Market Returns
Highlights EM EPS growth is set to decelerate significantly and will likely turn negative in 2018 based on the China/EM money/credit indicators. All measures of Chinese broad money growth have fallen to a record low signifying a major growth slump. The two pillars of the EM currency rally - strong growth in China that manifests in higher commodities prices and lower U.S. bond yields- are set to reverse. EM equities and credit markets relative performance versus their DM peers is about to relapse. A new fixed-income trade: receive 2-year swap rates in Mexico / pay 2-year swap rates in the U.S. Feature Last week we were on the road, meeting with some of our U.S. East Coast clients. This week we address some of the common questions we received. Q: Why do you think EM profits will relapse in the next six-to-nine months, given both global and EM growth continue to show strength? A: Our reluctance to change our view on EM risk assets in general and equities in particular has to do with EM/China business cycle/corporate profit indicators. Several indicators for EM profits - which have exhibited very good track records - presently forecast a material slowdown and possibly a contraction in EM EPS starting late this year and well into next year. In particular, China's broad and narrow money impulses lead EM EPS by about nine months, and are currently signaling that EPS growth is set to peak and begin to decline in the next nine months (Chart I-1). What's more, a few business cycle indicators from Korea and Taiwan, such as nominal manufacturing production and manufacturing shipments-to-inventory ratios, corroborate a peak in EM EPS growth (Chart I-2). Chart I-1EM EPS Is Set to Decelerate ##br##And Probably Contract Chart I-2More Signs Of Relapse##br## In EM EPS Growth Importantly, the EM corporate earnings slowdown will not occur in a vacuum. It will transpire amid a slowdown in Asian trade and lower commodities prices. In particular: China's broad money M3 impulse leads domestic industrial orders, nominal manufacturing production and imports (Chart I-3). Even though Asian export data were strong in August, China's container freight index signals a slowdown in Asian trade lies ahead (Chart I-4). Chart I-3China: M3 Impulse And Domestic Demand Chart I-4Asian Export Growth To Slow The Chinese broad money impulse also points to a rollover in Korean, Taiwanese, other EM as well as DM countries' shipments to the mainland (Chart I-5). This is how the slowdown in China's money/credit will hurt corporate profits in EM as well as in DM sectors with substantial exposure to Chinese growth. Besides, China's broad money impulse leads industrial metals prices in general and iron ore prices in particular (Chart I-6). This signifies downside risks to commodities producers. Finally, China's yield curve suggests that mainland manufacturing PMI will roll over after its recent ascent (Chart I-7). Chart I-5Shipments To China Are At Risk Chart I-6Industrial Metals Prices Have Peaked Chart I-7China: The Yield Curve And Manufacturing PMI In short, China has been gradually tightening monetary policy, which has already manifested in record-low broad money growth. The next phase is evidence of a material deterioration in sales and profits among China-exposed plays. The EM stock markets are unlikely to ignore it. Q: It seems you are putting a lot of emphasis on China's broad money M3 measure. Why do you look at your version of Chinese broad money M3 and not at official M2 and total social financing (TSF)? A: Over the past several months we have done a lot of research and analysis on China's money and credit, and believe that our broad money M3 measure and private and public credit aggregate calculated by BIS are presently better measures of money and credit than official broad money M2 and TSF: First, the TSF data have become distorted because of the local government financing vehicles (LGFV) debt swap program. Specifically, according to the LGFV debt swap mechanics, starting in 2015 provincial governments began issuing bonds that have been purchased by banks. The amount of bonds issued was RMB 3.2 trillion in 2015, RMB 4.9 trillion in 2016 and expected to be RMB 4.8 trillion in 2017. This amounts to total issuance of RMB 12.9 trillion since the commencement of the program. As the next step, local governments were supposed to transfer the proceeds from these bond issuances to their LGFVs, with the latter using the money to pay down their debt. The ultimate goal of the program is to shift the debt from LGFVs to provincial governments, as the latter's creditworthiness is much better than the former. This has also reduced interest rates on the debt as provincial governments borrow at lower interest rates than LGFVs. All that said, it is unclear how much of their debt LGFVs have repaid. The main problem with using TSF data is knowing the amount of proceeds from the issued debt swap bonds that were used to pay down LGFV debt. If the entire amount of these bonds issued by provincial governments was used to pay down LGFV debt, there would not be an impact on economic activity, and only a very short-term impact on money supply. When banks buy bonds from non-banks (including governments), they create new money. When debtors (including governments and their entities) pay down debt to banks, money is destroyed. Nevertheless, both official M1 growth and our measure of broad money (M3) were too strong in 2015 and 2016 – i.e., they remained strong much longer than would have been justified by the LGFV debt swap. Furthermore, private and public credit, M2 and M3 money measures have decoupled from TSF since the middle of 2015 (Chart I-8A). TSF adjusted for the LGFV debt swap – the latter is added to TSF – has also diverged from official M2, our broad money M3 and BIS’s private and public credit measures (Chart I-8B). This corroborates that TSF data can no longer serve as a reliable measure of credit/money origination. Chart I-8AChina: TSF Has Diverged From ##br##Other Money/Credit Measures Chart I-8BChina: TSF Adjusted For LGFV Debt Swap Has Also Decoupled From Money/Credit Measures Markedly, paying down debt by LGFVs should have reduced corporate debt outstanding by RMB 12.9 trillion, which would represent a 12% drop from the RMB 112 trillion outstanding at the end of 2015. However, corporate debt has continued to expand rapidly, even as government debt has surged. Given all of the above, we doubt all of the proceeds from bonds issued within the LGFV debt swap program were immediately used to repay LGFV debt. Instead, we suspect the proceeds from the bond issuance might have been at least partially invested into the economy in 2016, in defiance of the rules of LGFV debt swap operation. We played down the rise in M1 in late 2015 and early 2016 because we regarded it as temporary, reflecting the LGFV debt swap program. In retrospect, it was a mistake - this was one of the main reasons we did not heed the message from recovering money growth in early 2016 to turn cyclically positive on China's growth, and consequently on commodities and broader EM. Provided we do not know what portion of LGFV debt was repaid and when, corporate credit and total social financing data have become difficult to interpret. Chart I-8A and Chart I-8B demonstrate that TSF with and without the LGFV debt swap has diverged from private and public debt since the middle of 2015 when the LGFV debt swap program commenced. Apparently, one no longer can rely on TSF or adjust it by the amount of LGFV debt swap to gauge money and credit creation in China. In this context, the aggregate of private and public credit is a much more appropriate measure of credit provision and debt creation than TSF. The basis is because it includes both private and public debt. Indeed, the reshuffling of debt between local governments and LGFVs (the latter are treated as enterprises in China's banking statistics), does not affect either aggregate borrowing or amount of debt held in the economy. Second, when credit numbers are distorted, one needs to resort to money supply measures to judge credit dynamics. The reason is because financial engineering and, in the case of China, the LGFV debt swap program, can obscure the amount of outstanding credit, but they cannot conceal the amount of money banks create when they lend or purchase bonds or any other asset. Money is created when a bank originates claims on non-banks, and money is destroyed when a debt is paid back to the bank. Accordingly, money traces debt creation by banks. Banks can disguise their assets, and corporations and governments can conceal their liabilities, but none of them can camouflage the amount of money in circulation. In short, we trace money to gauge the amount of private and public sector borrowing from banks. This is why we have calculated various measures of money in China to overcome the shortcomings of the TSF. Specifically, we have calculated broad money M3 (see details of our calculation below) and credit-money. The latter is the sum of commercial banks' assets such as claims on non-financial institutions, claims on other financial institutions, claims on government and claim on other resident sectors and commerical banks' as well as the central bank's foreign currency assets. Chart I-9 demonstrates various measures of broad money and outstanding credit: official M2, our measure of broad money M3, our credit-money measure, and private and public debt (source BIS). Importantly, all measures of money and private and public credit suggest that credit origination/money creation was very strong in 2015 and 2016, and that it has slowed substantially in 2017. In brief, the message from various measures of money/credit is consistent. Chart I-9China: Money/Credit Growth Has Decelerated To New Lows Interestingly, broad money M3 rose by RMB 21 trillion in 2015, RMB 20 trillion in 2016 and by only RMB 16.5 trillion in the past 12 months through end of August. This is why the M3 impulse - a change in money flows - has turned negative since early this year. Third, we prefer our broad money measure M3 to official M2 because it is more consistent with the BIS's measure of private and public credit. It has also served as a better tool in forecasting the 2016-2017 recovery in Chinese growth. As can be seen in Chart 1, 3, 4, 5 and 6 on previous pages, the M3 impulse - its second derivative - has a great track record in forecasting China's business cycle dynamics. The acceleration in M2 growth in 2015-16 was milder than one would expect in order to achieve meaningful acceleration in nominal economic activity. M2 growth was more subdued than a rise in both private and public debt (Chart I-9). We suspect that M2 is no longer an encompassing measure of broad money in China, and therefore we have calculated other measures of broad money to gauge true money/credit creation. Chart I-10China: Consumer Price Inflation Is Rising Broad money consists of various liabilities of commercial banks. While the official M2 includes many of their liabilities such as corporate demand deposits, corporate time deposits and personal deposits. It does not include some others. We have added the following commercial banks' liabilities - transferable deposits and other deposits which are not included in M2, liabilities to other financial corporations and other liabilities - to M2 to produce a more all-inclusive measure of broad money M3. Q: Why can't the Chinese authorities stimulate and revive growth again, like they have done many times in the past? A: Of course, they can. However, if the authorities begin easing monetary/credit and fiscal policies now, it will affect growth six to nine months down the road. Based on money and credit indicators shown in the charts above, growth is set to slow over the next nine months because of the time lag that money/credit has on the economy. In the next six to nine months, economic activity and corporate profits are likely to decelerate considerably, based on the monetary/credit tightening that has already occurred in China. Provided China-related financial markets in general and EM risk assets in particular have so far not discounted the slowdown suggested by China's money/credit indicators, they are very vulnerable. Finally, the magnitude of the impending growth slump is likely to be large, as evidenced by the substantial decline in these money and credit indicators that has already occurred. In brief, policymakers have been tightening credit/money creation, and it has