Market Returns
Highlights The biggest demand-side risk to base metals this year remains a larger-than-expected China economic slowdown. A managed slowdown appears to be under way, with Beijing giving every appearance of balancing macro-prudential policies in a way that does not severely derail the economy. It goes without saying a loss of control over this process could produce a hard landing in China, with more severe consequences for the economy in general, and base metals in particular. Energy: Overweight. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and Russia appear to be negotiating a 10- to 20-year deal that would institutionalize OPEC 2.0 as a production-management coalition. This has global significance, which we will be exploring in future research.1 Base Metals: Neutral. Fears of a trade war between the U.S. and China following the announcement of up to $60 billion in tariffs - meant to redress alleged theft of U.S. intellectual property - sent copper prices below $3/lb last week. There are tentative signals this threat is receding; if confirmed, base metals, particularly copper, would rally. Precious Metals: Neutral. Gold prices rallied more than $50/oz over the past week, following the announcement of U.S. tariffs directed at China, only to fall ~ $25/oz by mid-week as trade tensions lessened. We remain long the metal as a portfolio hedge against such risks. Ags/Softs: Underweight. Chinese officials threatened to levy countervailing tariffs against imports of U.S. ags, steel pipes, and scrap aluminum in response to the $60 billion tariff package announced by the U.S. last week. Treasury Secretary Mnuchin attempted to calm rising tensions, with assurances the U.S. and China would reach an agreement that avoids the imposition of tariffs. Feature Once-hot metals markets are at risk of cooling (Chart of the Week). Despite the weak U.S. dollar and relatively strong - albeit more risky - global economic environment, investors have been hesitant to take large bullish positions in metals, largely because of fears of a slowdown in China. This fear is not unfounded, and this week we assess how likely such a slowdown is, and the consequences for metals markets. China accounts for ~ 50% of demand for most metals we cover (Chart 2). Construction, infrastructure, automotive, and manufacturing sectors have an outsized role as end users of metals, and their performance will be especially significant to the demand outlook going forward (Chart 3). Chart of the WeekMetals Markets At Risk Of Cooling Chart 2Don't Overlook China Chart 3Keep An Eye On Key Sectors China Intentionally Out Of Sync With Global Business Cycle? Chart 4China's Cycle Peaked Last Year Analysts generally believe commodities tend to outperform late in the business cycle as economies start to overheat and central banks move to restrain inflation. We believe these dynamics will pan out differently this time around. China's current business cycle likely peaked last year (Chart 4), and entered a moderation phase. As the single largest consumer of metals on the planet, it would be extremely important for global base metals markets if China's business cycle is out of sync with the rest of the world, which, based on the IMF's latest assessment, remains in a robust growth phase. This alone could justify a less bullish stance on metals this year, and could mute the late-cycle phase returns we would typically expect. Nevertheless, the synchronized global upturn being tracked by ourselves and the IMF is the first such upswing since the Global Financial Crisis (GFC).2 In a note exploring China's significance in global commodity markets, researchers at the IMF found that surprises in China's Industrial Production (IP) announcements - measured as the scaled deviation of actual year-on-year (y/y) IP growth from the median Bloomberg consensus estimate just before the announcement - have an important effect on metal prices.3 Given China's outsized role in global commodity markets, this result is intuitive. Another relevant finding from their research is that the impact of Chinese IP surprise is larger when global risk is elevated - measured by the VIX. This is especially significant in the case of negative surprises.4 These findings are all the more relevant now, given the higher likelihood of negative surprises from China as it sets in motion a managed slowdown on a scale never before seen. Provided the synchronized nature of global growth remains intact, we expect global demand ex-China will partially mitigate the negative impact of domestic policies in China aimed at slowing the economy. Nonetheless, we do expect volatility to be higher this year. The Backdrop Chart 5Secondary Industry Output Past Its Peak Both China's official manufacturing PMI and the Li Keqiang Index peaked in 2017 and have since weakened significantly, raising fears of softening demand fundamentals for metals this year. Even though growth in the services sector remains robust, it is not as relevant to metal demand as manufacturing and infrastructure (Chart 5). Nevertheless, it could help support metals demand indirectly as growth in the services sector - i.e., the so-called tertiary industries, which now account for more than half of Chinese GDP - could spur demand for physical goods, and in turn re-energize the manufacturing cycle. This will depend crucially on maintaining income growth to spur demand for consumer durables and discretionary purchases (e.g., automobiles requiring gasoline). Similarly, China's GDP came in above target last year, coinciding with a recovery in secondary industries - i.e., construction and manufacturing, which are big metals consumers. However, secondary industry output appears to have peaked, which we believe is further evidence a benign moderation is already underway in China. This is compounded by the ongoing transition in China's economic structure - a services-led Chinese economy is not as supportive for metals demand as a manufacturing one. At present, out of the indicators of the general health of China's economy we track, the sole beacon of hope comes from the Caixin manufacturing PMI, which currently stands above its 12-month moving average level. Given the slew of other series pointing to a benign slowdown, we are inclined to push this PMI strength aside as an exception rather than the rule. Oh, Don't Forget A Possible Trade War Our analysis of metals markets is made difficult by the possibility of a trade war between the U.S. and China. The Trump Administration already has pledged to impose tariffs of up to $60 billion on Chinese imports over alleged intellectual-property theft. The net effect of these tariffs would be a reduction in demand for Chinese products - propagating a slowdown in the manufacturing sector. Despite these grim data readings, we expect Chinese policy makers to continue holding the reins in this policy-induced slowdown. We expected a deceleration going into the year, which now is evident in the data, but a severe and unruly unwinding is not our base case scenario. Macro-Prudential Measures Driving Up Interest Rates Chart 6Market Rates Are Trending Higher The Peoples Bank of China's (PBOC) 1-week interbank repo rate has been the official policy rate since 2015. However, it does not reflect the reality of rising interest rates in China. Instead, BCA Research's China Investment Strategists point to the 3-month rate as the de facto indicator of the monetary policy environment in China.5 While the former is up ~50 bps since late 2016, the latter has increased by about 200 bps during the same period. The wide rate spread reflects Beijing's renewed regulatory efforts to crack down on shadow banking (Chart 6). Our China Strategists note that the main trigger for a China slowdown likely would be monetary-policy tightening. However, the uptrend in market interest rates has been driven by regulatory decisions - the implementation of macro-prudential policies - rather than direct monetary policy tightening. In their scenario-based analysis, BCA's China specialists conclude that since China's economy is already cooling, increases in the benchmark lending rate - the 1-week interbank repo rate - are not needed. If anything, such increases would pressure the average lending rates into tight-monetary-policy territory. Although a hawkish PBOC - absent a meaningful improvement in economic outlook - is on our analysts' list of risks to monitor this year, they do not expect aggressive policy tightening in China, as they do not foresee an inflationary breakout. The Impact The exceptional performance of metals last year was in part driven by infrastructure spending and a rebound in real estate investment in China. Since then, Beijing has also tightened the leash on the property sector. Additionally, a deceleration in infrastructure investment is now evident. This is unsurprising given that two of the three "critical battles" highlighted by Xi Jinping threaten the housing and infrastructure sectors. Furthermore, automobile production and sales do not suggest a reason for optimism. President Xi Jinping has been experimenting with various measures to rein in housing speculation including restrictions on home purchases, encouraging an affordable rental market, and the introduction of "joint-ownership" housing.6 In addition, a "long term property mechanism" as well as a national property tax are in the works. The objective is to discourage speculative home building and property speculation generally, while ensuring sufficient supply in the market to help alleviate shortages, thus curbing exorbitant price increases. The impact of these policies - in the form of a cooling housing market - is evident in home prices in Tier 1 cities. After having decelerated meaningfully at the end of last year, they recorded y/y declines in the first two months of this year (Chart 7). While not as pronounced, home prices in Tier 2 and 3 markets have also slowed considerably compared to 1H17. However, BCA Research's China investment strategists point out that although prices of homes in Tier 1 cities generally lead Tier 2 and 3 markets, this overlooks other significant indicators of the health of China's real estate sector.7 Our China specialists argue that residential floor space sold should be used as the leading gauge of the property market. They find that floor space sold leads Tier 1 prices which guides floor space started and land area purchased. While the latter two are relatively weak, the recent upturn in floor space sold may point toward a more positive future for the Chinese housing sector. A rebound in the House Price Diffusion Index as well as a falling floor-space-available-for-sale versus sales ratio makes them a little less pessimistic about the market's future, suggesting a potential pickup in construction if floor space started does in fact take its cue from the pickup in floor space sold. Nevertheless, it remains too early to get a clear reading on the future of China's real estate sector at this point. On a positive note, the percentage of Chinese households planning to buy a house in the next three months remains high (Chart 8). Further, while the percentage of total new bank loans that are housing mortgages and loans to real estate developers came down slightly last year, they have rebounded, and now make up roughly half of total new bank loans. However, new mortgage loans as a percent of home sales have decelerated sharply. Chart 7Pick Up In Floor Space Sold:##BR##A Positive Sign? Chart 8Large Number Of Households##BR##Plan To Purchase Homes While the slowdown in real estate may not turn out to be as severe as some of the data suggests, Beijing's government spending is decelerating (Chart 9). While spending in transportation infrastructure has decelerated from double-digit figures recorded earlier last year, spending on utilities has come down considerably. In line with other sectors, automobile production slowed considerably in China last year (Chart 10). It has been decelerating on a monthly basis since December, and most recent February data shows large y/y declines. Going forward, we expect the phasing out of tax breaks for small vehicles in China to continue slowing demand growth for cars there. Chart 9Government Spending##BR##Decelerated Significantly Chart 10Auto Production And Sales##BR##Not Lending Support Bottom Line: A tighter regulatory and credit backdrop is evident in recent readings on China's real estate, infrastructure, and automobile sectors. Given the importance of these industries as end users of metals, the above heralds a more tepid view of China's demand for metals going forward, as we continue to expect moderation in China's economy. Nevertheless, the global market will remain supported by strength elsewhere. On the supply side, disruptions remain an upside risk this year. Stay neutral for now. Roukaya Ibrahim, Associate Editor Commodity & Energy Strategy RoukayaI@bcaresearch.com 1 OPEC 2.0 is the producer coalition lead by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and Russia, which, at the end of 2016, agreed to remove 1.8mm b/d of production from the market. The coalition has been remarkably successful in maintaining production discipline, which, together with strong global demand growth, has put OECD oil inventories on a steep decline path. Please see "Oil Price Forecast Steady, But Risks Expand" in last week's Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report for our latest assessment of global supply and demand and our price forecaset. It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see "Brighter Prospects, Optimistic Markets, Challenges Ahead," in the IMF's January 2018 World Economic Outlook Update. 3 Please see IMF Spillover Notes "China's Footprint in Global Commodity Markets," dated September 2016. 4 The IMF also found U.S. IP surprises have a similar impact on commodity markets, despite its smaller share of global imports. The Fund puts this down to the fact that the U.S. is an indicator for global growth. 5 Please see China Investment Strategy Special Report titled "Seven Questions About Chinese Monetary Policy," dated February 22, 2018, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. 6 Please see "What's Next In China's Bid To Cool Housing Market: QuickTake," available at bloomberg.com, dated March 4, 2018. 7 Please see China Investment Strategy's Weekly Report titled "Is China's Housing Market Stabilizing?," dated February 8, 2018, available at cis.bcaresearch.com. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed in 2018 Summary of Trades Closed in 2017
