Sectors

The 10-year US Treasury yield has been range bound between 1.5% and 1.7% for the past three months despite fireworks in the US economic data, from CPI readings to unemployment beats. The fact that the bond market has refused to budge no matter how positive US data got, confirms our view that all the good news has already been priced in. Citigroup US economic surprise index (CESI) is hovering around zero, which corroborates the same message. Given a tight positive correlation (0.44) between CESI and UST10Y, and the fact that growth is peaking, it is unlikely that the bond market will enter another aggressive sell-off phase (see chart). The implication for equities is that long-duration growth equities, beaten down by rising yields, may stage a come back, especially once inflation data makes a clear ∩-turn on a year-over-year basis. Bottom Line: Bond market is likely to remain calm over the next three to six months, and it’s time to revisit beaten down growth names. Stay tuned for future research on the topic.

In today’s Sector Insight report, we take the opportunity to summarize our views on the US equity market return expectations across different investment horizons. And by doing so help clients reconcile our views with the other BCA publications. Currently, US Equity Strategy is cyclically (6 to 12 months investment horizon) bullish on the prospects of the broad equity market. The reasons for that are numerous: Pent up demand does not show signs of waning, supply chain bottlenecks are yet to be resolved, and stimulus checks and excess savings are yet to be spend. All of the above is to contribute to robust earnings growth which we expect to surprise on the upside, just like during Q1-2021 earnings season. Looking ahead we do not anticipate a recession but only a modest slowdown in a current fast pace of economic growth. This business cycle bull market rally has not run its course. Having said that, we believe that in the near term the market is ripe for a correction. It is fully valued, if not outright expensive: nearly 50% of all industries have PEs ranking in top 10 percentile of their ten-year history. There is simply not much valuation cushion left to absorb any negative shocks. More specifically, there are two major risks that can serve as a catalyst for a selloff: 1) Fed may surprise the market with hawkish rhetoric if jobs data exceeds expectations or inflation exhibits a staying power; 2) China growth deceleration surprises further on the downside. And these are just the known risks. Further, we are mindful of the SPX risk/reward profile over the next 3-6 months. The market expects EPS NTM of $196 and if we assume an optimistic 22x forward P/E multiple, this equates to SPX target of 4,312 over the next 3-6 months. This is a 3% upside from the current level of 4200. Deploying new capital at these levels of valuations and with a limited upside is like picking up pennies in front of a steamroller.  Our recommendation is to raise dry powder by taking profits from some of the recent winners like industrials and basic materials, and redeploying capital during the next market pullback which would provide a more favorable risk/return profile. Bottom Line: We remain cyclically bullish on the prospects of the broad equity market, but are keeping our guard up in the near-term. ​​​​​​​

Highlights Political and corporate climate activism will increase the cost of developing the resources required to produce and deliver energy going forward – e.g., oil and gas wells; pipelines; copper mines, and refineries. Over the short run, the fastest way for investor-owned companies (IOCs) to address accelerated reductions in CO2 emissions imposed by courts and boards is to walk away from the assets producing them, which could be disruptive over the medium term. Longer term, state-owned companies (SOCs) not facing the constraints of IOCs likely will be required to provide an increasing share of the resources needed to produce and distribute energy. The real difficulty will come in the medium term. Capex for critical metals like copper languishes, just as the call on these metals steadily increases over the next 30 years (Chart of the Week). The evolution to a low-carbon future has not been thought through at the global policy level. A real strategy must address underinvestment in base metals and incentivize the development of technology via a carbon tax – not emissions trading schemes – so firms can innovate to avoid it. We remain long energy and metals exposures.1 Feature And you may ask yourself, "Well … how did I get here?" David Byrne, Once In A Lifetime Energy markets – broadly defined – are radically transforming from week to week. The latest iteration of these markets' evolution is catalyzed by climate activists, who are finding increasing success in court and on corporate boards – sometimes backed by major institutional investors – and forcing oil and gas producers to accelerate CO2 emission-reduction programs.2 Climate activists' arguments are finding increasing purchase because they have merit: Years of stiff-arming investors seeking clarity on the oil and gas producers' decarbonization agendas, coupled with a pronounced failure to provide returns in excess of their cost of capital, have given activists all of the ammo needed to argue their points. Chart of the WeekCall On Metals For Energy Will Increase This activism is not limited to the courts or boardrooms. Voters in democratic societies with contested elections also are seeking redress for failures of their governments to effectively channel mineral wealth back into society on an equitable basis, and to protect their environments and the habitats of indigenous populations. This voter activism is especially apparent in Chile and Peru, where elections and constitutional conventions likely will result in higher taxes and royalties on metals IOCs operating in these states, which will increase production costs and ultimately be passed on to consumers.3 These states account for ~ 40% of world copper output. IOCs Walk Away Earlier this week, Exxon walked away from an early-stage offshore oil development project in Ghana.4 This followed the unfavorable court rulings and boardroom setbacks experienced by Royal Dutch Shell, Chevron and Exxon recently (referenced in fn. 2). While the company had no comment on its abrupt departure, its action shows how IOCs can exercise their option to put a project back to its host government, thus illustrating one of the most readily available alternatives for energy IOCs to meet court- or board-mandated CO2 emissions targets. If these investments qualify as write-offs, the burden will be borne by taxpayers. As climate activism increases, state-owned companies (SOCs) not facing the constraints of IOCs likely will be required to provide an increasing share of the resources – particularly oil and gas – needed to produce and distribute energy going forward. This is not an unalloyed benefit, as the SOCs still face stranded-asset risks, if they invest in longer-lived assets that are obviated by a successful renewables + grid buildout globally. That is a cost that will have to be compensated, when the SOCs work up their capex allocations. Still, if legal and investor activism significantly accelerates IOCs' capex reductions in oil and gas projects, the SOCs – particularly those in OPEC 2.0 – will be able to expand their position as the dominant supplier in the global oil market, and could perhaps increase their influence on price levels and forward-curve dynamics (Chart 2).5 Chart 2OPEC 2.0s Could Expand If Investor Activism Increases Higher Call On Metals At present, there is a lot of talk about the need to invest in renewable electricity generation and the grid structure supporting it, but very little in the way of planning for this transition. Other than repeated assertions of its necessity, little is being said regarding how exactly this strategy will be executed given the magnitude of the supply increase in metals required. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the refined copper market, which has been in a physical deficit – i.e., production minus consumption is negative – for the last 6 years (Chart 3). Physical copper markets in China, which consumes more than 50% of refined output, remain extremely tight, as can be seen in the ongoing weakness of treating charges and refining charges (TC/RC) for the past year (Chart 4). These charges are inversely correlated to prices – when TC/RCs are low, it means there is surplus refining capacity for copper – unrefined metal is scarce, which drives down demand for these services. Chart 3Coppers Physical Deficit Likely Persist Chart 4Chinas Refined Copper Supply Remains TightTheoretically, high prices will incentivize higher levels of production. However, after the last decade’s ill-timed investment in new mine discoveries and expansions, mining companies have become more wary with their investments, and are using earnings to pay dividends and reduce debt. This leads us to believe that mining companies will not invest in new mine discoveries but will use capital expenditure to expand brownfield projects to meet rising demand. In the last decade, as copper demand rose, capex for copper rose from 2010-2012, and fell from 2013-2016 (Chart 5). During this time, the copper ore grade was on a declining trend. This implies that the new copper brought online was being mined from lower-grade ore, due to the expansion of existing projects(Chart 6). Chart 5Copper Capex Growth Remains Weak Chart 6Copper Ore-Quality Declines Persist Through Capex Cycle Capex directed at keeping ore production above consumption will not be sufficient to avoid major depletions of ore supplies beginning in 2024, according to Wood Mackenzie. The consultancy foresees a cumulative deficit of ~ 16mm MT by 2040. Plugging this gap will require $325-$500 billion of investment in the copper mining sector.6 The Case For A Carbon Tax The low-carbon future remains something of a will-o'-the-wisp – seen off in the future but not really developed in the present. Most striking in discussions of the low-carbon transition is the assumption of resource availability – particularly bases metals –in, e.g., the IEA's Net Zero by 2050, A Roadmap for the Global Energy Sector, published last month. In the IEA's document, further investment in hydrocarbons is not required beyond 2025. The copper, aluminum, steel, etc., required to build the generation and supporting grid infrastructure will be available and callable as needed to build all the renewable generation the world requires. The document is agnostic between carbon trading and carbon taxes as a way to price carbon and incentivize the technology that would allow firms and households to avoid a direct cost on carbon. A real strategy must address the fact that most of the world will continue to rely on fossil fuels for decades, as development goals are pursued. Underinvestment in base metals and its implications for the buildout of generation and grids has to be a priority if these assets are to be built. Given the 5-10-year lead times base metals mines require to come online, it is obvious that beyond the middle of this decade, the physical reality of demand exceeding supply will assert itself. A good start would be a global effort to impose and collect carbon taxes uniformly across states.7 This would need to be augmented with a carbon club, which restricts admission and trading privileges  to those states adopting such a scheme. Harmonizing the multiple emissions trading schemes worldwide will be a decades-long effort that is unlikely to succeed. Such schemes also can be gamed by larger players, producing pricing distortions. A hard and fast tax that is enforced in all of the members of such a carbon club would immediately focus attention on the technology required to avoid paying it – mobilizing capital, innovation and entrepreneurial drive to make it a reality. This would support carbon-capture, use and storage technologies as well, thus extending the life of existing energy resources as the next generation of metals-based resources is built out. In addition, a carbon tax raises revenue for governments, which can be used for a variety of public policies, including reducing other taxes to reduce the overall burden of taxation. Lastly, a tax eliminates the potential for short-term price volatility in the pricing of carbon – as long as households and firms know what confronts them they can plan around it.  