not yet impacted financial markets. Furthermore, inflation is rising in China (Chart I-10) and policymakers are unlikely to start easing before they witness a major growth slump. Until the latter becomes visible in economic data and on the ground, financial markets leveraged to mainland growth will sell off notably. Q: There is no indication that the Federal Reserve will turn hawkish. This will be especially true if global growth slows - as you argue it will because of China. Why do you expect the EM currency rally to peter out amid a dovish Fed? Historical empirical evidence suggests that EM currencies are often driven by commodities prices, not the interest rate differential over U.S. rates. Let's take the BRL and the ZAR as examples. Charts I-11A and Chart I-11B illustrate that the BRL and ZAR exchange rates versus the U.S. dollar have historically been closely correlated with commodities prices, not the level of or change in their interest rate differential over the U.S. Chart I-11ABrazil: What Drives The Currency? Chart I-11BSouth Africa: What Drives The Currency? This has also been true over the past 18 months. The rally in EM currencies since early 2016 can be largely attributed to the rise in commodities prices. As and when commodities prices roll over - as we expect to occur - the trade balances of commodities-producing nations will deteriorate, as will their currencies. Remarkably, there are tentative signs that the drop in U.S. bond yields and the greenback's depreciation are late and overdone. Two-year U.S. bond yields have bounced from their 200-day moving average (please refer to the middle panel of Chart II-1 in the Mexican section). Typically, such a technical profile leads to new highs. Our sense is that U.S. bond yields will rebound in the coming months, which will also weigh on EM currencies. Importantly, one of the drivers behind the U.S. dollar selloff since early this year has been the rise in banks' excess reserves at the Fed (Chart I-12). The latter was due to the debt ceiling, as the U.S. Treasury was running down its account at the Fed by issuing less paper. In short, since the beginning of this year the U.S. Treasury did not issue bonds/bills and deposit them at its Treasury General Account (TGA) at the Fed - meaning it was not destroying banking system reserves as it typically does. This boosted the supply of U.S. dollars - banks' excess reserves at the Fed rose by US$ 300 billion. More dollar supply depressed both the exchange rate and U.S. interest rates. Chart I-12 demonstrates that in the post-QE era, banks' excess reserves at the Fed have correlated with the U.S. dollar's exchange rate. The debt ceiling has been resolved for now, and the Treasury will now begin accumulating dollars in its TGA account again. It has already announced that its TGA will rise from $73 billion now to $400 billion at the end of this year. The Treasury will issue more paper, and deposit U.S. dollars in the TGA. This will shrink banks' excesses reserves. This, in tandem with the reduction in the Fed's balance sheet, will diminish banks' excess reserves. The latter will reduce U.S. dollar supply in off-shore markets and will likely trigger a U.S. dollar rebound. On the whole, the two pillars of the EM currency rally - strong growth in China that manifests in higher commodities prices and lower U.S. bond yields - are set to reverse. In turn, a potential EM currency selloff along with deteriorating EM corporate profits will likely weigh on EM equities and EM sovereign and corporate debt. Q: Does this mean EM stocks will relapse in absolute terms, or simply underperform the DM equity markets? Our strongest conviction at the moment is on EM relative equity performance versus DM equity markets. Odds are that a relapse in relative performance is imminent as and if U.S. bond yields rise (Chart I-13). Chart I-12U.S. Banks' Excess Reserves ##br##And The U.S. Dollar Chart I-13U.S. Stocks Outperform EM Ones When ##br##U.S. Bond Yields Are Rising In addition, U.S. stocks' underperformance versus the global equity index in common currency terms is at a technical support (Chart I-14, top panel), and will likely reverse as the dollar firms up. Historically, when U.S. stocks outperform the global benchmark in common currency terms - denoted by shaded periods in Chart I-14, EM stocks typically underperform the global equity index. The dynamics of EM equity absolute performance depends on investor's risk appetite. It will be hard for EM share prices to drop meaningfully as the DM rally persists. Global stocks are still trading well, and it is very difficult to pinpoint any trigger that will lead to a reversal. As our readers well know, we do not forecast triggers for the simple reason that the chances of getting it right are much lower than a coin toss. That said, in the medium term, the reason for a correction in DM stocks could well be EM/China growth, as it was in 2015. In such a scenario, EM risk assets will sell off first. As to timing, it is hard to find indicators that lead share prices, but aggregate EM narrow (M1) money growth has historically been coincident or leading with EM share prices - and it presently points to a considerable drop in EM equity prices (Chart I-15). This EM M1 aggregate is equity market-cap weighted making it relevant to investors. Chart I-14EM And U.S. Equites Typically Do Not Outperform Global Stocks Simultaneously Chart I-15EM M1 Growth And EM Share Prices Arthur Budaghyan, Senior Vice President Emerging Markets Strategy arthurb@bcaresearch.com A New Trade: Receive Mexican / Pay U.S. 2-Year Swap Rates Mexico's 2-year bond yield has recently fallen through a technical support line while the U.S. 2-year bond yield has recently bounced off a major support level (Chart II-1). Our bias is that the 2-year yield in Mexico will fall relative to 2-year U.S. yield (Chart II-1, bottom panel). We recommend a new trade: receive 2-year swap rates in Mexico and pay U.S. 2-year swap rates. Historically, the domestic demand cycle in Mexico was synchronized with the business cycle in the U.S., mainly due to the fact these two economies are heavily integrated. However, the two economies have recently become desynchronized. This is evident by the fact that the Mexican export sector - which is leveraged to U.S. - is booming while the domestic demand in Mexico is slowing down (Chart II-2). Chart II-12-Year Bond Yields: Mexico And U.S. Chart II-2Divergence Within Mexican Economy The culprit behind this desynchronization is the previous collapse in the peso. Falling oil prices and excessive money/credit expansion in Mexico led to a major peso depreciation in 2014 and 2015. The election of Trump pushed it off the cliff in 2016. Inflation in Mexico spiked due to the massive currency depreciation. Consequently, the Mexican central bank has hiked interest rates by 400 basis points since the end of 2015. This, along with fiscal tightening, has choked domestic demand growth in Mexico. At this point, our bias is that the short-term interest rate differential between Mexico and the U.S. is unjustifiably wide and is about to narrow. Going forward, we expect inflation to fall in Mexico and interest rate expectations will at minimum not rise. Inflation in Mexico will roll over soon and moderate because of the following: A large part of the rise in inflation was caused by the depreciation in the peso. The peso's material appreciation this year will reduce the inflation rate (Chart II-3). Consumer spending and capital expenditure are set to continue slumping as the impact of higher interest rates continues filtering through the economy (Chart II-4, top and bottom panel). Chart II-3Mexico: Exchange Rate And Core Inflation Chart II-4Mexico: Domestic Demand To Disappoint Further Domestic vehicle sales are shrinking signifying no revival in interest rate-dependent sectors. Fiscal policy has been tightening and this will continue to be a headwind on economic growth (Chart II-5). Hence, despite flourishing exports to the U.S., very weak domestic demand will dampen inflation in Mexico. Finally, there were several one-off effects to inflation such as the gasoline subsidy removal that took place at the end of last year, and the minimum wage hike that was implemented at the beginning of the year. As the base effect of these fade, the inflation rate will moderate. In the U.S., our bias is that interest rate expectations are too low given the tight labor market, reasonably strong growth, and the U.S. dollar depreciation this year. Odds are that the U.S. interest rate expectations will rise as core inflation moves up (Chart II-6). Chart II-5Mexico: A Major Improvement In Fiscal Position Chart II-6U.S. Core Inflation To Rise Investment Recommendations We recommend fixed-income traders to receive Mexican / pay U.S. 2-year swap rates. The main risk to this trade lies in the event of an abrupt sell-off in the peso against the U.S dollar that could push up the 2-year swap rate differential. While we expect EM currencies, including the peso, to depreciate, this trade is still favorable in terms of risk-reward because of the starting point in interest rate differential and peso valuations: Despite the rally this year, the peso is still cheap (Chart II-7). Furthermore, its current account and fiscal balances have improved dramatically. So, the peso should depreciate less than many other EM currencies. Chart II-7The MXN Is Still Cheap In fact, the interest rate spread between Mexico and the U.S. is already historically high, and the peso depreciation might not push it much higher. We would not be recommending this trade if the peso was fairly or overvalued, or if interest rates in Mexico were not this high. Entering this position under these current circumstances reduces the downside risk and, therefore, makes the risk-reward attractive. As to Mexican financial markets in general, we remain constructive on the peso versus other EM currencies. More specifically, we continue to recommend long positions in MXN versus ZAR and BRL. Mexican local currency bonds and sovereign credit offer good value relative to their EM counterparts. Fixed income investors should continue to overweight Mexican local currency and sovereign credit within their respective EM benchmarks. Finally, the outlook for Mexican stocks in absolute terms is poor as domestic demand will slump, further hampering corporate profits. Within an EM equity portfolio we recommend neutral allocation to this bourse mainly due to our expectations of the peso outperforming other EM currencies. Stephan Gabillard, Senior Analyst stephang@bcaresearch.com Equity Recommendations Fixed-Income, Credit And Currency Recommendations