Highlights Portfolio Strategy The reward/risk profile of air freight & logistics is extremely attractive. Synchronized global growth, the capex upcycle, a falling dollar and secular advance in e-commerce compel us to add this unloved transportation sub-index to our high-conviction overweight list. Prepare to lock in gains in managed health care. The positive demand and pricing backdrops are already reflected in perky valuations. While homebuilders still have to contend with rising lumber prices and interest rates and the partial elimination of mortgage interest deductibility, the near 20% peak-to-trough drawdown suggests that all of the bad news is baked in relative share prices, warranting an upgrade alert. Recent Changes Add the S&P air freight & logistics index to the high-conviction overweight list. Put the S&P managed care index on downgrade alert. Set an upgrade alert on the S&P homebuilding index. Table 1 Feature Equities lost ground last week and flirted with the bottom part of the trading range established during the past two months, but held the 200-day moving average. Our view remains that the SPX is digesting the early-February swoon, and the buy-the-dip strategy is still appropriate for capital with a cyclical (9-12 month) time horizon as the probability of a recession this year is close to nil. Nevertheless, the recent doubling in the TED spread and simultaneous spike in financials investment grade bond spreads is slightly unnerving (second panel, Chart 1). Junk spreads also widened as investors sought the safety of the risk-free asset. What is behind this fear flare up propagating in risk sensitive assets? First, the Fed continued its tightening cycle last week, raising the fed funds rate another 25bps. As we have been writing in recent research Weekly Reports, rising interest rates go hand-in-hand with increasing volatility (please see Chart 1 from the March 5th Special Report on banks). Thus, as the Fed tightens monetary policy and continues to unwind its balance sheet, the return of volatility will become a key market theme (bottom panel, Chart 1). The implication is that a bumpier ride looms for equities, and the smooth and nearly uninterrupted rise that market participants have been conditioned to expect is now a thing of the past. With regard to the composition of equity returns in the coming year, rising interest rates and volatility signal that the forward P/E multiple has likely crested for the cycle, leaving profits to do all the heavy lifting (Chart 2). Second, rising policy uncertainty (trade and Administration personnel related, please see Chart 1 from last week's publication) is muddying the short-term equity market outlook at the current juncture, and fueling the risk-off phase. However, synchronized global growth, a muted U.S. dollar and easy fiscal policy are a boon to EPS and signal that profit growth will reclaim the driver's seat in coming weeks. Stocks and EPS are joined at the hip and there are good odds that equities will vault to fresh all-time highs on the back of earnings validation as the year unfolds (Chart 3). Chart 1Closely Monitor These Spreads Chart 2EPS Doing The Heavy Lifting Chart 3Profits And Cash Flow Underpin Stocks Importantly, comparing net profit growth to cash flow growth rates is instructive, as SPX EBITDA is not affected by the new tax law. While EPS are slated to grow close to 20% in calendar 2018, the respective forward SPX EBITDA growth rate (based on IBES data) sports a more muted 10% per annum rate (second panel, Chart 4). Similarly, sell side analysts pencil in a visible jump in forward net profit margins, whereas the forward EBITDA margin estimate is stable (middle panel, Chart 4). The recent tax-related benefit is a one-time dividend to profits that will not repeat in 2019. Thus, the market will likely look through this one time effect and start to focus on the calendar 2019 EPS growth number that is a more reasonable 10%, and also similar to next year's EBITDA growth rate. Our sense is that this transition will also be prone to turbulence. Our EPS growth model corroborates this profit euphoria and is topping out near the 20% growth rate (Chart 5). While it will most likely decelerate in the back half of the year, as long as there is no relapse near the contraction zone à la late-2015/early 2016, the equity bull market will remain intact. Chart 4Investors Will See Through The Tax Cut Chart 5EPS Model Flashing Green As we showcased in the early February Weekly Report, four key macro variables are behaving as they have in four prior 20% EPS growth phases since the 1980s excluding the post-recession recoveries (please see the Appendix of the February 5th "Acrophobia" Weekly Report). Therefore, if history at least rhymes, the equity overshoot phase will resume. This week we add a neglected transportation group to the high-conviction overweight list, put a defensive index on the downgrade watch list and set an upgrade alert on a niche early cyclical group. Air Freight & Logistics: Prepare For Takeoff Last week we reiterated our overweight stance in the broad transportation space and today we are compelled to add the undervalued and unloved S&P air freight & logistics index to the high-conviction overweight list. Air freight services are levered to global growth. Currently, synchronized global growth remains the dominant macro theme. Firming export expectations suggest that global trade volumes will get a bump in the coming months (second panel, Chart 6). Importantly, U.S. manufacturers are also excited about exports; the latest ISM manufacturing export subcomponent hit a three decade high. While the specter of a global trade spat is disconcerting, our sense is that a generalized trade war will most likely be averted or, if the current executive Administration is to be believed, short-lived. The upshot is that air freight & logistics sales momentum will gain steam in the coming months (second panel, Chart 7). Chart 6Heed The Signals From Global Growth,##br## Capex And The Greenback Chart 7Domestic Demand##br## Is Also Firm Beyond euphoric survey data readings, hard economic data also corroborate the soft data message. G3 (U.S., the Eurozone and Japan) capital goods orders are firing on all cylinders and probing multi-year highs, underscoring that rising animal spirits are translating into real economic activity (third panel, Chart 6). Chart 8Mistakenly Unloved And Undervalued Tack on the near uninterrupted depreciation of the trade-weighted U.S. dollar and factors are falling into place for a relative EPS overshoot, given the large foreign sales component of this key transportation sub-group (bottom panel, Chart 6). Not only are air freight stocks' fortunes tied to the state of global trade, but this industry is also sensitive to capital outlays. A synchronized global capex cycle is one of the key themes we are exploring in 2018. The third panel of Chart 7 shows that our capex indicator points to a reacceleration in the corporate sales-to-inventories ratio. This virtuous capital spending upcycle, that would get a further lift were an infrastructure bill to be signed into law, is a boon to air cargo services. In addition, as the secular advance in e-commerce continues to make inroads in the bricks-and-mortar share of total retail dollars spent, demand for delivery services will continue to grow smartly, underpinning industry selling prices (bottom panel, Chart 7). As a result, we would look through recent softness in industry pricing power that has weighed on relative performance. Indeed, transportation & warehousing hours worked have recently spiked, corroborating the message from global revenue ton miles (not shown), rekindling industry net earnings revisions (second panel, Chart 8). Importantly, relative valuations are discounting a significantly negative profit backdrop, with the relative price/sales ratio at its lowest level since 2002 (third panel, Chart 8). Similarly, the index is trading at a 10% discount to the broad market's forward P/E multiple or the lowest level since the turn of the century (not shown). Finally, technical conditions are washed out offering a compelling entry point for fresh capital (bottom panel, Chart 8). The implication is that the group is well positioned to positively surprise. Bottom Line: The S&P air freight & logistics index has a very attractive reward/risk profile and if we were not already overweight, we would take advantage of recent underperformance to go overweight now. Therefore, we are adding it to our high-conviction overweight list. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5AIRF - UPS, FDX, CHRW, EXPD. Downgrade Alert: Managed Health Care Managed health care stocks have been stellar outperformers not only versus the overall market, but also compared with the broad S&P health care sector. Since the April 2016 inception of our overweight recommendation, they have added considerable alpha to our portfolio to the tune of 21 percentage points above and beyond the SPX's rise (Chart 9). While most of the factors underpinning our sanguine view for health insurers remain intact, from a risk management perspective we are compelled to put them on downgrade alert. Most of the good news is likely baked into relative prices and valuations (bottom panel, Chart 9). In the coming weeks, we will be on the lookout for an opportunity to pull the trigger and crystalize gains and downgrade to a benchmark allocation, especially if defensive equities catch a bid on the back of the current mini risk off phase. Namely, recent inter-industry M&A euphoria is a key catalyst to lighten up on this health care services sub-sector (Chart 10). While regulators have disallowed intra-industry consolidation over the past few years, the M&A premia remained and now the proposed CVS/AET and CI/EXPR deals could be a harbinger of petering out relative valuations and share prices. Chart 9Prepare To Book Gains Chart 10M&A Frenzy True, melting health care inflation is likely a secular theme that is in the processes of reversing three decades worth of health care industry, in general and pharma in particular, pricing power gains. While this is a dire backdrop for drug manufacturers - which remains a high-conviction underweight - it is a clear benefit to HMOs (Chart 11). Health insurance labor costs are also well contained: the employment cost index for this industry is probing multi-year lows (bottom panel, Chart 12). The upshot is that profit margins are on a solid footing. Chart 11Operating Metrics Suggest... Chart 12...To Stay Overweight A While Longer Meanwhile, the overall U.S. labor market is on fire. Last month NFPs registered a month-over-month increase of 300K for the first time in four years and unemployment insurance claims are perched near five decade lows. This represents an enticing demand backdrop for managed health care companies, especially when the economy is at full employment and the government is easing fiscal policy (bottom panel, Chart 11). Despite the still appealing demand and pricing backdrop, the flurry of M&A deals will likely serve as a catalyst to lock in gains and move to a benchmark allocation in the coming weeks as this health care sub-index is priced for perfection. Bottom Line: Stay overweight the S&P managed health care index, but it is now on downgrade alert. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5MANH - UNH, AET, ANTM, CI, HUM, CNC. Upgrade Alert: Homebuilders Showing Resiliency In late-November 2017 when we launched our 2018 high-conviction call list, we downgraded the niche S&P homebuilding index to underweight (Chart 13). Our thesis was that the trifecta of rising lumber prices, mortgage interest deductibility blues and rising interest rate backdrop, a key 2018 BCA theme, would weigh on profit margins and, thus, profits would underwhelm. Since then we have monetized gains of 10% versus the SPX and removed this early-cyclical index from the high-conviction underweight list.1 Today we are putting it on upgrade alert. As a reminder, this was not a call based on a souring residential housing view. In fact, we remain housing bulls and expect more gains for the still recovering residential housing market that moves in steady prolonged multi-year cycles (Chart 14). Keep in mind that housing starts are still running below household formation and the job market is heating up. The implication is that the U.S. housing market rests on solid foundations. Chart 13Bounced Off Support Line Chart 14Housing Fundamentals Are Upbeat While interest rates and rising house prices are denting affordability (second and fourth panels, Chart 15), homebuilders share prices have been resilient recently and have smartly bounced off their upward sloping support trend line (Chart 13). Indeed, interest rates may continue to rise from current levels, but as we have highlighted in recent research, there is a self-limiting aspect to the year-over-year rise in the 10-year yield near the 100bps mark. Put differently, any rise above 3.05% on the 10-year Treasury yield in a short time frame would likely prove restrictive for the U.S. economy.2 Encouragingly, the mortgage application purchase index has well absorbed the selloff in the bond market, unlike its sibling mortgage application refinance index, signaling that there is pent up housing demand (second panel, Chart 16). New home sales are expanding anew as price concessions have likely been sufficient to compete with existing homes for sale (top panel, Chart 16). Chart 15Get Ready To Upgrade... Chart 16...Given Receding Profit Margin Risks On the lumber front, prices have gone parabolic year-to-date courtesy of trade war talk and a softening U.S. dollar. However, lumber inflation cannot continue at a 50%/annum pace indefinitely (third panel, Chart 16). While higher lumber prices are a de facto negative for homebuilding profit margins, we deem they are now well reflected in compelling relative valuations (bottom panel, Chart 15). In addition, if we are correct in assessing that housing demand remains upbeat, this will give some breathing room to homebuilders to partly pass on some of this input cost inflation to the consumer. Bottom Line: The S&P homebuilding index remains an underweight, but it is now on our upgrade watch list. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5HOME-DHI, LEN, PHM. Anastasios Avgeriou, Vice President U.S. Equity Strategy anastasios@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Insight Report, "Housekeeping In Turbulent Times," dated February 9, 2018, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Weekly Report, "Reflective Or Restrictive?" dated March 12, 2018, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. Current Recommendations Current Trades Size And Style Views Favor value over growth. Stay neutral small over large caps (downgrade alert).