Tax revenues also can be used to reduce the regressive nature of such levies. Investment Implications The lack of a coherent policy framework that addresses the very real constraints on the transition to a low-carbon economy makes the likelihood of a volatile, years-long evolution foreordained. We believe this will create numerous investment opportunities as underinvestment in hydrocarbons and base metals production predisposes oil, natural gas and base metals prices to move higher in the face of strong and rising demand. We remain long commodity index exposure – the S&P GSCI and GSCI Commodity Dynamic Roll Strategy ETF (COMT), which is optimized to take advantage of the most backwardated commodity forward curves in the index. These positions were up 5.3% and 7.2% since inception on December 7, 2017 and March 12, 2021, respectively, at Tuesday's close. We also remain long the MSCI Global Metals & Mining Producers ETF (PICK), which is up 33.9% since it was put on December 10, 2020. Expecting continued volatility in metals – copper in particular – we will look for opportunities to re-establish positions in COMEX/CME Copper after being stopped out with gains. A trailing stop was elected on our long Dec21 copper position established September 10, 2020, which was closed out with a 48.2% gain on May 21, 2021. Our long calendar 2022 vs short calendar 2023 COMEX copper backwardation trade established April 22, 2021, was closed out on May 20, 2021, leaving us with a return of 305%.   Robert P. Ryan Chief Commodity & Energy Strategist rryan@bcaresearch.com Ashwin Shyam Research Associate Commodity & Energy Strategy ashwin.shyam@bcaresearch.com   Commodities Round-Up Energy: Bullish OPEC 2.0 offered no surprises to markets this week, as it remained committed to returning just over 2mm b/d of production to the market over the May-July period, 70% of which comes from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), according to Platts. While Iran's return to the market is not a given in OPEC 2.0's geometry, we have given better than even odds it will return to the market beginning in 3Q21 and restore most of the 1.4mm b/d not being produced at present to the market over the course of the following year. OPEC itself expects demand to increase 6mm b/d this year, somewhat above our expectation of 5.3mm b/d. Stronger demand could raise Brent prices above our average $63/bbl forecast for this year (Chart 7). Brent was trading above $71/bbl as we went to press. Base Metals: Bullish BHP declared operations at its Escondida and Spence mines were running at normal rates despite a strike by some 200 operations specialists. BHP is employing so-called substitute workers to conduct operation, according to reuters.com, which also reported separate unions at both mines are considering strike actions in the near future. Precious Metals: Bullish The Fed’s reluctance to increase nominal interest rates despite indications of higher inflation will reduce real rates, which will support higher gold prices (Chart 8). We agree with our colleagues at BCA Research's US Bond Strategy that the Fed is waiting for the US labor market to reach levels consistent with its assessment of maximum employment before it makes its initial rate hike in this interest-rate cycle. Subsequent rate changes, however, will be based on realized inflation and inflation expectations. In our opinion, the Fed is following this ultra-accommodative monetary policy approach to break the US liquidity trap, brought about by a rise in precautionary savings due to the pandemic. In addition, we continue to expect USD weakness, which also will support gold and precious metals prices. We remain long gold, expecting prices to clear $2,000/oz this year. Ags/Softs: Neutral Corn prices fell more than 2% Wednesday, following the release of USDA estimates showing 95% of the corn crop was planted by 31 May 2021, well over the 87% five-year average. This was in line with expectations. However, the Department's assessment that 76% of the crop was in good-to-excellent condition exceeded market expectations. Chart 7 Chart 8 Footnotes 1     Please see Trade Tables below. 2     Please see OPEC, Russia seen gaining more power with Shell Dutch ruling and EXCLUSIVE BlackRock backs 3 dissidents to shake up Exxon board -sources published by reuters.com June 1, 2021 and May 25, 2021. 3    Please see Chile's govt in shock loss as voters pick independents to draft constitution published by reuters.com May 17, 2021, and Peru’s elite in panic at prospect of hard-left victory in presidential election published by ft.com June 1, 2021.  Peru has seen significant capital flight on the back of these fears.  See also Results from Chile’s May 2021 elections published by IHS Markit May 21, 2021 re a higher likelihood of tax increases for the mining sector.  The risk of nationalization is de minimis, according to IHS. 4    Please see Exxon walks away from stake in deepwater Ghana block published by worldoil.com June 1, 2021. 5    Please see OPEC 2.0's Production Strategy In Focus, which we published on May 20, 2021, for a recap our how we model OPEC 2.0's strategy.  It is available at ces.bcaresearch.com. 6    Please see Will a lack of supply growth come back to bite the copper industry?, published by Wood Mackenzie on March 23, 2021. 7     Please see The Challenges and Prospects for Carbon Pricing in Europe published by the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies last month for a discussion of carbon taxes vs. emissions trading schemes.     Investment Views and Themes Strategic Recommendations Tactical Trades Commodity Prices and Plays Reference Table Trades Closed in 2021 Summary of Closed Trades

Special Report

Highlights Asset Management Regulation (AMR) represents a critical and successful structural reform that is defusing risks in the most hazardous parts of China’s credit system. This bodes well for long-term sustainability of the nation’s financial system and, hence, its long-term economic outlook. That said, the sheer size of risky products and shadow banking makes it impossible to reduce systemic risk without hampering overall credit origination. AMR will dampen bank and shadow banking credit growth further and the credit impulse will be negative by year-end. As a result, China's growth will decelerate. The risk-reward profile of Chinese stocks remains poor. Favor Chinese local currency government bonds as yields will drop further. Feature Chart 1China’s Growth Is Set To Decelerate China’s broad credit and money growth have relapsed substantially. Given that they have historically been reliable leading indicators of business cycles (Chart 1), the question is: how far will credit growth decelerate. When gauging the magnitude of a money/credit slowdown, one should not only look at borrowing costs but also at the willingness and capacity of creditors to extend credit. In this context, it is essential to examine the impact of Asset Management Regulation (AMR) in China on both bank and non-bank credit growth. Please refer to Box 1 below for a more detailed discussion on AMR.     BOX 1 What Is AMR? AMR (Asset Management Regulation) was introduced in 2018 to mitigate financial system risks, increase transparency of financial products, and, hence, enhance investor protection. Financial institutions (banks and non-banks) were originally obliged to meet AMR requirements by the end of 2020. However, after the pandemic broke out, this term was extended to the end of 2021. The main objectives of AMR are: To restrict financial institutions from dodging financial regulations and prevent them from engaging in regulatory arbitrage. To prohibit financial institutions from providing other financial organizations with “channels” for evading regulatory requirements. To preclude banks from investing in high-risk assets. To forbid financial institutions from providing explicit or implicit guarantees for the principal and return on asset management products. AMR non-compliant products need to be either terminated or revamped to become AMR compliant before December 31, 2021. Assessing the value of outstanding AMR non-compliant products will help to gauge the actual impact of AMR on credit growth over the course of this year. A portion of banks’ wealth management products (WMP) and single fund trust products are AMR non-compliant and will need to be terminated or revamped. Commercial banks’ WMPs represent fund investment and management plans developed, designed and sold by commercial banks to individuals or institutions. In China, individual investors are the main customers for banks’ WMPs. In 2020, individual investors accounted for more than 99% in number of investors and 87% in investment amounts.1 The outstanding amount of WMPs is presently RMB 25 trillion. Single fund trusts have one investor – usually a bank or another financial institution. Given the disclosure regulation for single fund trusts is much looser than other fund trusts, it was prevalently used by financial institutions, including banks, to channel funds into investments to achieve regulatory arbitrage. Chart 2China Has Not Yet Deleveraged AMR represents regulatory tightening and will negatively affect bank and non-bank credit growth over the course of this year. In this report we examine what its impact will be on broad credit growth as banks and shadow banking attempt to comply with AMR by end of December this year. Authorities in China have been conducting well-thought-out surgical reforms – AMR being the cornerstone of these – to curb and restructure the risky elements of the credit system. By doing so, they have already dramatically reduced systemic risk in the financial system. Regardless of how deft and precise these reforms have been, they will continue to weigh on bank and shadow banking credit growth. The basis is that the sheer size of risky products and shadow banking makes it impossible to reduce systemic risk without hampering overall credit origination. It should also be noted that China has not yet deleveraged (Chart 2). How Large Are AMR Non-Compliant Assets? We reckon that AMR’s effect on broad credit is mainly through its impact on commercial banks’ Wealth Management Products (WMP) and single fund trusts. S&P Global2 estimates that by the end of 2020, banks will still have RMB 8.5 trillion in off-balance sheet WMP to restructure.  Single fund trusts’ assets stood at RMB 7.7 trillion in March 2021. However, to avoid double counting, flows from banks to trust funds (“bank-trust cooperation”) should be deducted from this value. The basis is that channeling funds by banks via trust companies is already captured in banks’ WMP statistics. Overall, non-compliant AMR assets that need to be revamped by year-end are as follows: Banks’ non-compliant WPM          8.5 trillion Single fund trust assets excluding “bank-trust cooperation”                   1.2 trillion Total                                          RMB 9.7 trillion This RMB 9.7 trillion represents 3.6% of total social financing (TSF) excluding equity issuance and 4.2% of private credit. The latter is defined as TSF excluding equity and central and local government bond issuance as well as special bonds.  Chart 3China: Various Borrowing Costs SP Global2 estimates that around RMB 5 trillion WMP will be revamped and made AMR compliant during this year. To put this figure into perspective, banks revamped RMB 4.8 trillion in 2020 and RMB 5.7 trillion in 2019. This will leave RMB 3.5 trillion of non-compliant WMP that banks are likely to take on their balance sheet before year-end. Even in the case of revamped WMP and single fund trusts, there will be unintended consequences for borrowers. In particular, the cost of borrowing could rise and/or the maturity of loans could be shortened. Both will weigh down on economic activity in general, and investment in the real economy in particular.   