Feature The Brazilian economy is finally improving following a devastating depression of about 3 years, where real GDP dropped by a whopping 7.4%. Does the current economic revival warrant a bullish stance on its financial markets? If the global risk-on trade persists among EM risk assets and commodities and there are no domestic political blunders in Brazil, the country's financial markets will continue to rally as economic growth improves. If the EM and commodities rallies wane and an EM risk-off cycle develops, Brazilian risk assets will sell off, regardless of domestic economic recovery. Provided economies around the world have become interconnected, it is often difficult to separate global economic and financial market impact from domestic economic dynamics. Yet, it is possible to do so in Brazil in the latest cycle. Chart I-1 demonstrates that the Brazilian real bottomed with iron ore prices on December 21, 2015 - not with the bottom in the Brazilian economy in early Q1 2017 (Chart I-1, bottom panel). In turn, the currency's rally amid the collapse in domestic demand has led to a material drop in inflation and allowed the central bank to cut interest rates aggressively. The exchange rate is the main variable driving financial markets in many developing countries, including Brazil. In these countries, it is the exchange rate that causes swings in interest rate expectations, not the other way around. Furthermore, other important variables that led to the bottom in iron ore prices and the BRL were the Chinese manufacturing PMI and money growth, both of which bottomed in the second half of 2015 (Chart I-2). Chart 1BRL Correlates With Commodities ##br##Not Domestic Demand Chart 2Chinese Data Led##br## The Bottom In BRL In short, economic recovery arrived much later in Brazil, and so far it has been exceptionally tame and tentative (Chart I-3). Brazil's domestic demand performance has in no way justified the rally in its financial markets since January 2016. If anything, it is the opposite: the domestic economic recovery emerged too late, and has been extremely subdued compared with the sizable gains in share prices. For example, banks' EPS bottomed only in May 2017, while their share prices troughed in January 2016 (Chart I-4). Similarly, Brazil's fiscal outlook and debt profile has continued to deteriorate, even though the country's sovereign spreads have tightened substantially (Chart I-5). Chart 3Brazil: Economic Recovery Is Exceptionally Tame Chart 4Brazil: Bank Share Prices And EPS Chart 5Brazil's Fiscal And Debt Profiles Have Deteriorated Hence, one can safely argue that economic growth and domestic fundamentals were not the basis behind why Brazilian financial markets found a bottom and rallied starting January 2016. Rather, the critical driving force has been commodities prices, China, the U.S. dollar and global risk appetite. This is consistent with the defining features of bull and bear markets: In a bull market, liquidity lifts all boats, and all flaws are overlooked or discharged while minor positives are magnified by the market. In a bear market, even marginal negatives are overblown, and the market punishes severely for minor missteps. In short, global risk assets have been in a genuine bull market since early 2016, and that has overridden Brazil's poor domestic fundamentals. Going forward, we recommend avoiding Brazilian risk assets - not because we do not expect an economic recovery in Brazil to progress, but because our view on China's impact on commodities and the potential U.S. dollar rebound will curb overall risk appetite toward EM. We discussed this EM/China/commodities outlook at length in last week's report.1 Timing a shift in financial market regimes is always a difficult task, but our sense is that a top in EM risk assets will likely occur between now and the end of October, as China's Communist party Congress reiterates its focus on containing financial risk and leverage, as well as the authorities' marginal tolerance for slightly slower growth. Furthermore, our broad money (M3) impulse for China suggests an imminent relapse in Goldman Sach's current economic activity indicator for the mainland economy (Chart I-6). Our assumption is that commodities prices will drop due to potential weakness in China, and that the U.S. dollar and U.S. bond yields are oversold and will recover, respectively. Altogether, these views warrant a cautious stance on EM currencies. The real has historically been correlated with commodities prices, and this positive correlation will likely continue. As and when the Brazilian currency resumes its depreciation, the risk-on trade in Brazilian equities and credit markets will end. As for Brazilian financial markets, a few relationships are worth highlighting: Since early this year, iron ore prices have been inversely correlated with Chinese money market rates (Chart I-7). A possible explanation is that iron ore and other commodities prices trading on Chinese exchanges have been driven by meaningful speculative buying that negatively correlates with borrowing costs on the mainland. Chart 6China's Growth Is Set To Slow Chart 7Iron Ore Prices Are Vulnerable Given the latest relapse in Brazil's nominal GDP growth, the pace of amelioration in private banks' NPL and NPL provisions could stall (Chart I-8). In turn, Brazilian banks' share prices seem to move inversely with the rate of change in private banks' NPL and NPL provisions (Chart I-9A & Chart I-9B). If these relationships hold, we might be close to a peak in Brazilian bank share prices. Chart 8Brazil: Is The Improvement In NPL Cycle Over? Chart 9ABrazil: NPL Cycles and Bank Stocks Chart 9BBrazil: Provisions Cycles And Bank Stocks Finally, the pace of economic recovery will likely disappoint because the Brazilian economy is facing numerous headwinds: High borrowing costs - the real prime lending rate is 12.5% and the policy rate in the real terms is 6.8%, while public banks' lending rates are set to rise due to the TJLP reform that will remove the government budget's subsidy for borrowers. With 50% of outstanding credit being earmarked credit (previously subsidized by the government and provided by public banks), the impact on economic activity will be non-trivial; Lower government spending, as 2018 government expenditure growth cannot exceed the 2017 June headline inflation rate of 3%. Besides, the fiscal balance is so disastrous that risks to taxes are to the upside, not downside. Furthermore, the recently augmented 2017 year-end fiscal primary deficit target of BRL 159 billion is smaller than the deficit of BRL 182 billion for the past 12 months. This entails government spending cuts are likely this year, which will weigh on growth. The Brazilian exchange rate is not cheap. The nation needs a cheaper currency to reflate its economy. Lingering political uncertainty amid the corruption scandals and upcoming presidential elections in fall 2018 will continue to weigh on capital spending and employment, which have not yet recovered. Bottom Line: Our overarching negative view on EM, China and commodities heralds staying cautious on Brazil's financial markets despite the early signs of domestic economic recovery. Arthur Budaghyan, Senior Vice President Emerging Markets Strategy arthurb@bcaresearch.com Andrija Vesic, Research Assistant andrijav@bcaresearch.com 1 Please refer to the Emerging Markets Strategy Weekly Report, titled "Copper Versus Money/Credit In China - Which One Is Right?", dated September 6,. Equity Recommendations Fixed-Income, Credit And Currency Recommendations
Highlights The ECB can talk down the euro, but not by much. The central bank has previously expressed comfort with EUR/USD at 1.15. The cyclical and structural direction of EUR/USD is higher... ...because the euro area versus U.S. long bond yield spread should ultimately compress to -40 bps from today's -130 bps. Remain neutral in Germany's DAX and underweight Sweden's OMX. Equity markets with a strong base currency and a large exposure to exporters will come under pressure. Overweight German consumer services equities versus German exporters and the DAX. Underweight U.K. consumer services equities versus the FTSE100. Feature When mariners know that a sea-change is coming, their concern is not whether it comes today, tomorrow or the day after tomorrow. The big issue is the sea-change itself - because it brings major implications for navigating the seas. In the same way, when currency markets know that a sea-change in monetary policy is coming, their concern is not whether the policy announcement comes on September 7, October 26 or December 141 - or indeed whether the sea-change will happen suddenly or gradually. At a sea-change, currency markets look much further ahead. Just as for mariners, the big issue is the sea-change itself. EUR/USD is now moving in lockstep with the expected differential between euro area and U.S. policy interest rates not next year, nor the year after next, but rather the differential five years out (Chart I-2). Chart I-1AA Strong Euro Is Good For ##br##German Consumer Services... Chart I-1B...A Weak Pound Is Bad For##br## U.K. Consumer Services Chart I-2EUR/USD Is Moving In Line With The Interest ##br##Rate Differential Expected In 2022 The ECB Can Talk Down The Euro, But Not By Much Chart I-3EUR/USD Might Find Support At 1.15 Therefore, if the ECB really wants to unwind the euro's sharp appreciation this year, the central bank must tell the market that the expectation for a sea-change is completely wrong. In other words, the ECB must indicate that it has no intention to dial back its emergency monetary accommodation. Such a volte-face is unlikely, for two reasons. First, the ECB likes to adjust market expectations incrementally rather than violently. The last policy meeting made the case "for proceeding gradually and prudently when approaching adjustments in the monetary policy stance and communication." Second, not to dial-back its emergency monetary accommodation flies in the face of a euro area economic expansion that is solid, broad, and among the strongest and best-established among major developed economies. "Postponing an adjustment for too long could give rise to a misalignment between the Governing Council's communication and its assessment of the state of the economy, which could (eventually) trigger more pronounced volatility in financial markets." Nevertheless, at the margin, dovish words from Draghi could pare back the euro. How much? Consider that at the last policy meeting EUR/USD stood at 1.15 and the ECB justified this level on the basis of the improved "relative fundamentals in the euro area vis-à-vis the rest of the world." (Chart I-3) Given that these relative fundamentals are still intact, 1.15 might provide a level of support in a technical retracement. Of course, EUR/USD also depends on the Federal Reserve and expectations for its policy rate five years out. EUR/USD would sink if the market became much more hawkish about where it sees the U.S. 'terminal' interest rate. However, for the terminal rate expectation to rise suddenly and sharply in the U.S. relative to the euro area would also fly in the face of the economic data on both sides of the Atlantic. Recently, there has been little difference in either economic growth or inflation rates. The 'Neutral' Real Interest Rates In The Euro Area And U.S. Are The Same More fundamentally, there is little difference in the so-called 'neutral' (or mid-cycle) real interest rates in the euro area and the U.S. Through the 19 years of the euro's life, the euro area versus U.S. long bond yield spread has averaged -40 bps2 (Chart I-4). Over this same period, the euro area versus U.S. annual inflation differential has also averaged -40 bps (Chart I-5). Ergo, the real interest rate differential has averaged zero. Meaning, the neutral real interest rates in the euro area and the U.S. have been exactly the same. Chart I-4Euro-U.S.: Average Interest ##br##Differential = -40bps Chart I-5Euro Area-U.S.: ##br##Inflation Differential = -40bps Bear in mind that the 19 year life of the euro captures multiple manias and crises, some centred in Europe, some in the U.S. Hence, 1999-2017 is a good representation of what the future holds, at least in relative terms if not in absolute terms. With little difference in the neutral real rates over the past two decades, is there any reason to expect a big difference in the future? Our starting assumption has to be no. Chart I-6If Composition Differences Were Removed, ##br##Euro Area And U.S. Inflation Would Be Near-Identical In fact, even the -40 bps annual inflation shortfall in the euro area is due to a compositional difference in the consumer price baskets. The euro area does not include owner occupied housing costs, whereas the U.S. does at a hefty weighting.3 If this compositional difference were removed, inflation would also be near-identical (Chart I-6). Still, each central bank must target inflation as it is defined in its respective jurisdiction, so let's assume the annual inflation differential continues to average -40 bps. In this case, the long bond yield spread should also ultimately compress to -40 bps from today's -130 bps. The biggest risk to this view is if the existential threat to the euro resurfaced. Looking at the political calendar, the German Federal Election on September 24 poses no such threat. Meanwhile, ahead of the Italian general election to be held no later than May 20 2018, even the non-establishment Five Star Movement and Northern League are toning down their anti-euro rhetoric. As my colleague Marko Papic, our Chief Geopolitical Strategist, puts it: "euro area politics are a red herring." On this basis, our central expectation is that the euro area versus U.S. yield spread has the scope to compress much further from its current -130 bps. This means that after a possible near-term retracement, we expect the cyclical and the structural rally in the euro to resume. German Consumers Are Winners, U.K. Consumers Are Losers When European currencies strengthen, the big winners are European consumers because they become richer in terms of the goods and services they can buy in international markets. This is significant because Europe imports its food and energy in large (and inelastic) volumes. Hence, their price decline in local currency