Highlights Our supply-demand balances indicate oil fundamentals are softening slightly. All else equal, this might prompt us to lower our average-price forecasts for Brent and WTI from $74 and $70/bbl this year by $2 to $3/bbl. However, this is oil: All else equal seldom applies. An unusual confluence of risk factors has raised the likelihood of sharp price moves - down and up - this year. These range from the threat of trade wars (bearish for demand), to renewed U.S.-led sanctions against Iran and deeper sanctions against Venezuela (bullish, as they could remove as much as 1.4mm b/d of supply). The possible extended delay of the Aramco IPO compounds the uncertainty. Brent and WTI implied volatilities - the principal gauge of price risk in trading markets - had a brief spike earlier this month, but subsequently retreated (Chart of the Week). We believe the lower volatility offers an opportunity to get long a put spread in Dec/18 Brent options, to complement an existing long call spread in these options. Energy: Overweight. We are taking profit on our long Jul/18 vs. short Dec/18 WTI calendar spread to re-position for the higher volatility. As of Tuesday's close, this spread was up 90.4% since inception November 2, 2017. Base Metals: Neutral. Metal Bulletin reported the flow of zinc into China from Spain has turned into a flood, which is depressing physical premiums and causing unintended inventory accumulation. Almost 161k MT of Spanish zinc was shipped to China last year, a 15-fold increase in annual volumes. The bulk of the increase occurring during the August-to-December period. Spain accounted for a quarter of the ~ 67k MT of zinc imported by China in January. Precious Metals: Neutral. Going into Jerome Powell's first meeting as Fed Chair, gold held recent support ~ $1,310/oz. We remain long gold as a portfolio hedge. Ags/Softs: Underweight. U.S. Ag Secretary Sonny Perdue warned farmers a tit-for-tat trade war could hit their markets particularly hard earlier this week, according to Reuters. Cotton could be especially hard hit (please see p. 9 for details).1 Feature Fundamentally, our global supply-demand balances indicate the global oil market will remain in a physical deficit this year, even though they do suggest a slight softening. As such, we are leaving our Brent and WTI forecasts for this year at $74 and $70/bbl (Chart 2). For next year, we also are leaving our average-price Brent and WTI expectations at $67 and $64/bbl, respectively, with the caveat that these are highly conditional on OPEC 2.0's expected forward guidance later this year.2 Chart of the WeekCrude Oil Volatility Lower,##BR##Even As Price Risks Mount Chart 2BCA's Oil Price Forecast##BR##Remains Unchanged Nonetheless, it is difficult to remain sanguine regarding the oil-price outlook. A remarkable confluence of geopolitical events has introduced higher risk to the downside and the upside for oil prices this year and next. On the downside, trade-war rhetoric continues to ramp up, as the Trump administration threatens sanctions against China for alleged theft of U.S. intellectual property, and slow-walks NAFTA negotiations with Mexico and Canada. Either or both of these could be the spark that lights a global trade war. Re the latter, U.S. Agriculture Secretary Sonny Perdue is warning U.S. farmers their markets could get caught up in a tit-for-tat trade war.3 Upside oil-price risk arises from increasingly bellicose signaling by the Trump administration re the Iran nuclear sanctions deal, and hints the U.S. could impose sanctions directly on Venezuela's oil industry, which would augment sanctions against individuals already in place. Rex Tillerson's expected replacement at the U.S. State Department, Mike Pompeo, shares President Trump's hostility to the 2015 deal that lifted trade sanctions on Iran, which allowed it to increase its production and boost exports. If the May 12 deadline for issuing waivers on the Iran sanctions passes, trade penalties again will be in force against Iran, which likely will, once again, reduce its production and exports, if U.S. allies fall in line with Washington. The odds of this are now higher with Rex Tillerson no longer at the helm at the U.S. State Department. Lastly, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman Al Saud, who, as Minister of Defense, is leading KSA's proxy wars against Iran throughout the Middle East, is in Washington cementing relations with President Trump. Trump has indicated his administration is abandoning his predecessor's pivot away from the Middle East and re-engaging at a deeper level with KSA. The Crown Prince also indicated he will be discussing the Iran sanctions with President Trump in meetings this week.4 Fundamentals Remain Supportive ... For Now Chart 3Supply-Demand Fundamentals##BR##Remain Supportive The slight softening detected in our supply-demand balances model is largely coming from the supply side (Chart 3). Most of this is due to surging U.S. crude and liquids production. The EIA's higher-than-expected U.S. crude oil production estimates for 4Q17 provides a higher base on which continued production gains can build this year. Our colleague Matt Conlan notes in this week's Energy Sector Strategy that, over the past three months, the EIA increased its U.S. onshore oil production estimates for 4Q17 by 310k b/d.5 Although we faded this estimate earlier this year, Matt's analysis of E&P balance sheet data for the quarter confirms this surge in production. U.S. production growth dominates global growth this year - up almost 1.3mm b/d on average y/y, led by a 1.2mm b/d y/y gain in shale-oil output. For next year, we have U.S. output up just over 1mm b/d, almost all of which is accounted for by increased shale production. Total U.S. crude production goes to 10.6mm b/d this year, and 11.9mm b/d next year. In 1Q18, the U.S. will displace KSA as the second-largest crude producer in the world. U.S. crude oil production will exceed Russia's expected crude and liquids production of 11.35mm b/d next year by 2Q19 (Table 1). Total U.S. crude and liquids production (including NGLs, biofuels, and refinery gain) goes to 17.4mm b/d this year, and 19.1mm b/d next year. Strong demand continues to absorb rising production this year and next. By our reckoning, global oil demand grows 1.7mm b/d this year, and 1.64mm b/d next year, up slightly from our earlier estimate of 1.57mm b/d. Global demand averages 100.3mm b/d this year, and just shy of 102mm b/d next year. These fundamentals continue to support our judgement that OPEC 2.0's primary goal - draining OECD inventories below their current five-year average - will be met this year (Chart 4). Table 1BCA Global Oil Supply - Demand Balances (mm b/d) Chart 4Expect OECD Inventories To Draw A Bit Slower Expect OPEC 2.0 To Endure Next year is a different story. Not because markets fundamentally change. But because we fully expect to be substantially revising our production estimates as OPEC 2.0 evolves into a more durable, longer-lasting structure. Chart 5Backwardation Weakens Under##BR##Provisional 2019 Estimates We expect OPEC 2.0 to provide forward guidance regarding its production-management goals for 2019 and beyond, once all of the particulars in formalizing its structure are agreed later this year. As a result, we fully expect to be revising our price forecasts and OECD inventory expectations in line with more definitive OPEC 2.0 production guidance throughout this year. As things stand now, we assume volumes voluntarily removed from production - some 1.1 to 1.2mm b/d by our reckoning - will slowly be returned to the market over 1H19. By 2H19, those states within OPEC 2.0 that actually cut production - mostly KSA and Russia - are assumed to be back at pre-2017 production levels. More than likely, the coalition will maintain its production cuts at a lower level so that OECD inventories do not grow excessively and place the OPEC and non-OPEC member states of the coalition in the same dire straits that led to the formation of OPEC 2.0. This will arrest the descent in prices generated by our fundamental models toward the end of 2019 (Chart 2). In addition, the renewed OECD inventory build our model generates (Chart 4) also will be arrested. This will keep markets backwardated in 2019, as opposed to moving toward contango as production growth exceeds consumption growth, restraining the erosion in the backwardation in the forward Brent and WTI curves (Chart 5). Tail Risks Rising In Oil Markets An unusual confluence of risk factors has raised the likelihood of sharp price moves to the downside and to the upside this year. These range from the threat of growth-killing trade wars, to renewed U.S.-led sanctions against Iran and deeper sanctions directed at Venezuela's oil sector. A full-blown global trade war would be bearish for prices, as it would depress growth globally, particularly in EM economies, which are the primary drivers of oil demand. At the other end of the price distribution, reimposing sanctions on Iran and targeting Venezuela's oil industry with sanctions could remove up to 1.4mm b/d of supply from markets later this year, by some estimates.6 A former Obama administration official familiar with the Iran sanctions estimates as much as 500k b/d of exports could be lost if sanctions are reimposed. Venezuela's crude oil output has been collapsing and currently is less than 1.6mm b/d. Oil-directed sanctions from the U.S. could force the Venezuelan oil industry to collapse. Added to this volatile mix, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman Al Saud, also known as MBS, called on President Trump this week in Washington. MBS is leading KSA's proxy wars against Iran, and remains at the forefront of efforts to deny them political and military advantage in the Gulf and the Middle East. MBS and President Trump are on the same page in their opposition to the Iran sanctions deal, as is the presumptive U.S. Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo, who, as Reuters notes, "fiercely opposed the Iranian nuclear deal as a member of Congress."7 Lastly, reports of a possible extended delay of the Aramco IPO creates additional uncertainty re our analysis. It is entirely possible KSA thus far has failed to get indicative bids for the 5% of the firm they intend to float anywhere near its $100 billion target. A target bid would value Saudi Aramco at ~ $2 trillion. Given that we view the IPO as the principal driver of KSA's oil policy over the next two years, this raises questions as to whether the Kingdom will remain committed to higher prices over the short term - $60 to $70/bbl is the range we assume - or whether it will lower its sights to a range we believe Russia favors ($50 to $60/bbl). We continue to expect KSA to favor higher prices over the short term, as it works to reduce its fiscal breakeven oil price from ~ $70/bbl to $60/bbl. A higher price range also will help the Kingdom raise debt under more favorable terms, should it decide to wait on the IPO and finance the early stages of its diversification away from oil-export revenues. Either way, we would expect the Kingdom to favor higher prices. It also is possible a lack of bids approaching KSA's Aramco target level will make a private placement more attractive. A consortium led by China's sovereign wealth fund is believed to have shown a bid for the entire 5% placement. The quid pro quo is believed to have been KSA accepting payment for its oil in yuan. This could have profound implications for the market, as we noted in a Special Report exploring the Kingdom's anti-corruption campaign. This alternative also would tend to favor higher prices, in as much as KSA would not want its new shareholder to realize a loss shortly after its purchase of 5% of Aramco.8 Investment Implications Of Higher Tail Risk As our Chart of the Week indicates, trading markets do not appear to have priced the growing tail risks into option premiums. The market's chief gauge of oil-price risk - the implied volatilities of traded put and call options - staged a brief rally, but have since retreated.9 Volatility is the critical driver of option value. We believe the low volatility levels in the market at present offer an opportunity to add to our long Brent call spreads in Dec/18 options. Specifically, we recommend getting long a $50/bbl Dec/18 Brent put and selling a $45/bbl Dec/18 Brent put option against it. This will give investors low-cost, low-risk exposure to a sudden down move, in addition to the upside exposure our existing Dec/18 $65 vs. $70/bbl Brent call spread provides to a sudden up move resulting from the risk factors we discussed above. Of course, more adventuresome investors can choose to get long put spreads and ignore taking exposure to the upside if they believe downside risks from trade tensions will dominate the evolution of oil prices this year. On the other side of the divide, those who believe the increasing geopolitical tensions discussed above will dominate price formation going forward, can choose to get long calls or call spreads and ignore taking exposure to the downside. Separately, we will be taking profits on our long Jul/18 WTI vs. short Dec/18 WTI spread trade, to re-position for our higher-volatility expectation. This position was up 90.4% as of Tuesday's close, when we mark our recommendations to market. Bottom Line: We are keeping our forecast for 2018 and 2019 unchanged, despite the unexpectedly strong U.S. oil supply growth being reported by the EIA and in E&P quarterly earnings reports. An unlikely confluence of geopolitical risks has raised price risk to the downside and the upside. To position for this, we are recommending investors get long put and call spreads in Dec/18 Brent futures. Robert P. Ryan, Senior Vice President Commodity & Energy Strategy rryan@bcaresearch.com Hugo Bélanger, Research Analyst Commodity & Energy Strategy HugoB@bcaresearch.com 1 We discussed the implications of a trade war vis-a-vis U.S. ag markets in last week's Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report. Please see "Ags Could Get Caught In U.S. Tariff Imbroglio," published by BCA Research March 15, 2018. It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 2 In last month's publication, we noted the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and Russia - the putative leaders of the producer coalition we've dubbed OPEC 2.0 - favor formalizing their agreement with a long-term alliance. Among other things, OPEC 2.0 members would be expected to build buffer stocks to address any sudden supply outages, in order to maintain orderly markets. Please see "OPEC 2.0 Getting Comfortable With Higher Prices," published by BCA Research's Commodity & Energy Strategy February 22, 2018. It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see footnote 1 references, and "U.S. agriculture secretary says exports at risk in tariff disputes," published by reuters.com March 19, 2018. 4 Please see "Trump Says of Iran Deal, 'You're Going to See What I Do,' published by bloomberg.com March 20, 2018. 5 Please see "Public Companies Confirm Large Q4 2017 Production Surge," in the March 21, 2018, issue of BCA Research's Energy Sector Strategy. It is available at nrg.bcaresearch.com. 6 Please see "U.S. foreign policy turn could take 1.4 million b/d off global oil market: analysts," published by S&P Global Platts on its online site March 15, 2018. 