With full transparency and no implicit guarantee from banks, investors will require higher interest rates to invest in these products (Chart 3). In addition, investors will opt for shorter maturities of these products. Impact On Bank Credit… Chart 4China: Bank Loan Approvals And Bank Credit Impulse As banks take these AMR non-compliant WMP onto their balance sheets, their assets will automatically expand even though they will not originate new loans/provide financing to the real economy. The estimated RMB 3.5 trillion of WMP is equivalent to 1.5% of commercial bank broad credit and 1.2% of their assets. Hence, AMR will reinforce the deceleration in new credit origination. Both bank assets and broad bank credit will slow and their impulses will contract further (Chart 4).   Importantly, bringing these assets onto their balance sheet will require banks to both (1) allocate more capital to support these new assets and (2) increase provisions for the portion of these assets that are non-performing. The non-performing share of these AMR-non-compliant assets could be significant given that funds from off-balance sheet WMP were often invested in high-risk, high-return projects. These often represent claims on risky businesses, including property developers and local government financing vehicles (LGFV). In brief, there were reasons why banks did not initially put these assets on their balance sheets and doing so now will not be inconsequential. Overall, this move will hinder commercial banks’ ability and willingness to originate new credit, i.e., to provide new funding to the real economy (Chart 4). …And Shadow Banking Chart 5 demonstrates that shadow banking credit – comprised of trust loans, entrust loans, and unrealized banker acceptance bills – has been contracting. Outstanding shadow banking credit at RMB 23.9 trillion makes up 9% of TSF excluding equity issuance. Single fund trust loans – please refer to Box 1 above for more information – are the most vulnerable part of shadow banking to AMR. Despite their having contracted since 2017, single fund trust assets excluding “bank-trust cooperation” still amount to RMB 1.2 trillion or 0.5% of TSF, excluding equity issuance (Chart 6). Chart 5China’s Shadow Banking Continues To Shrink Chart 6Single Fund Trusts Are The Most Vulnerable To AMR Regulation     This type of financing will continue to shrink, weighing on aggregate credit flow. Although investors in these products might reinvest their funds in AMR-compliant funds, they will demand higher interest rates to offset higher credit risk. The basis is that full transparency will inform them that the trust companies and banks can neither guarantee principal nor interest on their investments. Higher interest rates demanded by investors in trust funds or their reduced financing will affect borrowers that rely on funding from this source. Specifically, trust funds investment in property developers and LGFV has been and will continue to shrink (Chart 7).      Impact On Property Developers And LGFV Property developers and LGFV are among the most vulnerable segments to reduced financing because of AMR. Trust companies have meaningful exposure to both real estate developers and LGFV. RMB 2.3 trillion in trust funds are invested in real estate and RMB 1.2 trillion in government projects, mostly representing claims on LGFV. Trust companies’ claims to both segments have been and will continue contracting (Chart 7). Property developers and LGFV are not only vulnerable to curtailed funding due to AMR but also from authorities’ campaign to limit their debt. Three Red Lines policy for property developers imposes caps on their debt. In addition, bank regulators have imposed limits on banks’ claims on property developers as well as residential mortgages (Chart 8, top panel). Loans are capped at 40% for the largest state-owned lenders, while banks’ mortgage lending should be no more than 32.5% of large banks’ outstanding credit. The regulations are even more rigorous for smaller banks. For smaller banks, caps on loans to real estate and mortgage loans are 27.5% and 20%, respectively.3 Banks’ credit to property developers and household mortgages are growing at a historically low pace and will likely decelerate further (Chart 8, bottom panel). To sum up, banks and shadow banking will curtail their exposure to property developers and LGFV. Consequently, these credit-intensive sectors will have to shrink their capital spending and construction activity. The latter will have ramifications for raw materials and industrial sectors exposed to traditional infrastructure and construction. Chart 7Trust Funds’ Exposure To Property Developers And LGFVs Chart 8Banks’ Exposure To Property Developers And Residential Mortgages   Investment Conclusions On the positive side, AMR represents critical and successful structural reform that is defusing risks in the most hazardous parts of China’s credit system. This bodes well for long-term sustainability of the nation’s financial system and, hence, its long-term economic outlook. Nevertheless, this regulatory tightening along with clampdown on the property market and local government debt will weigh on the Chinese business cycle over the next six-to-nine months: Private credit growth will continue downshifting and its impulse will turn negative, weighing on credit-exposed sectors (Chart 9). Although the private credit impulse is unlikely to reach -10% of GDP like it did in 2018, it will likely turn negative by year-end. Our guess it might be negative 3-4 % of GDP later this year. Chart 9China: Private Credit Impulse Will Turn Negative By Year-End Chart 10China: Fiscal Spending Impulse Will Be Modestly Positive In 2021   Public sector credit – measured as borrowing by central and local government, including special-purpose bonds – will continue decelerating according to bond quotas for this year. Still, higher government revenue will offset the slump in government borrowing so that government spending will grow in 2021 from a year ago. In aggregate, the fiscal spending impulse for all of 2021 will be positive at 1.6% of GDP (Chart 10). Overall, the fiscal spending impulse of 1.6% of GDP in 2021 will not offset the private credit impulse that we reckon to be about negative 3-4% of GDP. The upshot will be a modestly negative aggregate credit and fiscal spending impulse. The latter will be slightly worse than the readings of this indicator during the 2011 and 2014-15 slowdowns but more positive than in 2018 (please refer to Chart 1 above). This heralds a non-trivial business cycle slowdown. The latter will be concentrated in areas that usually benefit from credit and fiscal stimulus. Construction activity and traditional infrastructure spending are the most vulnerable areas. This entails that Chinese demand for raw materials will disappoint and base metals prices are vulnerable. With regard to investment strategy, investors should continue favoring Chinese local currency government bonds over stocks. As the economy decelerates, bond yields will drift lower. Share prices remain vulnerable. Chart 11 illustrates that net EPS revisions for the MSCI China A-share index has rolled over but has not yet dropped to their previous lows. Our hunch that EPS slowdown is not yet fully priced into the Chinese onshore equity market. Concerning MSCI China Investable non-TMT stocks, they have rolled over at their previous high (Chart 12). Given the negative corporate profit outlook, the risk-reward is unattractive both in absolute terms and relative to global equities. Chart 11Chinese Stocks: EPS Growth Expectations Will Downshift Further Chart 12An Intermediate-Term Top In Chinese Non-TMT Stocks?   In the long run, however, the de-risking of the credit system is bullish for Chinese share prices. Declining systemic financial risks entail a lower equity risk premium. Consequently, equity valuations will ultimately be re-rated. Arthur Budaghyan Chief Emerging Markets Strategist arthurb@bcaresearch.com Qingyun Xu Associate Editor Qingyun@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1 2020 Bank’s Wealth Management Product Report 2 Source: SP Global "China Banks May Still Have RMB3 Trillion In Shadow Assets By Year-End Deadline." 3 https://www.cbirc.gov.cn/cn/view/pages/ItemDetail.html?docId=955074&ite…   Cyclical Investment Stance Equity Sector Recommendations

On Friday 4th June, I will be debating my colleague Peter Berezin on the future of cryptocurrencies. I believe that the cryptocurrency asset-class has substantial further price upside, whereas Peter thinks that it is going to zero. So please join us for what will be a lively debate on Friday 4th June at 10am EDT, (3pm BST, 4pm CEST). Dhaval Joshi Feature Chart of the WeekThe Fractal Structure Of Cryptos Had Become Very Fragile Today’s report is a brief review and update of the 22 short-term trades that we have recommended through the past three months, and it demonstrates the power of Fractals: The Competitive Advantage In Investing. At the end of the report we also introduce a new trade. Our 22 recommendations have comprised 10 structured trades – which include profit-targets, symmetrical stop-losses, and expiry dates – plus a further 12 recommendations without structured exit points. In summary, three structured recommendations have hit their profit targets: short NOK/PLN +2.6 percent, long European Personal Products versus Autos +15 percent, and long Finland versus Sweden +4.7 percent. Two open trades are in profit, and one is flat. Against this, two structured recommendations hit their stop-losses: short GBP/JPY -2.2 percent, and long New Zealand versus MSCI ACWI -4 percent. Meanwhile, long China versus Netherlands reached its expiry date at a slight loss -1.8 percent. And one open trade is in loss. This results in a ‘win ratio’ at a commendable 55 percent – counting a ‘full win’ as hitting the profit target, a ‘full loss’ as hitting the symmetrical stop-loss, and pro-rata for partial wins and losses. The win ratio at 55 percent is commendable because, in recent months, all financial assets been strongly correlated to the ebb and flow of bond yields and the ‘reflation trade’ – as we highlighted in The Pareto Principle Of Investment. This has made the current environment a difficult one to find genuinely independent investment ideas. Even more commendably, the 12 unstructured recommendations, which included Bitcoin, Ethereum, and several commodities, have all anticipated exhaustions or sharp reversals. The sections below review the structured and unstructured recommendations in chronological order. The 10 Structured Recommendations 1.            18th March: Short NOK/PLN                 Achieved its +2.6 percent profit target. 2.            25th March: Short GBP/JPY                 Hit its -2.2 percent stop-loss. 3.            1st April: Long European Personal Products vs. European Autos                 Achieved its +15 percent profit target. 4.            15th April: Long China vs. Netherlands                 Expired at -1.8 percent (versus its +5 percent profit target). 5.            15th April: Long Finland vs. Sweden                 Achieved its +4.7 percent profit target. 6.            22nd April: Long New Zealand vs. MSCI ACWI                 Hit its -4 percent stop-loss. 7.            6th May: Short Building and Construction (PKB) vs. Healthcare (XLV)                 In profit, and we expect further upside (Chart I-2). Chart I-2Short Building And Construction Versus Healthcare 8.            6th May: Short France vs. Japan                 In loss, but we expect upside. 9.            13th May: Long USD/CAD                 Flat, but we expect upside. 10.          20th May: Long 10-year T-bond vs. 10-year TIPS                 In profit, and we expect further upside (Chart I-3). Chart I-3Short Inflation Expectations The 12 Unstructured Recommendations 1.            18th March: Stocks vs. Bonds (MSCI ACWI vs. 30-year T-bond) to consolidate                 As anticipated, global stocks have consolidated versus bonds since mid-March, and we expect the consolidation to continue. 