terms significantly boosts the real spending power of consumers. And vice-versa (Chart I-7). As if to prove the point, German consumer services equities have rallied strongly this year (Chart I-8). And their outperformance has closely tracked euro strength (Chart of the Week, left panel). Across the English Channel, it is the mirror-image story. The pound has slumped. And the big losers are U.K. consumers, whose real spending power is evaporating as food and energy prices - in pound terms - rise. Again, to prove the point, U.K. consumer services equities have struggled to make any headway this year (Chart I-9). And their underperformance has closely tracked the trade-weighted pound's weakness (Chart of the Week, right panel). Chart I-7German Consumption Accelerating,##br## U.K. Consumption Decelerating Chart I-8German Consumer Services ##br##Have Rallied Chart I-9U.K. Consumer Services ##br##Have Struggled If the euro has more cyclical and structural upside - as we anticipate - then these equity performance trends have further to run. Chart I-10The Exporter Heavy DAX And##br## OMX Have Struggled Remain overweight German consumer services equities versus German exporters and the DAX. And remain underweight U.K. consumer services equities versus the FTSE100. At the same time, equity markets with a strong base currency and a large exposure to exporters will come under pressure. Mostly, this is because the translation of multi-currency international earnings into a strengthening base currency hurts index profits. For the time being, this influences our allocation to Germany's DAX - in which we have been neutral relative to the Eurostoxx600 - and Sweden's OMX - in which we have been underweight (Chart I-10). Next week, we will update our overall European country allocation. Given the large sector skews in European equity indexes, this country allocation is heavily dependent on the stance towards Healthcare and Banks. Hence, we await any incremental communication from the ECB. Dhaval Joshi, Senior Vice President Chief European Investment Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com 1 These are the dates of the ECB's three remaining monetary policy meetings in 2017. 2 Calculated from the over 10-year government bond yield: euro area average, weighted by sovereign issue size, less U.S. 3 The imputed cost of owner occupied housing (owners' equivalent rent of residences) comprises 25% of the U.S. consumer price basket but 0% of the euro area consumer price basket. Fractal Trading Model Basic materials equities are technically overbought. Initiate a short position relative to the broad market with a profit target / stop loss at 2.5%. In other trades, long Mediaset Espana / short IBEX35 hit its stop-loss. For any investment, excessive trend following and groupthink can reach a natural point of instability, at which point the established trend is highly likely to break down with or without an external catalyst. An early warning sign is the investment's fractal dimension approaching its natural lower bound. Encouragingly, this trigger has consistently identified countertrend moves of various magnitudes across all asset classes. Chart I-11 The post-June 9, 2016 fractal trading model rules are: When the fractal dimension approaches the lower limit after an investment has been in an established trend it is a potential trigger for a liquidity-triggered trend reversal. Therefore, open a countertrend position. The profit target is a one-third reversal of the preceding 13-week move. Apply a symmetrical stop-loss. Close the position at the profit target or stop-loss. Otherwise close the position after 13 weeks. Use the position size multiple to control risk. The position size will be smaller for more risky positions. * For more details please see the European Investment Strategy Special Report "Fractals, Liquidity & A Trading Model," dated December 11, 2014, available at eis.bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading Model Recommendations Equities Bond & Interest Rates Currency & Other Positions Closed Fractal Trades Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Currency & Bond Equity Sector Country Equity Indicators Bond Yields Chart II-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart II-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Interest Rate Chart II-5Indicators To Watch ##br##- Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-6Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-7Indicators To Watch##br## - Interest Rate Expectations Chart II-8Indicators To Watch ##br##- Interest Rate Expectations
Highlights Chart 1"Trump Trade" Progress Report One of our seven investment themes for 2017, published in a Special Report last December, is that the combination of strong U.S. growth and accommodative Fed policy creates a cyclical sweet spot in which risk assets will outperform. After last week's GDP revisions we now know that real growth averaged 2.1% in the first half of the year, solidly above the Fed's 1.8% estimate of trend. Meanwhile, weak inflation has caused markets to discount an exceptionally shallow path for Fed rate hikes - only 19 bps of rate hikes are priced for the next 12 months. This divergence between growth and inflation is reflected in Treasury yields. The real 10-year yield is 24 bps above its pre-election level, while the compensation for inflation protection is only 5 bps higher (Chart 1). Not surprisingly, the cyclical sweet spot has led corporate bonds to outperform duration-matched Treasuries by 296 bps since the election. The persistence of the cyclical sweet spot leads us to believe that last month's politically-driven spread widening should be seen as an opportunity to increase exposure to corporate bonds. Remain at below-benchmark duration and overweight spread product in U.S. fixed income portfolios. Feature Investment Grade: Overweight Chart 2Investment Grade Market Overview Investment grade corporate bonds underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 62 basis points in August, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to 146 bps. The average index option-adjusted spread widened 8 bps on the month to reach 110 bps. In last week's report,1 we demonstrated that to properly assess corporate bond valuations it is not sufficient to simply look at the average index spread. We need to adjust for the fact that both the average credit rating and duration of the index change over time. We also need to consider corporate spreads relative to other similar stages of the economic cycle, not relative to long-run averages. In this respect, considering the breakeven spread2 for each credit tier relative to where it traded in the early stages of prior Fed tightening cycles gives us the best sense of the value proposition in corporate bonds. At present, this analysis shows that while Aaa corporate spreads are expensive, the other investment grade credit tiers all appear fairly valued (Chart 2). Corporate profit data for the second quarter was released last week and showed a big jump in our measure of EBITD (panel 4). This makes it extremely likely that net corporate leverage declined in Q2. All else equal, this lengthens the window for corporate bond outperformance Table 3.3 Table 3ACorporate Sector Relative Valuation And Recommended Allocation* Table 3BCorporate Sector Risk Vs. Reward* High-Yield: Overweight Chart 3High-Yield Market Overview High-Yield underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 67 basis points in August, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to 378 bps. The index option adjusted spread widened 26 bps to end the month at 378 bps, 55 bps above the mid-2014 cycle low. Back in March4 we tested a strategy of buying the High-Yield index relative to Treasuries whenever spreads widened by more than 20 bps in a single month, and then holding the trade for a period of one, two or three months. We found that this "buy the dips" strategy works very well when inflationary pressures are low, but performs poorly when inflation is high and rising. When inflation is low the Fed needs to support the recovery by adopting a more dovish posture whenever financial conditions tighten. With the St. Louis Fed Price Pressures Measure5 at only 6% (Chart 3), we expect a "buy the dips" strategy will continue to work for some time. In terms of valuation, our estimated default-adjusted spread stands at 245 bps. Historically, this level is consistent with excess returns of just under 3% versus duration-matched Treasuries over the subsequent 12 months. Our estimated default-adjusted spread is based on an expected default rate of 2.6%, and an expected recovery rate of 49%. MBS: Underweight Chart 4MBS Market Overview Mortgage-Backed Securities underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 12 basis points in August, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to -9 bps. The conventional 30-year MBS yield fell 13 bps in August, driven by an 18 bps decline in the rate component. This was partially offset by a 4 bps increase in the compensation for prepayment risk (option cost) and a 1 bp widening of the option-adjusted spread (OAS). The Fed is likely to announce the run-off of its balance sheet when it meets later this month. For its part, the market has been pricing-in this eventuality for most of the year, leading to a significant widening in MBS OAS. More recently, the option cost component of MBS spreads has joined in, widening alongside falling mortgage rates and expectations of rising prepayments (Chart 4). In this sense, the Fed's commitment to proceed with balance sheet normalization no matter the outlook for the future pace of rate hikes is doubly negative for MBS spreads. OAS are biased wider as Fed buying exits the market, while low rates encourage faster prepayments and a higher option cost component of spreads. Going forward, the option cost component of spreads will decline as mortgage rates cease their downtrend, but OAS still appear too tight relative to trends in net issuance. Despite robust issuance so far this year and the Fed backing away as a buyer, the conventional 30-year MBS OAS remains well below its pre-crisis mean (panel 2). While MBS are starting to look more attractive, especially relative to Aaa credit (panel 3), we think it is still too soon to buy. Government-Related: Underweight Chart 5Government-Related Market Overview The Government-Related index outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 5 basis points in August, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to 154 bps. The Foreign Agency and Local Authority sectors drove the index outperformance in August. Both beat the duration-matched Treasury benchmark by 12 bps. Sovereigns outperformed the benchmark by 3 bps, Supranationals outperformed by 1 bp, and Domestic Agency bonds underperformed by 2 bps. We took a detailed look at the Sovereign index in a recent report,6 both at the aggregate and individual country levels. At the aggregate level, the two main factors we consider when deciding whether to add USD-denominated sovereigns to our portfolio at the expense of domestic U.S. credit are relative valuation and the outlook for the U.S. dollar (Chart 5). At present, relative valuation is skewed heavily in favor of domestic U.S. credit (panel 2). Added to that, given downbeat Fed rate hike expectations, we view further dollar weakness as unlikely on a 6-12 month horizon. Taken together, we continue to favor U.S. credit over USD-denominated Sovereign debt. At the country level, we identified several countries where USD-backed debt appears attractive. We found that Finland, Mexico and Colombia all offer attractive spreads. However, the spread pick-up available in Mexican and Colombian debt is compensation for heightened exchange rate volatility. Finnish debt appears the most attractive on a risk/reward basis. Municipal Bonds: Underweight Chart 6Municipal Market Overview Municipal bonds underperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 40 basis points in August (before adjusting for the tax advantage). Munis have outperformed the Treasury benchmark by 144 bps, year-to-date. The average Municipal / Treasury (M/T) yield ratio held flat in August, and it remains extremely tight relative to its post-crisis trading range (Chart 6). The M/T yield ratio remains very low despite the fact that state & local government net borrowing continues to rise. Net borrowing increased to $209 billion in Q2, the highest level since the second quarter of