7 Please see "Oil nears six-week high as concern grows over Middle East," published by uk.reuters.com March 21, 2018. 8 Please see our Special Report published by BCA Research's Commodity & Energy Strategy November 16, 2017. It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 9 Implied volatilities, or "implieds" in trading markets, are market-cleared pricing parameters for options. They are calculated once a put (the right to sell the underlying asset upon which an option is written) or call (the right to buy the asset) price (i.e., the option premium) clears the market. Implieds are the annualized standard deviation of expected returns for whatever asset is being priced in a trading market. As such, they are often used to measure the risk that is being priced in options markets by willing buyers and sellers. When implieds are high, risk expectations are high, and the range in which prices are expected to trade widens. "The opposite holds when volatility is low." Ags/Softs Can China Retaliate With Agriculture? China's outsized population means that it is a major consumer of many agricultural products. In last week's Weekly Report, we highlighted that this has made U.S. farmers increasingly wary of the impact of a prospective trade war on the agriculture sector. We concluded that while restrictions on China's imports of U.S. soybeans would have a large impact on U.S. farmers, retaliation by China may not be feasible, given that alternative sources of supply are not readily available. Instead, cotton appears to be the more vulnerable crop, in the event of retaliation. Table 2 below formalizes this analysis. The first column shows the importance of each ag to the U.S., as measured by the percent of U.S. exports that go to China. We use this measure to derive the qualitative value displayed in the third column. The results imply that restrictions on China's imports of U.S. sorghum, soybeans, and to a lesser extent cotton, would severely harm U.S. farmers of these crops. On the other hand, wheat, corn, and rice exports to China do not make up a large proportion of U.S. exports, and thus are not especially significant to American farmers of those commodities. The second column measures China's ability to substitute away from the U.S. as a supplier. We calculate a ratio using world inventories ex-U.S. versus the volume of China's imports from the U.S. for particular crops. The larger the value in column two, the greater China's ability to substitute away from the U.S. Based on these metrics, the last column reveals that China is extremely dependent on the U.S. in terms of sorghum and soybeans, while it has greater ability to find alternative suppliers of the other commodities. Cotton accounts for 16% of U.S. exports. World inventories ex-U.S. for cotton stands at 157 times more than the volume of China's 2017 imports from the U.S. This simple analysis indicates U.S. cotton exports likely will fall victim to retaliation by China, in the event of a trade war. Table 2Cotton Could Fall Victim In Trade Dispute Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed in 2018 Summary of Trades Closed in 2017
Highlights Portfolio Strategy Synchronized global growth, a soft U.S. dollar, our resurgent Boom/Bust Indicator and avoidance of a Chinese economic hard landing, are all signaling that it still pays to overweight cyclicals at the expense of defensives. Economically hyper-sensitive transports also benefit from synchronous global growth and capex. We expect a rerating phase in the coming months. Within transports, we reiterate our overweight stance in the key railroads sub-index as enticing macro tailwinds along with firming operating metrics underscore that profits will exit deflation in calendar 2018. Recent Changes There are no portfolio changes this week. Table 1 Feature The S&P 500 continued to consolidate last week, still digesting the early February tremor. Policy uncertainty is slowly returning and sustained Administration reshufflings are becoming slightly unnerving (bottom panel, Chart 1). Nevertheless, the dual themes of synchronized global growth and budding evidence of coordinated tightening in global monetary policy, i.e. rising interest rate backdrop, continue to dominate and remain intact. Importantly in the U.S., the latest non-farm payrolls (NFP) report was a goldilocks one. Month-over-month NFPs surpassed the 300K hurdle for the first time since late-2014, on an as-reported-basis, while wage inflation settled back down. The middle panel of Chart 2 shows that both in the 1980s and 1990s expansions, NFPs were growing briskly, easily clearing the 300K mark. The 2000s was the "jobless recovery" expansion and likely the exception to the rule. In all three business cycle expansions wage growth touched the 4%/annum rate before the recession hit. The yield curve slope also supports this empirical evidence, forecasting that wage inflation will likely attain 4%/annum before this cycle ends (wages shown inverted, Chart 3). Chart 1Watch Policy Uncertainty Chart 2Goldilocks NFP Report... Chart 3...But Wage Growth Pickup Looms One key element in the current cycle is that the government is easing fiscal policy to the point where both NFPs and wages will likely surge in the coming months as the fiscal thrust gains steam, likely extending the business cycle. This is an inherently inflationary environment, especially when the economy is at full employment and the Fed in slow and steady tightening mode. Last autumn, we showed that the SPX performs well in times of easy fiscal and tight money iterations, rising on average 16.7% with these episodes, lasting on average 16 months (Table 2).1 The latest flagship BCA monthly publication forecasts that the current fiscal impulse will last at least until year-end 2019, contributing positively to real GDP growth. Thus, if history at least rhymes, SPX returns will be positive and likely significant for the next couple of years (Chart 4). With regard to the composition of the equity market's return, we reiterate our view - backed by empirical evidence - that EPS will do the heavy lifting whereas the forward P/E multiple will continue to drift sideways to lower.2 Not only will rising fiscal deficits cause the Fed to remain vigilant and continue to raise interest rates and weigh on the equity market multiple (Chart 5), but also heightened volatility will likely suppress the forward P/E multiple. Table 2SPX Returns During Periods Of Loose##br## Fiscal And Tight Monetary Policy Chart 4Stimulative Fiscal Policy##br## Extends The Business Cycle... Chart 5...But Weighs On ##br##The Multiple This week we revisit our cyclical versus defensive portfolio bent and update the key transportation overweight view. Cyclicals Thrive When Global Growth Is Alive And Well... While retaliatory tariff wars are dominating the media headlines, global growth is still resilient. Our view remains that the odds of a generalized trade war engulfing the globe are low, and in that light we reiterate our cyclical over defensive portfolio positioning, in place since early October.3 Global growth is firing on all cylinders. Our Global Trade Indicator is probing levels last hit in 2008, underscoring that cyclicals will continue to have the upper hand versus defensives (Chart 6). Synonymous with global growth is the softness in the U.S. dollar. In fact, the two are in a self-feeding loop where synchronized global growth pushes the greenback lower, which in turn fuels further global output growth. Tack on the rising likelihood that the trade-weighted dollar has crested from a structural perspective, according to the 16-year peak-to-peak cycle4 (Chart 7) and the news is great for cyclicals versus defensives (Chart 8). Chart 6Global Trade Is Alright Chart 7Dollar The Great Reflator... Chart 8...Is A Boon For Cyclicals Vs. Defensives Related to the greenback's likely secular peak is the booming commodity complex, as the two are nearly perfectly inversely correlated. Commodity exposure is running very high in the deep cyclical sectors and thus any sustained commodity price inflation gains will continue to underpin the cyclicals/defensives share price ratio. BCA's Boom/Bust Indicator (BBI) corroborates this upbeat message for cyclicals versus defensives. The BBI is on the verge of hitting an all-time high and, while this could serve as a contrary signal, there are high odds of a breakout in the coming months if synchronized global growth stays intact as BCA expects, rekindling cyclicals/defensives share prices (Chart 9). Finally, if China avoids a hard landing, and barring an EM accident, the cyclicals/defensives ratio will remain upbeat. Chart 10 shows that China's LEI is recovering smartly from the late-2015/early-2016 manufacturing recession trough, and the roaring Chinese stock market - the ultimate leading indicator - confirms that the path of least resistance for the U.S. cyclicals/defensive share price ratio is higher still. Chart 9Boom/Bust indicator Is Flashing Green Chart 10China Is Also Stealthily Firming Bottom Line: Stick with a cyclical over defensive portfolio bent. ...As Do Transports, Thus... Transportation stocks have taken a breather recently on the back of escalating global trade war fears. But, we are looking through this soft-patch and reiterate our barbell portfolio approach: overweight the global growth-levered railroads and air freight & logistics stocks at the expense of airlines that are bogged down by rising capacity and deflating airfare prices (Chart 11). Leading indicators of transportation activity are all flashing green. Transportation relative share prices and manufacturing export expectations are joined at the hip, and the current message is to expect a reacceleration in the former (top panel, Chart 12). Similarly, capital expenditures, one of the key themes we are exploring this year, are as good as they can be according to the regional Fed surveys, and signal that transportation profits will rev up in the coming months (middle panel, Chart 12). The possibility of an infrastructure bill becoming law later this year or in 2019 would also represent a tailwind for transportation EPS. Not only is U.S. trade activity humming, but also global trade remains on a solid footing. The global manufacturing PMI is resilient and sustaining recent gains, suggesting that global export volumes will resume their ascent. This global manufacturing euphoria is welcome news for extremely economically sensitive transportation profits (Chart 13). All of this heralds an enticing transportation services end-demand outlook. In fact, industry pricing power is gaining steam of late and confirms that relative EPS will continue to expand (Chart 12). Under such a backdrop, a rerating phase looms in still depressed relative valuations (bottom panel, Chart 13). Chart 11Stick With Transports Exposure Chart 12Domestic... Chart 13...And Global Growth/Capex Beneficiary ...Stay On Board The Rails Railroad stocks have worked off the overbought conditions prevalent all of last year, and momentum is now back at zero. In addition, forward EPS have spiked, eliminating the valuation premium and now the rails are trading on par with the SPX on a forward P/E basis (Chart 14). The track is now clear and more gains are in store for relative share prices in the coming quarters. Despite trade war jitters, we are looking through the recent turbulence. If the synchronized global growth phase endures, as we expect, then rail profits will remain on track. In fact, BCA's measure of global industrial production (hard economic data) is confirming the euphoric message from the global manufacturing PMI (soft economic data) and suggests that rails profits will overwhelm (Chart 15). Our S&P rails profit model also corroborates this positive global trade message and forecasts that rail profit deflation will end in 2018 (bottom panel, Chart 15). Beyond these macro tailwinds, operating industry metrics also point to a profit resurgence this year. Importantly, our rails profit margin proxy (pricing power versus employment additions) has recently reaccelerated both because selling prices are expanding at a healthy clip and due to labor restraint (second panel, Chart 15). Demand for rail hauling remains upbeat and our rail diffusion indicator has surged to a level last seen in 2009, signaling that there is a broad based firming in rail carload shipments (second panel, Chart 16). Chart 14Unwound Both Overbought Conditions And Overvaluation Chart 15EPS On Track To Outperform Chart 16Intermodal Resilience The significant intermodal segment that comprises roughly half of all shipments is on the cusp of a breakout. The retail sales-to-inventories ratio is probing multi-year highs on the back of the increase in the consumer confidence impulse and both are harbingers of a reacceleration in intermodal shipments (Chart 16). Coal is another significant category that takes up just under a fifth of rail carload volumes and bears close attention. While natural gas prices have fallen near the lower part of the trading range in place since mid-2016 and momentum is back at neutral, any spike in nat gas prices will boost the allure of coal as a competing fuel for energy generation (middle panel, Chart 17). Keep in mind that coal usage is highly correlated with electricity demand and the industrial business cycle, and the current ISM manufacturing survey message is upbeat for coal demand. Tack on the whittling down in coal inventories at utilities and there is scope for a tick up in coal demand (third panel, Chart 18). Finally, the export relief valve has reopened for coal with the aid of the depreciating U.S. dollar, and momentum in net exports has soared to all-time highs, even surpassing the mid-1982 peak (bottom panel, Chart 18). Chart 17Key Coal Shipments Underpin Selling Prices Chart 18Upbeat Leading Indicators Of Coal Demand All of this suggests that coal shipments will make a comeback later in 2018, and continue to underpin industry pricing power, which in turn boost rail profit prospects (bottom panel, Chart 17). Bottom Line: Continue to overweight the broad S&P transportation index, and especially the heavyweight S&P railroads sub-index. The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5RAIL - UNP, CSX, NSC, KSU. Anastasios Avgeriou, Vice President U.S. Equity Strategy anastasios@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Weekly Report, "Can Easy Fiscal Offset Tighter Monetary Policy?" dated October 9, 2017, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Weekly Report, "EPS And 'Nothing Else Matters'," dated December 18, 2017, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see BCA U.S. Equity Strategy Special Report, "Top 5 Reasons To Favor Cyclicals Over Defensives," dated October 16, 2017, available at uses.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see BCA Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report, "The Euro's Tricky Spot," dated February 2, 2018, available at fes.bcaresearch.com. Current Recommendations Current Trades Size And Style Views Favor value over growth. Stay neutral small over large caps (downgrade alert).