2.            18th March: Long 30-year T-bond                 Likewise, exactly as anticipated, bond prices have rebounded since mid-March, and we expect the rebound to continue (Chart I-4). Chart I-4Bond Prices To Rebound 3.            25th March: Tactically short Bitcoin                 Bitcoin subsequently corrected by almost 40 percent, but the correction is mostly done (Chart I-1).   4.            25th March: Tactically short Ethereum                 Likewise, Ethereum subsequently corrected, but the correction is mostly done. 5.            15th April: Short Taiwan vs. China                 Taiwan subsequently corrected versus   China, but the correction is mostly done. 6.            22nd April: Short PKR/USD                 As anticipated, PKR/USD corrected in the subsequent month. 7.            6th May: Short Corn vs. Wheat 8.            6th May: Short Timber (Chart I-5) Chart I-5Short Timber 9.            13th May: Short Soybeans 10.          20th May: Short Copper 11.          20th May: Short Tin 12.          27th May: Short Iron Ore                 As anticipated, all the above commodities have corrected, and in some cases very sharply. But the correction is still underway. New Recommendation Finally, this week’s new recommendation comes from the MSCI world equity index universe. The massive outperformance of Austria versus Chile – in large part due to the different sector compositions of the two markets – is fragile on all fractal dimensions: 65-day, 130-day, and 260-day (Chart I-6). Chart I-6Short Austria Vs. Chile Accordingly, the recommendation is to short Austria versus Chile, setting the profit target and symmetrical stop-loss at 7 percent.   Dhaval Joshi Chief Strategist dhaval@bcaresearch.com Fractal Trading System Fractal Trades 6-Month Recommendations Structural Recommendations Closed Fractal Trades Closed Trades Asset Performance Equity Market Performance   Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields Chart I-1Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields ##br##- Euro Area Chart I-2Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields ##br##- Europe Ex Euro Area Chart I-3Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields ##br##- Asia Chart I-4Indicators To Watch - Bond Yields ##br##- Other Developed   Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart I-5Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart I-6Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart I-7Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations Chart I-8Indicators To Watch - Interest Rate Expectations  

In yesterday’s Special Report, we initiated a long S&P oil & gas exploration & production / short S&P metals & mining market neutral trade as a way to capitalize on the China/DM growth differential on a 6 to 12-month time horizon. This trade is also a way to express our view that crude oil will likely outperform copper going forward. While we outlined the demand side of the story in the Special Report, today we touch on relative supply dynamics. Ultimately, supply of crude oil and copper is dictated by how much companies invest in capex. It allows them to dig up more commodities in the future, thus increasing supply and lowering commodity prices. The chart below illustrates this relationship for copper and crude producers and highlights that on a relative basis, copper producers’ capex meaningfully outpaced the one of oil producers (relative capex shown inverted). In short, that means that not only relative demand dynamics are a major headwind for the copper/crude oil price ratio, but the supply side of the story will also be a drag. Bottom Line: We reiterate our newly established long S&P oil & gas exploration & production / short S&P metals & mining pair trade. For more details on the rationale behind the trade, please refer to yesterday’s Special Report.

Special Report

The economic reopening has been an underlying theme throughout most of our research since last September that has allowed us, among other things, to harvest handsome gains from our long “Back-To-Work”/short “COVID-19 Winners” baskets pair trades to the tune of 42%. While in our research we primarily focused on exploiting how the pandemic affected different sectors of the US economy, in this Special Report we take an international approach. Specifically, we recommend a play that will benefit from the unfolding Chinese slowdown (China was the country that first emerged from the pandemic, and it has already gone through peak post-pandemic growth), and from the continuing recovery in developed markets (DMs) that are yet to reach their post-pandemic growth apex. Choosing The Trade Vehicle To express this cyclical 6 to 12-month time horizon trade, we chose an intra-commodity price ratio of long crude oil/short copper. Copper prices are intrinsically driven by China’s insatiable demand for commodities, and today the Middle Kingdom accounts for 60% of global copper consumption, up 200% from just 15 years ago (Chart 1, top panel)! At the same time, the crude oil market does not have a dominant end-demand consumer as even China accounts for only 15% of global consumption. The implication is that oil prices are a good proxy for global ex-China growth, whereas copper is a great China growth gauge. The bottom panel of Chart 1 also links China's consumption of copper relative to that of oil and the CPI differential between China and the rest of the world. Importantly, as DMs now enter a period of high CPI prints, the differential will dive deeper into negative territory supporting our thesis of preferring crude at the expense of copper. In the S&P 500 sector universe, Chart 2 shows that a long S&P oil & gas exploration & production (S&P O&G E&P)/short S&P metals & mining (S&P M&M) position approximates the oil-to-copper ratio. In this report we will stick to using this sub-sector level proxy. Chart 1China And Commodities Chart 2Expressing The Trade Using Sectors Review Of China’s Slowdown In December 2020, we first pointed out the risk of Chinese growth going on hiatus in the second half of 2021 serving as a catalyst to likely reset the stock market. Now that China is the center piece of our new pair trade, a brief review of Chinese macro data is in order. On the domestic front, China put a break on its fiscal stimulus programs that is not likely to change anytime soon. Since the GFC, China has a tendency to refrain from stimulating the economy – a rule that is only broken once an exogenous shock hits the system (Euro debt crisis in 2011, pop of the Chinese equity bubble in 2015, trade war in 2019, and finally the pandemic in 2020). Absent any black swan events, China’s fiscal support will continue its downward trajectory, which, at the margin, will cap future copper gains (Chart 3, bottom panel). Tack on the natural tightening from the Chinese sovereign bond market, and copper’s cyclically bullish thesis crumbles (Chart 3, middle panel). When we look at other regions that proxy mainland China, a similar message emerges. Chart 4 shows that not only is AUD/USD refusing to break above a key historical  resistance level, but also Taiwanese SAR1 building permits are sniffing out some trouble. Both of these series confirm that Chinese, and by extension, copper’s growth is likely peaking. Chart 3Troubling News At Home… Chart 4...And Abroad Chart 5A Key Driver Is Turning Finally, Chart 5 reiterates just how important China is for the S&P M&M index, which is due for a rough awakening. Review Of DM Growth The long leg of our trade relies on economic recovery in the DM region. The growth story for the US is well-known, so we will not spend much time on it besides reiterating that generous fiscal support and an accommodative Fed are here to stay for the foreseeable future, ensuring that real economic US growth will remain robust. This brings us to the next major DM player – Europe. When it came to the vaccine roll out, the old continent was slow at inoculation, which initially made for a sluggish recovery, but last month’s Eurozone PMI release showed that the common market is picking up steam. On top of that, several leading variables predict that the explosive rise in the euro area’s PMI is not a one-off print. A diffusion index comprising Swedish data remains on the ascent. Sweden is a hypersensitive economy partially focused on the early-stage production of industrials goods which makes it a good indicator of the future overall European growth. Next, the OECD’s Leading Indicator for the Eurozone that enjoys an approximately 5-6-month lead on the euro area PMI ticked up anew (Chart 6). Finally, a liquidity proxy in the form of M2 minus GDP growth reaccelerated after a brief pause emphasizing that the Eurozone’s recovery is here to stay (Chart 7). Chart 6Upbeat Soft Data Coupled… Chart 7...With Plentiful Liquidity... Chart 8 aggregates these three series into a leading model, which confirms that European PMIs will remain strong. The broader implication is that DM economic activity will remain healthy supporting higher WTI prices, at a time when China’s slowdown will be disproportionately weighing on copper prices. Chart 8...Equals Steady Eurozone PMI Dollar Context We also think that the continuing US dollar bear market, which is BCA’s and our base case view, will be more beneficial to WTI prices given their tight historical inverse correlation. Chart 9 also shows that the rally in copper prices wasn’t driven by the greenback, instead it was China stock piling of the metal in light of the recent collapse in prices that drove copper higher. If anything, the US dollar is now a headwind for copper as the massive divergence between copper prices and the greenback will likely close through a catch down phase in the former. Chart 9US Dollar Tailwinds Chart 10Enticing Industry-level Data Delving Into Sector-level Data While both the S&P O&G E&P and the S&P M&M sub-industries are highly exposed to their respective commodities, their relative pricing power closely mimics the shape of the business cycle. The implication is that oil producers are more efficient at converting their raw commodity into earnings than mining companies (Chart 10, second panel) – a feature that is also evident once we dissect income statement data (Chart 11). Mixing that with more limited wage pressures in the oil & gas industry makes for a perfect cocktail that will boost relative operating margins favoring E&P producers (Chart 10, third & bottom panels). Chart 11Clean Earnings Pipes What Is Priced In? Has the market and sell-side analysts already sniffed out this trade opportunity? The short answer is no. On a 12-month forward P/E ratio basis our long S&P O&G E&P / short S&P M&M pair trade is at the neutral zone. Similarly, on a 12-month forward P/S metric, this share price ratio is actually trading below its historical mean and in the neutral zone. The only metric that is a touch elevated is the relative net earnings revisions ratio, but again, it remains far from historical extremes (Chart 12). Switching from analysts’ forecasts to our TTM indicators, neither our Technical nor Valuation indicators are showing any signs of overbought conditions or overvaluation, respectively. Encouragingly, 6-month momentum also had a chance to reset courtesy of the recent pullback in the share price ratio, offering a compelling entry point to this trade (Chart 13). Chart 12Sell-side Is Late To The Party Chart 13Technicals Give The Go-ahead Bottom Line: Given the unfolding Chinese slowdown, yet still robust DM growth expectations, enticing sector-level data coupled with favorable technicals and valuations, it pays to initiate a long S&P oil & gas exploration & production / short S&P metals & mining market neutral trade as a way to capitalize on the China/DM growth differential on a 6 to 12-month time horizon. The ticker symbols for the stocks in the S&P 500 oil & gas exploration & production and S&P 500 metals & mining indexes are BLBG: S5OILP – COP, EOG, HES, COG, MRO, APA, PXD, DVN, FANG and BLBG: S5METL – FCX, NEM, NUE, respectively.   Arseniy Urazov Senior Analyst ArseniyU@bcaresearch.com   Footnotes 1     Taiwan (province of China).

