon for regime survival, while Israel will attack Iran as a last resort before it obtains a nuclear weapon. Yes, the US is reluctant to initiate another war in the Middle East. But public war-weariness is probably overrated today (unlike in 2008 or even 2016) and the US has drawn a hard red line against nuclear weaponization. Iran will retaliate to any US-Israeli aggression ferociously. But conflict and oil disruptions will emerge even before the US or Israel decide to launch air strikes, as Iran will face sabotage and cyber-attacks and will need to deter the US and Israel by signaling that it can trigger a region-wide war. Chart 9If US-Iran Talks Fail, Iraq Will Destabilize Further Recent social unrest in Iraq, where the nationalist coalition of Muqtada al-Sadr is pushing back against Iranian influence, is only an inkling of what can occur if the US-Iran talks are truly dead, Iran pushes forward with its nuclear program, and Israel and the US begin openly entertaining military options. The potential oil disruption from Iraq presents a much larger supply constraint than the failure to remove sanctions on Iran (Chart 9). A new wave of Middle Eastern instability would push up oil prices and strengthen Russia’s hand, distracting the US and imposing further pain on Europe. It would not strengthen China’s hand, but the risk itself would reinforce China’s Eurasian strategy, as Beijing would need to prepare for oil cutoffs in the Persian Gulf. Iran’s attempts to join the Shanghai Cooperation Organization should be seen in this context. Ultimately the only factor that could still possibly convince Iran not to make a dash for the bomb – the military might of the US and its allies – is the same factor that forces China and Russia to strengthen their strategic bond. The emerging Russo-Chinese behemoth, in turn, acts as a hard constraint on any substantial reengagement of the US and Chinese economies. The US cannot afford to feed another decade of Chinese economic growth and modernization if China is allied with Russia and Central Asia. Of course, we cannot rule out the possibility that the Xi and Biden administrations will try to prevent a total collapse of US-China relations in 2023. If China is not yet ready to invade Taiwan then there is a brief space for diplomacy to try to work. But there is no room for long-lasting reengagement – because the US cannot simply cede Taiwan to China, and hence China cannot reject Russia, and Russia no longer has any options. Bottom Line: Expect further oil volatility and price shocks. Sell Middle Eastern equities. Favor North American, Latin American, and Australian energy producers. Investment Takeaways Recession Risks Rising: The inflation surprise in the US in August necessitates more aggressive Fed rate hikes in the near term, which increases the odds of rising unemployment and recession. US Policy Uncertainty Rising: A recession will greatly increase the odds of US political instability over the 2022-24 cycle and reduce the incentive for foreign powers like Iran or China to make concessions or agreements with the US. European Policy Uncertainty Rising: We already expected a European recession. Russia’s setbacks make it more likely that it will adopt more aggressive military tactics and economic warfare. Chinese Policy Uncertainty Rising: China will continue stimulating next year but its economy will suffer from energy shocks and its stimulus is less effective than in the past. It will likely increase economic and military pressure on Taiwan, while the US will increase punitive measures against China. It is not clear that it will launch a full scale invasion of Taiwan – that is not our base case – but it is possible so investors need to be prepared. Long US and Defensives: Stay long US stocks over global stocks, defensive sectors over cyclicals, and large caps over small caps. Buy safe-havens like the oversold Japanese yen. Long Arms Manufacturers: Buy defense stocks and cyber-security firms. Short China and Taiwan: Favor the USD and EUR over the CNY. Favor US semiconductor stocks over Taiwanese equities. Favor Korean over Taiwanese equities. Favor Indian tech over Chinese tech. Favor Singaporean over Hong Kong stocks. Matt Gertken Chief Geopolitical Strategist mattg@bcaresearch.com Footnotes 1 Tessa Wong and Simon Fraser, “Putin-Xi talks: Russian leader reveals China's 'concern' over Ukraine,” BBC, September 15, 2022, bbc.com. 2 US Senate Foreign Relations Committee, “The Taiwan Policy Act of 2022,” foreign.senate.gov. 3 Greg Sargent, “Is Putin facing defeat? The ‘End of History’ author remains confident,” Washington Post, September 12, 2022, washingtonpost.com. Strategic Themes Open Tactical Positions (0-6 Months) Open Cyclical Recommendations (6-18 Months) Regional Geopolitical Risk Matrix