My colleagues Caroline Miller, Peter Berezin and I broadcasted a webcast this past Wednesday to discuss the outlook for the dollar along with recent market-relevant fiscal and trade policy pronouncements. If you haven't already, I hope you find time to listen in. Best regards, Mathieu Savary, Vice President Foreign Exchange Strategy Highlights On the one hand, because the Federal Reserve targets inflation and because tariffs are inflationary, when the economy is at full employment, tariffs could lift the USD. On the other hand, investors have been conditioned to the reality that tariffs are a tool used by previous U.S. administrations to weaken the dollar. Also, tariffs bring back memories of the 1970s stagflation, a very dollar-bearish period. Tariffs also raise the risk that the USD share of global reserves declines. Even if protectionist rhetoric raises the probability of a global trade war, we do not believe the set of tariffs proposed now are the beginning of such a catastrophe. However, we remain worried that Sino-American tensions will only escalate going forward. If a global trade war were to unfold, the USD would likely suffer down the road, and EUR/JPY could get hit. The short-term impact of Sino-U.S. trade tensions should be more limited; however, the AUD would suffer from this conflict. We are closing our short CAD/NOK trade at a 4.55% profit this week. Feature Last week, U.S. President Donald Trump announced that America would be slapping tariffs of 25% on steel imports and 10% on aluminum imports. True to himself, he then proceeded to tweet that "trade wars are good and easy to win." In response to this bravado, investors began to worry about the growing risk of a global trade war - a replay of the disastrous Smoot-Hawley tariffs of the 1930s - and the USD weakened anew. This obviously begs the following questions: Are tariffs and trade wars good or bad for the dollar? What is the real likelihood of a trade war engulfing the globe? What signposts should investors monitor to judge whether the world economy is regressing to a 1930s-like nationalist period? We think the current set of proposed tariffs will have a limited impact on the USD, especially as the Fed seems increasingly dead set on tightening policy. However, we need to monitor how NAFTA negotiations evolve. A breakdown in NAFTA negotiations would indicate a rising threat of a global trade war, which down the road would threaten the reserve currency status of the USD. Intellectual property trade disputes with China are another barometer to follow, as Sino-American tensions could intensify markedly. An escalation of these tensions would likely weigh on EM and commodity currencies. The SEK could suffer as well. How Could Tariffs Help The USD? There are two competing hypotheses out there, with diametrically opposed conclusions for investors. One school of thought argues that tariffs could help the dollar; another, that it would hurt the dollar. Chart I-1No Slack In The U.S. Let's begin by exploring how tariffs could help the dollar. Last July, the IMF published an in-depth study of the dynamics that may be associated with tariffs being implemented by any economy.1 Based on the assumption of the imposition of a 10% import tariff across the board, various interesting conclusions emerged. The imposition of imports tariffs should have an inflationary impact on the economy. The first stage is a one-off adjustment with a transitory impact, reflecting the sudden upward adjustment in the price of imports proportional but not equal to the size of the tariffs. If, however, the economy is at full employment, the higher price of foreign-sourced goods incentivizes repatriation of some production onshore. This repatriation brushes up against capacity constraints in the economy's production function, lifting prices over many quarters. The U.S. economy is at full employment, with aggregate capacity utilization at its tightest level since 2005. The U.S. could experience a second-round inflationary effect if broader tariffs are implemented (Chart I-1). The most important conclusion of the IMF study relates to interest rates. Tariffs put upward pressure on domestic nominal interest rates, especially if the economy is already at full employment (Chart I-2A). This is because the central bank presumably wants to counter the inflationary impact of the tariffs. On the other hand, because import tariffs hurt foreigners' exports, the tariffs hurt foreign economies. This makes the foreign output gap more negative than it would otherwise be. In this context, U.S. interest rate differentials rise relative to trading partners (Chart I-2B). Chart I-2A & BAt Full Employment, Import Tariffs Raise Rates The IMF also explores the impact of a global trade war, where tit-for-tat behavior proliferates globally. Unsurprisingly, the IMF's models show that global output declines by roughly 1% over five years after the implementation of the original tariffs (Chart I-3A), and global trade contracts by roughly 2% of GDP over the same time frame (Chart I-3B). Chart I-3A & BGlobal Trade Wars Hurt Trade And Growth The U.S. is a relatively closed economy, as exports constitute approximately 8% of GDP compared to 20% of GDP in major European economies and 16% of GDP in China and Japan (Chart I-4). Hence, the U.S. economy is likely to experience a smaller contraction of output in a global trade war than other major economies. Moreover, as the Global Financial Crisis illustrated, when global trade contracts, economies with deep current account deficits tend to experience an improvement in their trade balance. This means that for an economy like the U.S., which sports a current account deficit of 2.3% of GDP, contracting global trade will shrink the current account deficit, further mitigating some of the negative impact on GDP. Thus, the U.S. output gap would deteriorate less than in countries sporting large current account surpluses like Germany, Japan, or China. U.S. interest rates would rise relative to the rest of the world, causing the dollar to appreciate. Bottom Line: On the one hand, when an economy is at full employment, the imposition of tariffs can generate systemic inflationary pressures. The response of an inflation-targeting central bank would be to tighten policy. This describes the U.S. today, suggesting the USD could rise if tariffs are imposed. Moreover, if a full-fledged trade war ensues, the U.S. economy's lower sensitivity to global trade would limit the negative impact relative to its more globally exposed trading partners - another plus for the dollar. Chart I-4U.S. Growth Is Less Exposed To Global Growth Chart I-5History: Trade Spats Have Hurt The Dollar But The Dollar Is Falling, So What Gives? The analysis above is theoretical, and flies in the face of the real world, where the dollar has been weakening since President Trump announced his intention to impose tariffs. This analysis relies on two words: Ceteris Paribus, and the world is anything but Ceteris Paribus. Investors are having qualms about the dollar because of the history of tariffs. As Marko Papic highlighted in a recent special client note in BCA's Geopolitical Strategy service, tariffs and the threat of tariffs are often used by U.S. administrations to force an upward adjustment in the currencies of U.S. trading partners.2 This worked very well in 1971, when Nixon imposed a 10% surcharge on all imported goods. The 1985 Plaza Accord materialized amid threats of large tariffs by the U.S. on German and Japanese exports, which made those two nations much more willing to see their exchange rates appreciate sharply against the USD. Even more recent trade spats such as the U.S.-Japan tensions in the early 1990s or President George W. Bush's steel tariffs in 2002 were also associated with a weakening dollar (Chart I-5). History has another lesson in store: Investors fear a return of stagflation. The U.S. has a populist president, and fiscal policy is becoming expansionary despite the economy being at full employment - an environment very reminiscent of the late 1960s and early 1970s (Chart I-6). Tariffs too are inflationary and hurt output. Finally, while it remains to be seen if Fed Chairman Jerome Powell will be as malleable to the White House's demands as then Fed Chairman Arthur Burns was, Powell is still perceived as an untested Trump appointee. These apparent similarities with the 1970s are prompting investors to sell the USD. Stagflation was unkind to the dollar as the DXY fell 29% from the 1971 Smithsonian Agreement to December 1979. Chart I-6Like the Late 1960's: Full Employment And Fiscal Stimulus A theoretical concept is also frightening investors: Will Trump's policies prompt a decline of the dollar's share of global reserves? The U.S. dollar is the premier global reserve currency, accounting for 63% of allocated FX reserves. However, a paper from Harvard University highlighted that the dollar is in fact over-represented in global reserves based on trade flows.3 One of the key factors explaining the large role of the USD in global reserves is that many economies have dollarized financial systems, where the greenback represents a large share of their banks' liabilities. Since many of these economies have little access to direct financing from the Fed, as a matter of precaution these nations keep many more dollars in their FX reserve pools for rainy days. If the dollar increasingly becomes a weapon used by the White House, and the U.S. also wants to shrink its current account deficit through aggressively nationalist trade policy, the supply of dollars to the global financial system will decrease and become more volatile. This will make dollar-based financial systems around the world more unstable and dangerous. In the near-term, this uncertainty may support the dollar, but over the longer-run, growing trade restrictions by the U.S. could spur countries to abandon the USD as a source of financing. If they stop financing themselves in USD, they can diversify their FX reserves away from the dollar and mitigate geopolitical risk emanating from the U.S. Chart I-7Is The Exorbitant Privilege Ending? Why is this a problem? As Chart I-7 illustrates, the U.S. has a negative net international investment position of -40% of GDP - i.e. it owes much more money to foreigners than it is owed by foreigners. Yet, the U.S. still manages to eke out a positive primary international income balance of 1.1% of GDP. This is because foreigners are willing to hold dollar bonds at derisively low rates for such an indebted nation. Foreigners are willing to do so because they want to hold dollars as reserves. If the global demand for USD reserves declines, financing the U.S.'s current account deficit and negative net international investment position will become more expensive. The simplest and fastest way to make dollar assets more attractive for foreigners is to weaken the USD today, which lifts expected returns on U.S. assets down the road. Bottom Line: On the other hand, the dollar has responded negatively to the suggestion of new tariffs. The world is not a ceteris paribus environment, and investors are worried that tariffs could plunge the U.S. economy back into 1970's style stagflation. Moreover, the weaponization of the USD decreases its attractiveness as the premier reserve currency of the world, potentially endangering a crucial source of demand for the USD. So What? Both sides of the debate make some valid arguments. But as was the case with the twin deficit, the outlook for the dollar will hinge on the Fed's response to the impact of tariffs on inflation.4 If the Fed ignores the inflationary impact of the repatriation of production onshore, then, investors are correct to replay the stagflation story of the 1970s. However, the Fed doesn't seem to be so inclined. Chairman Powell has acknowledged accelerating U.S. economic momentum, and even perennial doves like Lael Brainard have highlighted the positive impact of stronger global growth, a weaker dollar, and fiscal stimulus on the U.S. growth outlook. The Fed seems ready to hike and does not want to fall behind the curve. There is another dimension to the question. What is the likelihood that Trump tariffs are the opening salvo of a protracted trade war? To be clear, tariffs on steel and aluminum only affect 1% of U.S. imports, or 0.15% of GDP. Tariffs will only have a macro impact if they are broadened or if widespread retaliation ensues. So far, these new tariffs barely affect the long-term trend of declining obstruction to trade, and they remain a far cry from the levels hit in the 1930s (Chart I-8). So, while the probability of a global trade war has risen, it is not a base-case scenario. Instead, it remains to be seen if Trump will become much more aggressive on the trade front. Canada - the top exporter of both steel and aluminum to the U.S. - would have been the country most negatively affected by these tariffs (Table I-1). However, key allies like Canada, Mexico, Australia, Korea and the EU will be exempted from the tariffs. This does not yet point to an all-out trade war between U.S. and the rest of the entire planet. Chart I-8Steel And Aluminum Tariffs: No Smoot-Hawley Table I-1Target Is Locked, Is It? While the probability of a generalized trade war with advanced economies is low, a continued toughening of relations with China is much more likely. President Trump wants greater access for U.S. firms to Chinese markets, and is likely to apply increasing pressure in that direction. For investors, it is important to evaluate if the U.S. is pursuing isolationist policies on a global level or if the impact will be limited to the Sino-American relationship. BCA's Geopolitical Strategy service recommend investors track the following signposts: NAFTA: Marko Papic and his team see a 50% probability that NAFTA will be abrogated as Trump is constitutionally unconstrained from abrogating the deal. If the White House continues negotiating with Mexico and Canada, it increases the likelihood that the tariffs are a shot across the bow directed at China. If NAFTA is not only abrogated but if the trade relationship reverts back to WTO rules, this would signal that the U.S. will remain highly belligerent, raising the risk of implementation of a broader spectrum of tariffs. China Intellectual Property Theft: China only imports US$8 billion in intellectual property from the U.S., suggesting that large-scale theft is happening. The Trump Administration is investigating Chinese technology transfers and Intellectual property theft under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974. This could lead to penalties imposed on China, including tariffs, an indemnity for past IP theft, and limitations to Chinese investments in the U.S. This would constitute a massive ratcheting up in Sino-U.S. tensions. This scenario has a much higher probability than a global trade war and it would have a meaningfully negative impact on the Chinese economy, as 19% of its exports are shipped to the U.S. The inflationary impact on the U.S. would be real as well. A global trade war would ultimately hurt the dollar as it would cause the dollar's share of global FX reserves to decline. However, commodity