last year. Further, the Trump administration appears to be finally tackling the issue of tax reform. While comprehensive tax reform is probably too ambitious, some form of corporate and personal tax cuts seems likely, probably in the first half of next year. Lower tax rates are obviously a negative for municipal bonds, but some of the negative impact could be offset if current tax deductions (such as the deduction of state & local income tax) are removed. All else equal, fewer available tax deductions elsewhere makes the tax exemption of municipal bonds look more attractive. Of course, the municipal bond tax exemption itself could also be threatened, but at least so far this appears less likely. The bottom line is that current M/T yield ratios are far too low given the looming risks of rising state & local government borrowing and looming federal tax cuts. Remain underweight. Treasury Curve: Favor 5-Year Bullet Over 2/10 Barbell Chart 7Treasury Yield Curve Overview The Treasury curve bull flattened in August. The 2/10 slope flattened 17 bps and the 5/30 slope flattened 2 bps. The market moved to discount an even shallower path for Fed rate hikes in August. At the end of July the market had expected 27 bps of rate hikes during the next 12 months, and that number has now fallen to 19 bps (Chart 7). Consequently, our recommendation to short the July 2018 fed funds futures contract has suffered. The position is now 17 bps in the red, but we continue to believe that the market's expected rate hike path is too benign. From current levels, a position short the July 2018 fed funds futures contract will return 35 bps if there are two hikes between now and next July and 61 bps if there are 3 hikes. We also continue to recommend a position long the 5-year bullet versus a duration-matched 2/10 barbell on the view that the Treasury curve will steepen as inflation and TIPS breakevens move higher. This position has earned 28 bps since initiation last December, but valuation is starting to look less attractive. Our butterfly spread model7 suggests that the 5-year bullet is now slightly expensive compared to the 2/10 barbell (panel 3). Or put differently, that the 2/10 Treasury slope will have to steepen by more than 20 bps during the next 6 months for our trade to earn a positive return. TIPS: Overweight Chart 8TIPS Market Overview TIPS underperformed the duration-equivalent nominal Treasury index by 36 basis points in August, dragging year-to-date excess returns down to -169 bps. The 10-year TIPS breakeven inflation rate fell 6 bps on the month and, at 1.76%, it remains well below its pre-crisis trading range of 2.4% to 2.5%. Despite robust growth, extremely weak realized inflation has caused breakevens to tighten this year. Last week's July PCE release was yet another disappointment. The year-over-year core inflation rate fell from 1.51% to 1.41% and the year-over-year trimmed mean rate fell from 1.68% to 1.64% (Chart 8). However, measures of pipeline inflation pressure such as the supplier deliveries and prices paid components of the ISM Manufacturing survey point towards higher inflation. The supplier deliveries component increased from 55.4 to 57.1 in August (panel 4) while the prices paid component held firm at an elevated 62 (panel 3). Adding it all up, and incorporating the fact that employment growth should stay strong enough to maintain downward pressure on the unemployment rate, we think it is very likely that core inflation will soon reverse course and resume the steady uptrend that began in early 2015. TIPS breakevens will widen alongside. At present, our TIPS Financial model suggests that breakevens are trading in line with other financial market instruments (panel 2). In other words, there is no apparent mis-valuation in breakevens relative to other financial markets, and higher realized inflation is likely required before breakevens move sustainably wider. ABS: Overweight Chart 9ABS Market Overview Asset-Backed Securities outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 11 basis points in August, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to 71 bps. Aaa-rated ABS outperformed the benchmark by 10 bps in August, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to 63 bps. Meanwhile, non-Aaa ABS outperformed by 26 bps in August, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to 147 bps. Credit card ABS outperformed the Treasury benchmark by 10 bps in August, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to 69 bps. Auto loan ABS outperformed by 12 bps, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to 71 bps. The index option-adjusted spread for Aaa-rated ABS tightened 4 bps on the month, and remains well below its average pre-crisis level (Chart 9). At 36 bps, the option-adjusted spread for Aaa-rated ABS is now the same as the option-adjusted spread for conventional 30-year Agency MBS. Meanwhile, lending standards are now tightening for both auto loans and credit cards. Further, the New York Fed's Household Debt and Credit Report for the second quarter revealed that "flows of credit card balances into both early and serious delinquencies climbed for the third straight quarter - a trend not seen since 2009."8 While overall credit card charge-offs in ABS collateral pools remain low (panel 4), it is clear that the cyclical winds are shifting against consumer ABS. If the trends of tightening lending standards and rising delinquencies continue, then it will soon be time to reduce consumer ABS exposure, possibly shifting into Agency MBS. Non-Agency CMBS: Underweight Chart 10CMBS Market Overview Non-agency Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 19 basis points in August, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to 116 bps. The index option-adjusted spread for non-agency Aaa-rated CMBS tightened 2 bps on the month, and is approaching one standard deviation below its average pre-crisis level (Chart 10). The combination of tightening lending standards and weaker demand for commercial real estate (CRE) loans (as evidenced by the Fed's Senior Loan Officer Survey) suggests that credit concerns are starting to mount in the CRE space. Meanwhile, CMBS delinquency rates have leveled-off during the past few months and remain much lower in the multi-family space (panel 5). Agency CMBS: Overweight Agency CMBS outperformed the duration-equivalent Treasury index by 14 basis points in August, bringing year-to-date excess returns up to 79 bps. The average index option-adjusted spread for the Agency CMBS index held flat at 48 bps on the month. This compares favorably to the 36 bps offered by both Aaa-rated consumer ABS and conventional 30-year Agency MBS. Not only does the Agency CMBS sector continue to offer an attractive spread relative to both consumer ABS and Agency MBS, but its agency guarantee and concentration in the multi-family space (where delinquencies are still low) makes it look particularly attractive. Treasury Valuation Chart 11Treasury Fair Value Models The current reading from our 2-factor Treasury model (which is based on Global PMI and dollar sentiment) places fair value for the 10-year Treasury yield at 2.67% (Chart 11). Our 3-factor version of the model (not shown), which also includes the Global Economic Policy Uncertainty Index, places fair value at 2.68%. The Global Manufacturing PMI rose to 53.1 in August, from 52.7 in July, reaching a 75-month high (panel 3). Meanwhile, bullish sentiment toward the U.S. dollar continues to plunge (bottom panel). Taken together, these two factors suggest that not only is global growth accelerating but that the global economic recovery is increasingly broad based. This is an extremely bond-bearish development. A broad based global recovery means that when U.S. data finally start surprising positively, it is less likely that any increase in Treasury yields will be met with an influx of foreign demand. For further details on our Treasury models please refer to the U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "The Message From Our Treasury Models", dated October 11, 2016, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com At the time of publication the 10-year Treasury yield was 2.16%. Ryan Swift, Vice President U.S. Bond Strategy rswift@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Policy Reflections", dated August 29, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 2 The 12-month breakeven spread is the basis point widening required over a 12-month period before a corporate bond delivers losses relative to a duration-matched Treasury security. We assume no impact from convexity and calculate the breakeven spread as OAS divided by duration. 3 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Low Inflation And Rising Debt", dated June 13, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 4 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "Keep Buying Dips", dated March 28, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 5 The Price Pressures Measure is a composite indicator which shows the percent chance that PCE inflation will exceed 2.5% during the next 12 months. 6 Please see U.S. Bond Strategy Weekly Report, "The Upside Of A Weaker Dollar", dated August 15, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 7 For further details on our models please see U.S. Bond Strategy Special Report, "Bullets, Barbells And Butterflies", dated July 25, 2017, available at usbs.bcaresearch.com 8 https://www.newyorkfed.org/microeconomics/hhdc Fixed Income Sector Performance Recommended Portfolio Specification Corporate Sector Relative Valuation And Recommended Allocation Total Return Comparison: 7-Year Bullet Versus 2-20 Barbell (6-Month Investment Horizon)
Feature Dear Client, In addition to this abbreviated Weekly Report, I am sending you a Special Report written by Mark McClellan, Managing Editor of the monthly Bank Credit Analyst. Mark makes a compelling case that the deflationary effects of the "Amazon economy" are overstated. I trust you will find his report very informative. Best regards, Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Global Investment Strategy Chart 1September Is Generally ##br##Not A Good Time Of Year For Stocks My colleagues and I convened a meeting earlier this week to discuss whether to abandon our long-standing cyclically bullish view towards risk assets. Several of them felt it was time to turn more cautious. I am sympathetic to their concerns: Valuations are stretched, volatility is low, and geopolitical risks (most notably North Korea) are on the rise. Profit growth is likely to decelerate later this year, as the easy comps stemming from the depressed level of earnings in the first half of 2016 vanish. Meanwhile, stocks are entering the volatile early autumn months, a period which has historically seen poor returns (Chart 1). Nevertheless, at times like these, it is useful to fall back on our time-tested indicators. Bear markets have almost always coincided with economic recessions, with the latter usually causing the former (Chart 2). None of our recession-timing signals are flashing red: To cite just a few examples, ISM manufacturing new orders are strong, initial unemployment claims are low, core capital goods orders are accelerating, and the yield curve is not in any immediate risk of inverting (Chart 3). Chart 2Recessions And Bear Markets Usually Overlap Chart 3No Warnings Of Recession Here U.S. financial conditions have eased sharply this year, which should support growth over the next few quarters (Chart 4). A recent IMF report highlighted that easier U.S. financial conditions tend to generate positive spillovers onto other countries.1 The fact that all 45 countries monitored by the OECD are on track to grow this year - the first time this has happened since 2007 - is a testament to the strong fundamentals underpinning the global economy. Chart 4Easing Financial Conditions Bode Well For Growth The Fed's Dot Problem In this light, the Fed's projection that the unemployment rate will end this year at 4.3% and only fall to 4.2% by end-2018 no longer looks credible. If U.S. GDP growth remains above trend, as we expect, the unemployment rate could fall below its 2000 low of 3.8% by next summer. That will be enough to prompt investors to price in a few more rate hikes. Considering that the market expects just 22 basis points in hikes through to end-2018, this is not a high bar to clear. A bit more fiscal stimulus would add to the pressure to tighten monetary policy. While any meaningful