Special Report

Dear client, This week, I am conducting a BCA Academy Marcroeconomic seminar in the Middle East. In lieu of our regular report, we are publishing a piece written by my colleague Jeremie Peloso. In it, Jeremie explores how to adjust valuation metrics to build country and sector selection tools which can be deployed to manage global equity portfolios. I trust you will find that this report provides a useful approach to equity selection. Best Regards, Mathieu Savary Chief European Strategist   Highlights We introduce our Combined Mechanical Valuation Indicator for European equities to identify extreme valuations at the country and sector level. At the country level, the historical track record of relative valuations as an alpha-generating tool is mixed; however, they demonstrate impressive predictive power at the sector level on a 3- to 12-month time horizon. A trading strategy consisting of a basket of the five cheapest relative valuations generates excess returns with high batting averages. The current reading from our Combined Mechanical Valuation Indicator suggests investors should overweight the following European sectors: consumer discretionary relative to both Swedish and British counterparts, tech relative to Australian counterparts, communications relative to Spanish counterparts, and utilities relative to Italian counterparts. Also, favor UK energy stocks relative to their Eurozone competitors. Feature European equities have been underperforming their foreign peers for the past 10 years (Chart 1). The persistently lower profitability of European stocks partly explains their subpar performance; a DuPont decomposition of RoE reveals how Europe’s economic malaise affects corporate profitability (Chart 2). Chart 1Structural Underperformance From The Past... Chart 2... And The Future The Eurozone’s excessively large capital stock is chief among these culprits (Chart 2, bottom panel). It suggests that a large proportion of the capital stock in the Eurozone is misallocated which, in turn, hurts profit margins and renders the Euro Area’s asset turnover inferior to that of other countries. Compared to the US, greater economic rigidities and lower market power and concentration in Europe also hurt profitability. On net, these forces indicate that the case for overweighting European equities on a structural investment horizon (5 to 10 years) remains weak. Despite the poor long-term outlook, European stocks could still perform well on both a tactical and cyclical investment horizon. We currently recommend a modest overweight in European stocks for cyclical investors. One of our main investment themes for the remainder of 2021 is that European growth will surprise to the upside, once the re-opening of economic activity in the Eurozone gets fully underway, supported by the rapid recent progress of vaccination campaigns. This process will cause a re-rating of European assets. Our recent work shows that positive changes in economic surprises translate into generous returns for European equities and EUR/USD. Moreover, prolonged accommodative monetary policies via low rates and the ECB’s PEPP program, as well as continued fiscal support via the NGEU recovery fund, will be supportive for European assets in absolute terms. However, there are risks to our upbeat view, which we explored last week. They are as follows: (1) a slowdown in the Chinese economy, (2) a global credit impulse deterioration, and (3) inflation surges that are faster than expected. While none of these risks constitute our base case scenario, they could derail the positive cyclical environment we anticipate for European equities. In order to diversify portfolio risk away from traditional cyclical factors, this Special Report presents a mechanical valuation framework for European equities to identify high-probability attractive excess returns on a 3- to 12-month time horizon. At the country level, the historical track record of relative valuation as a selection tool is mixed; however, it demonstrates impressive predictive power at the sector level. Therefore, this method provides an attractive starting point for sector selection. The Mechanics Of The Mechanical Approach The starting point of this analysis is to select different valuation metrics. We opt for the following measures commonly accepted by the investment community: Price-to-earnings, Forward price-to-earnings, Price-to-sales, Price-to-book,  Price-to-cash flows, Long-term growth in earnings. Next, we detrend each valuation measure by subtracting its 5-year moving average. We subsequently compute the difference between the detrended valuation metrics of the Euro Area MSCI equity benchmark and its chosen counterpart. For example, the calculation for the price-to-earnings ratio (P/E) with the US is as follows: Valuation Gap = (Euro Area P/E - 5-year m.a.) - (US P/E - 5-year m.a.) Then, we divide each of the valuation gaps shown above by their 5-year moving standard deviation: Mechanical Indicator = Valuation Gap / (5-year moving standard deviation of VG) The resulting valuation indicator mean-reverts and oscillates between +/- 2 standard deviations (Chart 3). We repeat this process for each valuation metric across 15 countries (including the All Country World and emerging markets MSCI indices) and the 10 GICS sectors. Considering the importance of relative sectoral biases, we create two versions of the mechanical indicators for the purpose of country analysis: a regular market-cap weighted version and a sector-neutral one, in which we weight all 10 GICS sectors equally. As Chart 4 illustrates, the differences in sector composition between the Eurozone and other regions lead to a sector-neutral valuation metric that deviates substantially from its market-cap weighted counterpart. Importantly, the sector-neutral mechanical indicators perform better on average than the market-cap weighted versions, thus reinforcing the importance of relative sectoral biases when it comes to equity valuation. Chart 3Mechanical Valuation Indicator Example Chart 4Sector Composition Matters Finally, given the sheer amount of computations performed, we only present the summary output from our analysis. The appendix, which starts on page 11, displays the detailed results for each of the valuation metrics, countries, and sectors. A Well-Oiled Mechanical Tool? Simple valuation measures make unreliable market timing tools. However, they are useful at extreme levels, which is precisely how the mechanical indicator is supposed to be used. The next step of our analysis is to assess our methodology and see where it displays predictive power. For this purpose, we back-tested trading rules relying on outlying readings of the relative Mechanical Valuation Indicator. More specifically, we calculated the common currency (US$) excess returns over 3-, 6-, and 12-month horizons generated by the following: Going long (overweight) European stocks, when they stood at 1 and 1.5 standard deviations on the cheap side of fair value. Going short (underweight) European stocks, when they stood at 1 and 1.5 standard deviations on the expensive side of fair value. We define excess returns as the returns in excess of the average returns observed over the past 10-year period. In other words, we want to ensure that the mechanical approach delivers more alpha than a passive buy-and-hold strategy. We use the 1.5 standard deviation threshold rather than the 2-sigma hurdle because of the lack of sufficient observations at the 2-standard deviation bar. If we had stuck to the 2-sigma threshold, the results from the back-test would not have been reliable, despite a sample with history going back to 2003. Table 1 presents the indicator’s batting average at the country level for all the valuation metrics - that is, the number of times both trading rules generated positive excess returns as a percent of the total number of signals. Table 1Mechanical Valuation Indicator (Sector-Neutral) Historical Track Record: Country Level The results are mixed. Individually, none of the metrics display batting averages that significantly exceed 50% and none of the valuation metrics seem to perform uniformly across either time horizons or trading rules. On the bright side, we observe an improvement in excess returns between the +/- 1 and 1.5 standard deviation signals, especially when the mechanical indicators signal that European equities are the most expensive. Looking more closely at each valuation metric reveals that the long-term expected growth in earnings and the price-to-cash flows provided much better signals than the forward P/E and the price-to-book metrics. We repeat the same exercise at the sector level by calculating mechanical indicators for European sectors relative to comparable sectors from other regions - for example, European industrials relative to US or Chinese industrials. The results displayed in Table 2 consist of the average excess returns and batting averages across all sectors. The results for each sector can be found on page 19.    Table 2Mechanical Valuation Indicator Historical Track Record: Sector Level The historical track record of valuation-based trading rules yields much better results for sector selection than for country picking. All of the valuation metrics provide respectable predictive ability except for the long-term expected growth in earnings. In fact, the indicator generates positive excess returns more than two-thirds of the time; in half of the cases when the indicator fails to generate alpha, the Mechanical Valuation Indicator is computed using the long-term expected growth in earnings. Furthermore, the batting averages are above the 50% mark often, except over 12-month time horizons. Strength In Numbers: Combining The Signals The mixed results obtained from applying trading rules based on our mechanical indicator at the country level suggest we could improve the predictive power of this framework. Since individual valuation metrics do not cut it, we combine them into a simple average. Table 3Combined Mechanical Valuation Indicator (Sector-Neutral) Historical Track Record: Country Level At the country level, the results are once again disappointing. As can be seen from Table 3, the quality of the signals from our combined mechanical indicator is not consistent across the board. The predictive power of the combined signals only appears to be effective when European equities are 1-sigma cheap or 1.5-sigma expensive. When the combined mechanical indicator is 1.5 standard deviations away from fair value on the expensive side, which, admittedly, is not a very common occurrence, going short (underweight) European equities deliver excess returns of 4.2%, 3.2%, and 2.6% over  3-, 6- and 12-month time horizons, respectively. Table 4Combined Mechanical Valuation Indicator Historical Track Record: Sector Level Despite this disappointment, the mechanical indicator once again truly shines at the sector level. Combining the valuation metrics, excluding the long-term expected growth rate of earnings (which, as we showed does a poor job), provides an excellent predictive power on all fronts (Table 4). All the excess returns are positive, and the batting averages are satisfying, especially on the 3-month and 6-month time horizons. The most impressive performance came from the mechanical indicator signaling European equity sectors were 1.5-sigma cheap. Out of 61 occurrences, following the signal resulted in earned excess returns of 3.3% and 4.8% on average over a 6- and 12-month time horizon, respectively. Importantly, the batting averages were both close to 60%. Bottom Line: Our Combined Mechanical Valuation Indicator is