currencies, the Swedish krona and key EM currencies would suffer as global trade contracts (Chart I-9). The yen could perform especially well in this environment, rallying even against the euro (Chart I-10). But again, we see this scenario as a tail risk, not a base case. Chart I-9Key Losers From Falling Global Trade Chart I-10EUR/JPY Could Suffer If A Trade War Materializes Meantime, a bilateral conflict with China is likely to have a more limited impact on currency markets. However, the AUD would be the big loser in such a scenario as the Australian and Chinese economies are tightly linked (Chart I-11). This is an additional reason to underweight the AUD as the probability of growing Sino-American tensions is elevated. Finally, our short EUR/SEK trade is being very negatively affected by the current environment of trade tensions, as EUR/SEK rallies when global trade recedes (Chart I-12). Since we expect tensions to decrease over the coming months, EUR/SEK is likely to weaken, ultimately. Chart I-11China's Boost Is Dissipating Australia Is Tied To The Hip With China Chart I-12SEK At Odds With Trump Bottom Line: The current set of tariffs proposed by the White House is not the beginning of a global trade war. However, it shows that the probability of such an event has grown. Since we are anticipating that the Fed will fight inflationary forces created by further tariff impositions, we are fading the dollar's recent weakness. Yet, we worry that tariffs aimed more specifically at China could become more of a focus. So while we fade the impact of tariffs on the USD, risks are building up for EM currencies and the Australian dollar. Global trade tensions are also a major headwind to the Swedish krona. Housekeeping We are closing our short CAD/NOK trade at a 4.55% profit. Our target was hit, and the exemption of steel and aluminum tariffs for Canada is a positive outcome that could at least temporarily reduce the discount imputed on the CAD. Mathieu Savary, Vice President Foreign Exchange Strategy mathieu@bcaresearch.com 1 Linde, Jesper and Andrea Pescatori (2017). "The Macroeconomic Effects of Trade Tariffs: Revisiting the Lerner Symmetry Result." IMF Working Paper No. 17/151, International Monetary Fund. 2 Please see BCA Geopolitical Strategy Special Report, "Market Reprices Odds Of A Global Trade War", dated March 6, 2018, available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 3 Shah, Nihar. "Foreign Dollar Reserves and Financial Stability"(2017) 4 Please see Foreign Exchange Strategy Weekly Report, "Twin Deficits: Bearish Or Not, The Fed Holds The Trump Card", dated March 6, 2018, available at fes.bcaresearch.com. Currencies U.S. Dollar Chart II-1USD Technicals 1 Chart II-2USD Technicals 2 Recent data in the U.S. has been positive for the dollar: PCE yearly inflation came in at 1.7%, outperforming expectations. ISM Manufacturing PMI and ISM prices paid both outperformed expectations, coming in at 60.8 and 74.2 respectively. Finally, unit labor costs yearly growth outperformed expectations, coming in at 2.5%. The only blip were initial jobless claims that surprised to the upside, coming in at 210 thousand. The dollar has depreciated by roughly 1.2% in the month of March so far. Overall, we continue to see upside for the dollar in the short term. However, this will be a countertrend rally within a cyclical bear market. Report Links: The Dollar Deserves Some Real Appreciation - March 2, 2018 Who Hikes Again? - February 9, 2018 A Cold Snap Doesn't Make A Winter - January 5, 2018 The Euro Chart II-3EUR Technicals 1 Chart II-4EUR Technicals 2 Recent data in the Euro area has been mixed: Producer price inflation came in at 1.5%, underperforming expectations. It also declined from 2.2% the previous month. Moreover, Markit services PMI AND Markit Composite PMI both underperformed expectations Finally, both the gross domestic product yearly growth and the unemployment rate came in line with expectations, at 2.7% and 8.6% respectively. After falling below 1.22, the euro has rallied by 2% in the month of March. However, in contrast to last year, data in the euro area is starting to disappoint expectations, as the effects of the tightening in financial conditions resulting from the higher euro are starting to be felt in the real economy. Report Links: Who Hikes Again? - February 9, 2018 The Euro's Tricky Spot - February 2, 2018 From Davos To Sydney, With a Pit Stop In Frankfurt - January 26, 2018 The Yen Chart II-5JPY Technicals 1 Chart II-6JPY Technicals 2 Recent data in Japan has been mixed: Consumer confidence came in at 44.3, surprising to the downside. Moreover Markit Services PMI also surprised negatively, coming in at 51.7. However, the unemployment rate came in at 2.4%, surprising positively. It also decreased from 2.8% the previous month. Q4 2017 GDP growth was also revised up to 2.2% from 0.5%, thanks to strong capex. The yen has appreciate further in March, at one point even trading below 106 as investors were still digeseting the impact of Trump's tariffs. Overall, while we expect further upside to the yen in the current volatile environment, the BoJ will be forced to combat this strength. At 102, USD/JPY will be a buy Report Links: The Yen's Mighty Rise Continues... For Now - February 16, 2018 Who Hikes Again? - February 9, 2018 Yen: QQE Is Dead! Long Live YCC! - January 12, 2018 British Pound Chart II-7GBP Technicals 1 Chart II-8GBP Technicals 2 Recent data in the U.K. has been positive: PMI construction came in at 51.4, outperforming expectations. Moreover, Markit Services PMI came in at 54.4, also beating expectations. Finally, house price yearly growth also surprised positively, coming in at 1.8% After falling at the end of February, the pound has rallied by nearly 1%. Overall we expect the upside to the pound to be limited, given that Brexit negotiations are heating up and that any potential tightening by the Bank of England is already well priced in. Report Links: Who Hikes Again? - February 9, 2018 The Euro's Tricky Spot - February 2, 2018 10 Charts To Digest With The Holiday Trimmings - December 22, 2017 Australian Dollar Chart II-9AUD Technicals 1 Chart II-10AUD Technicals 2 Recent data in Australia has been mixed: Gross domestic product yearly growth underperformed expectations, coming in at 2.4% Moreover, retail sales month-on-month growth underperformed expectations coming in at 0.1%. However, company gross operating profits quarterly growth outperformed expectations, coming in at 2.2%. AUD/USD has rallied roughly 1.3% since the beginning of the month. Overall, we continue to be bearish on the Australian dollar, as the economy is still not generating enough endogenous inflationary pressures to justify hiking rates. Moreover, a slowdown in economic activity in China would also weigh on this cross. Report Links: Who Hikes Again? - February 9, 2018 From Davos To Sydney, With a Pit Stop In Frankfurt - January 26, 2018 10 Charts To Digest With The Holiday Trimmings - December 22, 2017 New Zealand Dollar Chart II-11NZD Technicals 1 Chart II-12NZD Technicals 2 Recent data in New Zealand has been mixed: The trade balance came in at NZD -3.2 billion, underperforming expectations. However, thanks to robust dairy prices, the terms-of-trade index outperformed expectations, coming in at 0.8%. NZD/USD has rallied by nearly 1% in the month of March. Overall, upside to the kiwi will be limited, given that this currency will suffer amid the persistence in volatility. Report Links: Who Hikes Again? - February 9, 2018 10 Charts To Digest With The Holiday Trimmings - December 22, 2017 The Xs And The Currency Market - November 24, 2017 Canadian Dollar Chart II-13CAD Technicals 1 Chart II-14CAD Technicals 2 Recent data in Canada has been mixed: Housing starts surprised to the upside, coming in at 229.7 thousand. Moreover, the Ivey Purchasing Managers Index also outperformed expectations, coming in at 59.6. However, gross domestic product quarter on quarter growth underperformed, coming in at 1.7%. The Bank Of Canada left rates unchanged on Wednesday. Overall, the Canadian interest rates curve prices the policy outlook appropriately, the CAD has now cheapened in response to the risk of a full abrogation of NAFTA. While we do agree that the risk of NAFTA being abrogated is elevated, a return to the previously standing Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement would have a limited impact on the Canadian economy. The downside risk to the CAD is now much more limited. Report Links: Who Hikes Again? - February 9, 2018 Yen: QQE Is Dead! Long Live YCC! - January 12, 2018 10 Charts To Digest With The Holiday Trimmings - December 22, 2017 Swiss Franc Chart II-15CHF Technicals 1 Chart II-16CHF Technicals 2 Recent data in Switzerland has generally been positive: The KOF leading indicator surprised to the upside, coming in at 108, and increasing from the previous month. Moreover, the unemployment rate also surprised positively, declining from 3% to 2.9%. However, retail sales growth underperformed expectations, coming in at -1.4% per annum. EUR/CHF has rallied by more than 1.5% since the beginning of the month. Overall, we expect this trend to continue, given that inflationary pressures in Switzerland are too weak for the SNB to back off from its ultra-loose monetary policy stance. Report Links: Who Hikes Again? - February 9, 2018 10 Charts To Digest With The Holiday Trimmings - December 22, 2017 The Xs And The Currency Market - November 24, 2017 Norwegian Krone Chart II-17NOK Technicals 1 Chart II-18NOK Technicals 2 Recent data in Norway has been mixed: Registered unemployment came in line with expectations at 2.5%. However, it did go down from the previous month. Nevertheless, manufacturing output surprised negatively, coming in at -2%. USD/NOK has fallen by roughly 0.8% in the month of March. We are positive on the krone within the commodity currencies. This is because there are less hikes priced into the Norwegian curve than in other countries. Moreover, oil should outperform metals given than oil is less sensitive to a shock from China. Report Links: Who Hikes Again? - February 9, 2018 Yen: QQE Is Dead! Long Live YCC! - January 12, 2018 10 Charts To Digest With The Holiday Trimmings - December 22, 2017 Swedish Krona Chart II-19SEK Technicals 1 Chart II-20SEK Technicals 2 Recent data in Sweden has been mixed: Retail sales yearly growth underperformed expectations, coming in at 1.2%. Gross Domestic Product annual growth also underperformed expectations, coming in at 1.2%. However, the Manufacturing PMI surprised to the upside, coming in at 59.9. USD/SEK has been relatively flat this this month. Overall, we believe the Riksbank will be forced to lift rates in the face of rising prices. This will push EUR/SEK lower. Report Links: Who Hikes Again? - February 9, 2018 10 Charts To Digest With The Holiday Trimmings - December 22, 2017 Canaries In The Coal Mine Alert 2: More On EM Carry Trades And Global Growth - December 15, 2017 Trades & Forecasts Forecast Summary Core Portfolio Tactical Trades Closed Trades
Highlights Chart 1Inflation Perks Up The Fed has struck a decidedly more upbeat tone in 2018. We noted last week that the Fed staff made upward revisions to its growth forecasts, and then Chairman Jerome Powell testified to Congress that "some of the headwinds the U.S. economy faced in previous years have shifted to tailwinds." So far this more optimistic outlook is borne out in the data. Core PCE inflation rose sharply in January. The annualized 6-month rate of change is back above the Fed's target (Chart 1), and the 12-month rate of change should follow once base effects kick-in in March. For our investment strategy the message is to stay the course. The re-anchoring of inflation expectations will impart another 18 bps to 38 bps of upside to the 10-year Treasury yield. How much higher yields rise beyond that will depend on how well credit markets and equities digest the less accommodative monetary environment. Stay at below-benchmark duration and be prepared to scale back on credit risk once our target range of 2.3% to 2.5% is reached by both the 10-year and 5-year/5-year forward TIPS breakeven inflation rates. Feature Investment Grade: Overweight Chart 2Investment Grade Market Overview Investment grade corporate bonds underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 62 basis points in February, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to +10 bps. Although last month's sell-off did return some value to the investment grade corporate space, the sector is still expensive compared to both its own history and other comparable sectors. The 12-month breakeven spread for a Baa-rated corporate bond has only been tighter 11% of the time since 1989 (Chart 2). Further, in last week's report we compared breakeven spreads across the investment grade bond universe, split by credit tier.1 Our results showed that municipal bonds offer greater breakeven spreads than investment grade corporates, after adjusting for the tax advantage. We also found that Foreign Agency debt is more attractive than investment grade corporate debt in both the Aa and Baa credit tiers. Local Authority debt is more attractive in the Baa credit tier. With a less than compelling valuation case for investment grade corporates, we will start to pare exposure once our TIPS breakeven inflation targets (mentioned on page 1) are met. This week we take a preliminary step toward de-risking by adjusting our recommended sector allocation (Table 3). The adjustments were made to both increase exposure to sectors that look cheap after adjusting for credit rating and duration, and also to lower the average duration-times-spread (DTS) of the portfolio. Specifically, we downgrade Cable/Satellite, Paper, Media/Entertainment, Brokerage/Asset Managers/Exchanges and Lodging. We upgrade Supermarkets, Tobacco, Life Insurance and P&C Insurance. Table 3ACorporate Sector Relative Valuation And Recommended Allocation* Table 3BCorporate Sector Risk Vs. Reward* High-Yield: Overweight Chart 3High-Yield Market Overview High-Yield underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 52 basis points in February, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to +97 bps. The average index option-adjusted spread widened 17 bps on the month, and currently sits at 348 bps. The 12-month trailing speculative grade default rate edged down to 3.2% in January, and Moody's projects it will fall to 2% in one year's time. The projected decline is mostly driven by the continued waning of credit stress in the oil & gas sector. Using the Moody's projection as an input, we forecast High-Yield default losses of 1.3% for the next 12 months. This means that if junk spreads are unchanged from current levels we would expect High-Yield to return 251 bps in excess of duration-matched Treasuries (Chart 3). One hundred basis points of spread tightening would translate roughly to excess returns of 661 bps, and 100 bps of spread widening would translate to excess returns of -159 bps. Though High-Yield valuation is more attractive than for investment grade corporates - the 12-month breakeven spread for a B-rated security has been tighter than it is today 28% of the time since 1995, the