progress on tax reform will be difficult to achieve, the odds are good that Congress will agree to cut statutory corporate and personal tax rates, with the latter focusing mainly on middle-income earners. Failure to raise the debt ceiling or extend federal spending authority beyond the current budget window could scuttle the benefits from lower tax rates. Fortunately, the risks of such an outcome have receded. If there is a silver lining from Hurricane Harvey, it is that the disaster could at least temporarily overcome the political impasse in Washington. Congress will need to appropriate additional disaster relief funds over the coming weeks. Politicians who are seen as creating roadblocks to such funding will face the electorate's wrath. The odds of an infrastructure bill passing through Congress have also risen. All recoveries eventually run out of steam, but this one can last at least until the second half of 2019, which will make it the longest U.S. expansion on record. As we discussed several weeks ago, the next recession is likely to be triggered by the Fed scrambling to hike rates in response to rising inflation.2 This is not an immediate concern, given that it usually takes a while for an overheated economy to generate inflation - especially since the U.S. currently can satisfy rising domestic demand with higher imports. However, the risks of overheating will increase as unemployment falls further and excess capacity elsewhere in the world is absorbed. Draghi After Jackson Hole Chart 5A Stronger Euro Is Deflationary Textbook economic theory states that a shift in consumption towards imported goods requires a real appreciation of the currency. The dollar, of course, has done exactly the opposite of that, depreciating by 6.6% in trade-weighted terms since the start of the year. The euro, in particular, has gained significant ground against the greenback, rising above $1.20 at one point this week. Mario Draghi's failure to express concerns about the resurgent euro during his Jackson Hole address was construed by many market participants as a green light for further currency strength. We are skeptical of this "saying nothing means you are saying something" interpretation. Draghi wanted to acknowledge (and partly take credit for) the recovery across the euro area, but he is cognizant of the problems posed by a stronger euro. The ECB's June forecast showed inflation rising to only 1.6% in 2019. In the period since those forecasts were compiled, the trade-weighted euro has appreciated by 3.9%, bringing the year-to-date gain to 6.2% (Chart 5). ECB staff calculations, which Draghi has approvingly quoted, show that a 10% appreciation in the euro would reduce inflation by 0.2 percentage points in the first year and 0.6-to-0.8 points in the subsequent two years.3 Better-than-expected growth since the June forecasts will offset some of the deflationary impact from the stronger euro, but probably not by much, given that the Phillips curve is quite flat at high-to-moderate levels of spare capacity. With labor market slack across the euro area still 3.2 percentage points higher today than in 2008 (and 6.7 points higher outside of Germany), it will be a while before stronger growth generates markedly higher inflation. We expect the ECB to reduce its 2018/2019 inflation forecast by 0.1-to-0.2 percentage points next week. It would be awkward for the central bank to play up the prospect of monetary policy normalization while it is simultaneously trimming its inflation projections. This suggests that the ECB's communications could turn more dovish, thereby limiting further upside for the euro. EUR/USD is currently trading near the top of the $1.10-to-$1.20 range that we foresee lasting for the next 10 months. Thus, our expectation is that the euro will weaken over the next few months, ending the year near $1.15, and potentially moving back towards its 2017 lows in the second half of next year, as an overheated U.S. economy forces the Fed to pick up the pace of rate hikes. Peter Berezin, Chief Global Strategist Global Investment Strategy peterb@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see "Getting The Policy Mix Right," IMF Global Financial Stability Report, (Chapter 3), (April 2017). 2 Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "From Slow Burn Recovery to Retro-Recession?" dated August 18, 2017. 3 Please see European Central Bank, "March 2017 ECB Staff Macroeconomic Projections For The Euro Area." APPENDIX 1 Tactical Global Asset Allocation Monthly Update To complement our analysis, we use a variety of time-tested models to assess the global investment outlook. At present, these models favor global equities over bonds over a three-month horizon (Appendix Table 1). Appendix Table 1BCA's Tactical Global Asset Allocation Recommendations* Our business cycle equity indicators remain in bullish territory, as reflected in strong global growth and rising corporate earnings. Our monetary and financial indicators are also generally supportive. In contrast, our sentiment readings are sending mixed signals. On the one hand, implied equity volatility remains low and institutional exposure to stocks is quite high. On the other hand, surveys of retail investors show a healthy skepticism towards the bull market, which is a positive contrarian indicator. As has been the case for some time, our valuation measures are signaling that stocks are expensive, but these are typically useful only over horizons beyond one or two years. As we flagged last month, stocks tend to do poorly in August and September, which may hurt returns over the next few weeks. The stronger euro will negatively impact earnings in the euro area. This has caused our models to suggest a slight downgrade to European equities. However, we are inclined to fade this signal, given our expectation that the euro will give up some of its recent gains. Japanese stocks continue to score well on our metrics, buoyed by strengthening corporate profits and attractive valuations. Emerging market equities are fairly valued, although China still appears cheap. The rally in U.S. Treasurys has caused the gap between the 10-year yield and our model's fair value estimate to widen to around 50 basis points, the highest since last September. European and Japanese bonds also look somewhat overvalued, although the latter will continue to receive support from the BoJ's yield curve targeting operations. Strategy & Market Trends Tactical Trades Strategic Recommendations Closed Trades
GAA DM Equity Country Allocation Model Update The GAA DM Equity Country Allocation model is updated as of August 30th, 2017. The model has continued to reduce its allocation to the U.S. driven by worsening liquidity condition, and it's the second consecutive month that the U.S. allocation is the largest underweight. Australia is downgraded to neutral on concern of valuation. Germany and Netherland continued to receive more allocation and Canada's underweight is reduced as well, as shown in Table 1. Table 1Model Allocation Vs. Benchmark Weights Table 2Performance (Total Returns In USD) As shown in Table 2 and Charts 1, 2 and 3, the overall model outperformed its benchmark by 18 bps in August, entirely due to the 43 bps outperformance of Level 2 model where the overweight in Italy and Germany versus the underweight in Japan, Spain and Canada worked very well. Chart 1GAA DM Model Vs. MSCI World Chart 2GAA U.S. Vs. Non U.S. Model (Level1) Chart 3GAA Non U.S. Model (Level 2) Please see also on the website http://gaa.bcaresearch.com/trades/allocation_performance. For more details on the models, please see the January 29th, 2016 Special Report, "Global Equity Allocation: Introducing the Developed Markets Country Allocation Model." http://gaa.bcaresearch.com/articles/view_report/18850. Please note that the overall country and sector recommendations published in our Monthly Portfolio Update and Quarterly Portfolio Outlook use the results of these quantitative models as one input, but do not stick slavishly to them. We believe that models are a useful check, but structural changes and unquantifiable factors need to be considered too in making overall recommendations. GAA Equity Sector Selection Model The GAA Equity Sector Selection Model (Chart 4) is updated as of August 30, 2017. Chart 4Overall Model Performance Table 3Allocations Table 4Performance Since Going Live The model is optimistic on global growth and maintains in cyclical tilt. However, the magnitude of overweight in cyclical sectors has reduced on the back of momentum indicators. The biggest change has been utilities which has moved from a 2% underweight to a 1.7% overweight. For more details on the model, please see the Special Report "Introducing The GAA Equity Sector Selection Model," July 27, 2016 available at https://gaa.bcaresearch.com. Xiaoli Tang, Associate Vice President xiaoli@bcaresearch.com Aditya Kurian, Research Analyst adityak@bcaresearch.com
Highlights Yellen sidesteps monetary policy at Jackson Hole. The Fed raised rates in late 1990s before seeing any inflation. Tax cut deal is still likely... ..but a prolonged debt ceiling battle or government shutdown is not. Inflation surprise has not yet followed economic surprise higher. Earnings and earnings guidance matters more than politics. Feature Fed Chair Yellen's speech on financial stability at the Jackson Hole symposium on Friday, August 25 shed little light on the timing of the central bank's next policy move. Some investors were fearing that Yellen would give a nod to the hawks in her speech. Yellen did no such thing. She simply noted "that the core reforms we have put in place have substantially boosted resilience without unduly limiting credit availability or economic growth". Yellen made no comments to suggest that monetary policy needs to tighten in order to reduce financial froth and foster greater stability. Financial stability1 matters to the Fed almost as much as maintaining low and stable inflation, and full employment. In this week's report, we discuss the FOMC's deliberations when the economy was at full employment in the late 1990s, and note that the Fed was willing to raise rates even before inflation accelerated. Gary Cohn, a potential replacement for Yellen, suggested in an interview last week that tax cut legislation is on the way. We agree and discuss below. The economic surprise index is rebounding, but that has not yet led to positive surprises on inflation as it has in the past. We also examine what history says about earnings guidance, U.S. equities and the stock-to-bond ratios during and after earnings reporting season. Fed Deliberations At Full Employment Chart 1The Fed And Inflation At Full Employment Minutes from FOMC meetings in the late 1990s are instructive in understanding the central bank's reaction function due to a lack of inflation as the economy moves beyond full employment (Chart 1). The Fed cut rates following the LTCM financial crisis in late 1998 and subsequently held the fed funds rate at 4¾% until June 1999. Core inflation was roughly flat during the on-hold period, even as the unemployment rate steadily declined and various measures pointed to significant labor market tightness. The FOMC discussion in the late 1990s of why inflation was still quiescent sounds very familiar. Policymakers pointed to the widespread inability of firms to raise prices because of strong competitive pressures in domestic and global markets. In the Fed's view, significant cost-saving efforts and new technologies also contributed to the low inflation environment for both consumer prices and wages. Moreover, rapid increases in imports and a drawdown in the pool of available workers was also seen as satisfying growing demand and avoiding upward pressure on inflation. One difference from today is that productivity growth was solid at that time. The FOMC decided to hike rates in June 1999 by a quarter point, despite any indication that inflation had turned up. Policymakers described the tightening as "a small preemptive move... (that) would provide a degree of insurance against worsening inflation later". The Fed went on to lift the fed funds rate to 6½% by May 2000. Interestingly, the unemployment rate in June 1999 was 4.3%, the same as the current rate. There are undoubtedly important differences in today's macro backdrop. The Fed is also more fearful of making a policy mistake in the aftermath of the Great Recession and financial crisis. Nonetheless, the point is that the Fed has faced a similar low