a useful tool, especially for sector selection in a global portfolio. It sports an impressive historical track record and allows us to identify pockets of attractive relative valuation that generate alpha for investors on a 3- to 12-month time horizon. Investment Implication What is the current message from our Combined Mechanical Valuation Indicator? Chart 5Combined Mechanical Valuation Indicators (Sector-Neutral): Country Level At present, the approach only sends two signals at the +/- one-sigma threshold at the country level and both stand on the cheap side of fair value (Chart 5). According to the sector-neutral mechanical indicator, the European MSCI equity benchmark is cheap compared to emerging markets and Chinese benchmarks. And, while not at extremes, US and global equities are still expensive relative to Eurozone stocks. Chart 6 provides the current reading from the mechanical indicator for each sector. Chart 6ACombined Mechanical Valuation Indicators: Sector Level Chart 6BCombined Mechanical Valuation Indicators: Sector Level Chart 7Favor UK Energy Stocks Vs. European Ones A few things stand out. First, there appears to be no extreme relative valuations within materials. Second, European energy stocks turn out to be expensive relative to all other regions included in the analysis, especially against energy stocks out of China and the UK. In fact, it makes a compelling case for investors to underweight Euro Area energy stocks relative to UK counterparts (Chart 7). Third, within the communications sector, Eurozone stocks are cheap against all their counterparts except for German ones. The relative valuation does not, however, stand at an extreme. Finally, if we were to select the five strongest signals, we would select the following pairs: Overweight European consumer discretionary stocks relative to Swedish counterparts Overweight European communications stocks relative to Spanish counterparts Overweight European tech stocks relative to Australian counterparts Overweight European consumer discretionary stocks relative to UK counterparts Overweight European utilities stocks relative to Italian counterparts This basket should deliver positive excess returns over a 3- to 12-month time horizon (Chart 8). Chart 8Going With The Strongest CMVI Signals   Jeremie Peloso, Associate Editor JeremieP@bcaresearch.com   Appendix A The tables below present the historical track record of the sector-neutral mechanical valuation indicator for each of the valuation metrics at the country level. Euro Area vs. USEuro Area vs. All Country World Euro Area vs. Emerging Markets Euro Area vs. Germany Euro Area vs. France Euro Area vs. Italy Euro Area vs. Spain Euro Area vs. The Netherlands Euro Area vs. UK Euro Area vs. Sweden Euro Area vs. Switzerland Euro Area vs. Japan Euro Area vs. Canada Euro Area vs. Australia Euro Area vs. China   Appendix B The tables below present the historical track record of the mechanical valuation indicator for each of the valuation metrics at the sector level. Industrials Materials Consumer Discretionary Consumer Staples Energy Financials Technology Communications Utilities Health Care Appendix C The tables below present the historical track record of the sector-neutral combined mechanical valuation indicator (CMVI) at the country level.   Euro Area vs. US Euro Area vs. All Country World Euro Area vs. Emerging Markets Euro Area vs. Germany Euro Area vs. France Euro Area vs. Italy Euro Area vs. Spain Euro Area vs. The Netherlands Euro Area vs. UK Euro Area vs. Sweden Euro Area vs. Switzerland Euro Area vs. Japan Euro Area vs. Canada Euro Area vs. Australia Euro Area vs. China     Appendix D The tables below present the historical track record of the Combined Mechanical Valuation Indicator (CMVI) at the sector level. Industrials Materials Consumer Discretionary Consumer Staples Energy Financials Technology Communications Utilities Health Care   Footnotes

Underweight Our underweight in the S&P communications equipment index is slightly in the green, and today we reiterate our below benchmark allocation in this niche tech sub-sector. The key reason for concern is industry pricing power. While the US economy is inflating on nearly every metric, communications equipment manufacturers are struggling to keep up, and their relative pricing power is sinking like a stone (second panel).  In fact, year-over-year (y/y) growth for CSCO’s enterprise orders is at the 0% mark. Keep in mind that Q1/2020 is the earliest quarter that the pandemic started to wreak havoc, yet CSCO couldn’t even show a positive y/y number, despite soaring CEO capex intensions (bottom panel)! Thus, we view this tech sub-group as a value trap rather than an opportunity and we think there are valid reasons why the market is currently valuing this index at a 20% discount to the broad market on a forward P/E basis to the broad market (third panel). Bottom Line: We reiterate our underweight stance in the S&P communications equipment index.  The ticker symbols for the stocks in this index are: BLBG: S5COMM – CSCO, JNPR, MSI, ANET, FFIV. ​​​​​​​

Special Report

Highlights House prices are rising rapidly across the developed markets, in response to the extraordinary monetary and fiscal policy stimulus implemented to fight the pandemic. Evidence points to the house price surge being driven by monetary policy that has left real interest rates far below equilibrium levels. Supply factors are a secondary cause of the house price boom. Financial stability risks stemming from rising house prices are less acute than the pre-2008 experience, as overall household leverage has grown more slowly during the pandemic and global banks are better capitalized. Rapidly rising house prices are forcing some central banks to turn less accommodative earlier than expected. The recent hawkish turns by the Bank of Canada and Reserve Bank of New Zealand may be canaries in the coal mine for other central banks – perhaps even the Fed – if house prices and household leverage start rising together. Feature The COVID-19 pandemic led to the sharpest economic recession since World War II, alongside an enormous rise in unemployment. Consensus expectations call for the output gap to be closed (or mostly closed) in most advanced economies by the end of this year, but it remains an open question how quickly these economies will be able to return to full employment amid potentially permanent shifts in demand for office space and goods sold at physical, “brick and mortar” retail locations. Despite this sizeable and swift economic shock, house price appreciation accelerated last year in the developed world. Chart 1 highlights that US house prices rose at an 18% annualized pace in the second half of 2020, whereas they accelerated at a high-single digit pace in developed markets ex-US (on a GDP-weighted basis). This, in conjunction with a sharp rise in the household sector credit-to-GDP ratio (Chart 2), has unnerved some investors while raising questions about the implications for monetary policy. Chart 1House Prices Are Surging Around The World Chart 2Rising Fears About Deteriorating Household Balance Sheets Before we discuss the investment implications of the global housing boom, however, we must first accurately determine the reasons why it is happening. The Work-From-Home Effect: Less Than Meets The Eye When analyzing the surprising behavior of the housing market last year, the working-from-home effect brought upon by the pandemic emerges as an obvious factor potentially explaining house price gains. Last year, following recommended or mandatory stay-at-home orders from governments, most office-based businesses rapidly shifted to work-from-home arrangements as an emergency response. However, in the month or two following the beginning of stay-at-home orders, several national US surveys found many office workers preferred the flexibility afforded by work-from-home arrangements. Many employers, correspondingly, found that the productivity of their employees did not suffer while working from home, or that it even improved. Several prominent corporations in the US have subsequently made some work-from-home options permanent, or even allowed employees to work from offices in a different city than they did prior to the pandemic. Newfound work-from-home options have undoubtedly created new demand for housing, and thus explained the surge in house prices seen over the past year in the minds of some investors. However, in our view, evidence from the US, the UK, and France suggests that the work-from-home effect better explains differences in price gains across housing types and within large metropolitan areas, rather than aggregate or national-level changes in house prices. Chart 3 provides some quantification of the impact of work-from-home policies by plotting US resident migration patterns by city. This data has been compiled by CBRE, and the impact of COVID is shown as the change in net move-ins from 2019 to 2020 per 1000 people. This helps control for the underlying migration pattern that existed in US cities prior to the pandemic. Chart 3Work From Home Policies Have Impacted Migration Trends… The chart highlights that the negative migration impact from COVID has been mostly concentrated in New York City and the three most populous cities on the West Coast (by metro area): Los Angeles, San Francisco, and Seattle. And yet, Chart 4 highlights that house price inflation in these four cities has accelerated to a double-digit pace, only modestly below the national average. Chart 4...But Cities With Outward Migration Still Have Very Strong House Price Gains The house price indexes shown in Chart 4 represent aggregate, metro area trends, and clearly some regions within these metro areas have experienced house price deceleration or outright deflation versus gains in areas outside the urban core. But Chart 5 highlights that house prices have declined in Manhattan basically in line with the change in net move-ins as a share of the population, underscoring that double-digit metro area-wide house price gains appear to be vastly disproportionate to changes in net migration. Similarly, Chart 6 highlights that rents decelerated in the US over the past year but remained in positive territory and grew at a 3.5% annualized rate from February to April. Chart 5In Manhattan, House Prices Have Tracked Net Migration Chart 6Rent Costs Have Decelerated, But Have Not Contracted Evidence from Paris and London also suggests that a work-from-home effect is insufficient to explain broad house price gains. Panel 1 of Chart 7 highlights that house prices in France have accelerated significantly, but that apartment prices have decelerated only fractionally in lockstep. Panel 2 shows that the acceleration in house prices does reflect a work-from-home effect, as prices have risen faster in inner Parisian suburbs. Panel 3, however, highlights that Parisian apartment prices, the dominant property type in the urban core, have decelerated modestly. Chart 8 highlights that house price gains have not even decelerated in greater London; they have been merely been modestly outstripped by gains in Outer South East (outside of the Outer Metropolitan Area). Chart 7In France, Parisian Apartment Prices Are Simply Lagging, Not Falling Chart 8In The UK, Greater London Property Prices Are Accelerating     The Policy Effect: The Fundamental Driver Of The Housing Market Despite the broader location flexibility that work-from-home policies now provide to potential homeowners, it seems inconceivable that the housing market would have responded in the manner that it has over the past year given the size of the economic shock