same measure has been tighter only 13% of the time for a Baa-rated security - we still view the potential for spread tightening in high-yield as limited. First, 130 bps of spread tightening would lead to all-time expensive valuations in the High-Yield index - using the 12-month breakeven spread as our valuation measure. Second, the higher levels of implied equity volatility that are likely to prevail in an environment with a less-accommodative Fed will also limit how far spreads can fall (top panel). MBS: Neutral Chart 4MBS Market Overview Mortgage-Backed Securities underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 10 basis points in February, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to -25 bps. February's underperformance was concentrated in GNMA and Conventional 15-year issues, and also in 3.5% and 4% coupons. Excess returns for Conventional 30-year MBS were roughly flat, and securities with coupons above 5% delivered strong positive performance. The conventional 30-year zero-volatility MBS spread narrowed 4 bps on the month, split between a 3 bps reduction in the compensation for prepayment risk (option cost) and a 1 bp tightening in the option-adjusted spread. In last week's report we showed that the value proposition in Agency MBS is comparable to a Aaa-rated corporate bond, but is much less attractive than other Aaa-rated securitizations (consumer ABS and CMBS).2 However, MBS are also likely to offer investors more protection in a risk-off environment. Refinancing risk will remain muted as interest rates rise (Chart 4), and in past reports we showed that extension risk will likely be immaterial.3 Valuation in MBS versus investment grade corporates is less attractive than it was a month ago, owing to the recent widening in corporate spreads, but the relative spread is still elevated compared to recent years (panel 3). MBS will start to look more attractive on a relative basis as corporate spreads recoup some of their February losses. After that, we stand ready to shift some exposure from corporate bonds to MBS once our end-of-cycle inflation targets are met. Government-Related: Underweight Chart 5Government-Related Market Overview The Government-Related index underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 20 basis points in February, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to +22 bps. Sovereign debt underperformed the Treasury benchmark by 108 bps on the month, Foreign Agencies underperformed by 20 bps and Supranationals underperformed by 2 bps. Local Authorities delivered excess returns of +11 bps, and Domestic Agencies performed in-line with the benchmark. The Sovereign index has returned only 9 bps in excess of Treasuries so far this year, compared to 40 bps from the Baa-rated corporate bond index (Chart 5).4 We expect this poor relative performance to continue in the months ahead as the composition of global growth shifts back to the U.S., putting upward pressure on the dollar. In last week's report we looked at 12-month breakeven spreads in each segment of the investment grade U.S. fixed income market.5 Our results showed that Sovereign debt looks expensive across every credit tier. In contrast, Foreign Agency debt and Local Authority debt offer elevated breakeven spreads. Foreign state-owned energy companies account for a large portion of the Foreign Agency index, and this sector's relative performance closely tracks the price of oil. With our commodity strategists now calling for average 2018 crude oil prices of $74/bbl and $70/bbl for Brent and WTI respectively, the Foreign Agency sector should stay well supported.6 Municipal Bonds: Underweight Chart 6Municipal Market Overview Municipal bonds outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 32 basis points in February, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +86 bps (before adjusting for the tax advantage). The average Aaa-rated Municipal/Treasury yield ratio declined a modest 1% on the month, concentrated at the long-end of the curve. January's abrupt increase in flows into municipal bond mutual funds reversed course last month (Chart 6). Interestingly, the sudden surge and subsequent reversal in flows was mirrored by the behavior of municipal bond issuance for new capital (panel 2). This suggests that both trends were driven by changes to the federal tax code. While we remain underweight municipal bonds for now, we stand ready to shift exposure out of corporate bonds and into municipal bonds once our end-of-cycle inflation targets are met. But in the meantime, we note that municipal bonds are already quite attractive compared to corporates. In last week's report we showed that tax-adjusted municipal bond breakeven spreads are much higher than for comparable-quality corporate bonds.7 We also note that the yield differential between a tax-adjusted Aaa-rated municipal bond and an equivalent-duration A3/Baa1 corporate bond is only -19 bps (bottom panel). Historically, this yield differential turns positive near the end of the credit cycle and investors get an even better opportunity to shift out of corporates and into Munis. We expect to get that opportunity this year. Treasury Curve: Favor 5-Year Bullet Over 2/10 Barbell Chart 7Treasury Yield Curve Overview The Treasury curve rose sharply and steepened in February. The 2/10 Treasury slope steepened 4 basis points and the 5/30 slope steepened 5 bps. As a result, our recommendation to favor the 5-year bullet versus a duration-matched 2/10 barbell returned +5 bps on the month, though it is still underwater 35 bps since the trade was initiated in December 2016. As we explained in a Special Report last year, bullet over barbell trades are designed to profit from curve steepening.8 But they also depend on what is initially priced into the yield curve. Our model of the 2/5/10 butterfly spread relative to the 2/10 Treasury slope shows that the 5-year note is currently 5 bps cheap on the curve (Chart 7). Or alternatively, it shows that the 2/5/10 butterfly spread is priced for roughly 26 bps of 2/10 curve flattening during the next six months (panel 4). In other words, if the 2/10 slope steepens during the next six months, or flattens by less than 26 bps, we would expect the 5-year bullet to outperform the 2/10 barbell. The window for curve steepening is clearly closing, given that the Fed has adopted a more aggressive tightening bias. However, with inflation on the rise and long-maturity TIPS breakeven inflation rates still below levels consistent with the Fed's target, we think 2/10 flattening in excess of 26 bps during the next six months is unlikely. TIPS: Overweight Chart 8TIPS Market Overview TIPS outperformed the duration-equivalent nominal Treasury index by 9 basis points in February, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to +84 bps. The 10-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate rose 1 bp on the month and currently sits at 2.12%. The 5-year/5-year forward TIPS breakeven inflation rate fell 4 bps and currently sits at 2.21%. As we explained in a recent report, we view the first stage of the cyclical bond bear market as being driven by the re-anchoring of inflation expectations.9 We will consider inflation expectations well anchored when both the 10-year and 5-year/5-year forward TIPS breakeven inflation rates are in a range between 2.3% and 2.5%, where they were the last time that inflation was well anchored around the Fed's target. If the recent trend in realized inflation continues, then this re-anchoring could occur relatively soon. January data show that the annualized 6-month rate of change in trimmed mean PCE jumped to 1.99% (Chart 8), and while the 12-month rate of change rose only slightly to 1.69%, it will start to move higher in March when the strong inflation prints from January and February 2017 are removed from the sample. Our Pipeline Inflation Indicator also suggests that inflation will move higher, as do leading indicators for both shelter and medical care inflation, as we showed in last week's report.10 ABS: Neutral Chart 9ABS Market Overview Asset-Backed Securities underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 20 basis points in February, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to -16 bps. The index option-adjusted spread for Aaa-rated ABS widened 10 bps on the month and now sits at 45 bps, 12 bps above its pre-crisis low (Chart 9). The 12-month breakeven spread differential between Aaa-rated ABS and Aaa-rated corporate bonds currently sits at +13 bps, solidly above its post-2010 average (panel 3).11 Further, we noted in last week's report that consumer ABS exhibit relatively low excess return volatility.12 Although valuation is quite attractive, the evidence suggests that collateral credit quality is starting to weaken. Delinquency rates have bottomed for both auto loans and credit cards, and a rising household debt service ratio suggests they will continue to trend higher (panel 4). Banks have also noticed the deterioration in credit quality and have responded by tightening lending standards (bottom panel). Historically, tighter lending standards tend to coincide with periods of spread widening. Remain neutral ABS for now, based on still-attractive valuation relative to investment alternatives, but monitor credit trends for a signal on when to downgrade further. Non-Agency CMBS: Underweight Chart 10CMBS Market Overview Non-Agency Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 14 basis points in February, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to +47 bps. The index option-adjusted spread widened 4 bps on the month and currently sits at 62 bps, close to one standard deviation below its pre-crisis mean (Chart 10). In last week's report we observed that the 12-month breakeven spread of Aaa-rated non-Agency CMBS is elevated compared to other Aaa-rated sectors (consumer ABS being the exception), but that it also exhibits high excess return volatility.13 While there is no doubt that relative value is attractive, we are concerned about the gap that has emerged between CMBS spreads and the rate of appreciation in commercial real estate (CRE) prices (panel 4). It is possible that tight spreads are simply foreshadowing an imminent re-acceleration in prices, and in fact bank lending standards have become less of a headwind, tightening less aggressively than in recent years (bottom panel). But for now, we think non-Agency CMBS are still not worth the risk. Agency CMBS: Overweight Agency CMBS underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 6 basis points in February, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to +8 bps. The index option-adjusted spread widened 1 bp on the month and currently sits at 41 bps. In last week's report we noted that the 12-month breakeven spread for Agency CMBS is higher than for all other Aaa-rated sectors, except for non-Agency CMBS and consumer ABS. We also noted that the sector has historically exhibited low excess return volatility. Remain overweight. Treasury Valuation Chart 11Treasury Fair Value Models The current reading from our 2-factor Treasury model (based on Global PMI and dollar sentiment) pegs fair value for the 10-year Treasury yield at 2.96% (Chart 11). The fair value was revised down by 5 bps compared to last month due to a combination of more bullish dollar sentiment (bottom panel) and a tick lower in the Global PMI (panel 3). Of the four major economic blocs, PMIs declined in the U.S., Eurozone and Japan. Only the Chinese PMI managed a slight increase (panel 4). We see the risk of a significant relapse in the U.S. PMI as quite low, but recently highlighted that weakening leading indicators in China could soon bleed into lower Chinese PMI prints.14 This is a significant near-term risk to our below-benchmark duration recommendation. For further details on our Treasury models please refer to U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "The Message From Our Treasury Models", dated October 1, 2016, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com At the time of publication the 10-year Treasury yield was 2.86%. Ryan Swift, Vice President U.S. Bond Strategy rswift@bcaresearch.com Alex Wang, Research Analyst alexw@bcaresearch.com Jeremie Peloso, Research Assistant jeremiep@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Monetary Restraints", dated February 27, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 2 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Monetary Restraints", dated February 27, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 3 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "On The MOVE", dated February 13, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 4 The Baa-rated corporate index is the Sovereign sector's closest comparable in terms of average credit rating. 5 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Monetary Restraints", dated February 27, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 6 Please see Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report, "OPEC 2.0 Getting Comfortable With Higher Prices", dated February 22, 2018, available at ces.bcaresearch.com 7 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Monetary Restraints", dated February 27, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 8 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Special Report, "Bullets, Barbells And Butterflies" dated July 25, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 9 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "The Two-Stage Bear Market In Bonds", dated February 20, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 10 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Monetary Restraints", dated February 27, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 11 The breakeven spread measures the option-adjusted spread on offer per unit of duration. 12 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Monetary Restraints", dated February 27, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 13 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Monetary Restraints", dated February 27, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 14 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "The Two-Stage Bear Market In Bonds", dated February 20, 2018, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification Corporate Sector Relative Valuation And Recommended Allocation Total Return Comparison: 7-Year Bullet Versus 2-20 Barbell (6-Month Investment Horizon)