Listen to a short summary of this report Executive Summary GIS Projection For The EUR/USD We went long the euro early last week, as EUR/USD hit our buy limit price of $0.99. Despite a near cut-off of Russian gas imports, European gas inventories have reached 84% of capacity – above the 80% target that the EU set for November 1st. The latest meteorological forecasts suggest that Europe will experience a warmer-than-normal winter. This will cut heating usage, likely making gas rationing unnecessary. Currencies fare best in loose fiscal/tight monetary environments. This is what Europe faces over the coming months, as governments boost income support for households and businesses, while ramping up spending on energy infrastructure and defense. For its part, the ECB has started hiking rates. Since mid-August, interest rate differentials have moved in favor of the euro at both the short and long end. Rising inflation expectations make it less likely that the ECB will be able to back off from its tightening campaign as it did in past cycles. A hawkish Fed is the biggest risk to our bullish EUR/USD view. We expect US inflation to trend lower over the coming months, before reaccelerating in the second half of 2023. However, as the August CPI report highlights, the danger is that any dip in inflation proves to be shallower and shorter-lived than previously anticipated. Bottom Line: Although significant uncertainty remains, the risk-reward trade-off favors being long EUR/USD. Our end-2022 target is $1.06. Dear Client, I will be meeting clients in Asia next week while also working on our Fourth Quarter Strategy Outlook, which will be published at the end of the month. In lieu of our regular report next Friday, you will receive a Special Report from my colleague, Ritika Mankar, discussing the sources of US equity outperformance over the past 14 years and the likely path ahead. Best Regards, Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist It’s Just a Clown Chart 1Investors Are Bullish The Dollar, Not The Euro The scariest part of a horror movie is usually the one before the monster is revealed. No matter how good the special effects, the human brain can always conjure up something more frightening than anything Hollywood can dream up. Investors have been conjuring up all sorts of cataclysmic scenarios for the upcoming European winter. In financial markets, the impact has been most visible in the value of the euro, which has tumbled to parity against the US dollar. Only 23% of investors are bullish the euro at present, down from a peak of 78% in January 2021 (Chart 1). Conversely, 75% of investors are bullish the US dollar. More than half of fund managers cited “long US dollar” as the most crowded trade in the latest BofA Global Fund Manager Survey (“long commodities” was a distant second at 10%). As we discuss below, the outlook for the euro may be a lot better than most investors realize. While my colleagues, Chester Ntonifor, BCA’s chief FX strategist, and Mathieu Savary, BCA’s chief European strategist, are not quite ready to buy the euro just yet, we all agree that EUR/USD will rise over the long haul. Cutting Putin Loose Natural gas accounts for about a quarter of Europe’s energy supply. Prior to the Ukraine war, about 40% of that gas came from Russia (Chart 2). With the closure of the NordStream 1 pipeline, that number has fallen to 9% (some Russian gas continues to enter Europe via Ukraine and the TurkStream supply route). Yet, despite the deep drop in Russian natural gas imports, European natural gas inventories are up to 84% of capacity – roughly in line with past years and above the EU’s November 1st target of 80% (Chart 3). Chart 2Despite A Sharp Drop In Imports Of Russian Natural Gas… Chart 3...Europeans Managed To Stock Up On Natural Gas For The Winter Season Europe has been able to achieve this feat by aggressively buying natural gas on the open market. While this has caused gas prices to soar, it sets the stage for a retreat in prices in the months ahead. European spot natural gas prices have already fallen from over €300/Mwh in late August to €214/Mwh, and the futures market is discounting a further decline in prices over the next two years (Chart 4). Chart 4The Futures Market Is Discounting A Further Decline In Natural Gas Prices Chart 5Futures Prices Of Energy Commodities Provide Some Limited Information On Where Spot Prices Are Heading Follow the Futures? Futures prices are not a foolproof guide to where spot prices are heading. As Chart 5 illustrates, the correlation between the slope of the futures curve and subsequent changes in spot prices in energy markets is quite low. Nevertheless, future spot returns do tend to be negative when the curve is backwardated, as it is now, especially when assessed over horizons of around 12-to-18 months (Table 1). Table 1Energy Commodity Spot Price Returns Tend To Be Negative When The Futures Curve Is Backwardated Our guess is that European natural gas prices will indeed fall further from current levels. The latest meteorological forecasts suggest that Europe will experience a milder-than-normal winter (Chart 6). This is critical considering that natural gas accounts for over 40% of EU residential heating use once electricity and heat generated in gas-fired plants are included (Chart 7). Chart 6Meteorological Models Suggest Above-Normal Temperatures In Europe This Winter Chart 7Natural Gas Is An Important Source Of Energy For Heating Homes In The EU A warm winter would bolster the euro area’s trade balance, which has fallen into deficit this year as the energy import bill has soared (Chart 8). An improving balance of payments would help the