brought on by the pandemic without significant support from policy. Above-the-line fiscal measures to the pandemic have totaled in the double-digits in advanced economies (Chart 9), and monetary policy has contributed to easier financial conditions via rate cuts, asset purchases, and sizeable programs to support financial market liquidity. Chart 9There Has Been A Massive Fiscal Policy Response To The Crisis In fact, Charts 10-13 present compelling evidence that fiscal and monetary policy have been the core drivers of significant house price gains over the past year. Charts 10 and 11 plot the above-the-line fiscal response of advanced economies against the year-over-year growth rate in house prices as well as its acceleration (the change in the year-over-year growth rate). The charts show a clearly positive relationship, with a stronger link between the pandemic fiscal response and the acceleration in house prices. Chart 10Differences In Last Year’s Fiscal Response… Chart 11…Help Explain Differences In House Price Gains Chart 12Pre-Pandemic Differences In The Monetary Policy Stance… Chart 13…Do An Even Better Job Of Explaining 2020 House Price Gains   Charts 12 and 13 highlight the even stronger link between house prices and the pre-pandemic monetary policy stance in advanced economies, defined as the difference between each country’s 2-year government bond yield and its Taylor Rule-implied policy interest rate as of Q4 2019. We construct each country’s Taylor Rule using the original specification, with core consumer price inflation, a 2% inflation target, and real potential GDP growth as the definition of the real equilibrium interest rate. The charts make it clear that easy monetary policy strongly explains house price gains in 2020, particularly the year-over-year percent change rather than its acceleration. This makes sense, given that monetary policy was already quite easy in many countries at the onset of the pandemic – meaning that changes were less pronounced than they would have been had interest rates been higher. The explanation that emerges from Charts 10-13 is that historic fiscal easing, combined with an easy starting point for monetary policy – that became even easier last year – enabled demand from work-from-home policies to manifest during an extremely severe recession. We agree that work-from-home policies have shifted the geographic preferences of some home buyers and likely provided a new source of net demand from renters in urban cores purchasing homes in outlying areas. But we strongly doubt that the net effect of work-from-home policies in the midst of an extreme shock to economic activity would have caused the rise in house prices that we have observed, certainly not to this level, without major support from policy. This underscores that policy, and not the work-from-home effect, has and will likely remain the core driver of the global housing market. The Supply Effect: Mostly A Red Herring Chart 14Countries Fall Into Two Groups In Terms Of The Relative Trend In Real Residential Investment One perennial question that emerges when analyzing the housing market, particularly in markets with outsized house price gains, is the impact of constrained supply. It is frequently argued that constrained supply is squeezing prices higher in many markets, and that the appropriate policy solution to extreme house price gains is to enable widespread housing construction – not to raise interest rates. We do not rule out the potential impact of constrained supply in certain cities or regional housing markets, and we have highlighted in previous research that a positive relationship does exist between population density in urban regions and median house price-to-income ratios.1 But as a broad explanation for supercharged house price gains, the supply argument appears to fall flat. Chart 14 presents the most standardized measure of cross-country housing supply available for several advanced economies, the trend in real residential investment relative to real GDP over time. These series are all rebased to 100 as of 1997, prior to the 2002-2007 US housing market boom. The chart makes it clear that advanced economies generally fall into two groups based on this metric: those that have seen declines in real residential investment relative to GDP, especially after the global financial crisis (panel 1), and those that have experienced either an uptrend in housing construction relative to output or have seen a flat trend (panel 2). If scarce housing supply was the core driver of outsized house price gains, then we would expect to see stronger gains in the countries shown in panel 1 and smaller gains in the countries shown in panel 2. In fact, mostly the opposite is true: Charts 15 and 16 highlight that the relationship between the level of these indexes today relative to their 1997 or 2005 levels is positively related to the magnitude of house price gains last year, suggesting that housing market supply has generally been responding to demand over the past decade. The US and possibly New Zealand stand as possible exceptions to the trend, suggesting that relatively scarce supply may be boosting prices even further in these markets beyond what fiscal and monetary policy would suggest. Chart 15Countries That Have Seen A Stronger Pace Of Residential Investment… Chart 16…Have Experienced Stronger House Price Gains   Chart 17Is This Not Enough Supply, Or Too Much Demand? As a final point about the inclination of investors to gravitate towards supply-side arguments related to the housing market, Chart 17 presents a simple thought experiment. The chart shows a simple housing supply-demand curve diagram, in a scenario where the demand curve for housing has shifted out more than the supply curve has (thus raising house prices). Is this a scenario in which supply is too tight? Or is it a case in which demand is too strong? In our view, the tight supply answer is reasonable in circumstances where the increase in demand is normal or otherwise sustainable. But Charts 10-13 clearly showed that housing demand is being boosted by easy policy, which in the case of some countries has occurred for years: interest rates have remained well below levels that macroeconomic theory would traditionally consider to be in equilibrium, and this has occurred alongside significant household sector leveraging (Chart 18). As such, in our view, investors should be more inclined to view the global housing market as generally being driven by demand-side rather than supply-side factors. This Is Not 2007/08 … Yet We highlighted in Chart 2 above that the household sector debt-to-GDP ratio increased sharply last year, which has raised some questions about debt sustainability among investors. For the most part, the rise in this ratio actually reflects denominator effects (namely a sharp contraction in nominal GDP) rather than a huge surge in household debt. Chart 19 shows BIS data for the annual growth in total household debt in developed economies was roughly stable last year, at least until Q3 (the most recent datapoint available from the BIS). Chart 18Low Interest Rtaes Have Fueled Household Leveraging Chart 19Total Credit Growth Has Been Stable, But Mortgage Credit Growth Is Accelerating Chart 20US Mortgage Growth Is Picking Up, As Repayments Slow Consumer Credit Growth But Chart 19 shows the recent trend in total household debt, which masks diverging mortgage and non-mortgage debt trends. In the US, euro area, Canada, and Sweden, household mortgage debt has accelerated to varying degrees, underscoring that households have likely paid down non-mortgage debt with some of the savings that they have accumulated from a significant reduction in spending on services. Chart 20 shows this effect directly in the case of the US; mortgage debt growth accelerated by roughly 1.5 percentage points in the second half of the year, whereas consumer credit growth (made up of student loans, auto loans, credit cards, and other revolving credit) decelerated significantly. This aligns with data showing that US households have used some of their savings windfall to pay down their credit card balances. This changing mix within household debt - less higher-interest-rate consumer credit, more lower-interest-rate collateralized mortgage debt – could, on the margin, help mitigate financial stability risks from the housing boom by moderating overall debt service burdens. The starting point for the latter matters, though, in accurately assessing the risks from rising house prices and increased mortgage debt, particularly in countries where household debt levels are already high. According to data from the BIS, the US already has one of the lowest household debt service ratios (7.6%) among the developed economies (Chart 21).2 This compares favorably to the double-digit debt service ratios in the “higher-risk” countries like Canada (12.6%), Sweden (12.1%) and Norway (16.2%). On top of that, US commercial banks have become far more prudent with mortgage loan underwriting standards since the 2008 financial crisis. The New York Fed’s Household Debt and Credit report shows that an increasing majority of mortgage lending made by US banks since the 2008 crisis has been to those with very high FICO credit scores (Chart 22). This is in sharp contrast to the steady lending to “subprime” borrowers with poor credit scores that preceded the 2008 financial crisis. The median FICO score for new mortgage originations as of Q1 2021 was 788, compared to 707 in Q4 2006 at the peak of the mid-2000s US housing boom. Chart 21Diverging Trends In Global Household Debt Servicing Costs Chart 22US Banks Have Become More Prudent With Mortgage Lending   US bank balance sheets are also now less directly exposed to a fall in housing values. Residential loans now represent only 10% of the assets on US bank balance sheets, compared to 20% at the peak of the last housing bubble (Chart 23). This puts the US in the “lower-risk” group of countries in Europe, the UK and Japan where mortgages are less than 20% of bank balance sheets. This compares favorably to the “higher risk” group of countries where residential loans are a far larger share of bank assets (Chart 24), like Canada (32%), New Zealand (49%), Sweden (45%) and Australia (40%). Chart 23Banks Have Limited Direct Exposure To Housing Here Chart 24Banks Are Far More Exposed To Housing Here   Like nature, however, the financial ecosystem abhors a vacuum. “Non-bank” mortgage lenders have filled the void from traditional US banks reducing their lending to lower-quality borrowers, and they now represent around two-thirds of all US mortgage origination, a big leap from the 20% origination share in 2007. Non-bank lenders have also taken on growing shares of new mortgage origination in other countries like the UK, Canada and Australia. Chart 25Global Banks Can Withstand A Housing Shock Non-bank lenders do not take deposits and typically fund themselves via shorter-term borrowings, which raises the potential for future instability if credit markets seize up. These lenders also, on average, service mortgages with a higher probability of default, so they are exposed to greater credit losses when house prices decline. However, the risk of a full-blown 2008-style commercial banking crisis, with individual depositors’ funds at risk from a bank failure, are reduced with a greater share of riskier mortgage lending conducted by non-bank entities. This is especially true with global commercial banks far better capitalized today, with double-digit Tier 1 capital ratios (Chart 25), thanks to regulatory changes made after the Global Financial Crisis. Net-net, we conclude