The GAA DM Equity Country Allocation model is updated as of February 28, 2018. After the large upgrade in January, the model has furthered upgraded the U.S. to a small overweight of 3.3 percentage points from neutral in January. This change is mainly financed by a reduction in the large overweight in the Netherlands. Directionally, the model is becoming more defensive in the sense that the sizes of large bets have shrunk two months in a row, as shown in Table 1. As shown in Table 2 and Chart 1, Chart 2 and Chart 3, the overall model underperformed its benchmark by 55 bps in February, largely driven by the Level 2 model which underperformed by 131 bps. The large underweight in Japan hurt the performance the most because in USD terms Japan was the best performer thanks to the strength of JPY versus USD. Since going live in January 2016, the overall model has outperformed the benchmark by 102 bps, largely from the allocation among the 11 non-U.S. countries, which has outperformed its benchmark by 345 bps. The Level 1 model has performed on par with the MSCI benchmark. Table 1Model Allocation Vs. Benchmark Weights Table 2Performance (Total Returns In USD) Chart 1GAA DM Model Vs. MSCI World Chart 2GAA U.S. Vs. Non U.S. Model (Level 1) Chart 3GAA Non U.S. Model (Level 2) Please see also the website http://gaa.bcaresearch.com/trades/allocation_performance. For more details on the models, please see the January 29, 2016 Special Report, "Global Equity Allocation: Introducing the Developed Markets Country Allocation Model." http://gaa.bcaresearch.com/articles/view_report/18850. Please note that the overall country and sector recommendations published in our Monthly Portfolio Update and Quarterly Portfolio Outlook use the results of these quantitative models as one input, but do not stick slavishly to them. We believe that models are a useful check, but structural changes and unquantifiable factors need to be considered too in making overall recommendations. GAA Equity Sector Selection Model The GAA Equity Sector Selection Model (Chart 4) is updated as of February 28, 2018. Table 3Allocations Table 4Performance Since Going Live Chart 4Overall Model Performance The model has turned negative on cyclical sectors by sending negative signals from the growth component. Additionally, the recent correction in equity markets has also created unfavorable momentum signals. From being overweight on cyclical sectors by 10%, the model has now turned underweight by 1.3%. However, energy stocks have seen their overweight increase by 3% on the back of favorable valuations. The biggest change was an upgrade to overweight for the utilities sector on the back of the weaker growth outlook and not so negative momentum. For more details on the model, please see the Special Report "Introducing The GAA Equity Sector Selection Model," July 27, 2016 available at https://gaa.bcaresearch.com. Xiaoli Tang, Associate Vice President xiaoli@bcaresearch.com Aditya Kurian, Research Analyst adityak@bcaresearch.com
Highlights Seasonal environmental restrictions on Chinese aluminum output are due to ease going into spring, which will restore some of the output taken off line when inefficient smelters were shuttered last year. Global demand likely will slow later this year, largely because we expect GDP growth in China, which accounts for more than half of global aluminum consumption, to moderate in 2H18. In addition, expected U.S. tariffs and quotas will limit imports and revive output in that market. This will contribute to the easing of a tight global balance, and take some of the pressure off prices, but we do not expect a significant move lower. We remain neutral. Energy: Overweight. Our long Dec/18 $65/bbl Brent calls vs. short Dec/18 $70/bbl calls - recommended last week on the back of our updated price forecast - closed with a 3.1% gain on Tuesday. We took profits on our long 4Q19 $55/bbl Brent puts vs. short 4Q19 $50/bbl Brent puts, realizing a 20.7% gain since it was recommended January 18, 2018. Base Metals: Neutral. We are expecting a secular increase in aluminum supplies this year, on the back of Chinese environmental policies and more difficult global trading conditions. Precious Metals: Gold markets awaited Fed Chair Powell's Humphrey-Hawkins testimony beginning Tuesday, as vice chair for financial supervision, Randal Quarles, warned U.S. economic growth could exceed expectations the day before. Ags/Softs: Underweight. Argentina's drought looks like it will stress that country's grain harvests, and tighten markets at the margin. Feature Chart of the WeekAluminum In Large Deficit Last Year Easing of winter supply restrictions in China, as well as tighter controls on U.S. aluminum imports, will dominate the aluminum market in the near term. In both cases, the net effect likely will be an increase in global supply. The latter would also support aluminum's price in the U.S. market - as measured by the U.S. Midwest premium. These events will ease the global physical deficit in aluminum, which last year came in at its widest since 1995 (Chart of the Week). The current tight conditions are driven by Beijing's elimination of overcapacity, which, along with environmental reform policies implemented last year, led to a reduction in China's output. The price dynamics that dominated the aluminum market over the past couple years will shift as a result. This already can be seen in the behavior of prices on the LME and the SHFE: LME prices have been gyrating around $2,200/MT, while SHFE prices have dipped by more than 5% since the beginning of the year. Unwinding China's Supply-Side Policies? At first blush, it may not be apparent China's primary aluminum production sector experienced significant changes last year. After stalling at 1% year-on-year (y/y) growth in 2016, output grew 1.2% y/y in 2017, a sharp deceleration from the 16% y/y average growth rates registered between 2010 and 2015. However, the annual gain masked a 10% y/y increase in output in 1H17, which was almost completely reversed by the negative impacts of China's environmental policies and its efforts to eliminate overcapacity. These policy-led initiatives ultimately caused output to fall 7% y/y in 2H17 (Chart 2). The resulting 1 mm MT of production cuts in the second half of last year reflects China's 2017 supply-side policies. Beijing's strategy is two-fold: Chart 2Sharp Fall In 2H17 Output From China ... Eliminate outdated and unlicensed capacity by forcing it to close. This has removed an estimated 3-4 mm MT of annual capacity. The policy targets capacity lacking proper building and expansion permits, as well as the smelters that do not meet strict environmental standards. However, not all the shutdowns are permanent. Among this shuttered capacity is 2 mm MT of outdated smelter capacity belonging to China Hongqiao, which the company plans to replace with new capacity.1 The other major supply-side policy implemented by Beijing last year is a restriction on smelter activity during the mid-November to mid-March period. As is the case in the steel sector, this winter-curtailment policy seeks to reduce pollution during the smog-prone winter months. Aluminum smelters in the cities targeted in the winter plan were ordered to cut output by ~ 30% during this period. This policy is expected to be an annually recurring event until 2020. However, while 3 mm MT of annualized capacity would have been closed during the winter if the full 30% curtailment target had been met, reports surfaced in mid-December that compliance was low, and suggested only ~ 0.6 mm MT of capacity (just 20% of the goal, or 6% of the curtailment target) had been closed.2 The total aluminum annual capacity affected by both the winter environmental curtailments and capacity-reduction policies implemented last year could potentially reach 7 mm MT. China's total smelting capacity was a reported 40 mm MT in 2016. Lower Chinese Production ... And Consumption On a year-on-year basis, global primary aluminum production has been falling since August. This is, for the most part, true on a month-on-month basis, as well. The 12-month moving average for global aluminum production peaked in July, and has been coming down consistently since then. Although 2017 production came in higher than the previous year, this is due to a ~ 6% y/y increase in the first half, which preceded a ~ 4% y/y decline in output in the second half of the year. These dynamics are driven by China, which accounts for 55% of global primary production. Chinese firms raised primary output in 1H17, which was followed by a sharp contraction in 2H17. Chinese primary aluminum production peaked in June, recording an all-time record of 2.98 mm MT before falling in the subsequent months. On the other hand, primary production from the rest of the world has remained largely unchanged over the past two years, at 26 mm MT. Data from the International Aluminum Institute shows month-on-month production increases in China in December and January; however, output is still lower vs. the same period a year earlier. Chinese production drove global aluminum production higher in the past, but falling output from the world's leading producer now is causing global primary aluminum supply to contract. The impact of China's supply curtailments has been muted by lower demand for the metal (Chart 3). Again, lower consumption has been driven by the top-demand market - China - which typically consumes ~ 55% of the primary metal. Chinese primary consumption and production each came down by more than 1 mm MT y/y in the second half of last year. Falling aluminum demand in China is consistent with a slowdown in Chinese automobile production as well as fixed asset investments in infrastructure and transportation (Chart 4). Furthermore, China's scrap aluminum imports increased in 2H17, reflecting a preference for the secondary metal as the price of primary aluminum increased. Chart 3... Coincided With Falling Chinese Consumption Chart 4Slowdown In Chinese Demand A Divergence In Global Dynamics ... Despite the improved balance in China, the global primary aluminum balance in the rest of the world recorded a large deficit last year - the largest since 1995 (Chart 5). While both consumption and production in China came down by more than 1 mm MT in 2H17, consumption in the rest of the world increased by ~ 0.4 mm MT, even as production remained largely unchanged. This tightened the global market, as more stringent aluminum production policies in China meant that there was no flooding of Chinese aluminum to ease the deficit. In fact, the world excluding China deficit is the largest at least since the World Bureau of Metal Statistics (WBMS) started collecting data in 1995. ... Is Reflected In Inventory Dynamics This also coincides with rising aluminum stocks on the Shanghai Futures Exchange and falling inventory on the LME. In fact, Chinese aluminum imports have been falling and were down almost 30% y/y in 2H17. At the same time, Chinese net exports picked up slightly (Chart 6). Chart 5Record Aluminum Deficit Outside China Chart 6Chinese Net Exports On The Rise In response to lower output, LME inventories have been falling since 2Q14, and they continued their descent last year, ending 2017 at roughly the same level as mid-2008. On the other hand, stocks at the SHFE have been rising steeply since the beginning of last year and are at record highs (Chart 7). Whether the tight global market fundamentals will persist depends on whether China's outdated capacity cuts prove to be temporary or permanent. Chart 7Dynamics Reflected In Stock Changes U.S. Tariffs And Quotas Would Offset Tight Markets In what appears to be an effort to revive U.S. aluminum and steel production, the U.S. Commerce Department launched an investigation into these domestic industries late last year. Last month, Commerce proposed tariffs and quotas that would impact all aluminum imports with the exception of aluminum scrap and aluminum powders. There appear to be two main objectives of this investigation: 1. Increase capacity utilization in the U.S. aluminum and steel industries; and 2. Penalize China for subsidizing its aluminum sector at the expense of those in other countries. Among the Commerce proposals: 1. A 7.7% tariff on all aluminum imports to the U.S. 2. A 23.6% tariff on all aluminum imports from certain countries, while other countries would be subject to quotas equal to 100% of their 2017 exports to the U.S.3 3. A quota on all aluminum imports from other countries equal to a maximum of 86.7% of their 2017 exports to the U.S. In a memo issued last week, the U.S. Department of Defense expressed its support for the targeted tariffs (option 2 above), as well as a recommendation to postpone action on the aluminum sector. President Trump has until April 19 to make a decision on the aluminum recommendations. While he may not stick to the exact details outlined in the three options, our Geopolitical Strategists expect him to go through with implementing protectionist measures to limit aluminum imports. U.S. production of primary aluminum is at its lowest level since 1951 (Chart 8). To reach the 80% target of smelter capacity utilization envisioned by Commerce, the U.S. will have to add ~ 0.67 mm MT of supply. This represents just ~ 1.16% of world supply in 2016. Imports currently make up 90% of U.S. primary aluminum consumption. Chart 8U.S. Producers Took A Big Hit In fact, even if this amount of aluminum was supplied domestically in the U.S. last year, the world aluminum market would have remained in deficit. Furthermore, this additional supply would pale in comparison to the cuts China has already implemented in its aluminum sector last year. China's primary production in the August to December period last year came in 1.15 mm MT below the same period in 2016. Annual smelter capacity in the U.S. is estimated to be a combined 1.82 mm MT. Of this capacity, Alcoa has 0.34 mm MT of idle capacity, Century Aluminum has 0.27 mm MT, while ARG International's Missouri plant has 0.27 mm MT of idle capacity. U.S. producers have started communicating plans to restart idled capacity. According to Century Aluminum's CEO, the company's eastern Kansas operation, which shuttered more than half of its production, could ramp output at one of its smelters to full capacity of up to 0.27 mm MT by early next year. Similarly, Alcoa has committed to partially restarting production at its Warwick, Indiana, facility, which would bring 0.16 mm MT of capacity online by the second quarter of this year. However, imports are not the sole reason output in the U.S. aluminum sector is falling. High power costs also have contributed, but this is not addressed in the Department of Commerce's report. In any case, we would not be surprised to witness an increase in aluminum imports by U.S. consumers before a final decision is made. If import controls do in fact fall into place, prices in the U.S. - as reflected by the U.S. Midwest transaction premium - will likely increase. Bottom Line: Supply- and demand-side developments, mostly in China, which accounts for more than half of global production and consumption, will combine to ease a global supply deficit this year. Expected U.S. tariffs and quotas will limit imports and revive output in that market. This will take some pressure off prices, but, we do not expect levels to move significantly lower. Roukaya Ibrahim, Associate Editor Commodity & Energy Strategy RoukayaI@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see "China Hongqiao says to cut 2 mln T/year of outdated aluminum capacity," published on August 2, 2017, available at reuters.com. 2 Please see "Aluminum Under Pressure After China Smog Cutbacks Fall Short," published on December 20, 2017, available at reuters.com. 3 The countries noted are China, Hong Kong, Russia, Venezuela, and Vietnam. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed in 2018 Summary of Trades Closed in 2017