inflation / tight labor market environment before. Question marks regarding the structural headwinds to inflation will remain in place, but it will not take much of a rise in core inflation in the coming months for the Fed to deliver the next rate hike (most likely in December). Any fiscal stimulus, were it to occur, would reinforce the FOMC's bias to normalize interest rates. Is All Lost For U.S. Tax Cuts? Although tax reform was a major component of President Trump's legislative agenda, investors are skeptical that any fiscal stimulus or tax cuts will succeed (Chart 2). In our view, there is a high probability that at least a modest package will be passed. The reason is that, if it fails, Republicans will return empty-handed to their home districts to campaign for the November 2018 mid-term elections. Historically, Republican Presidents who have low approval ratings ahead of mid-term elections tend to lose a larger number of seats to Democrats (Chart 3). Chart 2Market Has Priced Out Trump's Economic Agenda Chart 3GOP Is Running Out Of Time Now that the border adjustment tax is officially dead, the GOP must either significantly moderate its tax cuts or add to the deficit. BCA's geopolitical strategists argue that regardless of which bill is passed by the GOP, the legislation will expire after a "budget window" of around 10 years.2 Tax cut plans ultimately will be watered down, but even a modest cut would be positive for the equity market. The dollar should also receive a boost, especially given that the Fed would have to respond to any fiscally driven growth impulse with higher interest rates. We expect Trump to ensure that the Fed retains its dovish bias when Chair Janet Yellen's term expires on February 3, 2018. He may favor a non-economist and a loyal adviser, such as Gary Cohn, over any of the more traditional and hawkish Republican candidates. Cohn could not single-handedly affect the course of monetary policy. The FOMC votes on rate changes, but decisions are formed by consensus (with one or two dissents). Cohn could implement an abrupt change in policy in the unlikely event that the Administration stacks the Fed Governors with appointees that are prepared to "toe the line." (The Administration does not appoint Regional Fed Presidents). Stacking the Governorships would take time. The FOMC has been very cautious in tightening policy and we do not see Trump taking an active role in monetary policy. The bottom line is that Cohn's possible appointment to the Fed Chair would not signal a major shift in monetary policy. Raising The Debt Ceiling Recent fights over Obamacare and tax reform have pitted fiscally conservative Republicans against moderates, with the debt ceiling used as a bargaining chip in the battles. While government shutdowns have occurred in the past, the debt ceiling has never been breached. At the end of the day, the debt ceiling will always be raised because government could not withstand the public pressure. Democrats can't be blamed because the Republicans control both chambers of Congress and the White House. Even the Freedom Caucus, the most fiscally conservative grouping in the House, is divided on the issue. This augurs well for a clean bill to raise the debt ceiling because the Republican majority in the House is 22 and the Freedom Caucus has 31 members. Democrats will not stand in the way of passage in the Senate. The worst-case scenario for the market would be a two-week shutdown, between October 1 when the current funding for the government will expire, and mid-October when the CBO predicts that the debt ceiling will be reached. Odds of such a scenario are probably around 25%. We would not expect a shutdown to have any lasting impact on the economy, although it could provide an excuse for the equity market to correct. The good news is that at least the economy is cooperating. Economic Surprise Versus Inflation Surprise Economic expectations are now low enough for the still-tepid activity data to beat, but this trend has not yet spilled over into the inflation data. Elevated economic expectations post-election led to a four-month period (early March-mid June) when the Citi Economic surprise index rolled over3 (Chart 4). In mid-July, the data began to top washed-out expectations and the surprise index accelerated. In the past two months, readings across a wide spectrum of economic indicators (consumer and business sentiment, consumer spending, home prices, manufacturing sentiment, and employment) have outpaced lowered expectations. Even so, inflation readings continue to disappoint relative to forecasts. Chart 4Inflation Surprise Usually Follows Economic Surprise Higher... But Not This Time After briefly moving above zero in early 2017 - indicating that inflation data was stronger than analysts projected- the Citi inflation surprise index rolled over again (Chart 4, bottom panel). Reports on the CPI, PPI, and average hourly earnings continued to fall short of consensus forecasts. This despite the rebound in the economic surprise index and the tightening of labor and product markets. The disappointment on price data relative to consensus forecasts is not new. Although there were brief periods where prices exceeded forecasts in 2010 and 2011, the last time that inflation exceeded market consensus in this business cycle was in late 2009 and early 2010. In the last few years of the 2001-2007 economic expansion through early 2009, the price data eclipsed forecasts more than half of the time. During this interval, economists underestimated the impact of surging energy prices on inflation readings. Moreover, the disconnect between economic surprise and inflation surprise has never been wider, but the inflation surprise index should follow the economic surprise index upward. In the past 13 years, there have been 15 periods when economic surprise has climbed after a trough. The inflation surprise index has temporarily increased in 13 of those episodes. For example, in the aftermath of the oil price peak in the U.S. in mid-2014, both economic surprise and inflation surprise diminished through early 2015 and then began moving up. However, today's inflation surprise index has rolled over while economic surprise has gained, but remember that inflation is a lagging indicator.4 Asset class performance since the economic surprise index formed a bottom in mid-June has run counter to history as risk assets have underperformed (Table 1). Returns on the S&P 500 have lagged Treasuries since the June 14 trough, driving down the stocks-to-bond ratio. U.S. large cap equities have outperformed Treasuries by an average of 290 basis points in the 11 prior episodes in this expansion as economic surprise climbed. Similarly, both high yield and investment-grade corporate bond returns have lagged Treasuries since mid-June. During previous episodes when the surprise index was climbing, credit outperformed Treasuries. Small caps have also lagged large caps, which is counter to the historical pattern, although oil and gold have both gained since the trough in economic surprise. The evidence is mixed for these two commodities after a bottom in economic surprise. Table 1Performance Of Risk Assets As Economic Surprise Rises BCA's view5 is that a Fed-led recession will begin in 2019. Nonetheless, markets were concerned about a recession occurring this year as the economic data underwhelmed in the first part of the year. Despite market fears, reliable leading indicators of a recession such as the LEI, the yield curve and the 26-week change in claims, are not signaling a recession (Chart 5). BCA does not expect the buildup of the types of imbalances that led to economic downturns in the past. Instead, a recession may be triggered by a Fed policy mistake, or a terrorist attack that disrupts economic activity over large area for an extended time, or a widespread natural disaster. Chart 5Data Suggest Low Odds Of A##BR##Recession In Next 12 Months Bottom Line: There are few imbalances in the economy and a recession in the U.S. is more than a year away. Although risk assets have not outperformed as is typical after a trough in economic surprise, we anticipate that stocks will beat bonds in the next 12-18 months. Inflation will surprise to the upside in the coming months, pressuring the Fed and the bond market. Stay short duration. Is Trump To Blame For The Stalled Stock Market Rally? Corporate earnings, not politics, drive equity prices. The S&P 500 has retreated from its all-time highs in early August despite another terrific earnings reporting season.6 Investors are concerned that Trump's erratic presidency may be to blame, but we take a different view Since the start of the economic expansion, the S&P 500 rose in 83% of the periods when large U.S. corporations provide results for the prior quarter and guidance on subsequent periods. (Table 2, bottom panel) U.S. equities increased only 66% of the time when managements were silent on profitability and future prospects (Table 3, bottom panel). However, there are periods when exogenous events like the 2011 U.S. debt downgrade and the 2015 Chinese devaluation that can disrupt the normal pattern, and we have excluded those from our calculations. Nevertheless, with the Q2 earnings reporting season over, the odds are less favorable for a rising U.S. equity market in the next few months. Table 2S&P 500, Stock-Bond-Ratio And Guidance During Earnings Season Table 3S&P 500, Stock-Bond-Ratio And Guidance Outside Of Earnings Season The stock-to-bond ratio also fares better during earnings season than during corporate quiet periods, and moves higher more often. When companies report profits, the stock-to-bond ratio increases 73% (Table 2, bottom panel) of the time versus just 65% outside of earnings season (Table 3, bottom panel). Since the start of 2010, the median return for the stock-to-bonds ratio is 0.046% per day during reporting season (Table 2, top panel) and 0.037% when it is not earnings season (Table 3, top panel). The implication is that the stock-to-bond ratio over the next two months may move higher, and at a faster rate than it did during the just completed Q2 earnings reporting season. Counter-intuitively, earnings guidance increases more often outside of earnings season (90% of the time and 0.04% per day, Table 3) than during it (77% of the time and 0.019% per day, Table 2). The top panels of Tables 3 and 2 respectively also show that the median daily return on stocks is higher outside of earnings reporting season (0.074% per day) than it is as earnings are being reported (0.054% per day). This is also somewhat counter-intuitive, as over the long term, earnings trends drive stock prices. We intend to examine the shorter term relationship between stock prices, the stocks to bond ratio and earnings guidance in a future Weekly Report. Bottom Line: The path of corporate earnings and not politics, ultimately drive stock prices. In the past eight years, the stocks to bond ratio during earnings season rises more and more often than when there was no new information on earnings. We remain upbeat on the earnings outlook for at least the remainder of this year, which will help the equity market weather the ongoing turbulence emanating from Washington. Next year, the earnings backdrop will not be as supportive. Stay overweight stocks versus bonds. John Canally, CFA, Senior Vice President U.S. Investment Strategy johnc@bcaresearch.com Mark McClellan, Senior Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst markm@bcaresearch.com 1 Please see U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "The Fed's Third Mandate", dated July 24, 2017. It is available at usis.bcaresearch.com. 2 Please see Geopolitical Strategy Weekly Report, "Is The Trump Put Over" dated August 23, 2017. It is available at gps.bcaresearch.com. 3 Please see BCA's U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "Global Monetary Policy Recalibration", published July 17, 2017. It is available at usis.bcaresearch.com. 4 Please see Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "From Slow Burn Recovery To Retro-Recession?," August 18, 2017. It is available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 5 Please see BCA's Global Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "The Timing Of The Next Recession" published June 16, 2017. It is available at gis.bcaresearch.com. 6 Please see BCA's U.S. Investment Strategy Weekly Report, "The Stage Is Set For Jackson Hole", August 21, 2017. It is available at usis.bcaresearch.com.