euro. Europe is moving quickly to secure new sources of energy supply. In less than one year, Europe has become America’s biggest overseas market for LNG (Chart 9). A new gas pipeline linking Spain with the rest of Europe should be operational by next spring. Chart 8Soaring Energy Costs Have Pushed The Euro Area Trade Balance Into Deficit Chart 9Europe Is America's Largest LNG Customer In the meantime, Germany is building two “floating” LNG terminals. It has also postponed plans to mothball its nuclear power plants and has restarted its coal-fired power plants, a decision that even the German Green Party has supported. France is aiming to boost nuclear capacity, which had fallen below 50% earlier this summer. Électricité de France has pledged to nearly double daily production by December. For its part, the Dutch government has indicated it will raise output from the massive Groningen natural gas field if the energy crisis intensifies. Fiscal Policy to the Rescue On the policy front, European governments are taking steps to buttress household balance sheets during the energy crisis, with nearly €400 billion in support measures announced so far (and surely more to come). Although these support measures will be offset with roughly €140 billion of windfall profit taxes on the energy sector, the net effect will be to raise budget deficits across the region. However, following the old adage that one should “finance temporary shocks but adjust to permanent ones,” a temporary spike in fiscal support may be just what the doctor ordered. The last thing Europe needs is a situation where energy prices fall next year, but the region remains mired in recession as households seek to rebuild their savings. Such an outcome would depress tax revenues, likely leading to higher government debt-to-GDP ratios. Get Ready For a V-Shaped Recovery Stronger growth in the rest of the world should give the euro area a helping hand. That would be good news for the euro, given its cyclical characteristics (Chart 10). The European economy is especially leveraged to Chinese growth. It is likely that the authorities will loosen the zero-Covid policy once the Twentieth Party Congress concludes next month, and new anti-viral drugs and possibly an Omicron-specific booster shot become widely available later this year. That should help jumpstart China’s economy. More stimulus will also help. Chart 11 shows that EUR/USD is highly correlated with the Chinese credit/fiscal impulse. Chart 10The Euro Is A Cyclical Currency Chart 11EUR/USD Is Highly Correlated With The Chinese Credit & Fiscal Impulse All this suggests that the prevailing view on European growth is too pessimistic. Even if Europe does succumb to a technical recession in the months ahead, it is likely to experience a V-shaped recovery. That will provide a nice tailwind for the euro. Loose Fiscal/Tight Monetary Policies: The Winning Combo for Currencies Chart 12Fiscal Policy Has Eased Structurally In The Euro Area More Than In Other Advanced Economies A tight monetary and loose fiscal policy has historically been the most bullish combination for currencies. Recall that the US dollar soared in the early 1980s on the back of Paul Volcker’s restrictive monetary policy and Ronald Reagan’s expansionary fiscal policy, the latter consisting of huge tax cuts and increased military spending. While not nearly on the same scale, the euro area’s current configuration of loose fiscal/tight monetary policies bears some resemblance to the US in the early 1980s. Even before the war in Ukraine began, the IMF was forecasting a much bigger swing towards expansionary fiscal policy in the euro area than in the rest of the world (Chart 12). The war has only intensified this trend, triggering a flurry of spending on energy and defense – spending that is likely to persist for most of this decade. The ECB’s Reaction Function After biding its time, the ECB has joined the growing list of central banks that are hiking rates. On September 8th, the ECB jacked up the deposit rate by 75 bps. Investors expect a further 185 bps in hikes through to September 2023. While US rate expectations have widened relative to euro area expectations since the August US CPI report (more on that later), the gap is still narrower than it was on August 15th. Back then, investors expected euro area 3-month rates to be 233 bps below comparable US rates in June 2023. Today, they expect the gap to be only 177 bps (Chart 13). Real long-term bond spreads, which conceptually at least should be the more important driver of currency movements, have also moved in the euro’s favor. In the past, ECB rate hikes were swiftly followed by cuts as the region was unable to tolerate even moderately higher rates. While this very well could happen again, the odds are lower than they once were, at least over the next 12 months. Chart 13Interest Rate Differentials Have Moved In Favor Of The Euro Since Mid-August Chart 14Euro Area: Inflation Expectations Have Risen Briskly For one thing, median inflation expectations three years ahead in the ECB’s monthly survey have risen briskly (Chart 14). The Bundesbank’s own survey paints an even more alarming picture, with median expected inflation over the next five years