that the overall financial stability implications of the current surge in house prices in the developed economies are relatively modest on average. The acceleration in mortgage growth has occurred alongside reductions in non-mortgage growth, at a time when banks are better able to withstand a shock from any sustained future downturn in house prices. However, if house prices continue to accelerate and new homebuyers are forced to take on ever increasing amounts of mortgage debt, financial stability issues could intensify in some countries. Services spending will recover in a vaccinated post-COVID world, as economies reopen and consumer confidence improves, which will likely end the trend of falling non-residential consumer debt offsetting rising mortgage debt in countries like the US and Canada. Overall levels of household debt could begin to rise again relative to incomes, building up future financial stability risks when central banks begin to normalize pandemic-related monetary policies – a process that has already started in some countries because of the housing boom. The Monetary Policy Implications Of Surging House Prices Rapidly appreciating house prices are becoming an area of concern for policymakers in countries like Canada and New Zealand, where the affordability of housing is becoming a political, as well as an economic, issue. In the case of New Zealand, the government has actually altered the remit of the Reserve Bank of New Zealand (RBNZ) to more explicitly factor in the impact of monetary policy on housing costs. The Bank of Canada announced in April that it would taper its pace of government debt purchases and signaled that its decision was based, at least in small part, on signs of speculative behavior in Canada’s housing market. Macroprudential measures like limiting loan-to-value ratios of new mortgage loans are a policy option that governments in those countries have already implemented to try and cool off housing demand. Yet while such measures can help alleviate demand-supply mismatches in certain cities and regions, the efficacy of such measures in sustainably slowing the ascent of house prices on a national scale is unclear. In the April 2021 IMF Global Financial Stability Report, researchers estimated that, for a broad group of countries, the implementation of a new macro-prudential measure designed to cool loan demand reduced national household debt/GDP ratios by a mere one percentage point, on average, over a period encompassing four years.3 If macroprudential measures are that ineffective in sustainably reducing demand for mortgage loans, then the burden of slowing house price appreciation will have to fall on the more blunt instruments of monetary policy. Importantly, surging house price inflation is not likely to give a boost to realized inflation measures – an important issue given the current backdrop of rapidly rising realized inflation rates in many countries. Housing costs do represent a significant portion of consumer price indices in many developed countries, ranging from 19% in New Zealand to 33% in the US (Chart 26), with the euro area being the outlier with housing having a mere 2% weighting in the headline inflation index. Chart 26A Limited Impact On Actual Inflation From Housing Yet those so-called “housing” categories overwhelmingly measure only housing rental costs and not actual house prices. This is an important distinction because rents – which are often imputed measures like in the US and not even actual rental costs - are rising at a far slower pace than actual house prices in most countries, so the housing contribution to realized inflation is relatively modest. So the good news is that booming house prices will not worsen the acceleration of realized global inflation that has concerned investors and policymakers in 2021. Yet that does not mean that central bankers will not be forced to tighten policy to cool off red-hot housing demand that is clearly being fueled by persistently negative real interest rates. In Chart 27 and Chart 28, we show both nominal and real policy interest rates for the “lower risk” and “higher risk” country groupings that we described earlier. The real policy rates are nominal policy rates versus realized headline CPI inflation. The dotted lines in the charts represent the future path of rates discounted by markets. Specifically, the projection for nominal rates is taken from overnight index swap (OIS) forward curves, while the projection for real rates is calculated by subtracting the discounted path of inflation expectations extracted from CPI swap forwards. Chart 27Markets Discounting Negative Real Rates For The Next Decade Chart 28Negative Real Rates Are Unsustainable During A Housing Bubble   There are two key takeaways from these charts: Real policy interest rates are at or very close to the most deeply negative levels seen since the 2008 financial crisis. Markets are discounting that real rates will be at or below 0% for most of the next decade. Admittedly, there is room for debate over what the equilibrium level of real interest rates (a.k.a. “r-star”) should be in the coming years. However, we deem it a major stretch to believe that real rates need to be persistently low or negative for the next ten years to support even trend growth across the developed economies. In our view, the current boom in housing demand and mortgage borrowing provides clear evidence that negative real rates are below equilibrium and, thus, are stimulating credit demand. Thus, the only way for a central bank to cool off housing demand will be to raise both nominal and, more importantly, real interest rates. Canada and New Zealand will be the “canaries in the coal mine” among developed market central banks for such a move. According to the latest Bank of Canada Financial Stability Review, nearly 22% of Canadian mortgages are highly levered, with a loan-to-value ratio greater than 450%, a greater share of such mortgages than during the 2016/17 housing boom (Chart 29). Canadian house prices have risen to such an extent that home prices in major cities like Toronto, Vancouver and Montreal are among the most expensive in North America.4  Stunningly, a recent Bloomberg Nanos opinion poll revealed that nearly 50% of Canadians would support Bank of Canada rate hikes to cool off the red-hot housing market (Chart 30). The central bank will be unable to resist the pressure to use monetary policy to slam on the brakes of the housing market – investors should expect more tapering and, eventually, rate hikes from the Bank of Canada over at least the next couple of years. Chart 29Canadians Are Leveraging Up To Buy Expensive Homes Chart 3050% Of Canadians Want A Rate Hike To Cool Housing   In New Zealand, worsening housing affordability has reached a point where a 20% down payment on the median national house price is equal to 223% of median disposable income (Chart 31). This is forcing more first-time home buyers to take on levels of mortgage debt that the RBNZ deems highly risky (top panel). Like the Bank of Canada, the RBNZ will prove to be one of the most hawkish central banks in the developed world over the next couple of years as the central bank follows their newly-revised remit to try and cool off housing demand in New Zealand. Who is next? Housing values, measured by the ratio of median national house prices to median national household incomes, are rising in the US and UK but are still below the peaks of the mid-2000s housing bubble (Chart 32). Meanwhile, housing is becoming more expensive across the euro area, but not in a consistent manner, with valuations in Germany and Spain having increased far more than in France or Italy. Housing valuations have actually improved in Australia over the past couple of years on a price-to-income basis. The most likely candidates for a housing-related hawkish turn are in Scandinavia, with housing valuations in Sweden and Norway closing in on Canada/New Zealand levels. Chart 31New Zealand Housing Is Wildly Unaffordable Chart 32Global House Price/Income Ratios Are Trending Higher   Investment Conclusions The current acceleration in global house prices is an inevitable outcome of the extraordinary monetary and fiscal easing implemented during the pandemic. Higher realized inflation is pushing real rates deeper into negative territory in many countries, fueling the demand for housing. Central banks in countries with more stretched housing valuations will be forced to turn more hawkish sooner than expected, leading to tapering and, eventually, rate hikes to cool housing demand. This has negative implications for government bond markets in countries where housing is more expensive and real yields remain too low, like Canada, New Zealand and Sweden (Chart 33). Investors should limit exposure to government bonds in those markets over the next 6-12 months. Chart 33Negative Real Yields & Expensive Housing Valuations – An Unsustainable Mix Bond markets in countries where house prices are not rising rapidly enough to force policymakers to turn more hawkish more quickly – like core Europe, Australia and even Japan - are likely to be relative outperformers. The US and UK are “cuspy” bond markets, as housing valuations are becoming more expensive in those two countries but the Fed and Bank of England are not facing the same domestic political pressure to use monetary policy tools to fight the growing unaffordability of housing. That could change, though, if overall household leverage begins to rise alongside house price inflation as the US and UK economies emerge from the pandemic. Current pricing in OIS curves shows that markets expect the RBNZ and Bank of Canada to begin hiking rates in May 2022 and September 2022, respectively (Table 1). This is well ahead of expectations for “liftoff” from other developed markets central banks, including the Fed in April 2023. The cumulative amount of rate hikes following liftoff to the end of 2024 is highest in Canada, New Zealand, the US and Australia. Those are also countries with currencies that are trading at or above the purchasing power parity levels derived from our currency strategists’ valuation models. This highlights the difficult choice that central bankers facing housing bubbles must confront, as the rate hikes that will help cool off housing demand will lead to currency appreciation that could impact other parts of their economies like exports and manufacturing. Table 1Hawkish Central Banks Must Live With Currency Strength Tracking the second-round economic consequences of eventual monetary policy actions to control excessive house price inflation, particularly in “higher risk” countries, is likely to be the subject of future Bank Credit Analyst / Global Fixed Income Strategy reports. Robert Robis, CFA Chief Fixed Income Strategist Jonathan LaBerge, CFA Vice President The Bank Credit Analyst   Footnotes 1 Please see Global Investment Strategy "Canada: A (Probably) Happy Moment In An Otherwise Sad Story," dated July 14, 2017, available at gis.bcaresearch.com 2 Importantly, the BIS debt service ratios include the payment of both principal and interest, thus making it a true measure of debt service costs that includes repayment of borrowed funds – a critical issue in countries with high loan-to-value ratios for home mortgages. 3 Please see page 46 of Chapter 2 of the April 2021 IMF Global Financial Stability Report, which can be found here: https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/GFSR/Issues/2021/04/06/global-financial-stability-report-april-2021 4 “Vancouver, Toronto and Hamilton are the least affordable cities in North America: report”, CBC News, May 20, 2021