Highlights Copper's impressive rally leaves prices out in front of fundamentals. We are expecting a correction going forward, given our view that reduced mine output results from transitory disruptions, and China's growth appears to be stalling: industrial output, investment, retail sales, and trade all grew less than expected last month. Energy: Overweight. Crude oil prices remain fairly well supported this week on signs U.S. production growth may not be as strong as expected, and continued production discipline by OPEC 2.0 keeps global inventories from building too rapidly. We remain long Brent and WTI $50/bbl vs. $55/bbl call spreads in Dec/17, which are up 99.1% and 18.9%, respectively. Base Metals: Neutral. Copper prices appear to be getting out ahead of fundamentals, particularly as regards Chinese demand, which could stall on the back of slower economic growth. Precious Metals: Neutral. In line with our House view, we expect the Fed to remain dovish on the inflation front, which, over time, will mean the central bank finds itself behind the curve on inflation. This means real rates remain relatively low for the foreseeable future, which will be supportive of gold. Ags/Softs: Underweight. We remain bearish, although we are not aggressively shorting any of the ags. Feature Chart of the WeekCopper 2017H1: Exceptional Performance Copper futures traded on COMEX rallied by almost 10% from the beginning of May, when spot was trading just under $2.50/lb, until late July, then shot up by an additional 9% on news of a potential ban on scrap imports by China; 4% of that increase was recorded on July 25 alone (Chart of the Week). Spot copper settled at $2.9865/lb Tuesday. Part of this rally can be put down to a renewed focus on China's environmental policies, which we expect to continue following the 19th National Congress of China's Communist Party later this year, and the better-than-expected performance of the Chinese economy in 2017H1. This occurred as supply side disruptions at some of the world's largest copper mines caused markets to discount possible near-term shortages, along with rumors of an import ban on so-called Category 7 scrap metals. These stories supercharged the copper market. Supply/Demand Imbalances Are Transitory While labor-related disruptions at major copper mines led to a production cutback in 2017H1, supply has, for the most part, recovered. Furthermore, these are one-off events that we do not foresee persisting or having a lasting impact on markets.1 Production of copper ores and concentrates fell a negligible 0.1% year-on-year (yoy) in H1, following a 6.7% yoy increase in global output in 2016. Year-to-date (ytd) production growth lies significantly below the 5.63% average for the same period 2013-2016 (Chart 2). Similarly, in a marked slowdown from the four-year average growth of ~ 4% yoy in refined copper production, output remained largely unchanged in the first 4 months of 2017 compared to last year. However, there is evidence of relief in May and June, which registered a 6.08% yoy increase in output. The slowdown in production is mainly driven by supply-side shocks at some of the world's largest mines in Chile, Peru, and Indonesia. Contract Renegotiations and Weather Disruptions in Chile: The respective 1% and 6.6% yoy fall in global ores and concentrates output in February and March can be attributed to a corresponding year-on-year 17% and 23% declines in production from Chile - the world's leading copper producer. At BHP Billiton's Escondida mine, the world's largest, 2,500 workers staged a 43-day strike over contract renegotiations, which ended without resolution in late March. Although the end of the strike has brought relief to copper output, talks will resume in 18 months, raising the possibility of another strike - and an accompanying production cut - in a year's time. However, President Marcelo Castillo has somewhat calmed these worries, expressing his intent to revise the mine's operating model so that it will be minimally impacted by such disputes in the future. The decline in Chilean output was compounded by heavy snow and rain in May, which forced the Caserones mine to halt production for three weeks. This was reflected in a ~ 1.7% yoy decline in national output in May. Caserones has since resumed production and is now reported to have reached 90% of capacity. Nationwide Strikes in Peru Not Expected to Show up in July Data: Labor reforms proposed at the end of July led to a three-day walk-out by unionized workers across Peru. The strike impacted operations at major deposits including Antamina, Cerro Verde, Cuajone among others. However, according to the National Society of Mining, Petroleum and Energy, absenteeism was insignificant and the impact on copper output was limited. This followed a five-day strike at Cerro Verde - Peru's second largest mine - in March due to dissatisfaction with labor conditions. Peru ramped up output by almost 25% in 2015, surpassing China as the second largest producer of copper, and accounted for 11.4% of global output in 2016. Dispute Over Export Rights and Worker Dissatisfaction at Grasberg: In an effort to promote its domestic smelting industry, Indonesian authorities imposed a temporary ban on exports of copper concentrates in January. However, in April, Freeport McMoRan was granted an eight-month license to resume exports from its Grasberg mine - the second largest in the world. Furthermore, CEO Richard Adkerson expressed confidence that Freeport will succeed in securing an agreement by October, allowing it to implement a major multi-billion-dollar underground mine development plan. Labor unrest remains a problem for the company, nonetheless. Angered by redundancies and enforced furloughs, a strike by 5,000 workers was extended for a fourth month, until the end of August. Output data until May shows production remained largely unchanged compared to last year and follows a 3.82% yoy increase in Q1. Indonesian output accounted for 3% of global copper production in 2016. This will have to be resolved for the company's development plans to proceed unchallenged. Despite these supply-side shocks and ensuing Q2 inventory draw, copper remains well stocked at the major warehouses (Chart 3). Furthermore, COMEX inventories are at their highest level since 2004. As long as the global market remains well stocked, we expect it will be capable of withstanding volatility induced by labor markets and government policy with minimal impacts on prices. Chart 2Supply Disruptions Subsiding,##BR##Copper Market Back In Balance Chart 3Copper Inventories##BR##Can Withstand Volatility Scrap Imports Kick In Amidst Elevated Prices Chart 4China Copper Demand Weakening A dip in Chinese demand was also partly to blame for the minimal impact of the production cutbacks on inventories. Chinese consumption single-handedly makes up ~ 50% of global copper demand. The 1.46% yoy decline in global refined copper consumption during 2017H1 is, in large part, due to a 4.57% yoy drop in Chinese consumption (Chart 4). In fact, consumption during February and April fell 10% and 11%, respectively. Weak demand is also evident in China's import of copper ores and concentrates data. Although imports grew by 2.72% yoy in 2017H1, this is a marked slowdown from the 33.66% growth rate witnessed during the same period last year, and the average H1 growth of 22.6% since 2012. Similarly, China's imports of refined copper, copper alloy, and products fell 18.32% yoy in 2017H1 before increasing by 8.33% yoy last month. However, it appears that scrap copper may have helped fill the void - China's imports of copper scraps and wastes increased by 18.56% in the first half of this year compared to the same period last year. This marks a turning point in the trend, as copper scrap imports have been on the decline since 2013, and is likely a direct result of speculation over the impact of China's environmental policies on base metals. China's Scrap Import Ban: Overplayed Last week, China confirmed intentions to ban some forms of scrap copper imports beginning as early as the end of the year. This is part of measures taken to support sustainable growth and environmental protection. While rumors swirled in late July suggesting "Category 7" (i.e. old) scrap copper would be included in the import ban, the list of banned waste imports released last week by the Ministry of Environmental protection did not include copper. However, copper scrap from automobiles, ships and electronic devices were included in a "limited import" category, with no further details of the import constraints to be imposed on these products. Scrap impacts the copper market in two main ways: It provides smelter-refineries an alternative input, in addition to ores and concentrates, thus enhancing total refined copper supply. The International Copper Study Group (ICSG) estimates global production of refined copper increased by 2% in January due to increased production from scrap, which rose by 13% yoy. It acts as a substitute for refined copper, providing first-stage manufacturers a lower-cost alternative input. This means that when prices are up, as they have been since late 2016, the impact on refined copper production is somewhat muted because scrap usage kicks in (Chart 5). Furthermore, because of this response, the effect of supply-side shocks on refined copper output are - to some extent - restrained. Chart 5Scrap Imports Kick In When Prices Are Up This explains why the market has been in somewhat of a frenzy since late July after hearing that the Chinese authorities will likely implement an import ban on some types of scrap copper, which caused copper prices to jump to levels last seen in 2015Q2. Copper futures traded on COMEX have rallied by 10% from the beginning of May to late July, then shot up an additional 9% on rumors of an import ban; 4% of that increase was recorded on July 25 alone. Markets are clearly buying into the news, and are optimistic the ban will hike demand for other forms of copper. However, we believe this optimism is unfounded, and that the impact on copper markets is overplayed. Although the ICSG estimates that ~ 30% of annual copper usage comes from 'secondary' or recycled sources, a much smaller ratio originates from 'old' scrap copper. This type of scrap is derived from end-of-life electronics, households, cars, and industrial products. While data on old-scrap copper supply is not readily available, researchers at Antaike estimated that out of the 3.35mm MT of scrap copper imports in 2016, old-scrap copper imports made up ~ 0.3mm MT of copper-equivalent. This accounts for a very small fraction of China's 17.05mm MT of imports of copper ores and concentrates and 4.94mm MT imports of refined copper last year. Thus, even if a ban on all old-scrap copper were to materialize, we do not believe it will create a supply deficit, or even threaten one. In addition, there has been speculation that a ban would reroute old scrap metal to other countries for dismantling and processing before being imported by China, diminishing its impact on the copper market. Given that the market's reaction to news of the ban has been favorable, we expect to see a correction as the market responds to information that the ban is less bullish than expected. Chinese Demand Will Ease As Tailwinds Die Down In 2017H1, China surprised with better-than-expected economic performance, which supported copper prices. China's infrastructure and equipment industries are especially important to the copper market, consuming, respectively, 43% and 19% of the red metal domestically. However, as our colleagues on BCA Research's China desk foresaw, recent data gives some early-warning signs of a slowdown in growth.2 Industrial output, investment and retail sales figures came in below expectations amid a cooling property market. Furthermore, restrictions on riskier types of lending will continue slowing credit growth going forward. The property market - residential and commercial construction - accounts for ~ one-third of copper consumption. After reaching three-year highs late last year, the official manufacturing PMI and the Keqiang index - both used as key measures of the state of China's economy - show evidence that the economy is stabilizing (Chart 6). In fact, the Keqiang index has come down significantly from its peak earlier this year. In particular, signs of cooling in China's property sector are playing into the possibility of weaker industrial metals generally. Steel-making commodities and base metals have been in high demand ever since China relaxed housing policies, reviving the property market. However, in an effort to cool this market, Chinese authorities announced measures to raise down payments and control speculative buying in 20 cities last September. These measures are beginning to show up in property-market construction and sales data (Chart 7). Chart 6Early Warning Signs Of China Slowdown Chart 7China Property Sector: Cooling New floor space started contracted by almost 5% yoy in July, potentially signaling early warning signs of what could come ahead. It marks a reversal of a 10.55% expansion in 2017H1. New floor space completed declined in July, registering a 13.54% fall yoy. This follows 5% growth in 2017H1 - a marked slowdown from the 20.05% pace of growth in 2016H1. Furthermore, floor space under construction has been steadily easing, growing just 3.17% yoy in July. In terms of floor space sold, July's yoy growth of 2% follows a 21.37% yoy growth rate in June, and marks a pronounced slowdown from the 15.82% average yoy growth rate in 2017H1. Chart 8China's Economic Structure##BR##Deviates From Trend While near term growth does not appear to be threatened, earlier this month the IMF warned against China's "reliance on stimulus to meet targets," and a "credit expansion path that may be dangerous," which could cause a medium-term adjustment. When this eventually weighs down on industrial activity - as we expect - it will reverberate throughout the economy, discouraging investment projects, and eventually taking its toll on commodities generally, base metals in particular. Even so, in a small change of pace, China's share of secondary sector (i.e. manufacturing) as a percent of GDP crept up in July (Chart 8). This is a deviation from the trend in the evolving structure of China's economy, where the tertiary sector (services) has been making up an increasing share of GDP. While it is still too early to determine whether this is the beginning of a change in trend, or a one-off case, this development is positive for metals short term, since manufacturing activity is industrial-metal intensive. Bottom Line: We expect a correction in copper prices near term, as markets adjust to revelations that the market impact of China's environmental policies is less than expected. Our longer-term outlook is neutral: The synchronized economic upturn in global demand will partially offset waning economic activity in China, as tailwinds from accelerating export growth and easing monetary conditions die down. Roukaya Ibrahim, Associate Editor Commodity & Energy Strategy RoukayaI@bcaresearch.com 1 We discuss some of these developments during 2017Q1 in BCA Research's Commodity & Energy Strategy Weekly Report "Copper's Price Supports Are Fading," published by March 23, 2017. It is available at ces.bacresearch.com. 2 Please see BCA Research's China Investment Strategy Weekly Report titled "China Outlook: A Mid-Year Revisit", dated July 13, 2017, It is available at cis.bcaresearch.com. Investment Views and Themes Recommendations Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed in 2017 Summary of Trades Closed in 2016