having risen to 5% from 3% in mid-2021 (Chart 15). Expected German inflation over the next ten years stands at a still-elevated 4%. Whether this reflects Germans’ heightened historical sensitivity to inflation risks is unclear, but it is something the ECB cannot ignore. Structurally looser fiscal policy has raised the neutral rate of interest in the euro area, giving the ECB more leeway to lift rates. A narrowing in competitiveness gaps across the currency bloc has also mitigated the need for the ECB to set rates based on the needs of the weakest economies in the region. Chart 16 shows that collectively, unit labor costs among the countries most afflicted by the sovereign debt crisis a decade ago have completely converged with Germany. Chart 15German Inflation Expectations Are Elevated Chart 16Europe's Periphery Has Closed The Competitiveness Gap With Germany While Italy is still a laggard in the competitiveness rankings, the ECB’s new Transmission Protection Instrument (TPI) – which allows the central bank to buy sovereign debt with less stringent conditionality than under the Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) program – should keep a lid on sovereign spreads. This, in turn, will allow the ECB to raise rates more than it otherwise could. Hawkish Fed is the Biggest Risk to Our Bullish EUR/USD View Chart 17Supplier Delivery Times Have Fallen Sharply Tuesday’s hotter-than-expected August US CPI report pulled the rug from under the euro’s incipient rally, pushing EUR/USD back to parity. We have been flagging the risks of high inflation for several years (see, for example, our February 19, 2021 report, 1970s-Style Inflation: Yes, It Could Happen Again). Our thesis is that inflation will follow a “two steps up, one step down” pattern. We are probably near the top of those two steps now, with the next leg for inflation likely to be to the downside, driven by ebbing pandemic-related supply side-dislocations. Perhaps most notably, supplier delivery times have fallen sharply in recent months (Chart 17). These pandemic-related dislocations extend to the housing rental market. Rent inflation dropped after rent moratoriums were put in place, only to rebound forcefully once the moratoriums were lifted and the labor market tightened. Although official measures of rent inflation will remain elevated for some time, owing to lags in how they are constructed, timelier data on new rental units coming to market already point to a sharp decline in rent inflation (Chart 18). This is something that the Fed is sure to notice. Ironically, falling inflation could sow the seeds of its own demise. Nominal wage growth is currently very elevated, yet because of high inflation, real wages are still shrinking. As inflation comes down, real wage growth will turn positive. This will lift consumer sentiment, helping to buoy consumption (Chart 19). A pickup in consumer spending will cause the economy to overheat again, leading to a second wave of inflation in the back half of 2023. Chart 18Timelier Measures Of Rent Inflation Have Rolled Over Chart 19Falling Inflation Will Boost Real Wages And Consumer Confidence As we discussed in our August 18th Special Report Dispatches From The Future: From Goldilocks To President DeSantis, the Fed will respond to this second inflationary wave by hiking the Fed funds rate to 5%. This will temporarily push up the value of the dollar, a process that will only stop once the US falls into recession in 2024 and the Fed is forced to cut rates again. Our projected rollercoaster ride for EUR/USD is depicted in Chart 20. We see the euro rising to $1.06 by year-end, peaking at $1.11 in the spring of 2023, falling back to $1.05 by late 2023, and then beginning a prolonged rally in 2024. Chart 20GIS Projection For The EUR/USD Chart 21The Dollar Is Very Overvalued Against The Euro Based On PPP Chart 21 shows that the dollar is 30% overvalued against the euro based on its Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) exchange rate. Thus, there is significant long-term upside to EUR/USD. Implications for Other Currencies and Regional Equity Allocation Chart 22Stock Markets Outside The US Tend To Fare Best When The Dollar Is Weakening The strengthening in the euro that we envision over the next six months or so will be part of a broad-based dollar decline. While BCA’s Foreign Exchange Strategy service sees more upside for the euro than the pound, GBP/USD will likely follow the same trajectory as EUR/USD. The yen is one of the cheapest currencies in the world and should finally gain some traction. If China abandons its zero-Covid policy and increases fiscal support for its economy, the RMB and other EM currencies should strengthen. Stock markets outside the US tend to fare best when the dollar is weakening. This includes Europe. As Chart 22 illustrates, there is a close correlation between EUR/USD and the relative performance of European versus US stocks. Thus, an above-benchmark exposure to international markets is appropriate during the coming months. Peter Berezin Chief Global Strategist peterb@bcaresearch.com Follow me on LinkedIn & Twitter Global Investment Strategy View Matrix Special Trade Recommendations Current MacroQuant Model Scores